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Summary
This thesis studies Spain’s failure to halt the revolution which led 
to Colombia’s independence in 1822. After Napoleon’s occupation of 
the Spanish peninsula in 1808, most of Spain’s South American 
colonies removed themselves from European control and functioned as 
sovereign states. The thesis explores, first, the activities of royalists in 
the Viceroyalty of New Granada during this period. It then turns to 
events after 1815. In that year, following the defeat of Napoleon,
Spain’s restored monarchy despatched a substantial army to Venezuela 
and New Granada, in an effort to return the viceroyalty to Spanish 
control. This expedition, while initially successful, failed ignominiously 
in its task.
The thesis examines the reasons for Spain’s defeat, which was 
more the result of Spanish error than Colombian patriotism. To begin 
with, Spain’s policies for solving the American problem suffered from 
several fundamental defects. All attempts at ending the American 
insurgencies were based on an inadequate understanding of American 
realities. Moreover, the only policy to which Spain committed itself 
wholeheartedly, namely military reconquest, was seen by many as 
merely exacerbating the problem, and was further restricted by 
financial considerations.
Spain thus lacked a coherent policy for counter-revolution, and 
failed to carry through those plans it succeeded in putting into 
operation. New Granada saw the effects of this non-policy. Colonial 
officials there, like officials in Spain, disagreed profoundly in their 
proposed cures for the insurgency. Furthermore, mutual distrust 
between members of the civil administration and the royalist arm y at 
times overshadowed efforts to defeat the insurgents.
Disagreement over policy was but one strand of the royalist crisis 
in New Granada. Equally serious was the chronic shortage of money 
suffered by both the army and the civilian adm inistration. Their 
continual demands for food, funding and supplies wore away 
Neogranadans’ initial support for Spain’s reconquest, as did the 
arrogant and offensive behaviour of royalist troops. Perennially short 
of cash, the army and the administration relied on forced loans and 
confiscation to keep afloat. These proved an unstable base for a re­
imposition of Spanish control. The effect was that the inhabitants of 
New Granada, most of whom had welcomed the royalist army in 1816, 
by 1819 gave enthusiastic support to Simón Bolivar’s campaign against 
Spain’s General Morillo.
The thesis examines these issues, setting them in the context of 
Spain’s effort to restore its authority in New Granada. It then charts the 
consequent collapse of royal government from 1819 to 1822. It concludes 
with an assessment of the Spanish response to the loss of the American 
colonies.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
In “Childe Harold's Pilgrimage”, Lord Byron’s 1812 
travelogue cum political commentary, the poet remarks on the 
ironic culmination of Spain's three hundred years as a imperial 
power. Byron was struck by the coincidence of Napoleon’s 
invasion of the Iberian peninsula with the outbreak of 
insurrection in Spanish America. Harking back to the defeat of 
“Quito’s sons”, the Incas, he wrote:
Strange retribution! now Columbia’s ease 
Repairs the wrongs that Quito’s sons sustain’d,
While o ’er the parent clime prowls murder unrestrained.1 
Indeed, as Byron suggests, the years from 1808 to 1825 were 
truly difficult ones for Spain. During these eighteen years Spain 
was invaded, and indeed conquered, by the troops of Napoleonic 
France, and furthermore lost virtually all of its overseas colonies. 
The peninsula experienced four entirely different types of 
government during the period, and Spanish troops participated in 
some five different wars of liberation, yet triumphed in only one, 
namely the fight against Napoleonic France. By 1820, Spain was 
widely regarded as a spent force. This thesis will explore one of 
these crises: the war of independence in New Granada.
Following the capture of Ferdinand VII and Napoleon’s 
invasion of the Spanish peninsula in 1808, most of Spain’s 
American colonies separated themselves from the remnant of 
Spanish government and began to function as autonomous states 
or statelets. In some regions this was accomplished with relative 
ease. The Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, for example, effectively
1 George Gordon Byron, "Childc Harold's Pilgrimage”, canto I. Ixxxix.
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freed itself from Spanish control in 1810, and from then on most 
of its provinces remained outside the Spanish sphere. In others 
the period from 1810 to 1815 was a time of bloodshed. The 
Viceroyalty of New Spain in particular experienced a violent 
attempt at social revolution. In yet other areas, the customary 
order was less disturbed. The government in Lima, although 
threatened on all sides by revolution, remained loyal to the crown 
until the 1820s. In New Granada events followed a still different 
course.
The creoles in the Viceroyalty of New Granada at first 
responded to the French invasion of Spain with concern. Cabildos 
across the region collected donations for the defeat of the French, 
and public outrage over Napoleon’s actions ran high. Within a 
year, however, the surface unity had shattered. In the city of 
Quito a governing junta was established, in competition with those 
already existing in Spain, and soon other cities formed separate 
juntas intended to govern in the absence of the Spanish monarch. 
These bodies, although ostensibly loyal to the imprisoned 
Ferdinand, were immediately perceived as revolutionary, and by 
1812 most had indeed declared independence from Spain. The 
unifying role played by Spain was not, however, occupied by any 
other entity. Efforts to create a central government in Santa Fe 
failed. New Granada instead acquired several competing 
governments, which soon declared war on each other. Thus, when 
Ferdinand returned to the throne in 1814, there was no 
independent ‘New Granada’, but rather a disunited collection of 
smaller states.
The rebellions in New Granada and the other American 
states had attracted the concern of successive governments in
Spain itself, although only very inadequate responses had been 
essayed prior to the defeat of the French. In 1814, however,
Spain determined to stamp out the spark of overseas revolution.
A considerable military force was assembled, and the Viceroyalty 
of New Granada was chosen as the destination. This army, 
commanded by General Pablo Morillo, a veteran of the Peninsular 
War, arrived in Venezuela in April 1815. Finding the Captaincy- 
General already virtually restored to royal control, Morillo moved 
his army to Cartagena, perhaps the most important city in New 
Granada. After a siege of 106 days, Cartagena surrendered to the 
Spanish, and the army soon recaptured the remainder of the 
country, thus completing the ‘Reconquest’ of New Granada. Quito 
itself had already been regained for the Spanish by an army of 
local royalists under the leadership of Juan Samano and Toribio 
Montes. Thus, by mid-1816, the situation of the Spanish in New 
Granada looked promising. The interior of the country had been 
recaptured with only derisory resistance, and Spanish officials 
appeared to be well on the way to reestablishing the colonial 
government. By 1817, however, the state of affairs had altered 
considerably. A growing opposition to the royalist military was 
making life difficult for the Expeditionary Army, and by 1818 
General Morillo was predicting catastrophe. In 1819 republican 
troops routed royalist forces north of the capital, and within a 
year Spanish control was confined to the northern and southern 
margins of the country. In 1822 the last Spanish troops withdrew 
from the viceroyalty, and New Granada became truly 
ind ep en d en t.
This study will examine the process by which Spain lost New 
Granada. The wars of independence have, of course, already
/
3
attracted a great deal of scholarship, which has sought to answer a 
variety of questions and has pointed in a number of different 
directions. José Manuel Restrepo’s great work, which remains the 
keystone for most subsequent research, is concerned 
fundamentally, as Germán Colmenares has noted, with the 
development of the Colombian state.2 Dozens of books explore the 
ideas and writings of Simón Bolívar.3 Others study the causes 
underlying the move for independence. John Lynch locates its 
origins in the economic and social crises confronting Bourbon 
Spanish America.4 * Indalecio Liévano Aguirre attributes the 
collapse of the First Republic to the unresolved social conflicts 
raging between Neogranadans, while Jorge Dominguez’s jargon­
laden study attempts to correlate indicators of 'social mobilisation’ 
with revolt.3 Much of the interesting recent work has explored 
the symbolism and ideology of the independence movements, in 
an effort to trace the origins of Colombian nationalism.6 It is clear
2 See Germán Colmenares, "La historia de la revolución por José Manuel 
Restrepo: una prisión historiográfica,” La independencia: ensayos de 
historia social, Germán Colmenares et al.. Instituto Colombiano de Cultura 
(Bogotá, 1986), pp. 9-23; and José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución 
de Colombia, 6 vols. Ediciones Bcdout (Bogotá. 1969).
3 See, for example, Victor Andrés Belaundc, Bolívar y el pensamiento 
político de la revolución hispanoamericana. Ediciones Cultura Hispánica 
(Madrid, 1959); Cristóbal Mendoza, Los escritos del libertador. Editorial Arte 
(Caracas, 1968); David Bushncll, The Liberator Simón Bolívar. Man and 
Imaye, Alfred A. Knopf (New York, 1970); Germán Carrera Damas, El culto a 
Bolívar, Universidad Central de Venezuela (Caracas, 1973); and Indalecio 
Liévano Aguirre, Bolívar, Editorial Oveja Negra (Bogotá).
4John Lynch. The Spanish American Revolutions, IH0H-IH26, W.W. Norton, 
(New York, 1986); and "The Origins o f  Spanish American Independence," 
The Independence of Latin America, Leslie Bcthcll (editor), Cambridge 
university Press (Cambridge, 1987).
3 Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Los yrandes conflictos sociales y económicas 
de nuestra historia, 2 vol„ Editorial Tercer Mundo, (Bogotá, 1985); and Jorge 
Dominguez. Insurrection of Loyalty: the Breakdown of the Spanish 
American Empire, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, 1980).
6 Scc, for example. Problemas de la formación del estado y de la nación en 
hispanoamérlca. Inge Buisson, GUntcr Kahlc, Hans-Joachim Konig, and 
Horst Piclschmann (editors), Latcinamcrikanischc Forschung 13, Bólilau
/
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that most of this research concerns the victorious insurgents and 
their supporters. Yet, to paraphrase Timothy Anna’s remark 
about Mexico, the “vast bibliography devoted to the process of 
rebel victory tells only half the story of how Spain lost political 
con tro l” .7 The war was not only won by the insurgents; it was 
lost by Spain. Bolivar and his allies did not defeat Morillo’s 
Expeditionary Army solely because the former were better 
patriots, nor did the only battles take place in the realm of 
ideology. Rather, the reasons for Spain’s defeat must be sought, 
first, in Spain itself, and then in the destructive dynamics within 
New Granada’s royalist camp.
This thesis provides a new explanation of how and why 
Spain lost New Granada. The fall of Spanish government in New 
Granada will be traced to specific Spanish weaknesses. In the first 
place, Spain never developed a coherent strategy for responding 
to its revolted colonies, and attempted to pursue a collection of 
often contradictory policies at the same time. Indeed Timothy 
Anna, whose work sheds much light on this aspect of Spain’s 
failure, suggests that his study of Spanish policy towards the 
American insurgencies might be subtitled, “Lessons in How to Lose 
an Empire” .8 This institutional crisis lies at the centre of Spain’s 
failed response.
Vcrlag (Colognc, 1984); Georges Lontné. "Las ciudades de la Nueva Granada; 
teatros y objetos de los conflictos de la memoria política (1810-1830)’, 
Coloquio Internacional; Les Enjcux de la Mémoirc (Paris, 1992); and 
Margarita Garrido, Reclamos y representaciones, variaciones sobre la 
política en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, I750-INI5, Banco de la República 
(Sanlafó de Bogotá, 1993).
7T¡ motliy Anua, The Fall of the RoyaI Government in México City,
Univcrsity of Ncbraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), p. ix.
8Timothy Anua, Spain and the Loss of America, Univcrsity of Ncbraska 
Press (Lincoln, 1983), p. xv.
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Events in Spain must, however, be considered together with 
events in New Granada itself. There royalists suffered not only 
from the effects of administrative disunity in Madrid, but also 
from other problems that had long plagued colonial 
administrators. Juan Friede has drawn attention to the continuing 
obstructiveness that characterised both the colonial 
administration and the reconquest government set up during the 
war. Conflict between civil and military authorities, slow 
responses, and the persistence of the old “se obedece pero no se 
cumple” mentality were typical of both periods.9 In New Granada, 
as elsewhere in Spanish America during the wars of 
independence, mutual distrust between members of the 
established colonial structures, such as the Audiencias, and the 
military bodies, at times overshadowed efforts to defeat the 
insurgents. Furthermore, colonial officials, like officials in Spain, 
disagreed profoundly in their proposed cures for the insurgency. 
Some, such as Quito’s President Toribio Montes, advocated a policy 
of forgiveness, while others, such as New Granada’s last viceroy, 
Juan Samano, believed that only severe punishment would deter 
the rebels. Proponents of these different policies clashed openly, 
and on occasion devoted more time to undermining the opposing 
view than to defeating the insurgents. At the highest level,
General Morillo and Viceroy Francisco Montalvo came to loathe 
each other, and each plotted the other’s downfall. Further 
conflicts developed in 1820, after the liberal revolution in Spain. 
With the return of the Constitution of 1812 came a renewed
9 Juan Friede, La otra verdad: la independencia americanafl vista por los 
españoles, Tercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1972), p. 39.
outbreak of factionalism in New Granada, which led to the 
overthrow of Viceroy Juan Samano.
Disagreement over policy was but one strand of the royalist 
crisis in New Granada. Equally serious was the chronic shortage of 
money suffered by both the army and the civilian administration. 
Spain, itself hard-pressed for cash, was unable to provide an 
adequate level of funding for Morillo’s Expeditionary Army, which 
as a consequence looked to New Granada’s population for 
sustenance. The continual demands for food, funding and supplies 
wore away New Granada’s initial support for the reconquest, as 
did the arrogant and offensive behaviour of royalist troops. By 
1817 irritation with the reconquerers was running high. The 
army’s dependence on the populace might not have pressed so 
heavily had the administration been able to restart the colonial 
economy. Despite efforts to re-establish the state monopolies, and 
to revive trade, the reconquest economy remained stalled, unable 
to generate even a fraction of the income routinely provided for 
the state two decades earlier. Perennially short of cash, the army 
and the administration relied on forced loans and confiscation to 
keep afloat. These proved an unstable base for a re-imposition of 
Spanish control.
Finally, the Expeditionary Army itself was scarcely secure. 
From the moment of its first landing in Venezuela, the army 
began to suffer from the ill health that would ultimately reduce it 
to a state of virtual nullity. British forces fighting in the 
Caribbean were unhappily familiar with the deadly effects of 
tropical disease, and Spanish troops too soon learned to dread 
service in the colonies. Dysentery, yellow fever, infection, and a 
myriad of other ills had, within a year of its arrival in the
Americas, already reduced Morillo’s army by nearly a third. 
Despite considerable recruitment in New Granada and Venezuela 
itself, General Morillo was unable to restore his army to full size. 
Moreover, this continual and necessary recruitment proved 
another source of irritation to Neogranadans, who came 
increasingly to view the royalist army as an enemy rather than a 
friend. Forcing civilians to act as unpaid labourers for the army, 
as well as confiscating their money and possessions, could hardly 
have been expected to assuage local opinion. The effect of this 
catalogue of royalist errors was that the inhabitants of New 
Granada, most of whom had welcomed the expeditionaries in 
1X16, by 1819 gave enthusiastic support to Bolivar’s campaign 
against Morillo.
Spain, then, not only lacked a coherent policy for counter­
revolution, but also failed to carry through the plans that it 
succeeded in putting into operation. New Granada saw the effects 
of this non-policy. Under-funded and disunited, royalists in New 
Granada did not present a convincing picture of the virtues of 
unity with Spain. The process by which New Granada gained 
independence was itself an illustration of Spain’s failure as a 
colonial power. The “systemic dysfunction” in Spanish 
government noted by Anna impeded a royalist victory, and the 
destructive behaviour of royalist administrators and officers in 
New Granada itself virtually secured a republican victory .10 
Spain lost the war as surely as the republicans won it.
The details of this failure form the subject of this thesis.
This study, moreover, seeks not only to explain how Spain lost 
New Granada, but also to throw new light on a neglected portion
10Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. xv.
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of Colombian history. In studies of the War of Independence, the 
reconquest is usually dismissed with a few paragraphs.11 In this 
work we will see that the period of the reconquest is of critical 
importance to a serious evaluation of New Granada’s War of 
Independence, and to Spain’s loss of its American colonies.
The principal sources used in this thesis are contained in the 
Archivo General de lndias. 1 spent nine months in Seville 
collecting material from the archive there, and the documents 
consulted during this period form the backbone of the study. In 
total, thirteen different sections (133 lega jos  ) were examined. 
Particularly extensive use was made of the ‘Papeles de Cuba’ 
section, which contains a wealth of information about the 
reco n q u es t .12 The reconquest documents in ‘Papeles de Cuba’ 
consist primarily o f  military records and correspondence between 
military officials. Other important material was also found in the 
‘Audiencia de Santa Fe’ section, specifically, records of the Council 
of the Indies relating to New Granada, and correspondence of the 
viceroys. The sections ‘Audiencia de Quito’, ‘Audiencia de Panama’ 
and ‘Audiencia de Caracas’ also yielded information about the 
course of the war in these regions; ‘Audiencia de Quito’ in 
particular shed light on the presidency of Toribio Montes, one of 
the royalists’ more interesting officials. Finally, eight other
1 1 For u recent work on independence which virtually ignores the years
from 1816 to 1819, sec Rafael G6mez Hoyos, La independencia de Colombia,
MAPFRE (Madrid. 1992).
*1 2  *Whilc it might appear surprising that material relating to New Granada
is filed under the heading ‘Cuba’, there is in fact a good reason for this.
Most o f  the reconqucst material in ‘Papcles dc Cuba’ was brought to Havana
from Cartagena when that city surrendered to the republicans in 1821. In
1898 this material was transferred from Havana to Spain, where it was
naturally classified as originating in Cuba.
sections, including ‘Estado’, ‘Indiferente General’, and ‘Diversos’, 
were consulted as well.
I also visited several other Spanish archives. The Archivo 
de Simancas, outside Valladolid, contains useful correspondence 
between the Spanish ambassadors in London and Spanish officials 
in both Spain and New Granada. The Archivo Histórico Nacional in 
Madrid houses the Colección Torrepando, the collected papers of 
Miguel de la Torre, the high-ranking Spanish officer who replaced 
General Pablo Morillo as royalist commander-in-chief. This 
collection is thoroughly catalogued, and access to particular 
documents is thus easy. Also in Madrid is the Biblioteca de la Real 
Academia de Historia. This library proved to be the location of 
General Morillo’s papers, and it was here that Morillo’s biographer 
Antonio Rodriguez Villa found most of his sources. These papers 
are in the process of being catalogued, and I was able to study 
many documents that Rodriguez Villa did not include in his 
b iography.
Finally, a few areas of this study employ material collected 
for my master’s thesis in the Public Record Office (London), the 
British Library (London), the Archivo Histórico Nacional de 
Colombia (Bogota), and the Archivo Central del Cauca (Popayán).
A number of primary printed sources have also been used. 
Firstly, many participants in the war left memoirs. The “memoirs” 
of Pablo Morillo himself are, in fact, an edited version of a 
manifesto published by the general in 1X20, and are not 
particularly useful.11 On the other hand, José Manuel Restrepo,
11 Marqués Ernest«) dc Blosscvillc and Pablo Morillo, Mémoires du Général 
Morillo, Conte de Carthagène, Marquis de la Puerta, réldtifs aux principaux 
événemens de ses campagnes en Amérique de 1815 a 1821, suivis de deus 
précis de don José Domingo Díaz et du Général don Miguel de la Torre, P.
whose magnificent history of the Colombian revolution provides a 
fair and insightful (if pro-Bolivarian) assessment of the war, also 
wrote an interesting autobiography which includes an expanded 
section on events in 1816.14 New Granada’s other great 
republican historian, Daniel O ’Leary, likewise left a readable 
account of the war.15 Royalist officer Rafael Sevilla wrote a fast- 
paced thriller of a memoir, while Neogranadan José María 
Caballero kept a more laconic diary of the war.16 Several 
Venezuelans also left first-hand accounts of the war; Caraqueño 
official Francisco Xavier Arámbarri, for example, wrote a bitter 
denunciation of Morillo’s tenure in Venezuela.17
Secondly, various collections of printed documents were 
consulted. Overall, the most important printed primary source 
proved to be Rodriguez Villa’s biography of General Pablo Morillo. 
Rodríguez Villa, an unabashed Morillo apologist, published, in 
addition to his one volume biography, a three volume 
documentary appendix that contains many of the most important 
letters written by Morillo.18 This is thus an essential source for
Duf'art, Paris, 1826. It is essential to read the analysis of the memoirs by 
Eduardo Posada: ’“Las Memorias de Morillo,” BHA, vol. I (1903), pp. 43-47. 
14José Manuel Restrepo, Autobiographia, con apuntamientos sobre la 
emigración que hice en 1816 de la provincia de Antioquia a la de Popayán, 
Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, vol. 30, (Bogotá. 1957).
15 Daniel Florencio O’Lcary, Memorias, 3 vols, Editorial Sanlafé, (Bogotá, 
1952).
16Rafael Sevilla, Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas 
contra Bolivar y los separatistas de América, Editorial América, (Madrid, 
1916); and José María Caballero, Diario, Editorial Villegas (Bogotá, 1990). 
17Francisco Xavier Arámbarri, Hechos del General Pablo Morillo en 
América, Ediciones de la Embajada de Venezuela en España (Murcia, 1971).
Sec also Juan Manuel de Cajigal, Memorias del Mariscal de Campo don Juan 
Manuel de Cajigal sobre la revolución de Venezuela, Biblioteca Venezolana 
de Historia (Caracas, 1960); José Francisco Hcrcdia. Memorias del Regente 
Heredia (de las Reales Audiencia de Caracas y México), Editorial América, 
(Madrid, n.d.); and Joseph Domingo Díaz, Recuerdos sobre la revolución de 
Caracas. León Amarita (Madrid, 1827).
18Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, primer 
Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-18.17), 4 vol.. Real Academia
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all studies of the reconquest. Aside from Morillo’s life, the subject 
best served by collections of published documents is the campaign 
of 1819. Juan Friede has edited a collection of documents about 
the Battle of Boyacá, and the Fundación Francisco de Paula 
Santander has also published several volumes of official 
correspondence from 1818 and 1819.* 19 Roberto Arrazola’s 
collection of documents relating to the trial and execution of 
Cartagena’s nine republican heroes in 1816 reveals much about 
the attitudes of these early revolutionaries.20 For information 
about Britain's involvement in the war, C.K. Webster’s classic 
Britain and the Independence o f  Latin America  is a useful 
primary source.21
Finally, one must consider the secondary sources. Until 
recently there have been virtually no substantial studies 
concerned specifically with the royalist army in New Granada; 
Oswaldo Diaz Diaz’s two volume La reconquista española, 
burdened with excessively long citations from uninteresting 
documents, was perhaps the only work to examine closely the
de la Historia (Madrid, 1908 & 1910). There also exists an abbreviated 
version, published by Editorial América in Madrid in 1920 (Antonio 
Rodriguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, primer Conde de 
Cartagena, Marquis de la Puerta (1778-1837), Editorial América (Madrid, 
1920». This version does not contain the three volume documental 
appendix and is thus o f  lesser interest. It is denoted in the footnotes as 
follows: Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo (1920).
19Juan Friede (editor). La Batalla de Boyacá, 7 de agosto de 1819, a través de 
los archivos españoles. Banco de la República (Bogotá, 1969); Alberto Lee 
López (editor). Los ejércitos del Key, 1818-1819, 2 vols. Biblioteca de la 
Presidencia de la República, (Bogotá, 1989); and Cartas Santander-Bolívar,
1813-1820, vol 1, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1988). 
2(1Roberto Arrazola, Los mártires responden. . . , Ediciones Hernández 
(Cartagena, 1973). See also Gabriel Jiménez Molinares, Los mártires de 
Cartagena de I8lf> ante el consejo de guerra y ante la historia, 2 vols. 
Imprenta Departamental (Cartagena, 1948, 1950).
21C.K. Webster, Britain and the Independence o f Latin America, 1812-1830, 
2 vol., Octagon Books (New York, 1970).
period of the reconquest.22 Diaz, however, is concerned to 
document the extensive popular participation in the revolutionary 
movement, rather than to examine the royalist forces in 
themselves. Juan Friede’s study of Spanish views towards 
independence is in essence an extended essay, which describes 
the conflicts that raged between the different royalist leaders. It 
draws heavily on material in the Archivo de Indias.23 The 
commemoration of the quincentenary of Columbus’ landing has, 
however, brought a new outpouring of books on Spain’s 
participation in the war of independence. The MAPFRE series 
contains several books on the royalist army, most notably Juan 
Marchena Fernandez’s latest work, as well as a less distinguished 
study of the Spanish navy. Julio Albi has written an interesting 
general study of the royalist a rm y’s participation in the American 
wars of independence.24 There also exist several works of 
military history which study the various campaigns in the War of 
Independence. Among the most interesting of these is Jorge 
Mercado’s 1919 analysis of Morillo’s campaign. Mercado, an 
officer in the Colombian army, produced an interesting and 
accessible description of events in 1X15-16.25 Various
2 2 Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, 2 vol.. Historia Extensa de 
Colombia, vol. 6, Ediciones Lcmer (Bogotá, 1967).
23 Fricdc, La otra verdad .
24j uan Marchena Fernández, Ejércitos y milicias en el mundo colonial 
americano, MAPFRE (Madrid, 1992); José Cervcra Pery, La marina española 
en la emancipación de Hispanoamérica, MAPFRE (Madrid, 1992); and Julio 
Albi, Honderas olvidadas: el ejército realista en América, Ediciones de 
Cultura Hispánica (Madrid, 1990). The last two books both makc 
unnccessary mistakes with dates and figures.
“ Jorge Mercado, Campaña de invasión del Teniente General Don Pablo 
Morillo, INI5-1816, Ejército de Colombia, Estado Mayor General (Bogotá,
1919). Scc also Camilo Riaño, Historia Militar: La independencia, 1810-1815, 
Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol. 18, Editorial Lcmer, (Bogotá. 1971), and 
Camilo Riaño, La campaña libertadora de 1819, Editorial Andes (Bogotá, 
1969).
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biographical studies also assisted me in drawing up a picture of 
the period, although Stoan’s biography of Morillo proved 
d isappo in ting .26 In this work Morillo’s tenure in Venezuela is 
whitewashed and his sojourn in New Granada is discussed only 
briefly. Altogether more red-blooded is Margaret W oodward’s 
much-cited article on Spain and the loss of the Americas.
Woodward paints a vivid picture of the despair that permeated 
royalist forces and which goes a long way toward explaining their 
defea t.27 (Laura Ullrick’s study of Morillo, often mentioned at the 
same time as Woodward’s, is entirely outdated and consists of 
little more than an enumeration of facts.28)
Secondary sources were used most extensively in the 
sections dealing with events in Spain itself. There are, to begin 
with, four classic works studying Spain’s response to the American 
crisis. These are Melchor Fernández Almagro’s study o f  Spanish 
opinion, José Luis Comellas Garcia Llera’s fine work, Los prim eros 
pronunciam ientos en España , and two rather similar studies of the 
Spanish press by Jaime Delgado and Luis Miguel Enciso Recio.29 I
26Stcphen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820, Ohio State 
University Press (Columbus, 1974); Sergio Elias Ortíz, Franceses en la 
independencia de la Gran Colombia, Biblioteca Eduardo Santos, vol. 1, 
Editorial ABC (Bogotá, 1971); and tlircc works by José María Restrepo Sacnz: 
Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, vol. 1, Imprenta Nacional (Bogotá, 
1932); Gobernadores y próceres de Neiva, Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, 
vol. 63 (Bogotá. 1941); and Biografías de los mandatarios y ministros de la 
real Audiencia (1671-1819), Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 84. Editorial 
Cromos, (Bogotá, 1952).
2 7 Margarct Woodward, "The Spanish Army and tlie Loss of America, 1810- 
1824", HAHR, Vol. 48 (1968).
28Laura Ullrick, "Morillo’s Attcmpt to Pacify Venezuela”, HAHR, vol. 3 
(1920).
2 9 Melchor Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América y su reflejo en 
la conciencia española. Instituto de Estudios Políticos (Madrid, 1954); José 
Luis Cornelias García Llera, Los primeros pronunciamientos en España, 
1814-1820, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Madrid. 1958); 
Jaime Delgado, La independencia de América en la prensa española. 
Seminario de Problemas Hispanoamericanos (Madrid, 1949); and Luis
have employed all four of these texts, but my account of the 
political turmoil in Spain during and following the French invasion 
is drawn primarily from three more recent works, which 
themselves make use of these earlier studies: Edmundo Heredia’s 
Planes españoles para reconquistar Hispanoamérica, Michael 
Costeloe’s Response to Revolution, and Timothy Anna’s Spain and  
the Loss o f  A m erica .30 All of these works examine the response of 
Spain’s various governments to the American insurgencies; none 
deal in any detail with events in the Americas. Of these three, 1 
have found Costeloe’s book the least convincing. Costeloe 
describes Spain as deeply concerned about the insurgencies, and 
insists that great (although ineffective) efforts were made to 
contain the revolutions. He further asserts that at no time did 
Spain become complacent about the war. These assertions do not 
accord with my own observations about the period. I am more 
inclined to agree with Heredia and Anna that Spain’s governments 
were slow to recognise the seriousness of the American revolts, 
and never succeeded in giving the war sufficient attention. All 
works however contain a wealth of information about Spanish 
politics during the war. The various studies by Catalan Josep 
Fontana further illustrate the sorry state of Spanish political life 
during the years o f  the war.3 1
Miguel Ene i so Recio, La opinión pública española y la independencia 
hispanoamericana, 1819-1820, Universidad de Valladolid (Valladolid, 1967)
3(,Edmundo Hcrcdia’s Planes españoles para reconquistar hispanoamérica, 
1810/1818, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires. 1974); 
Michacl Costeloe, Response to Kevolution. Imperial Spain and the Spanish 
American Revolutions, 1810-1840, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 
1986); and Anna, Spain and the Loss of America .
31 Josep Fontana. La crisis del antiguo régimen, 1808-1833, Editorial Crítica, 
(Barcelona, 1979); and La quiebra de la monarquía absoluta, 1814-1820, 
Editorial Ariel, (Barcelona, 1987).
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Finally, there are the comparative and general works. 
Timothy Anna’s homonymous studies of the fall of royal 
government in Mexico and Peru, while not offering explicit 
comparisons with the situation in New Granada, nevertheless 
illustrate the many similarities, in particular, the disunity at the 
highest levels of royalist command.32 There are also many 
general studies of New Granada’s revolution. Indalecio Lievano 
Aguirre’s work on social conflict contains several interesting 
chapters on independence, in which he debunks myths and 
blackens the reputations of many traditional p r o c e r e s .33 Miguel 
Izard’s study of the Venezuelan revolution similarly tarnishes 
republican reputations in its exploration of class conflict in Tierra 
F i rm e .34 Finally, there are scores of other, more specialized 
studies of specific events and regions, which I will not attempt to 
enumerate. These items appear in footnotes throughout the text 
and do not need to be described separately.
Lastly, it is, perhaps, necessary to clarify the term ‘New 
Granada’. In 1808, the Viceroyalty of New Granada was an 
amorphous space, which included the Kingdom of New Granada, 
the Audiencia of Quito, and the Captaincy-General of Venezuela. 
The Kingdom of New Granada, in turn, included present-day 
Colombia, as well as Panama. All these regions were under the
3 2 Anna. The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City ; and Timothy 
Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Peru, University of  Nebraska 
Press, (Lincoln, 1979). Sec also Brian Hamnett, "Mexico’s Royalist Coalition: 
the Response to Revolution 1808-1821”, JLAS, vol 12 (1980); and Lucas 
Atamán, Historia tie Méjico, 5 vols, Editorial Jus (Mexico City, 1969).
3 3 Liévano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos4, and also Eduardo Pérez, Guerra 
irregular en la independencia de la Nueva Granada y Venezuela, 1810-1830, 
Publicaciones de la Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia 
(Tunja, 1982).
3 4 Miguel Izard, El miedo a la revolución: La lucha por la libertad en 
Venezuela, (1777-1830), Editorial Tccnos (Madrid, 1979).
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nominal rule of the viceroy in Santa Fe de Bogotá, but, in practice, 
the Captain General of Venezuela and the President of Quito’s 
Audiencia functioned in virtual autonomy. We will here follow 
contemporary usage by employing the term ‘New Granada’ when 
referring to the territory now comprising modern Colombia. The 
term ‘viceroyalty’ refers to the entirely of Venezuela, New 
Granada, Panama and Quito. The terminology is somewhat 
complicated by the fact that in 1812 the Viceroyalty of New 
Granada was demoted to Captaincy-General, and its viceroy 
replaced by a captain general. (This decision was reversed in 
1816, when the region was again promoted to viceroyalty.) Thus, 
when referring to the period from 1812 to 1816 we will speak of 
the ‘Captaincy General of New Granada’, but this should cause no 
confusion. This study is concerned with New Granada itself, and, 
to a lesser degree with Panama, and the Presidency of Quito, 
which shared jurisdiction with the Audiencia of Santa Fe over the 
southern portions of New Granada. We will, moreover, often refer 
to events in Venezuela, whose history was intimately linked to 
that of New Granada.
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Chapter 1: War in Spain and America
The first section of this thesis surveys the period from 1808 
to 1815. These years were for Spain and New Granada a time of 
warfare and uncertainty. An understanding of this period is 
necessary for a proper study of both General Morillo’s reconquest 
and the colonial government’s subsequent collapse. Moreover, the 
period of New Granada’s First Republic, the so-called Patria Boba, 
has been understudied. Chapter 2 will outline the activities of 
Neogranadan royalists during this pivotal period. Here, we 
examine the opening moves of the independence years: Spain’s 
Peninsular War, and the formation of insurgent juntas in New 
Granada.
§ 1 The Peninsular War
The fall of Spain’s overseas empire began in 1807. In the 
autumn of that year, Napoleon decided to invade Portugal to 
ensure that Britain did not evade his Continental System, or 
blockade, by trading with the Portuguese. Passage through Spain 
for 28,000 French troops was easily arranged. Manuel de Godoy, 
the de facto head of Spanish government, granted the French 
permission to march through Spain, in return for the promise of 
kingdoms in the about-to-be conquered Portugal. Godoy was to 
become the Prince of the Algarve.1 However, Charles lV’s son
'Extracts of the 1807 Treaty of Fontainblcau and many other important 
documents from the years 1807-1813 may be found in Spain under the 
Bourbons, 1700-1S33: A Collection of Documents, W.N. Hargreavcs-Mawdsley 
(editor). University of South Carolina Press (Columbia, 1973), pp. 196-243.
For a thorough account of the Peninsular War, see Gabriel Lovett, Napoleon  
and the Birth of Modern Spain, 2 vols, New York University Press (New 
York. 1965).
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Ferdinand, fearful that Godoy would entirely eclipse him, 
determined to come to his own arrangement with Napoleon. He 
thus began secret negotiations with the emperor, to whom he 
confided his own ambitions and from whom he requested help in 
overthrowing Godoy. Napoleon thus became the arbiter of the 
Spanish succession. Various governmental configurations were 
then essayed. On learning of his son’s secret contacts with 
Napoleon, Charles IV arrested Ferdinand for treason, then 
pardoned him, in late 1807. Following popular rioting in Aranjuez 
in March 1808, Godoy was dismissed by Charles IV, and 
Ferdinand elevated to the throne. Napoleon, convinced of the 
ineptitude of the Spanish royalty, contemplated offering the 
Spanish throne to his brother Louis, and then, on 16 April 1808, 
invited both Charles IV and Ferdinand to Bayonne to discuss the 
events of the past few months. French troops had meanwhile 
occupied most of Spain and all of Portugal. In Bayonne, during a 
busy three days, Ferdinand was induced to return the throne to 
his father, who then signed a treaty with Napoleon recognising the 
Corsican as emperor of Spain and the Indies. Napoleon appointed 
his brother Joseph to rule in Spain, and the entire Spanish royal 
family was imprisoned, Charles IV, Maria Luisa and the inimitable 
Godoy in the chateau of Compiegne, and Ferdinand and his 
brothers in Tallyerand’s chateau, Valen^ay.2
2Napoleon was unimpressed hy Ferdinand. In a letter to Talleyrand he 
remarked, "the Prince of Asturias is a brute, a bad lot, and an enemy of 
France. You can imagine that, with my experience of  managing men, his 
twenty-four years quite failed to impress me: indeed my mind is so clear 
about him that nothing less than a long war would induce me to recognise 
him as King of Spain". Sec Napoleon to M. Talleyrand, Bayonne, I May 1808, 
in Napoleon's Letters, J.M. Thompson (editor), Everyman's Library,
(London, 1964), pp. 198-199.
An amusing account of Godoy's life may he found in Jacques 
Chastenct, Godoy, Master of Spain, 1792-1 SOS, Batchworth Press (London, 
1953).
The detention of the Spanish monarchs proved a fatal error 
for Napoleon, who had failed to recognise the extraordinary 
enthusiasm felt across Spain for Ferdinand. Indeed, Ferdinand’s 
mere decision to travel to Bayonne had already caused a popular 
anti-French uprising in Madrid on 2 May 1808. The cruelty with 
which this revolt was repressed by General Murat further aroused 
anti-French feeling. When news of Ferdinand’s imprisonment 
reached Asturias, the province rose in revolt. A general summons 
to arms was issued on 24 May 1808; “to arms, to arms, Asturians!
. . .  let us hasten to throw this treacherous and execrable nation 
out and to wipe them from the face of our peninsula,” urged the 
newly-created ‘Supreme Junta’ of Asturias, formed to govern 
Asturias in the absence of Ferdinand.3 These sentiments were 
soon echoed by other ‘Supreme Juntas’, set up in Santander, La 
Coruna, Segovia, Zaragoza, Valencia, Seville, and elsewhere, to 
defend the rights of the imprisoned Ferdinand. When the 
unfortunate Joseph I entered Spanish territory in July 1808, he 
found a populace widely opposed to his rule and increasingly in 
revolt. Patriotic armies were quickly mobilised, and, in the same 
month, French forces suffered their first serious defeat since 
1804. Some 30,000 irregular Spanish troops under General 
Francisco Xavier Castaños defeated two French divisions at 
Bailén.4
This Spanish success did not end the hostilities. The French 
army, recovering from its defeat at Bailén, enjoyed victory after
3Proclamation o f the General Council o f the Principality o f Asturias,
Oviedo, 24 May 1808, Hargrcaves-M awdsley, Spain under the Bourbons, pp. 
211 - 212 .
4Scc George Rudé, Revolutionary Europe, 178J - / 8 15, Fontana Press (London,
1964) p. 267. Both Francisco Xavier Venegas, the future viceroy of Mexico, 
and Pablo Morillo came to military prominence at the Battle of Bailén.
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victory. Madrid was recaptured in December 1808, Zaragoza fell 
to a 42-day French siege in February 1809, Ocaña was captured, 
with heavy Spanish losses, in November 1809, and by the spring 
of 1810 most of Andalucía was in French hands. Meanwhile 
Spanish guerrilla forces harassed the French across the country, 
and civilians assassinated and spied on French troops. Confronted 
with perhaps the first guerrilla war in Europe, the French 
responded with attacks on civilian populations.5
Most of the regional juntas formed to oversee the resistance 
to Napoleon decided in 1808 to unite into a single body, generally 
known as the Junta Central. (The junta in Seville did not accept 
the authority of the Junta Central until March 1809.) This new 
entity first met in Aranjuez on 25 September 1808, under the 
presidency of the Count of Floridablanca. Confusion reigned, 
according to Timothy Anna: “the Junta Central was wracked by 
political disagreements between conservatives and reformers, and 
the authority to create such a national government was openly 
doubted by the Council of Castille, to say nothing of many 
American creoles”.6 Many of Spain’s American colonies were, by 
this stage, also in a state of considerable uncertainty. The juntas 
of Asturias and Seville had each sent their own delegates to major 
American cities to explain events in Spain, and to canvass support 
for their conflicting claims of authority, an action that merely 
resulted in greater confusion. Mexico City was visited in quick 
succession by representatives of both the juntas. The evident lack
5 Napoleon was as unimpressed by the Spanish guerrillas as he had been by 
Ferdinand. He noted that “in all my military life I have never come across 
anything so despicable as these Spanish bands and troops”. (Napoleon to 
Joseph Napoleon, Bordeaux, 31 July 1808, Napoleon's Letters, pp. 204-205. 
^Timothy Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, University o f Nebraska 
Press (Lincoln, 1983), pp. 30, 42-46. The Council o f Castillc was a Bourbon 
governm ental council which briefly survived the Napoleonic invasion.
of unity between the different bodies prompted Viceroy 
Iturrigaray to assert that, “Spain is now in a state of anarchy, 
there are Supreme Juntas everywhere, and we should therefore 
not obey any of them” .7
The effects of this display of disunity were to be further 
exacerbated by the Junta Central. In January 1809 the Junta 
Central, by this time resident in Seville as a consequence of the 
French recapture of Madrid, issued an important document 
summoning regional delegates to attend its sessions. The 
summons invited not only the Spanish provinces, but also the 
American viceroyalties to send delegates, and declared that these 
latter regions would no longer be considered colonies, “sino parte 
esencial e integrante de la monarquía española” .8 This 
remarkable statement, far from inciting the unity of feeling 
intended by the Junta Central, merely served to engender further 
American resentment. To begin with, gross inequality governed 
the election of deputies. The peninsular provinces, with a 
population of some 10,100,000, were to elect 26 deputies, while 
the 17,()()(),()()() inhabitants of Spanish America were initially 
allocated a mere 9. This inequality increased the following year, 
when the Cortes were summoned; Spain was granted some 250 
deputies, while the Americas were allowed only 30. This obvious 
proof of America’s continued inferior status immediately became 
a source of complaint and resentment.9
7 Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 32.
8Fram,ois-Xavier Guerra, “La independencia de México y las revoluciones 
h ispánicas,” Cuadernos de historia latinoamericana: el liberalismo en 
Mexico, no. 1, (1993), pp. 31-32.
9Scc, for example. Guerra, “La independencia de México", p. 32; and also the 
discussion of the Memorial de Agravios in Sergio Elias Ortiz, Génesis de la 
revolución del 20 de julio de ISI0, Biblioteca Eduardo Santos, vol. 19,
Editorial Kelly (Bogotá, I960), pp. 45-74, csp. pp. 50-51.
The war was meanwhile going exceptionally badly for 
Spain’s patriotic resistance; by the spring of 1X10 virtually all 
Spain lay in French hands. Moreover, the Junta Central had 
received little support from the population of Seville, and was 
forced to flee the city when the French invaded Andalucía in early 
1810. They set up residence first in Cádiz, and subsequently on 
the Island of Leon. On 29 January 1810 the Junta Central 
dissolved itself and established a separate governing body, the 
Council of Regency. The Regency, confined as it was to Cádiz, 
became, as Anna notes, “a kind of hostage to the business and 
political interests of Cádiz,” and in particular to the Junta Superior 
de Cádiz, a local governing council, and the Comisión de 
R eem plazos.10
Prior to its self-dissolution, the Junta Central had resolved to 
convoke a Cortes, to be attended by deputies from both Spain and 
the Americas. Preliminary orders had already been issued to 
cities throughout Spain’s dominions to elect delegates. Then, on 
14 February 1810, the Regency distributed an additional 
statement, in which it affirmed that, “desde este momento, 
españoles americanos, os veis elevados a la dignidad de hombres 
libres. . .vuestros destinos ya no dependen ni de los ministros, ni 
de los virreyes, ni de los gobernadores; están en vuestras manos”. 
This announcement, according to José Manuel Restrepo, caused “ la
There is som e disagreem ent about precisely how many delegates 
were allocated. See Ascensión Martínez Riaza, “Las diputaciones 
provinciales am ericanas en el sistem a liberal español,” Revista de Indias, 
vol. 52 (1992), p. 650n. The figure for Spain 's population is drawn from the 
1788 census. Sec J.R. Aymcs, La guerra de la independencia en España 
(1808-1814), Siglo Veintiuno (Madrid, 1990), p. 127. The approximate 
population of Spanish America is given in John Lynch, The Spanish 
American Revolutions, 1808-1826, W.W. Norton, (New York, 1986), p. 1.
10Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 60-62, 80-84. The Comisión dc 
Reemplazos is discussed in Chapter 8.
mas profunda sensación” across the Americas.11 The first 
meeting of the Cortes occurred on 24 September 1810, and was 
attended by 104 deputies. The Cortes immediately declared itself 
the natural repository of sovereignty, an act which was to provoke 
the resignation of the entire membership of the Council of 
R e g e n c y .12 For the next three and a half years, until the return of 
Ferdinand in 1814, Spain was governed by the extraordinary 
Cortes of 1810-1813 and the ordinary Cortes of 1813-1814, 
together with the Regency. The Cortes issued a series of decrees 
intended to reform government and society in both Spain and 
America, and, most importantly, drafted Spain’s first written 
constitution, the Constitution of 1812.13 This limited the role of 
the king, and introduced a number of controversial reforms both 
to Spain and to the colonies. It established a constitutional 
monarchy; authority was to reside essentially with the Cortes. 
America was declared an integral part of Spain, not a colony. The 
judicial system was reorganised, a single, universal tax was 
introduced, the military was restructured, and freedom of the 
press was decreed. The document was promulgated in the 
royalist-controlled regions of Spanish America with varying 
degrees of sincerity.14
1 1 José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, voi. 1, 
Ediciones Bcdout (M edellin, 1974), p. 117.
12 New members were soon appointed. See Anna, Spain and the Loss of 
America, pp. 66-67.
13For a line summary o f the provisions of the 1812 Constitution, sec Karl 
Marx and Frederick Engels, Revolution in Spain, Greenwood Press 
(Westport, 1975), pp. 57-61; or, for a more recent assessment, Mario 
Rodriguez, The Cddiz Experiment in Central America, ISOS to IS26, 
University o f California Press (Berkeley, 1978), pp. 75-100.
1 4TIic application o f the Constitution of 1812 in Mexico has been 
com paratively w ell-studied. Sec, for example, Antonio Annino, “ Pratiche 
creole c liberalismo nella crisis dello spazio urbano coloniale; il 29 
novembre 1812 a Città del Messico”, Quaderni Storici: Notablili Elettori 
Elezioni, no. 69 (December 1988), pp. 727-763; Nettie Lee Benson (editor),
Meanwhile, the fortunes of the French army were waning. 
The continued popular uprising, “the Spanish ulcer” , as Napoleon 
called it, proved a fatal drain on French military resources.15 
Furthermore, Portugal had revolted against Napoleon in 1808, and 
with British help had forced the French to withdraw into Spain. 
This provided Wellington with a military base from which to 
attack the French, while Spanish irregulars whittled away at the 
large armies of Soult and Massena. In May 1813, French troops 
were forced to abandon Madrid, while allied British and Spanish 
troops marched through Castile. Then, on 21 June 1813,
Wellington struck the fatal blow. French troops at Vitoria were 
defeated in a major battle which virtually ended their control of 
the peninsula. Ferdinand was released from captivity in 
December 1813, and reentered Spain on 22 March 1814. He was
Mexico and the Spanish Cortes, 1810-1822, Institute o f Latin American 
Studies, University of Texas (Austin, 1968); and Virginia Guedea, “El pueblo 
de México y la política capitalina: 1808 y 1812”, (17th International LASA 
Congress). For Central America, see Rodriguez, The Cádiz Experiment in 
Central America.
In New Granada, the constitutional reforms were im plem ented only 
in areas of royalist domination, and, even there, had limited impact. Sec 
Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 241-242; and Anna, Spain and 
the Loss of America, p. 95. In Panama, elections to the Cortes were held in 
August 1812, but the failure o f Viceroy Pérez to implement certain articles 
of the Constitution became fodder in the A udiencia’s long-running battle 
with Pérez and the Panama City cabildo. (See Benito Pérez to Minister of 
Grace and Justice, Panama, 16 November 1812; Joaquín Carrión, Manuel 
lgarrio(?) and Tomás de Arcchaga to Council of the Indies, Panama, 6 
February 1813; both in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 668; Juan Domingo 
de Iturraldc to Minister of Overseas, Santiago de Veragua, 3 August 1813,
AGI, Audiencia dc Panama, legajo 265; and Francisco Montalvo to Minister 
o f Overseas, Santa Marta, 9 November 1814, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, 
legajo 668 (this letter is also contained in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 
631.)
The constitutional system appears to have implemented most fully in 
Quito, during the rule o f Toribio Montes. There elections to constitutional 
bodies of some sort were held, to the disgust of absolutists (Sec Pedro Pérez 
Muñoz, Historia dc la rebelión dc América, Guayaquil, 31 December 1815, 
carta 29, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.) President Montes, however, suspended 
the two most important elections, those to the Cortes and to the Provincial 
Deputation, until late 1813. (Sec Toribio Montes to Minister o f  Overseas, 
Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI, Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 260.) 
l5 Scc Rudé, Revolutionary Europe, pp. 264, 267.
greeted everywhere with great popular acclaim. “When 
Ferdinand entered Valencia, on April 16, 1814, ‘the joyous people 
yoked themselves to his carriage’. . . From Aranjuez to Madrid 
Ferdinand’s carriage was drawn by the people,” recorded Marx 
with d isgust.16 Although Ferdinand initially approved the 
establishment of the Cortes and the Regency, and appeared willing 
to accept their requirement that he swear loyalty to the 
Constitution, he soon decided to ignore the demands of these two 
bodies. Immediately surrounded by the group of friends or 
camar i l la  that was to dominate his political life from then on, 
Ferdinand resolved instead to effect an absolutist coup. Leading 
liberal members of the Cortes and Regency were arrested, and on 
4 May 1814 Ferdinand issued a decree ordering all aspects of 
Spain’s government to return to their status in 1808, prior to the 
surrender at Bayonne. In particular, the Cortes were dissolved 
and their actions declared illegal. Absolutism was thus restored to 
Spain. Napoleon was meanwhile experiencing difficulties on other 
fronts. His invasion of Russia had failed spectacularly, and 
nationalist sentiments in Austria and Germany aroused increasing 
opposition to French rule. On 6 April 1814 Napoleon abdicated 
and accepted confinement on the Island of Elba. By this stage, 
however, war with France had inflicted huge damage on Spain’s 
authority in its empire. While Spaniards struggled against the 
French in the Peninsula, the framework of imperial government 
had been ruptured by rebellion in the American colonies. The 
first cracks had appeared in 1810, when many of Spain’s 
American colonies had broken with central government.
l6 Marx, Revolution in Spain, p. 71.
embarking on a process remarkably similar to the peninsular 
w a r .17
§ 2  Ame r i c an  J u n t a s
Spain’s grip on New Granada had weakened during the 
preceding two decades. Since 1793, Spain had been almost 
constantly at war with either France or Britain, and, as a result, 
Spanish trade with its colonies had declined precipitously.18 
Furthermore, Spain’s consistent bad luck in the field of European 
politics could have done little to bolster its reputation as a 
powerful metropolis. Nonetheless, as Anthony McFarlane has 
argued. New Granada showed few signs of being a society ripe for 
revolution. The occasional attempts at revolutionising the 
viceroyalty had been resounding failures, and increased conflict 
between creoles and peninsulars did not at first prevent 
Neogranadans from rallying to Spain’s defence after Napoleon’s 
invasion. Indeed, it was events in Spain, rather than conflicts 
within New Granada, which propelled the viceroyalty into revolt. 
Only when the breakdown of royal authority appeared complete 
did several of New Granada’s provinces strike off on their own.
In doing so, they mirrored the actions of Spain’s own 
provinces. The dissolution of the Spanish state, and the creation 
of the various governing juntas in Spain itself, was both an
17Ninctecnth-century Spaniards did not fail to notice the sim ilarities 
between the Peninsular W ar and the Spanish American wars of 
independence. Sec, for exam ple, Melchor Fernández Almagro, La 
emancipación de América y su reflejo en la consciencia española. Instituto 
de Estudios Políticos (Madrid, 1954), p. 93.
l8 Sce Anthony McFarlane, Colombia before Independence: Economy,
Society and Politics under Hourbon Rule, Cambridge University Press 
(Cambridge, 199.3), pp. 297-324; and, for further information on the impact 
of war on colonial trade, John Fisher, Trade, War and Revolution: Exports 
from Spain to Spanish America, I797-IN20, Institute of Latin American 
Studies Monograph 16 (Liverpool, 1992).
opportunity and a model for Spanish America. By 1810, Spain 
was no longer a unified entity. Sovereignty was divided unevenly 
between the French, who controlled most of the country, and the 
resistance juntas that sprang up in many cities. This state of 
division was soon mirrored by New Granada. First in Quito, then 
in Caracas, Cartagena, Santa Fe, and elsewhere, governing juntas 
were established, in competition with the Junta Central and the 
Regency in Spain. The American juntas all initially claimed to be 
patriotic bodies, formed to govern New Granada only during the 
absence of Ferdinand, but virtually all eventually declared in 
favour of complete independence from Spain. As the Junta 
Central retreated first to Andalucía, and then to a small island off 
Cádiz, its claims to represent the entire Hispanic world began to 
look exceedingly unconvincing. When in 1810 the Council of 
Regency sent out representatives requesting the American 
colonies to recognise that body as the official voice of free Spain, 
many regions refused. Indeed, in the Viceroyalty o f  New 
Granada’s principal cities, it was the arrival of the Regency’s Royal 
Commissioners, Carlos Montúfar and Antonio de Villavicencio, that 
provoked an overt rupture with Spain.
The breakdown of royal government within the Viceroyalty 
of New Granada began in the city of Quito. Soon after the arrival 
from Spain of news announcing Ferdinand’s imprisonment, a 
group of eminent Quiteño creoles overthrew the president and 
created its own governing junta on 10 August 1809. President 
Ruiz de Castilla was arrested, and the junta declared its support 
for Ferdinand VII and undying opposition to the intruder
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Napoleon. The Quito junta was thus in no sense a radical body.19 
It was nonetheless immediately labelled heretical by opponents; 
in southern New Granada it was denounced as a collection of 
“ herejes insurgentes” and “traidores” .20 The junta did, however, 
enjoy initial support from the c ity’s population. This was, in part, 
because in Quito, as elsewhere, the leading colonial officials were 
accused of being French sympathisers. Rumours had circulated 
throughout Quito that President Ruiz de Castilla and his allies 
intended to deliver the city into the hands of the French, and that 
a general massacre of Americans was imminent.21
Efforts to attract support from the region’s other cities were 
less successful. Although some of the smaller towns around Quito 
threw in their lot with the innovators, Cuenca, Guayaquil and 
Popayan, not to mention Lima and Santa Fe, all declined to 
recognise the junta, and the Quito junta itself became bogged 
down in pointless discussions concerning the type of uniform its 
members should wear. The junta made the further error of 
attempting to attack the city of Pasto, to the north. Pasto, long an 
economic competitor of Quito, had refused to recognise the new
19Sce Martin Minehom, The People of Quito, 1690-1810: Change and Unrest 
in the Underclass, Wcstview Press (Boulder, 1994), pp. 241-256; Scarlett 
O'Pliclan Godoy, "Por cl rey, religión y la patria; Las juntas de gobierno de 
1X09 en La Paz y Quito,” Bulletin de l'Institut Français d’Etùdes Andines, vol. 
17 (1988); and Michael Hammerly, “Selva Alegre, President of the Quiteña 
Junta of 1809: Traitor or Patriot?”, HAHR.  Vol. 48 (1968). For a detailed list of 
all those involved in the revolution in Quito, see Report by Ramón Núñez 
del Arc, Quito, 22 May 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 257.
2,)See Ignacio Rodríguez Guerrero, “ Repercusiones de la revolución quiteña 
de 10 de agosto de 1809, en la Nueva Granada," Revista de Historia, vol. 7 
(Pasto, 1967), p. 10; and Gerardo León Guerrero, “¿Por qué vinieron los 
quiteños? Dos invasiones al distrito de Pasto, 1809-1811”, Raíces Históricas, 
Academia Nariñcnse de Historia, (Pasto, 1987), pp. 106-107.
21 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 109, 112. See also Marie- 
Danielle Démêlas and Yves Saint-Gcours, Jerúsaien y Babilonia: Religión y 
política en el Ecuador, 1780-1880, Biblioteca de Ciencias Sociales, vol. 21, 
Corporación Editora Nacional (Quito, 1988), chapters 5-6, for further 
discussions of Q uito’s two juntas.
junta. Quito’s elite seized this opportunity to vanquish a rival, and 
sent a large but untrained army northwards. This army was 
entirely defeated by the Pastusos in October 1809. Quito’s junta, 
already suffering from self-doubt, took this opportunity to 
dissolve itself, thus ending its brief existence.
The ju n ta ’s members arranged a ‘surrender’ with President 
Ruiz de Castilla, who promised that no reprisals would be taken. 
This promise was swiftly broken, and over 70 supporters of the 
former junta were thrown into jail in early December 1809. Some 
800 pardo  troops were sent north from Lima to assist Ruiz de 
Castilla in maintaining control. These troops rapidly earned the 
hatred of Quito’s citizenry, either by their reportedly uncontrolled 
pillaging or by their dark skins.22 Matters came to a head on 2 
August 1810, almost exactly a year after the creation of the Quito 
junta. On that day an organised attempt was made to free the 
pro-junta prisoners and to attack the Limeño troops. The attempt 
failed, and in response the Limeño troops went on a rampage 
through the city. Many of the jun t i s ta  prisoners were massacred, 
and perhaps as many as 80 civilians were killed as well.23
Following this attack, Ruiz de Castilla and his supporters felt 
it necessary to make some gesture of conciliation. They 
accordingly recommended dropping the criminal cases against 
surviving members of the junta, and ordered the p a r d o  troops to 
return to Lima. This in no way dispelled the growing hostility 
towards Ruiz de Castilla’s government, and when in late 1810 the
22Scc Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, p. 118, for ambiguous 
comments about the Lim eños' defects.
23Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. I, p. 110-121, describes these 
events. One Quiteño estimated that 140 civilians were killed (Pedro Pérez 
Múñez, Historia de la revolución de América en 35 cartas, Quito, 31 
December 1815, carta 16, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42), while Minchom cites a 
figure of 300 (Minchom, The People of Quito, p. 249).
Regency’s commissioner, Carlos Montúfar, arrived in the city, he 
easily convinced Ruiz de Castilla to permit the formation of a new, 
quasi-official, junta, headed by Ruiz de Castilla himself. The 
remaining posts were filled by the surviving members of the 
original junta. This odd situation continued until October 1811, 
when Ruiz de Castilla resigned and was replaced as president by 
Quito’s insurgent bishop, José de Cuero y Caicedo. During this 
period the junta came increasingly to favour separation from 
Spain, and indeed declared independence on 11 December 1811.
More or less simultaneously with the formation of Quito’s 
second junta, Joaquin Molina landed in Guayaquil, having been 
appointed by the Regency to replace Ruiz de Castilla.24 Molina, 
basing himself in Cuenca, opened negotiations with the new junta, 
which had once again failed to win the support of the province’s 
other large cities. These negotiations went nowhere, and open 
hostilities broke out in early 1811 between the royalist troops of 
Molina and Cuenca’s Governor Melchor Aymerich, and the army 
assembled by Quito’s Pedro Montúfar. The troops of Quito’s now 
openly insurgent junta were also enmeshed in fighting against 
Popayán’s governor Miguel Tacón, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
President Molina led Quito’s royalist resistance during 1811 
and 1812. He was then replaced by Toribio Montes, one of Spain’s 
more controversial officials. Montes, building on earlier royalist 
victories, launched an attack on Quito itself, and recaptured the 
city on 7 November 1812.25 After their defeat in Quito, Carlos
24Ruíz de Castilla remained in Quito, where he was assassinated in June 1812 
during a riot. Sec Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, p. 234.
2 ,Torihio Montes to Minister of Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI,
Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.
Montufar and his insurgent allies fled north to Ibarra, where they 
were besieged by Juan Samano, and in the end agreed to 
cap i tu la te .26 Montes took up residence in Quito, proclaimed the 
Constitution of 1X12, and began instituting a highly controversial 
policy of ‘reconciliation’, described by some as venal capitulation 
to the insurgents. Quito’s Audiencia refused to return to Quito, 
however, remaining instead in Cuenca, as a consequence of 
disagreements with President Montes. Thus, by the autumn of 
1X12, Quito’s brush with revolution had ended. The presidency 
had been restored to royalist hands with a minimum of bloodshed, 
and no further attempts at revolutionising the region enjoyed 
success until 1X22. Movements against Spain continued, however, 
in other parts of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, where events 
evolved in a substantially different way.
In Venezuela, various dissident movements had already 
hatched plots to overthrow Spanish authority, and in 1X0X, after 
news o f  the capture of the Spanish monarchs reached Caracas, 
attempts were made to form an independent junta in the 
c a p i ta l .27 The move was stifled, as were similar attempts in late 
1X09 and early 1X10. When, however, news of the virtual 
collapse of Spain’s anti-French resistance was brought to Caracas 
by the Regency’s special commissioner, Antonio de Villavicencio, 
matters came to a head. Ignoring the views of Captain General 
Vicente Emparan, a group of creoles composed mainly of members 
of the Caracas cabildo, formed a Junta Conservadora de los 
Derechos de Fernando VII. Emparan was deposed, and the junta
26Scc Toribio Montes to Juan Stunano, Quito, 22 November 1812, AOI,
Audicneia dc Quito, legajo 257.
27Scc Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, pp. 193-199, for a 
description of events in Caracas. See also Antonio de Villaviccncio to 
Cortes, Cartagena, 29 May 1810, AG1, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 747.
took over government of Venezuela. Outright independence from 
Spain was declared on 5 July 1811. The Junta, and the Congress 
that succeeded it, represented the interests of the country’s creole, 
landowning class. It abolished legal distinctions between whites 
and p a r d o s ,  yet preserved the social structures that permitted de 
facto discrimination. As John Lynch comments, “ independence, 
then, simultaneously raised and frustrated [pardo]  expectations” .28
This fatal error proved the downfall of Venezuela’s first 
republic. Crypto-royalists encouraged Black revolt, and soon won 
a series of victories over the precarious republic. Within six 
weeks of the earthquake that destroyed much of Caracas on 26 
March 1812, the city surrendered to the royalist commander 
Domingo Monteverde. Venezuela’s republican leaders were 
swiftly imprisoned, although some, including Simón Bolívar, the 
future l ibertador,  managed to escape. By the end of 1812,
Caracas, like Quito, was again in royalist hands. Unlike Quito, 
which was to remain royalist for the next decade, Venezuela soon 
exploded into a civil war.
Meanwhile, in New Granada, Spain’s authority was also 
challenged in several places. In Cartagena, hostility between the 
city’s conservative cabildo, Governor Francisco Montes, and the 
peninsular merchants resident in Cartagena had been increasing 
throughout 1808 and 1809.29 The conflict had, at first, centred on 
the desirability of legalising trade with the Caribbean, but, by late 
1809, events in Spain itself came to play a central role in the 
dispute. Although the c ity ’s cabildo had already recognised the 
Junta Central, the junta’s flight from Madrid and the depressing
28Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, 198.
29Scc McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, pp. 338-344 for an 
overview of events in Cartagena.
military reports began to have a discouraging effect.30 Members 
of Cartagena’s cabildo demanded permission to form a junta of 
their own, and responded angrily when Governor Montes tried to 
pack the cabildo with his own supporters. Montes, allegedly 
fearful of a repeat of events in Haiti, was unwilling to allow the 
city’s creoles a greater share of local power.31 When the 
Regency’s special commissioner, Antonio de Villavicencio, arrived 
in May 1810 with news of the total dissolution of the Junta 
Central, Montes’ position became completely untenable. Montes 
allegedly prohibited Cartagena’s creoles to carry weapons, while at 
the same time encouraging peninsulars to train in their use. His 
supporters were moreover said to have covered the city with 
anti-cabildo pasquinades and “cartas inflamatorias” .32 He had 
furthermore lost the support of the c i ty ’s peninsular merchants, 
who, as representatives of the Cádiz-based Americas trade, were 
eager to recognise the Regency, tied as it was the Consulado de 
Cádiz. On 14 June 1810 a ten hour “cabildo pleno” voted to 
remove Montes from office and replace him with the province’s 
lieutenant governor, Colonel Blas de Soria. This act was of 
primarily symbolic importance, as Montes refused to accede to the 
cabildo’s demands. The special cabildo was, however, followed 
five days later with an attack on the house of Governor Montes, 
led by members of the Regimiento Fijo de Cartagena and various
30Scc, for example. Observaciones sobre cl estado presente de la España, 
sobre los males que amenazen a la América, y sobre las medios de 
precaverlos, (written by José María García de Toledo?) Cartagena, 28 April 
1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011.
31 Antonio de Villavicencio to Cortes, Cartagena, 29 May 1810; and Antonio 
de Villavicencio to Antonio Amar, Cartagena, 30 May 1810; both in AGI,
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
32Antonio de Narváez y la Torre to Antonio Amar, Cartagena, 19 June 1810,
AGI. Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011. Sec also Antonio de Villavicencio to 
Cortes, Cartagena, 29 May 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
35/
“ hombres del pueblo” .33 This latter event appears to have 
persuaded Governor Montes to permit the establishment of a 
junta, which was formed on 22 May 1810.34 Montes remained a 
member of this junta only briefly. He and his secretary were 
arrested on 14 June 1810 and sent to Havana.35
Cartagena’s new junta was a conservative body.36 Its 
members were peninsular merchants and representatives of 
Cartagena’s creole elite, and it voted immediately to recognise the 
Regency in Spain. Nonetheless, in Spain the junta was instantly 
perceived as a radical installation. Many officials in New Granada 
itself were equally disturbed. Indeed, within a few months of the 
ju n ta ’s formation, the governor of Panama reported to the Cortes 
that Cartagena was in a state of insurrection.37 Moreover, the 
junta  began planning a complete restructuring of New Granada’s 
government. It advocated the formation of a national federal 
assembly, which would govern New Granada during the captivity 
of the king. Despite the junta’s claim that this federal system 
would be only a temporary measure, it designed a full-scale 
government, including ambassadors to foreign countries, and the 
virtues of federal republicanism were extolled.38 The new junta
"A n to n io  de Narvácz y la Torre to Antonio Amar, Cartagena, 19 June 1810, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011.
34Bando de Francisco de Montes et al.. Cartagena, 23 May 1810, AGI,
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
"R c s trc p o , Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 128-129.
"M cF arlan c , Colombia befare Independence, p. 341.
' 7Juan Antonio de la Mata to Cortes. Panama, 1 Septcmbcr 1810, AGI,
Audiencia de Panama, legajo 262.
38Scc La Provincia de Cartagena de las Indias a las demás de éste nuevo 
Rcyno de Granada, Cartagena, 19 August 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, 
legajo 745; and also Gabriel Jiménez Molinarcs, Los mártires de Cartagena de 
IR 16 ante el consejo de guerra y ante la historia, vol. 1, Edición Oficial 
(1948), pp. 164-173.
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thus began a difficult balancing act between loyalty and 
in d ependence .
Nor did the removal of Governor Montes restore calm in 
Cartagena itself. In Spain, the patriotic juntas had been beset by 
outbreaks of rivalry and local factionalism. Cartagena too was 
plagued by regional rivalry and local power struggles. In early 
November 1810, the arrival of José Dâvila, appointed by the 
Regency to replace Governor Montes, provoked a brief riot, which 
was quelled only when Davila left the city.39 Then, in early 
February 1811, another uprising occurred. Troops from the 
Regimiento Fijo de Cartagena, as well as members of the c ity’s 
white and pardo militias and the “pueblo”, launched an attack on 
the junta which was defused only with difficulty.40
The revolt had been sparked by the appointment to an 
important position of José Maria Moledo, an unpopular officer who 
supported the revolutionary junta in the capital. This led some 
contemporaries to view the Cartagena uprising as a simple 
attempt at counter-revolution, intended to overthrow Cartagena’s 
junta and restore royalist authority.41 The revolt was clearly led 
by individuals opposed to the junta, but they were not a unified 
group of proto-royalists.42 Indeed, the account provided by José 
Manuel Restrepo makes clear that the revolt was, rather, an
,9 Jim éncz M olinares, Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, pp. 149-153.
40José María del Real to Secretary of Despacho Universal, Cartagena, 7 
February 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo K ill. The Fixo de 
Cartagena and the pardo and white militias were considered opponents of 
the junta. Sec Junta de Cartagena to Regency, Cartagena, 20 November 
1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
41 Both Restrepo and the royalist Carridn y Moreno referred to the riot as a 
counter-revolution. Sec Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 155- 
160; and Joaquín Carrirtn y Moreno to Secretary o f Statc(7), Havana, 10 
March 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
42Migucl Gutiérrez to Captain General de Cuba, Havana. 3 March 1811, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
internal struggle between the supporters of José María García de 
Toledo, Antonio de Narváez, and Tomás Andrés Torres, all 
members of the provincial elite who had participated in forming 
the Cartagena junta. The revolt thus illustrates more than 
anything else the intensive factional struggles that broke out in 
Cartagena after the formation of the junta.
Meanwhile, the level of social unrest in Cartagena was 
increasing. The junta, perched as it was on an exceedingly narrow 
base, formed largely by the city’s merchant elite, turned to the 
populace for support. Rumour and counter-rumour circulated, 
and money and alcohol were dispensed freely by the competing 
fac t ions .43 Moreover, several members of the junta had become 
disillusioned with the Regency in Spain. The Regency, distrustful 
of the new junta, had ordered its dissolution, and the unequal 
representation of Americans in the Cortes had angered the c ity ’s 
e l i te .44 Eventually those members of the elite who favoured 
complete independence gained the upper hand. On 11 November 
1X11, “ los pardos del barrio Getsemani” and a section of the c ity’s 
garrison marched into the city and obliged the junta to swear 
complete independence from Spain, one month ahead of Quito’s 
ju n ta .43 The city then issued a republican constitution that
43Sce Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 189-191, 203-204. See 
also Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos sociales y 
económicos de nuestra historia, vol. 2, T ercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1985), pp. 559- 
561 for a discussion of the class and racial conflicts stewing in Cartagena at 
the time.
44Scc Junta dc Cartagena to Regency, Cartagena, 20 November 1810, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747, for the jun ta 's angry reaction to the 
R egency ’s d isapproval.
43TIic text o f the Acta de independencia is printed in Jiménez. M olinarcs,
Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, pp. 249-257.
instituted (limited) male suffrage, expelled the Inquisition, and 
enacted other reforms.46
These actions were viewed with universal disapproval by 
Cartagena’s neighbours. Cartagena had already gone to war with 
Mompós the previous year after that city refused to recognise 
either the Regency, or, more importantly, the new junta in 
C ar tagena .47 Cartagena’s attempt to form itself into an 
independent sovereign state merely aroused further hostility.
None of the surrounding regions wished to become a province of 
the Republic of Cartagena, and the city found itself isolated. New 
Granada’s internal provinces refused to continue sending the 
traditional transfers of money needed to support Cartagena’s 
garrison, thereby causing tremendous financial hardship for the 
new governm ent.48 Moreover, many of those Cartageneros 
opposed to independence had emigrated to Santa Marta, which 
soon became a centre for opposition to the Republic of Cartagena, 
and remained in a state of continual hostility with Cartagena until 
the arrival of General Pablo Morillo’s expedition in 1815. Thus 
Cartagena, unlike Quito or Caracas, remained separate from Spain 
after the initial creation of its junta. No army of reconquering 
royalists overthrew Cartagena’s junta during the years of the 
Peninsular War, and Cartagena became one of the bastions of 
insurgency in New Granada.
The other bulwark of revolt was located in the interior of 
New Granada, towards which the Regency’s commissioner Antonio
46The text o f the 1812 Constitution of the State o f Cartagena is printed in 
Constituciones tie Colombia, Manuel Antonio Ponibo and José Joaquín Guerra 
(editors), Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana (Bogotá, 1951), pp. 93- 
176.
47Scc Liévano Aguirre, Los graneles conflictos, vol. 2, pp. 560, 649-650; and 
Jiménez M olinares, Los mártires de Cartagena, pp. 136-146.
48Sec Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 192-194, 201-202.
de Villavicencio was making his way. After participating in the 
formation of the junta in Cartagena, Villavicencio stopped briefly 
in Mompós, which likewise established an independent junta. He 
then journeyed on toward the capital. Meanwhile, anti-Spanish 
revolts broke out in several towns in the interior. In Pamplona an 
independent junta was formed on 4 July 1X10, and on 9-10 July 
1X10 the town of Socorro rebelled against its corregidor and 
established a sovereign junta independent of the viceroy in Santa 
Fe. Further south, the city of Cali deposed its cabildo and 
established a junta on 3 July 1X10. All these bodies, while 
proclaiming loyalty to Ferdinand VII, emancipated themselves 
from the central authority in Santa Fe.49 The Viceroyalty of New 
Granada began to disintegrate.
In the capital, this process of dissolution was watched with 
interest by members of the creole elite. Since 1X09, when news of 
the junta in Quito had reached Santa Fe, the city had been in a 
state of excitement and anxiety, with rumours about imminent 
disasters abounding.50 Tensions between creoles and peninsulars 
in the capital had increased over the last decades, and several 
revolutionary plots had already been hatched.51 These had all 
failed, but the next would prove successful. On 20 July 1X10 a 
group of creole conspirators staged a riot in the centre of Santa 
F e .52 That evening, crowds poured onto the streets, unhindered 
by the militia, whose creole officers sympathised with the
49See Ortiz, Génesis de la revolución, pp. 136-139; and Restrepo, Historia de 
la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 130-131.
50Scc José María Caballero. Diario, Biblioteca de Bogotá, Editores Villegas, 
(Bogotá, 1990), pp. 63-75.
51Scc McFarlane, Colombia before independence, pp. 272-338.
52For a blow-by-blow description of the July 1810 revolution sec Ortiz, 
Génesis de la revolución. A summary may be found in McFarlane, Colombia 
before Independence, pp. 341-346.
conspirators. Then, following this demonstration of popular anger, 
the city’s cabildo persuaded Viceroy Amar to form, and preside 
over, a junta. Amid popular unrest, the new junta met on 21 July 
1810, and swore loyalty to the Regency. The junta further 
declared itself the supreme representative of New Granada, and 
summoned provincial representatives to participate in the 
formation of a provisional federal government. This call received 
a cold welcome from the other juntas so recently established in 
the provinces.
This was not the end of the coup d ’etat. In the succeeding 
days, members of the Audiencia, together with prominent 
peninsulars, and then, on 25 July 1810, the viceroy and vicereine 
themselves, were arrested amid popular rioting. The next day, 
the junta revoked its recognition o f  the Regency, although it 
continued to protest its loyalty to Ferdinand VII. The junta, 
however, found itself again challenged in early August 1810. 
Restrepo reports that “el pueblo soberano hacía diariamente 
nuevas y extravagantes peticiones” , and on 13 August “ la hez del 
pueblo” transferred the viceroy and his wife from house arrest to 
the c ity ’s public prisons.51 *3 This proved too much for the junta. 
Several individuals believed to be the intellectual authors of the 
transfer were arrested by the ju n ta ’s recently formed militia, and 
the viceroy and vicereine were freed and sent to Cartagena.54 The 
now-unchallenged junta set about forming a government, and 
proceeded with its plans to hold a congress of national deputies.
51 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, p. 140.
54For Viceroy Amur’s version of events, see Antonio Amur to Regency, La
Coruña, 13 January 1811, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 747. This letter
is published in Mario Herrín Buqucro, El Virrey Don Antonio Amar y 
Barbón. La crisis del régimen colonial en la Nueva Granada, Banco de la 
República (Bogotá, 1988), pp. 305-310.
This congress met in late December 1810, but was attended 
by very few delegates from outside Santa Fe. Within a few 
months the congress had dissolved itself, to be replaced with a 
series of different leaders and organisations. Meanwhile, ever- 
greater fragmentation, rather than increased unity, was the order 
of the day. Mompós and Cartagena had already gone to war over 
the former’s refusal to recognise Cartagena’s junta, and soon 
Cartagena clashed with Santa Fe over the most suitable form of 
government for New Granada. In the succeeding months separate 
juntas were formed in Quibdó, Neiva, Nóvita, Antioquia, Mariquita, 
Casanare, Girón, Santa Marta, Popayán, and Tunja, and various 
provinces split into contending sections.55 Santa Fe itself 
attacked Ocaña, Socorro and, later, Tunja in an effort to 
incorporate these latter into the capital’s system of centralised 
ru le .56 It was later itself besieged by forces representing a new 
congress in Villa de Leiva. Restrepo remarked that, “apenas hubo 
ciudad ni villa rival de su cabecera, . . . que no pretendía hacerse 
independiente y soberana” .57 Only in the south did insurgents in 
Cali succeed in forming a union of regional juntas, which for the 
next few years alarmed royalists in Pasto and Popayán.
In Spain, and indeed in New Granada itself, the dramatic 
events in Caracas, Cartagena, Quito and Santa Fe were regarded as 
frankly revolutionary. The oaths of loyalty to the imprisoned
55See Caballero, Diario, pp. 83-110; Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol.
1. p. 142-150; Junta provisional de gobierno de Santa Marta to the Regency, 
Santa Marta, 22 September 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and 
Bando on formation of junta in Antioquia, 11 October 1810, AGI, Audiencia 
de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
56Sce Tomás de Acosta to Council o f the Indies, Santa Marta, 29 November 
1811, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Caballero, Diario, p. 95, 109. 
57Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, p. 149. Sec also the comments 
of the traveler Charles Stuart Cochrane, Journal of a Residence and Travels 
in Colombia during the Years 1823 and 1824, vol. I, Henry Colburn (London, 
1825), reprinted by AMS Press (New York, 1971), p. 376.
Ferdinand notwithstanding, contemporaries realised that the 
formation of juntas constituted a de facto declaration of 
independence. José Acevedo Gómez, who had played a key part in 
the formation of the Santa Fe junta, acknowledged this when on 
25 July 1810 he wrote to his cousin, “ la España en lo venidero será 
nuestra aliada, pero ya no nos dará leyes” .58 Indeed, within days 
of the Santa Fe jun ta ’s formation, Oidor Joaquin Carrión y Moreno 
was referring to it as a realisation of “las antiguas ideas de 
independenc ia” .59
Among royalists recriminations and finger-pointing started 
almost immediately. Carrión y Moreno for his part complained 
that Viceroy Amar had mishandled Santa F e ’s uprising, and 
asserted that the revolt could have been nipped in the bud by an 
opportune deployment of the militia. He further suggested that a 
military force be sent from Spain to defeat the insurgent juntas.60 
This suggestion was soon seconded by officials in Spain. By the 
end of 1811 over 1,000 troops had embarked for America. By 
1820 over 40,000 Spaniards had been despatched. In subsequent 
chapters we will examine the fate of these men and explore the 
reasons for their failure to suppress the revolutions which broke 
out in 1810. First, however, we must consider those elements 
within New Granada which favoured and facilitated the 
restoration of royal government. It is to this that we now turn in 
the next chapter.
58Ortiz, Génesis de la revolución, p. 147. See also Rodríguez Guerrero, 
"Repercusiones de la revolución quiteña”, pp. 14-15.
59Extract of letter hy Joaquín Carrión y Moreno to Regency, Cartagena, 28 
August 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
60Joaqufn Carrión y Moreno to Regency, Havana, 10 March 1811, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
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C h a p t e r  2: R o y a l i s t  E n c l a v e s  in N e w  ( ¡ r a n a d a
It has long been observed that, after the dissolution of 
viceregal government in 1810, cities and provinces in New 
Granada fought with their neighbours as much as with Spain 
i ts e lf .1 Provinces fought to maintain their colonial unity, smaller 
towns tried to free themselves from domination by larger cities, 
and pre-existing regional rivalry fuelled conflict. In this, New 
Granada mirrored the peninsula, where the extremely regional 
nature of the initial resistance to Napoleon led to rivalry and 
dissension. But internecine struggle was not confined to New 
Granada’s insurgent-controlled areas. Those regions that 
recognised the Regency fought with those that had not, and 
different factions within royalist-controlled areas fought each 
other. Factional struggle crippled the royalist government-in- 
exile established in Panama, while Santa Marta and Pasto, the two 
strongly royalist provinces of New Granada, were quickly 
submerged in bitter conflicts with their insurgent neighbours.
While Santa Marta and Pasto kept alive a semblance of imperial 
control in New Granada, the problems facing the new viceroy,
Benito Pérez, combined with the Regency’s failure to provide any 
guidance, meant that Pérez contributed little to the fight against 
insurgency. We will first survey the period of Pérez’s tenure in 
office, and will then examine the royalist enclaves in Santa Marta 
and Pasto.
1 For a concise statement o f this view, see Hermes Tovar, “Guerras dc 
opinión y represión cn Colombia durante la independencia (IS 10-1820)”,
Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura, no. 11 (1983). For 
com m ents on regionalism in Peru, sec John Fisher, "R oyalism , Regionalism 
and Rebellion in Colonial Peru, 1808-1815,” HAHR,  vol. 59 (1979).
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§ 1. Benito Pérez in Panama
Although it is tempting to think Antonio Amar’s career as 
viceroy of New Granada was ended by Santa Fe’s insurgents, the 
Regency had, in fact, already decided to replace Amar with Benito 
Pérez before July 1810.2 Pérez, who was 61 years old, had served 
in the Americas for over 30 years, and, like most of New 
Granada’s viceroys, was a military man.3 Pérez was appointed 
viceroy in August 1810, but did not take up his post until early 
1812. It was by this stage impossible for the viceroy to reside in 
Santa Fe, as the capital, and indeed most of the country, was in the 
hands of the insurgents. Pérez accordingly took up residence in 
Panama, which was one of the few remaining royalist strongholds. 
The Audiencia of Santa Fe moved to Panama in late March 1812, 
at the same time that Benito Pérez was installed as viceroy, and 
the Tribunal de Cuentas also settled in Panama.
The arrival of the viceroy and establishment of a quasi­
capital in Panama disturbed the existing balance of power in the 
province. Panama’s Governor Juan Antonio de la Mata had been 
governing the isthmus in complete autonomy since the collapse of 
central government in July 1810. With the arrival of Pérez and 
the Audiencia, both the governor and Panama City’s cabildo were 
dislodged from their positions at the top of the region’s hierarchy. 
Neither accepted this change without struggle. Bitter arguments
2 Amar was retired on 20 February 1810, perhaps because he was suspected 
o f  being too pro-French. See Mario Herrán Baquero, El Virrey don Antonio 
Amar y Barbón, La crisis del régimen colonial en la Nueva Granada, Banco 
de la República (Bogotá, 1988), pp. 72- 73. The Regency’s original plan had 
been to replace Amar with Francisco Xavier Venegas, who was 
subsequently named viceroy of M exico.
3For details about Pdrez’s career, see José Marfa Rcstrcpo Sácnz, Biografías 
de los mandatarios y ministros de la Real Audiencia (1671 a IRI9), Biblioteca 
de Historia Nacional, vol. 84. Editorial Cromos (Bogotá, 1952), pp. 245-249.
soon broke out between the Audiencia on one hand, and the 
cabildo and governor on the other. The Audiencia complained 
that the cabildo refused to carry out its duties, while the cabildo 
alleged that the Audiencia, which by early 1814 was reduced to 
one member, was not properly constituted, and refused therefore 
to recognise its authority.4 Viceroy Pérez took the side of the 
cabildo. He refused to release funds to pay the salaries of 
Audiencia officials, and complained that it was the Audiencia, 
rather than the cabildo, which failed to carry out its official duties. 
Moreover, he stated, on those occasions which Audiencia members 
did attend public ceremonies, they did not observe the expected 
decorum. Oidor Manuel Garcia, for example, had appeared before 
the bishop “sin insignia alguna, en un frac poco decente y aún sin 
e sp ad a” .5 The Audiencia countered that the viceroy was old, 
infirm, and had a “natural repugnancia a la observación de las 
leyes” .6
At the heart of the conflict was the Audiencia’s claim that 
the cabildo was a haven for smugglers. Viceroy Pérez allegedly 
aided and abetted the contraband trade, and himself profited 
from it. The cabildo’s efforts to unseat the Audiencia and to deny 
it authority were merely attempts to derail prosecution of 
smugglers, the Audiencia asserted.7 This view was supported by
4 Benito Pérez to the Regency, Panama, 17 September 1812, AGI, Audiencia 
de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Joaquín Carrión y Moreno to Minister of Grace 
and Justice, Panama, 25 August 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580 
(this letter may also he found in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 665).
5 Benito Pérez, to Minister o f grace and Justice, Panama, 1813, AGI, Audiencia 
de Santa Fe, legajo 580. See also the many other documents in AGI,
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajos 580 (ramo 3) and 665.
6Act o f the Audiencia de Santa Fe, Panama, 14 November 1812, AGI,
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
7Joaquín Carrión y Moreno to Minister o f Grace and Justice (7), Panama, 19 
July 1813, 22 June 1814, and 31 October 1814, all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa
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the bishop of Panama. He too accused the members of the cabildo 
of being confirmed contrabandists. The cabildo, in turn, claimed 
that the bishop’s manners were “propio de un hombre sin cuna”, 
and accused him  of being the smuggler.
Further conflicts emerged. Governor Mata was also drawn 
into the fighting between Viceroy Pérez, the cabildo, and the 
Audiencia. Pérez reportedly favoured the same men as Mata, and 
generally continued M ata’s style of governing, namely winking at 
smugglers and insurgents.* 8 Mata therefore supported Viceroy 
Pérez and the cabildo, which brought the governor into conflict 
with both the Audiencia and the bishop. Mata indeed became 
submerged in a prolonged struggle with Bishop Manuel, which 
was due in part, it was whispered, to the governor’s protection of 
a renegade canon who was having an affair with his wife.9 
Regional rivalries also surfaced, as Panama City and Portobelo 
struggled for supremacy. Portobelo’s cabildo complained that 
Panama City was trying to take over command of the entire 
isthmus, and alleged that the viceroy had originally intended to 
reside in Portobelo, but had been lured to Panama City with false 
promises of a healthier c lim ate.10
None of these conflicts did anything to reaffirm royal 
authority in New Granada, and Panama sank into a mire of local
Fe, legajo 665. See also Audiencia de Santa Fe to RcgcneyC?), Panama, 20 
November 1812, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
8Scc Declaration of Tomás de Bajo, Panama, 18 November 1812, AGI,
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
9Juan Antonio de la Mata to Cortes, Panama, 20 June 1810; Manuel, Bishop of 
Panama to Juan Antonio de la Mata, Panama, 17 September 1810; and many 
other documents relating to this conflict, all in AGI, Audiencia de Panama, 
legajo 262. Also sec Joaquín Carrión y Moreno and Manuel García to 
Minister of Grace and Justice, Panama. 10 June 1812, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 665.
l0 Rcport by Council of the Indies, 7 February 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa 
Fe, legajo 747.
infighting. Yet it was during this period virtually the only part of 
New Granada completely free of insurgents. Although Santa 
Marta and Pasto, the two other bases for royalists, fought 
doggedly against the insurgency, both were in continual danger of 
defeat. Pérez was in little position to assist either city militarily or 
financially, but hard-line royalists were nonetheless bitter at the 
paucity of Pérez’s efforts. No funds or expeditions were sent to 
either Santa Marta or Pasto by Pérez during his rule, and Pérez 
enraged hard-liners by receiving republican envoys from 
Cartagena as if they were ministers of a recognised state.11
Pérez was in poor health, and asked to resign in late 1812. 
His resignation was accepted and Francisco de Montalvo was 
appointed to replace him. Montalvo, who was directed to settle in 
Santa Marta, rather than Panama, took up office in early 1813. 
Pérez died in Panama in August of the same year.12 Pérez’s 
inactivity might suggest that for royalists, the years from 1810 to 
1813 were a virtual lacuna, but this would be a misconception. On 
the contrary, these years formed a critical period of royalist 
resistance to revolution, although the real action took place not in 
Panama, but further south and east, in Pasto and Santa Marta. In 
the next two sections we will examine the rivalries and 
dissensions that marked these two regions’ involvement in the 
movement for independence. For Santa Marta, the city’s long­
standing commercial rivalry with Cartagena was at the heart of its 
rejection of independence. For Pasto, too, economic rivalries
^A udiencia  de Santa Fe to Regency (?), Panama, 20 November 1812; 
Declaration of Tomás de Bajo, Panama. 18 November 1812; both in AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe. legajo 746; and Gabriel Jiménez Molinarcs, Los  
mártires de Cartagena de IS 16 ante el consejo de guerra y ante la historia, 
vol. I, Edición Oficial (1948), p. 303.
l2 Sec Restrepo Sacn/., Hiografías de los mandatarios, p. 251.
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underscored opposition to the insurgents. There, the new 
philosophy of republicanism arrived via Quito, a city which had 
for many years been Pasto’s economic rival. The elite of Pasto 
rejected independence as an attribute of Quito, invented to 
facilitate an assault on their province's territorial, political and 
economic integrity. These conditions placed Santa Marta and 
Pasto in perhaps inevitable conflict with their insurgent 
ne ighbours .
§ 2 .  Royal i st  Santa Marta
Cartagena, as we saw in the last chapter, had, in 1810, 
formed a junta to govern the city during the French occupation of 
the peninsula. Aware that a hostile Santa Marta would jeopardise 
its existence, Cartagena’s junta had invited Santa Marta to form a 
similar junta and ally itself with Cartagena. And indeed, on 10 
August 1810, a “tribunal de seguridad, con el título de junta 
provincial” was set up in Santa Marta.13 It did not, however, align 
itself with Cartagena. The junta’s stated purpose was to keep a 
close eye on the public good, and, Cartagena’s hopes 
notwithstanding, Santa Marta’s junta appears to have had little 
revolutionary intent. The majority of its members were firm 
opponents of republicanism. Indeed, on several occasions 
members of the junta were forced to resign after they were 
accused of supporting the insurgents.14 The junta moreover had
13Junta provisional de gobierno dc Santa Marta to the Regency, Santa 
Marta, 22 September 1810, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 746.
l4 Junta Provisional dc Santa Marta to Consejo de Indias, Santa Marta, 20 
March 1811, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Jiménez M olinarcs, 
Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, p. 185-186. More detailed information 
about the ju n ta 's  tenure in Santa Marta may he found in Ernesto Rcstrcpo 
Tirado, Historia de la Provincia de Santa Marta, vol. 2, Ministerio dc 
Educacidn Nacional, (Bogotá, 1953), pp. 310-342.
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no intention of disobeying orders from Spain. It had in September 
1810 informed the Regency of its establishment, but, as the junta 
did not receive approval from Spain, it dissolved itself in July
1 8 1 1. 1 5
The junta’s failure to develop into a revolutionary body may 
be largely ascribed to the negative influence of Cartagena. Santa 
Marta was, to begin with, already Cartagena’s principal 
commercial rival. During the Anglo-Spanish wars of 1796-1808, 
Santa Marta had attracted a greatly increased share of trade with 
the Caribbean, and Cartagena’s trading profits had declined 
substantially. Complaints about the unrestrained smuggling 
encouraged by the residents of Santa Marta had long been voiced 
in Cartagena, where Santa Marta’s inhabitants enjoyed little 
e s t e e m .* 16 After the establishment of Cartagena’s junta in June 
1810, a large number of peninsular merchants left Cartagena and 
took up residence in Santa Marta. This merely strengthened the 
city’s already well-developed contraband links with the British 
C a r ib b ean .  It is thus perhaps not surprising that the junta of 
Cartagena soon developed plans to attack and annex Santa 
M a r ta .17 In the course of the next few years the inhabitants of 
Santa Marta were subjected to repeated attacks from Cartagena. 
Consequently, Santa Marta’s pre-existing hostility with Cartagena
l<iActa del Ayuntamiento dc Santa Marta, Santa Marta, 5 July 1811, AG1, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 745.
16Scc Report hy Martín de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles dc 
Cuba, legajo 750; and Anthony M eFarlane, Colombia before Independence, 
Economy, Society, and Politics under Hourbon Rule, Cambridge University 
Press (1995), pp. 126-184 passim, 297-507; and also Lance Grahn, "An 
irresoluble Dilemma: Smuggling in New Granada. 1715-1765”, Reform and 
Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru, John Fisher, Allan Kucthc 
and Anthony McFarlanc (editors), Louisiana State Press, (Baton Rouge,
1990), pp. 125-146.
17Scc Jiménez Molinares, Los mártires de Cartagena, pp. 184-186; and 
Donaldo Bossa Hcrazo, Cartagena independiente: tradición y desarrollo. 
Ediciones Tercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1967),p. 15.
and its inhabitants became yet more entrenched. Already, by 
November 1X10, Santa Marta’s population was reportedly in 
favour of exiling all supporters of Cartagena’s junta.18 (Cartagena, 
incidentally, took the opposite approach, impeding a royalist 
exodus by refusing to issue passports to areas held by the 
Spanish. 19>
The assault on Santa Marta started soon after the formation 
of Cartagena’s junta. In retaliation for Santa Marta’s illegal 
monopolisation of coastal trade, in January 1811, Cartagena had 
imposed a 12% tax on all goods from Santa Marta, and a $1 per 
f a n e g a  tax on salt. This was followed, in March 1811, with the 
threat to suspend all commercial relations between the two 
c it ie s .20 Throughout 1811, the cabildo of Santa Marta complained 
that Cartagena was trying to destroy the province’s commerce, 
because Santa Marta refused to “unirse a su sistema de 
g o b ie rn o ” .21 Cartagena further fomented separatist tendencies in 
the towns of Santa Marta Province, and gave every sign of 
intending to invade Santa Marta itself. By mid-1811, open war 
had broken out. Armed companies from both Cartagena and Santa 
Marta clashed along the River Magdalena.22 In view of 
Cartagena’s aggressions, the government of Santa Marta wrote 
regularly to Spain asking to be provided with weapons, soldiers,
18José María Martínez de Aparicio to Regency, Santa Marta, 25 November 
1810, AGI. Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
|y Tomás de Acosta to Consejo de Indias, Santa Marta, 10 December 1811, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746
20Rcport by Junta de Santa Marta, Santa Marta, 4 June 1811, AGI, Audiencia 
de Santa Fe, legajo 745; and Jiménez Molinarcs, Los mártires de Cartagena, 
voi. 1, pp. 202-204, 208-209. Santa Marta responded by imposing trading 
restrictions of its own. Sec Acta capitular de la ciudad de Santa Marta, Santa 
Marta, 22 August 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 745.
21 Report by Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta. Santa Marta, 7 September 1811, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fc, legajo 745.
22Scc Jiménez Molinarcs, Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, pp. 214-235
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and money.23 In 1812, the Regency responded. 308 troops were 
despatched to Santa Marta, followed in 1813 by a further 214, 
who this time were accompanied by a battleship.24 Perhaps as a 
result, by late 1812 Santa Marta had successfully occupied much 
of the eastern side of the Magdalena River, and had expanded its 
dominion into the region around Tolú.25 Foreshadowing later 
disasters, the royalist commander in San Benito Abad, Antonio 
Fernández Rebustillo, managed to provoke a resurgence of support 
for the republicans by imposing huge financial contributions on 
the population and by permitting the rape of local women.26
Cartagena at last retaliated. On 6 January 1813, insurgent 
forces led by the Frenchman Pierre Labatut captured the city of 
Santa Marta. This victory evidently did not require great military 
prowess on the part of Labatut. The cabildo of Santa Marta 
complained that the town surrendered without a fight, and one 
royalist officer affirmed that:
Santa Marta no se perdió por la fuerza de los enemigos, que 
en número, disciplina y valor era muy inferior de la nuestra, 
sino por el desorden, arbitrariedad, colusiones, despotismo y 
malversión de caudales de casi todos los funcionarios 
públicos y de los que tuvieron comisiones o tenían mando y
23 José María Martínez de Aparicio to Regency, Santa Marta, 25 November 
IS 10, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Junta of Santa Marta to 
Regency, Santa Marta, 4 June 1811; Francisco Pérez Dávila to Regency,
Santa Marta, 3 July 1811; and Tomás de Acosta to Council of the Indies, Santa 
Marta, 29 November 1811; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 745.
24Scc Edmundo Heredia, Planes españoles para reconquistar 
hispanoamérica, IHIOIIRIH.  Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires (Buenos 
Aires, 1974), pp. 79, 94.
25Jim énez Molinarcs, Los mártires de Cartagena, voi. 1, pp. 306-308.
26Scc Miguel de Bust ilio y Colina to Cortes, Kingston, 12 March 1813, in 
Jiménez Molinarcs, Los mártires de Cartagena, voi. 1, pp. 312-319.
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manejo monetario en las carreras militar, diplomatica y de 
Real Hacienda ten Santa Marta].27 
The governor and military commander fled, as did Santa Marta’s 
military installation and most of the inhabitants. The forces sent 
from Spain in 1812 had apparently become disaffected after the 
city’s repeated failure to pay their salaries, and because local 
officers had subjected the peninsulars to humiliating treatment.28 
Only a few priests, including the bishop, remained during the 
insurgent occupation, not out of any republican sentiment, but in 
order to carry our their religious duties. These, as a result of their 
opposition to independence, were placed under arrest and taken 
to Cartagena, “pasando indecibles trabajos” .29
Republican control over Santa Marta was short-lived, 
however, largely because Labatut antagonised its inhabitants. He 
harassed even the “pocos e ilustrados” supporters of 
independence, imposed heavy financial contributions on the 
populace, and introduced a paper currency. The introduction of 
paper money was viewed as particularly objectionable. According 
to the cabildo of Santa Marta, the paper money caused such 
inconvenience among the province’s Indians that the Mamatocos 
tried to murder Labatut when he visited their village. Inspired 
by this action, the inhabitants of Santa Marta themselves rebelled.
27Migucl de Bustillo y Colina to Cortes, Kingston, 12 March 1813, in Jiménez. 
Molinares, Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, pp. 312-319; and Ayuntamiento 
de Santa Marta to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 16 September 
1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
28Scc Miguel de Bustillo y Colina to Cortes, Kingston, 12 March 1813,
Jiménez M olinares, Los mártires de Cartagena, voi. 1, pp. 312-319.
29Santiago Martínez to Minister o f Grace and Justice, Madrid, 11 March 
1814; Josef Eulalio Ziosi to Council o f the Indies, Santa Marta, 31 March 1813; 
Ayuntamiento de Riohacha to Council of the Indies, Riohacha, 6 May 1813; 
and Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa 
Marta, 16 September 1813; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
and, together with local Indians, drove out Labatut and the 
Cartageneros on 5 March 1813.
Two months later the city was again attacked by forces from 
Cartagena, this time unsuccessfully. Troops led by another 
Frenchman, Colonel Louis Bernard Chatillon, attacked Santa Marta 
on 10 May 1813. Although they were accompanied by 7 
warships, the republicans were defeated, again with the help of 
the Mamatoco Indians, and Chatillon was killed, along with some 
400 insurgents soldiers.30
Shortly after Chatillon’s defeat, Santa Marta’s role as a 
royalist enclave was strengthened by the arrival of New Granada’s 
new captain general. In June 1813, Francisco Montalvo, the 
replacement of Benito Pérez, reached Santa Marta. Montalvo came 
not as viceroy, but as captain general, following the Regency’s 
decision to demote New Granada from a viceroyalty to a 
captaincy-general, in what appears to have been a cost-cutting 
measure. Montalvo, a rich hacendado living in Cuba, had left 
Havana for New Granada in late April 1813, and landed in Santa 
Marta on 1 June 1813. He arrived, to the disgust of the 
inhabitants, accompanied by only 300 troops. He wrote 
immediately to Spain, expressing the hope that they would soon 
send more soldiers, as “ no era de creer se hubiese persuadido que 
con solo mi presencia se había de pacificar o sugetar el Nuevo 
Reino de Granada”.31
30See Sergio Elias Ortiz, Franceses en la independencia de la Gran Colombia, 
Biblioteca Eduardo Santos, vol. 1, Editorial ABC (Bogotá, 1971), pp. 102-112, 
115-119; Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta to Minister of Grace and Justice,
Santa Marta. 16 September 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and 
Miguel de Bust ¡lio y Colina to Cortes, Kingston, 12 March 1813, Jiménez 
M olinarcs, Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, pp. 312-319.
31 Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f State, Santa Marta, 25 February 1815, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580.
Montalvo’s rule extended but little outside of Santa Marta 
itself. Even in areas under royalist control his authority was 
openly challenged. President Toribio Montes of Quito initially 
refused to recognise Montalvo, commenting that he had received 
no order to recognise the, as he put it, “Captain General of Santa 
M arta” .32 Montalvo was of course Captain General of N e w  
G ranada ,  but Montes’ version of his title more accurately 
expressed the spread of his authority. Alexander Hore, the 
governor of Panama, similarly resisted recognising Montalvo, 
while in Venezuela Montalvo’s authority was purely nominal.33
Montalvo’s stay in Santa Marta did little to improve Spain’s 
dwindling authority in New Granada. This was partly because he 
soon fell out with Santa Marta’s governor, Pedro Ruiz de Porras, a 
hard-line absolutist who enjoyed considerable popular support. 
Montalvo was thus subjected to abuse from the “clases bajas” who 
supported the governor.34 The situation was evidently bad 
enough to prompt Montalvo to leave Santa Marta temporarily on 3 
December 1813. Although he stated publicly that he had gone to 
Fortaleza del Morro in order to recover his health, he privately 
informed the governor that the “mumuraciones vulgares del
32Toribio Monies to Minister o f Overseas. Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI,
Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260; and also Toribio Montes to Manuel Bernardo 
Alvarez, Quito, 27 September 1814, Archivo Nariño 1812-1815, vol. 5, 
Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1990), pp. 379-380.
3 'Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los 
últimos virreyes de Nueva Granada, Relación de Mando del Virrey don 
Francisco Montalvo y noticias del Virrey Sámano sobre la pérdida de i Reino 
11815-1819), Eduardo Posada and P.M. íháfiez (editors). Biblioteca de la 
Juventud H ispano-Amcricana. Editorial América, (M adrid, n.d.), pp. 101-102; 
and José Francisco Heredia, Memorias del Regente Heredia (de las Reales 
Audiencias de Caracas y México, Editorial América (Madrid, n.d.), pp. 291 - 
293.
34Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f  Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 4 
March 1814, and Rafael de Zúñiga to Francisco Montalvo, Santa Marta, 12 
January 1814, both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; Reflections on 
the Loss of Santa Marta, 10 November 1820, AHNM, estado, legajo 8733, fol.
26; and also Rcstrcpo Tirado, Historia de Santa Marta, vol. 2, pp. 370-371.
número de facciosos” had been the real reason for his absence.35 
The economic situation in Santa Marta was meanwhile miserable 
in the extreme. By 1814, the province’s small agricultural output 
had been almost completely halted by the war, as had much of its 
trade, since its only saleable products, cotton and cocoa, were no 
longer grown. Food was scarce, and there were shortages of rice, 
maize and plantains, the region’s staple diet.36 In addition, 
although after Captain General Montalvo’s arrival Santa Marta 
served as a capital city, it lacked many of the basic requirements 
of a capital. There was, for example, no printing press, which 
meant that all decrees and orders had to be copied out by hand 
for distribution to governors and cabildos. There was moreover a 
shortage of trained lawyers and judges, the lack of which was 
particularly serious given the large number of insurgent prisoners 
held by the government. The only lawyer in the province was 
completely unable to keep up with the work-load, and in any 
event did not enjoy Montalvo’s trust as he was a creole.37
The state of the army caused Montalvo great concern. Not 
only was it inadequately small, but, even worse, he found upon 
his arrival that:
Se había armado con los fusiles que había en ello a los indios 
de los pueblos inmediatos, los que siendo inútiles en mucho 
para el momento de la acción tienen bastante audacia para 
manifestar oposición a los ordenes superiores. Robar 
imprudentamente las haciendas de los ciudadanos ricos, y
35Pedro Ruíz de Porras to Minister of Grace and Justice. Santa Marta. 7 
January 1814, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 746.
36Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f Hacienda. Santa Marta, 23 June 1814, 
AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
17Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 22 
August 1813, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 746.
calumniarlos con este objeto, llamándoles ‘jacobinos’, que 
según ellos, quiere decir ‘discidente’, es el efecto de aquella 
inmediata providencia .38
Indeed, the possibility of a Black or Indian uprising alarmed 
Montalvo almost as much as the war with Cartagena. He 
commented that while he was impressed with the dedication with 
which Santa Marta’s Black and Indian population fought the 
insurgents, he was petrified by “el ascendiente que se les ha 
dejado tomar” .39
Following his appointment in 1X13, Montalvo was instructed 
by the Cortes to open discussions with the rebels in Cartagena. 
Montalvo was sceptical about the probable success of this 
approach, but nonetheless from July 1X14, he and the republicans 
of Cartagena exchanged a series of letters in which they discussed 
the possibility of opening talks. Neither side appears to have put 
very much faith into the idea of negotiating. The discussions 
continued until mid-September, when they ended, sunk under the 
weight of their own pointlessness. On 23 December 1X14,
Montalvo reported to the Council of the Indies that the 
republicans were not interested in an armistice and still intended 
to attack Santa Marta. He insisted that he needed an army, not a 
negotiating team.40
38Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Overseas, Santa M arta, 21 August 1813, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe. legajo 631.
39Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f Overseas, Santa M arta. 21 August 1813, 
AGI. Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. Sadly, I have found no more 
information on these class and racial conflicts in Santa Marta.
40Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f Overseas, Santa M arta, 23 December 
1814; and Camilo Torres to Francisco Montalvo, Tunja, 6 September 1814; 
both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631 and 747; and Francisco 
Montalvo to Council o f the Indies, Santa Marta, 19 Septem ber 1814, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747, ramo I. M ontalvo's reports contain 
copies of the insurgents' letters.
This is not to imply that Montalvo believed diplom acy had no role to 
play in the pacification of New Granada. One of his m ore imaginative
Meanwhile, various towns and villages on the Caribbean 
coast quietly separated themselves from the jurisdiction of Santa 
Marta. The towns of Chiriguaná, Banco, and the whole region of 
Valledupar broke away from Santa Marta in 1811.41 We have 
already noted that such splits were often motivated by local 
politics, rather than by ideological differences, and events in 
Riohacha illustrate this truth particularly well. Riohacha 
separated from  Santa Marta, yet both regions remained firmly 
royalist. The local elite in Riohacha had, for some years, been in 
conflict with the authorities in Santa Fe, and, in 1806, Riohacha’s 
Governor, Josef  de Medina y Galindo, had been deposed by 
Viceroy Antonio Amar, who substituted Juan Sámano.42 Sámano 
had left Riohacha in early 1810, and during the outbreak of junta- 
formation that summer, Riohacha too formed a junta. It was 
headed by the alcalde, Pedro Pérez Prieto. Riohacha’s junta 
refused to recognise the authority of the juntas in Cartagena and 
Santa Fe. Moreover, in 1811, former governor Medina y Galindo 
returned to Riohacha. He was then attacked by a group of Guajiro 
Indians, led by Pérez Prieto. Medina fled, but later returned to 
Riohacha, accompanied by a group of armed men. He threatened
initiatives was his recruitment o f Gregorio Nariño, the son o f Antonio 
Nariño, as a royalist ambassador. This occurred in 1813, at a time when 
Montalvo was also considering direct negotiations with Antonio Nariño 
himself. M ontalvo hoped that Gregorio would succeed in convincing his 
insurgent father to reconcile him self with Spain. In the end this plan 
came to nothing, in part because Gregorio was him self arrested by General 
Morillo, who mistakenly believed him to be involved in the 1810 revolution 
in Santa Fc. (Sec Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f Overseas, Santa Marta, 
17 April 1814; and Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f Grace and Justice, 
Cartagena, 20 May 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and 
Report by Council of the Indies, 28 November 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa 
Fc. legajo 551.)
41Sce Jiménez Molinares, ¿os mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, pp. 215-217.
42This was perhaps because o f Medina y G alindo's involvement in 
smuggling. Sec Juan Marchcna Fernández, Oficiales y soldados en el 
Ejército de America, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-americanos (Seville, 1983), 
p. 15.
the cabildo, demanding that he be restored as governor. Medina 
indeed regained control of the province, which by this time had 
separated itself from the authority of Santa Marta. Santa Marta’s 
Governor Tomás de Acosta complained in November 1811 that 
“Ríohacha se halla en el mayor desorden con su gobernador 
intruso quien me ha negado sus auxilios” .43 In 1813 Medina, still 
governor, continued his attempt to build up his regional authority. 
The village of San Juan de César placed itself under Riohacha’s 
protection, as did the towns of Fonseca and Barranca. The three 
towns moreover formed their own cabildo in San Juan de César, 
although it was rapidly forced to disband.44 This was, however, 
no republican uprising. Both Pérez Prieto and Medina were 
staunch defenders of the Spanish monarchy, and Ríohacha 
furthermore resisted Labatut’s attempts to conquer the city for 
Cartagena, its citizenry making the traditional promise to 
“derramar la ultima gota de nuestra sangre,” rather than submit.45 
Ríohacha was instead freeing itself of its subordination to Santa 
Marta and Cartagena, its elite seizing the opportunity to exercise 
greater power.
§ 3 .  Royal i st  Pasto
The other bastion of Neogranadan royalism lay in the south, 
in the Province of Pasto. There the role played by Cartagena was
43Tomás dc Acosta to Council o f the Indies, Santa Marta. 29 November 1811, 
AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 746. Sec also Restrcpo Tirado, Historia dc 
Santa Marta, vol. 2, pp. 330-332, 352-356.
44Rcprcscntac¡ón de los vecinos del sitio dc San Juan de César to cabildo of 
Ríohacha, San Juan dc César, 13 March 1813; Ayuntamiento dc Ríohacha to 
the Council o f the Indies, Ríohacha, 6 May 1813; and Francisco M ontalvo to 
Minister of Overseas, Santa Marta, 4 November 181.3; all in AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fe, legajo 746.
45Ayuntamiento dc Ríohacha to Council of the Indies, Ríohacha, 6 May 
1813, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Rcstrepo Tirado, Historia de 
Santa Marta, vol. 2, p. 355.
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filled by Quito, with which Pasto had long been at odds. In 1825, 
the British consul in Guayaquil, H. M. Wood, remarked on the 
"rivalry and hatred which has always existed between Quito and 
P as to " .46 This rivalry was partly if not entirely economic in origin; 
the two regions competed with each other for markets for their 
principal export, woollen cloth. Thus, when, in 1809, the cabildo 
of Pasto received a letter from the newly-formed Supreme Junta 
of Quito, suggesting that Pasto recognise the junta and sever its 
links to the colonial authorities in Bogotá, they reacted with 
suspicion. Indeed, they correctly interpreted the letter as a threat 
of invasion, and prohibited all unauthorised movement in and out 
of Pasto.47 Quito's separatism appeared simply a guise for an 
attack on Pasto's independence, and the Pastusos would have none 
of it. On 16 October 1809, the city of Pasto was indeed attacked 
by 1,000 insurgent troops from Quito. An ill-equipped and 
rapidly assembled Pastuso army led by Tomás de Santacruz 
nonetheless defeated the Quiteños at Funes, south of the city of 
Pas to .48
Pasto’s cabildo not only sent to Spain the traditional report 
detailing the battle, but also enclosed an appeal for greater 
privileges. The contents of this and subsequent appeals are 
interesting, for they illustrate well the quest for autonomy so
46H.M. Wood to George Canning, Popayán, 30 June 1825, PRO, F.O. 18/21. ff. 
86-91. Also see Francisco Zuluaga, José María Obando: de soldado realista a 
caudillo republicano. Biblioteca Banco Popular. (Bogotá, 1985), p. 28 for a 
discussion o f the traditional rivalry between Quito and Pasto.
47Scrgio Elias Ortiz, Agustín Agualongo y su tiempo, Editorial ABC, (Bogotá, 
1958), p. 82.
48Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egcrton, 1809 (this 
document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 549 and 
AGI, Audiencia dc Quilo, legajo 276.) Sec also Cabildo of Pasto to Pablo 
Morillo. Pasto, 13 October 1816, printed in Gustavo Guerrero, Documentos 
históricos para los hechos ocurridos en Pasto en la guerra de la 
independencia. Imprenta del Departamento, (1912), pp. 136-142.
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typical o f New Granada’s First Republic. The appeals served one 
purpose: to plead for greater autonomy for Pasto. In 1809, the 
cabildo asked for judicial independence from Quito, and the 
erection of a college in Pasto, because "due to the poverty of Pasto 
as well as the rivalry of the Quiteños, the youth of Pasto are 
unable to instruct themselves for the good of the public and the 
monarchy"; it also called for the construction of fortifications on 
the frontier between Quito and Pasto, and for good measure 
requested that a new Audiencia be established in Pasto, although 
the cabildo must have recognised the fantastical nature of this 
r e q u e s t .49
None of these requests were met; so, in 1814, following their 
defeat of Antonio Nariño, the cabildo of Pasto again wrote to 
Spain, requesting that Pasto be granted a bishop, a cabeza de 
gobierno político  , and better schools, as well as that certain taxes 
be eliminated.50 Similar pleas were repeated throughout the war, 
and at one point the city went to the effort of appointing a special 
envoy to travel to Lima to present their case. The envoy 
succeeded only in extracting a congratulatory letter praising 
Pasto’s loyalty from the colonial authorities in Guayaquil. This 
being the only thing available, the cabildo determined that the 
congratulations from Guayaquil be "printed and many copies 
distributed to all the cities in the Americas".51 Such schemes were 
discussed regularly by Pasto’s cabildo. Every effort was made to 
acquaint the world with Pasto's merit, as the city's authorities
49Ortíz, Agustín Agualongo, p. 99
50Cabildo o f Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton, 1809, f. 442.
5 'O rtiz , Agustín Aguulongo, p. 339. The cabildo's efforts bore some fruit; 
Pablo M orillo himself championed the cause of Pasto, commenting the 
c ity 's  loyalty made it "un lugar muy distinguido en la historia del mundo” 
(Pablo Morillo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Barcelona, 30 May 1817, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 549).
hoped the outbreak of war would provide Pasto with an 
opportunity to increase its importance within the colonial 
structure. While other cities, such as Quito and Cali, hoped 
republicanism would allow them to achieve a more prominent 
place within regional hierarchies, Pasto placed its faith in 
royalism. In this respect, their goals were very similar.
The threat from the first junta in Quito was short-lived, as 
the junta had collapsed by the end of 1809. However, Pasto 
continued to face military threats from another source. Insurgent 
troops from Santa Fe, led by Antonio Baraya, marched south, and 
in March 1811 defeated the royalists at Bajo Palacé, outside 
Popayán. This insurgent victory, the first in the war of 
independence, was a humiliation for Miguel Tacón, governor of 
Popayán and commanding royalist officer. Tacón’s troops refused 
to obey his orders to attack, and some royalist soldiers even 
opened fire on their own side, causing considerable damage.“' 2 
Once Popayán was in the hands of the republicans, Governor 
Tacón fled down the Patia River towards Barbacoas, and 
eventually moved to Pasto. (Remaining in republican Popayán 
was Ana María Polonia García de Tacón, Tacón’s wife. Following 
her husband’s defeat at Bajo Palacé she was detained by the 
insurgents, who sent threatening letters to Governor Tacón 
warning that if he did not return to Spain immediately he would 
never see his family alive again. She was later released
s2 Migucl Tacón to Joaquin Molina. Pasto, 14 May 1811, AGI, Audiencia de 
Quito, legajo 235. The evidence provided by Tacón him self contradicts the 
claim made by some Colombian historians that the governor was a highly 
skilled politician, who enjoyed great popular support. Sec Margarita 
Garrido, Reclamos y Representaciones: Variaciones sobre la política en el 
Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1770-1 Rl5, Banco de la República (Santafd de 
Bogotá, 1993), pp. 272-274.
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unharmed, and became something of an advocate of her former
captors. )53
These events caused great alarm in Pasto, and many felt 
surrender to the insurgents was the only option, particularly as 
they again faced attack from Quito, following the establishment of 
Quito’s second junta in April 1811. To meet this new threat,
Governor Tacón, by then resident in Pasto, organised a force of 
nearly 1,000 men. These troops faced an invading army of some 
5,000 Quiteños, who not surprisingly captured Pasto on 22 
September 1811. They then sacked the city. "Los quiteños no 
dejaron ni claves," stated Mariano Medina, who witnessed the 
a t ta c k .54 The insurgent forces from Quito remained in Pasto for 
some months. A British diplomat recorded that, during this 
period, the Pastusos "felt heavily the miseries of war, . . suffering 
much from the excesses of the independent troops".55 The Pasto 
cabildo had evidently been correct in viewing with suspicion the 
protestations of fraternal feeling expressed in 1809 by the first 
Quito junta.
In the light of the unfortunate situation in Pasto, the 
revolutionary Junta of the Confederate Cities of the Cauca, under 
the leadership o f  Dr. Joaquín Caycedo y Cuero, began negotiations 
with the forces from Quito, whom they somehow convinced to 
return to their own city. A Pastuso historian has asserted that the 
Caleños were unhappy with the presence in New Granada of 
‘foreign’ intruders, and for this reason pressured the Quiteños to
53See Manuel Santiago Vallccilla ct. al. to Miguel Tacón, Popayán, II April 
1811; Antonio Baraya to Miguel Tacón, Popayán, II April 1811; and Miguel 
Tacón to Manuel Santiago Vallccilla, Pasto, 28 April 1811; all in AGI,
Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 235.
54O rtíz, Anustín AguiilonRo, p. 162.
55H.M. Wood to George Canning. Popayán, 30 June 1825, PRO, F.O. 18/21.
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w ithd raw .56 In any event, the troops from Quito left Pasto, and 
Caycedo y Cuero established a new republican government there, 
linking the town to the other Confederate Cities of the Cauca.
This, unlike Quiteño republicanism, enjoyed the support of 
many prominent citizens.57 Indeed, on 13 October 1811, the city 
held a cabildo abierto presided over by Caycedo y Cuero, and 
attended by members of the regular cabildo, the clergy, and other 
local notables, at which those attending declared that "they 
recognised the Junta Suprema de Santa Fé de Bogotá; that they 
united themselves with the Junta of Popayán; and that the cabildo 
members, along with the secular and regular clergy and the 
people of the town, embraced the patriot cause and from then on 
would defend it".58 59
Pasto’s conversion to insurgency was short lived. First, in 
early 1812 Caycedo y Cuero travelled to Quito, and several 
prominent royalist d isa fe c ta d o s , including the former mayor of 
Pasto, led an unsuccessful rebellion against the temporarily 
leaderless insurgent government. Caycedo y Cuero returned to 
Pasto, but was soon the victim of a more successful revolt. On 20 
May 1812, royalists from the Patia marched into Pasto at the 
invitation of the disaffected Pastusos and defeated the 
repub licans .5 9
The Patianos, Blacks from the scorchingly hot Patia Valley, 
were to remain royalist until the last days of the war. Most were 
escaped slaves who lived from banditry. The clientelistic
56Edgar Bastidas Urresty, Las guerras de Pasto, Ediciones Testimonial (Pasto, 
1979), p. 56.
57Ortíz. Agustín Agualongo, pp. 18(7-182.
580rtíz, Agustín Agualongo, p. 181.
59Cabildo of Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egcrton, 1809.
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networks developing out of their system of brigandage led easily 
to the formation of guerrilla bands following the outbreak of the 
War of Independence.60 The Patianos’ royalism is traditionally 
attributed to the provocative behaviour of Baraya’s republican 
troops, who marched through the Patia in 1811.61 The republican
troops sacked houses, confiscated cattle, and burnt the church of 
the small town of Patia. This, José María Obando asserted, was 
positive proof as far as the Patianos were concerned of the 
impious sentiments of the revolutionaries.62
The Patianos captured both Pasto and Dr. Caycedo y Cuero. 
When news of the attack reached Popayán, which was at the time 
also under the control of the junta of Cali, republican 
reinforcements rushed to Pasto, but they arrived too late to be of 
service to the beleaguered Caleños. The republicans, led by José 
María Cabal and the American volunteer Alexander Macauley, 
were forced to retreat to Popayán, "dejando el camino señalado 
con su sangre, y el (Río) Juanambú cubierto de sus cadáveres", in 
the words of the Pasto cabildo.63 Tw o months later, Macauley and 
Cabal returned to Pasto. The Pastusos, suffering from a shortage 
of ammunition, were forced to surrender. They released Caycedo 
y Cuero, and an armistice was signed.
It is not entirely clear what happened next. According to 
the cabildo of Pasto, the republicans were unwilling to abide by
60Francisco Zuluaga, “Clicntelismo y guerrillas en el Valle del Palia. 1536- 
1811”, La independencia, ensayos de historia social. Instituto Colombiano de 
Cultura. (1986), p. 114.
61 Scc Indalecio Liévano Aguirrc, Los grandes conflictos sociales y 
económicos de nuestra historia, vol. 2, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, (Bogotá, 
1964), p. 181.
62Zuluaga, José María Ohando, p. 39, and José María Obando, Apuntamientos 
para la historia, Vol. I, Editorial ABC, (Bogotá, 1945), p. 19.
63Cabildo de Pasto to Fcrdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egcrton 1809.
the terms of the armistice. The republicans accordingly returned, 
violating the armistice. They lost their way, however, and were 
defeated by the Pastusos. Macauley and Caycedo y Cuero were 
then shot.64 H. M. Wood, the British consul to Guayaquil, provides 
the republican version of events. According to Wood, who 
probably heard this version from Popayan republicans, the 
shooting of Macauley and Caycedo y Cuero occurred immediately 
after the signing of the armistice. He writes:
At the moment of signing the articles of the convocation by 
Dr. Caysedo on the part of the independents, and by Juan de 
Paz on the part of the Pastucians, the latter by a concerted 
plan suddenly attacked the independents' army, which thus 
surprised in a disadvantageous position was obliged to 
surrender. The perfidy of the Pastucians gained them a 
complete victory which they followed up with the greatest 
cruelties. A few days after this event Colonel Macauley and 
Dr. Caysedo with their officers were publicly shot.65 
In either event, the end result was the death of Caycedo y Cuero 
and Macauley, and the defeat of the republicans in Popayan and 
Pasto. Royalists recaptured Popayan on 30 June 1813, Cali on 6 
Ju ly  1813, and successful expeditions were launched against 
remaining insurgents in the Cauca Valley. The Junta of Quito had 
furthermore already been suppressed by Toribio Montes, and 
republicanism was thus temporarily eliminated from the south of 
the  viceroyalty.
64 Cabildo dc Pasto to Pablo Morillo. Pasto, 13 October 1816, printed in 
G uerrero, Documentos históricos, pp. 138-139. Sec also Cabildo de Pasto to 
Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egcrton 1809.
65 H. M. Wood to George Canning, Popayán, 30 June 1825, PRO. F.O. 18/21.
/
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With the suppression of the second Junta of Quito and the 
defeat of Caycedo y Cuero came a lull in hostilities, but the calm 
was not to last. Several matters served to disrupt the 
reestablished colonial order. To begin with, Colonel Juan Samano 
was appointed commander of the royalist troops stationed in 
Popayan, and within a very short period he managed to irritate 
major sections of the Popayan citizenry. Brian Hamnett asserts 
that Popayan's creole elite resented the presence of Samano and 
his Peruvian troops, whom they felt to be culturally inferior, and 
Samano’s arbitrary and abrasive manner drove many back into 
the insurgent camp. He allowed his troops to loot outlying 
haciendas, arrested a number of important citizens on suspicion of 
collaboration with the republicans, and detained several parish 
priests on the same grounds. Samano, it seems, did not even get 
on well with his own troops.66
This became a matter of importance, for in September 1813, 
Antonio Narino, President of “Cundinamarca”, the insurgent 
government in Santa Fe, marched south with 1,200 infantry 
soldiers and over 200 cavalry, well supplied with ammunition and 
other necessities, with the intention of bringing republicanism to 
the south. Narino had only recently emerged victorious from a 
protracted dispute with proponents of federalism over the proper 
form for an independent New Granada. After thus consolidating 
his position in the central provinces he embarked on an attack of 
the royalists in the South, who were the most obvious danger to 
the precarious republican government in Bogota.
66Brian Hamnett, “Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction: Colombian 
Regions, IS 10-1823”, Reform and Insurrection; Cabildo de Paslo to 
Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egcrton, 1809, f. 439; and Toribio Montes 
to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI, Audicncia dc Santa Fe, 
legajo 631.
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The republican offensive began well. Unlike Macauley, 
Nariño had no problem attracting Indian guides; most of the work 
of transporting heavy artillery over the mountains was done by 
Indian porters. A number of local priests also assisted.67 * The 
commander of Nariño’s advance guard, José María Cabal, 
successfully defeated Sámano on 30  December 1813 at Alto 
Palacé. Sámano withdrew from Popayán to Pasto, after having 
detonated all the gunpowder stockpiled in the city, causing 13 
deaths. Again demonstrating his poor leadership, Sámano was 
defeated at the hacienda of Calibio on 14 January 1814 by 
Nariflo's army, which grew as Sámano's troops deserted. The 
republicans occupied Popayán until the end of March 1814, and 
then marched on Pasto.
En route they were subjected to frequent guerrilla attacks 
by royalist Indians. José Hilario López, who participated in the 
campaign, commented that the region around Pasto was infested 
with guerrillas; throughout the campaign artificial rock slides and 
showers of stones rained down on the republicans, leaving them 
demoralised, if not dead. There was talk of returning to Popayán, 
and general gloom reigned in the republican camp. Matters were 
exacerbated, according to López, by Nariño's bad temper and 
in flex ib i l i ty .6S The republicans nevertheless defeated the 
royalists in a number of confrontations, despite the fact that 
Sámano had been replaced by Melchor Aymerich, who was less 
u n p o p u la r .69
67Antonio Nariflo, Escritos políticos. El Ancora, (Bogotá, 1982), pp. 77, 80.
6KJosé Hilario López, Memorias, vol. 1, Editorial ABC, (1942), pp. 46-58.
69The most important royalist defeat was at the Juanambú River on 9 April 
1814. Sec Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egcrton 
1809; and Toribio Montes to Ministers o f State and War, Quito, 7 July 1814, 
AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.
In Pasto itself, preparations for the attack were underway. 
The cabildo and Nariño exchanged a series of withering letters, 
which served only to inflame further passions on both sides. The 
cabildo’s final communication with Nariño concluded, "En suma, 
nosotros nos ponemos en manos de aquel Soberano Señor, que con 
una pierdecilla en los pies de barro, como los de usía, sabe reducir 
a polvo los colosos más orgullosos y elevados".70 They stressed 
the fact that Nariño was the aggressor, and repeatedly noted that 
he led an invading army of outsiders, intent on perturbing their 
customary tranquillity. They had stockpiled large quantities of 
arms, and an engineer was commissioned to construct 
fortifications around Pasto.71 Furthermore, messages were sent to 
the surrounding resguardos, requesting help from the Indians. 
Consequently, many of Pasto’s Indians arrived from the outlying 
villages around Pasto, armed with axes and machetes.72
Nariño had been expecting reinforcements from the north, 
but these failed to arrive. He nevertheless insisted, against 
advice, on attacking Pasto without the additional troops. The 
battle began on 10 April 1814 and lasted for an entire day. 
Royalist commander Aymerich played little part in the conflict, 
which was fought by the inhabitants of Pasto and Nariño’s troops. 
The Pastusos resisted fiercely, and thousands of men and women 
poured into the streets to fight. The Indians who had been 
summoned to the city also acquitted themselves well. As the 
Pasto cabildo put it, "los indios mismos, estos hombres degredados, 
tan cobardes e incapaces de empresas grandes, con el fusil en el
70Cabildo de Pasto to Antonio Nariflo, Pasto, 8 April 1814, Archivo Nariño, 
vol. 5, pp. 319-320. Sec also the other letters in this volume, pp. 311-320.
71Cahildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egcrton 1809, f. 440.
72Leopoldo López. Alvarez, "Campaña del sur y destrucción del ejército 
patriota”, Boletín de Estudios Históricos, Vol. 2, (1929), p. 241.
mano presentan con denuedo el pecho a las balas, y hacen pródigo 
de valor".73
The inhabitants of the city and the Indians of the resguardos 
repelled Nariño's forces, and Nariño was separated from his troops 
during the chaotic withdrawal. He hid for several days in the 
forests, then, driven by hunger and thirst, surrendered without 
giving his name to some Indians, promising to reveal to them the 
location of General Nariño. On his arrival in Pasto a large and 
unruly crowd gathered to learn the hiding-place of the general. 
Nariño, after fortifying himself with some soup, stepped onto the 
balcony of the house in which he was being held to address the 
crowd. "Pastusos", he cried, " Si queréis al General Nariño, aquí lo 
tenéis!". This revelation was greeted with calls for his immediate 
death, but Aymerich, who had been impressed with the 
intelligence of the previously-unidentified prisoner, intervened.74 *
Despite his eloquence, Nariño was imprisoned for thirteen months 
in Pasto under unpleasant conditions. Nariño later described his 
stay as follows:
Figuraos, señores, por unos momentos, que me veis 
encerrado en una pequeñísima pieza, tendido sobre una 
mala cama, cubierto con una ruana, con un par de grillos en 
mis pies ulceradas, sin un amigo, sin un libro para 
distraerme y esperando de hora en hora correr la suerte de 
Caycedo y Macauley.73
73Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egcrton 1809, fol. 
441; López, Memorias, p. 59; and Testimonio sobre la campaña del General 
Nariño en Pasto, 21 April 1814, Archivo Nariño, vol. 5, pp. 321-324. Volunte 
5 of the Archivo Nariño contains much inform ation about N ariño’s 
c a m p a i g n .
74Scc Liévano Aguirre. Los grandes conflictos, vol. 2, pp. 830-832, Nariño, 
Escritos políticos, pp. 139-140, and Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 
June 1814, BL, Egcrton 1809, fol. 442.
73 Nariño, Escritos políticos, p. 145.
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Nariño exaggerated slightly, as he was certainly not without 
friends in Pasto. On the contrary, his sojourn was enlivened by 
the undisguised admiration shown to him by Pasto’s royalist 
commanders. Nariño chatted openly with royalist officers about 
his plans for New Granada, and was on such good terms with them 
that rumours circulated that he was plotting a general republican 
uprising from his cell in Pasto.76
Nariño was eventually sent to Spain, where he languished 
for four years in the prison in Cádiz, before being freed in the 
wake of Spain’s constitutional revolution in 1820. Aymerich, in 
disgrace after his behaviour during the battle of Pasto, did not 
regain President Montes’ confidence, and Juan Sámano was once 
again appointed to command royalist troops. Even after the 
defeat of Nariño, some 1,000 insurgents remained in the Cauca 
Valley, and Popayán itself was still in republican hands.
In 1815, southern New Granada, like the Caribbean coast, 
was in a state of uneasy equilibrium. The two regions had been 
the only parts of New Granada where resistance to independence 
had enjoyed some successes, but while Santa Marta and Pasto did 
not succumb to republicanism, neither succeeded in eliminating it 
from their domains. The royalist enclaves had served two 
principal purposes during New Granada’s first republic. They had 
blocked the expansionist ambitions of their powerful neighbours, 
Cartagena and Quito, thereby weakening the movement for 
independence in these cities. The capture of Nariño in Pasto
76Sce Thomas Blossom, Nariho, Hero of Colombian Independence,
University of Arizona Press, (Tucson, 1967), p. 127; Declaration by Francisco 
Artcta, Palmira, 19 May 1815, BRAH, sig. 9/7648 (legajo 52), fols. 147-151; 
Declaration by José Brandcnbcrg, Q uito, 29 June 1815; and Declaration of 
Juan Guerra, Quito, 4 July 1815, both in AGI, Audicncia dc Quito, legajo 275. 
Narifio further carried on a correspondence with the Congress in Tunja, 
during his stay in Pasto. Sec Archiva Narino, vol. 5, pp. 363-368.
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similarly deprived the capital of one of its ablest leaders.
Secondly, the survival of two staunchly royalist centres 
encouraged the belief in Spain that many Neogranadans opposed 
independence. The absence of any such royalist foci in the 
Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata was partially responsible for Spain’s 
decision not to send military reinforcements there. The presence 
of reliable bases in New Granada and Venezuela, on the other 
hand, made the viceroyalty a much more attractive destination.77 
The royalist resistance of Santa Marta and Pasto was thus much 
more than a bulwark against insurgency. It helped attract the 
military support from Spain necessary for a royalist reconquest. 
The next section of this thesis will detail the success of Spain’s 
reconquering expedition, sent in 1815 under the command of 
General Pablo Morillo.
General Morillo arrived to find a polarised society in New 
Granada. Many regions had been in a state on continual warfare 
for five years. Some, like Cartagena, had tasted real autonomy for 
the first time, and were unwilling to return to the former diet of 
subservience. Others had grown tired of the fighting and 
disorganisation, and were disillusioned with the advocates of 
independence. These rifts were not healed by the arrival of 
Morillo’s Expeditionary Army. Centres for royalism such as Santa 
Marta and Pasto, which had withstood the onslaught of 
republicanism, expected to receive preferential treatment. 
Individuals who had tacitly supported independence expected to 
be pardoned, and the republican elite expected to be treated with 
respect, rather than the disdain previously felt by peninsulars
77Scc Edmundo Hcredia, "El destino de la expedición de M orillo," Anuario de 
Estudios Americanos, vol. 29 (1972), p. 326.


C h a p t e r  3:  T h e  R e c o n q u e s t  o f  N e w  ( ¡ r a n a d a
The demise of New Granada’s incipient independence 
movements may have owed something to internal political 
dissentions, regional rivalries, and continuing resistance from the 
royalist enclaves in Santa Marta and Pasto, but the principal agent 
of their military defeat was the Spanish Expeditionary Army led 
by General Pablo Morillo, which was sent to ‘pacify’ Venezuela and 
New Granada. This section will examine the reconquest itself, and 
the response of royalists in Spain and New Granada to the 
reimposition of royal authority. We begin, in this chapter, with an 
account of the organisation of Morillo’s expedition and the 
campaign of 1816.
$ 1 .  The Organisation of  the Expedit ion
Plans to organise a substantial expedition to relieve royalist 
forces in the Americas were first discussed by Spain in June 1814, 
following Ferdinand V Il’s return to the throne. Ferdinand’s 
government did not at first reveal that it intended to send such an 
expedition to Venezuela, and instead let it be known that the 
destination would be Río de la Plata. This ruse was intended to 
mislead the Comisión de Reemplazos, the privately-run agency 
that was bankrolling the expedition. The Commission, which was 
composed primarily of Cadiz-based merchants, had been agitating 
for an army to be sent to Buenos Aires, in order to regain control 
of the viceroyalty’s trade. The Commission had relatively little 
interest in preserving trade to Venezuela and New Granada. The
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destination of the expedition was thus kept secret from the 
Commission, and from the participating officers.1
The troops enlisted in the Expeditionary Army, although 
unaware of their true destination, were nonetheless extremely 
unhappy. Few wished to risk their lives fighting in the colonial 
war. Many attempted to desert before the ships embarked, and 
officers had to be bribed to remain in their posts. Rumours of 
barracks uprisings abounded.2 The expedition was intended to 
set sail in December 1814, but various delays forced the troops to 
remain in Jérez de la Frontera until February 1815. In the end, 
the expedition left from Cádiz on 17 February 1815 with 20 
warships, 59 transport vessels, and 12,254 men, o f  whom 2,500 
were designated to go to Panama.3 It was not until they had been 
at sea for over a week that the true destination of the expedition 
was revealed to the troops. The news caused general 
consternation. “Todos sabemos,” recorded Rafael Sevilla, the 
nephew of Navy Commander Pascual Enrile and a volunteer 
officer in the Expeditionary Army, “que en Buenos Aires y 
Montevideo los rebeldes estaban divididos, que uno de sus bandos 
esperaba las tropas del Rey, para pasarse a ellos y auxiliarlas, y 
que en la Costa Firme, la guerra se hacía sin cuartel y con salvaje
*Scc Edmundo Hercdia, “El destino de la expedición de M orillo”, Anuario de 
Estudios Americanos, vol 29 (1972), pp. 315-340, and Michacl Costeloe,
"Spain and thc Spanish American Wars o f Indepcndcnce: The Comisión de 
Reemplazos, 1811-1820” , JLAS, vol 13 (1981), pp. 223-237.
2Michael Costeloe, Response to Revolution: Imperial Spain and the Spanish 
American Revolutions, 1810-1840, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 
1986), p. 114; and José Luis Cornelias García Llera, Los primeros 
pronunciamientos en España, 1814-1820, Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones C ientíficas (M adrid, 1958), p. 307.
3Costcloe, "The Comisión de Reemplazos”, p. 229, and Antonio Rodríguez 
Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, 
Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), vol 1, Editorial América, (Madrid, 1920), p. 
120. Rafael Sevilla, Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas 
contra Rolívar y los separatistas de América, Editorial América, (Madrid, 
1916), p. 23, gives slightly different figures for thc num ber of ships.
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ferocidad” . General Morillo, the commander in chief, tried to 
overcome the discontent by sending a personal message to the 
troops, reminding them of the honour they were about to win for 
themselves, and of the fact that Venezuela was much closer to 
Spain than was Buenos Aires. Sevilla reports that Morillo 
organised a little ceremony in which the boats passed by the flag 
ship as he shouted ‘¡Viva el Rey! ¡Viva España!’ . “ ‘¡¡¡Viva!!!’, 
contestaban los pobres soldados, agitando sus gorras en el aire.
Con este acto solemne volvió la alegría y el entusiasmo a los 
expedicionarios,” adds Sevilla, rather unconvincingly.4
Pablo Morillo, the expedition’s commander, was 37 years old 
at the time he was appointed. Morillo had first joined the Spanish 
army as a humble soldier in 1791, at age 13. Although he had 
accumulated some military experience before the French invasion 
of Spain in 1808, it was in the Peninsular War that he rose to 
prominence. He was appointed field marshal in 1813, and won 
several notable victories against the French. In 1814, he was 
named to lead an expedition to the Americas, and was promoted 
to general.
The commission to command the Expeditionary Army was 
Morillo’s first political appointment. Ferdinand probably found 
Morillo an acceptable candidate because he had refused to swear 
loyalty to the liberal Constitution of 1812. It should be noted that 
this refusal does not reveal Morillo’s true political beliefs.
Although he had been a protégé of General Francisco Castaños, the 
hero of the Peninsular War and later member of the Regency, and 
although Morillo had refused to swear loyalty to the Constitution, 
which suggest conservative leanings, he developed more liberal
4Scvilla, Memorias p. 24.
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sentiments in the following years. Indeed, before the 
Expeditionary Army left Cádiz in 1814, rumours circulated that 
Morillo was not only a liberal but also a freemason. Conscious of 
the damage such a rumour could do to his reputation in newly 
absolutist Spain, Morillo immediately joined a religious 
cofraternity, hoping thereby to establish his credentials as a 
co n se rv a tiv e .5 Such posturings aside, Morillo retained an 
essentially liberal outlook, remaining throughout his life a 
m oderado  , or moderate liberal.6 He nonetheless enjoyed the 
confidence of Ferdinand VII, who not only appointed him 
commander of the Expeditionary Army in 1814, but expected 
Morillo to participate in an anti-constitutional coup planned for 
1821. Although Morillo did not involve himself with this plot, he 
opposed the more anti-monarchical liberalism of the constitutional 
trien io  and helped restore Ferdinand’s absolute power in 1823, 
an action which he immediately regretted, once the regressive and 
vindictive nature of Ferdinand’s restored regime became 
apparent. He then chose exile in France to further public duties in 
absolutist Spain, and returned only after the “ominous decade” of 
triumphant absolutism ended.
A professional soldier. Morillo was widely respected for his 
military talents, which even republicans such as Daniel Florencio
5Stcphcn Stuan. Pablo Morillo and Venezuela , Ohio State University Press 
(Columbia, 1974) p. 65; and Rodrigue/. Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 1 (1920). p.
I 17. Stoan further reports that the Venezuelan historian Juan Uslar Pictri 
“insists that his own grandfather had a death penalty com m uted personally 
hy Morillo alter giving the general a secret Masonic sign". See Stoan,
Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, p. 65.
6Scc Manifiesto a la Nación Española de José Moreno de García, Cádiz, 16 
February 1822, Iris Zavala, Masones, comuneros y carbonarios. Siglo XXI 
(Madrid. 1971), for a (partisan) discussion of mode rudos ; and Antonio 
Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de 
Carta nena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), vol 1, Real Academia de la 
Historia, (Madrid, 1910), p. 498.
8 0
O ’Leary acknow ledged.7 In his personal manner Morillo was 
described as blunt, not to say rude. His manners particularly 
angered royalists in Venezuela, where he was regarded as 
arbitrary and insulting; one official even described him as “un 
hombre sin principios, . . .  de carácter y genio violento”.8 This 
negative view was not universal; Captain General Juan Manuel de 
Cajigal regarded Morillo as “honrado, franco, activo y generoso” .9 
Nonetheless, the overall picture is of a man with little social grace 
and little desire to acquire any. “Jamás olvidó que había sido un 
sargento que rozaba con las ínfimas clases del ejército”, 
commented José Manuel Restrepo.10
The commander in chief of the Navy, who was Morillo’s 
second in command, was of altogether different social extraction. 
Pascual Enrile was the son of the Marqués de Casa-Enrile, and had 
grown up in Havana. He served initially in the navy, although 
during the Peninsular war he returned to Spain and joined the 
army. The republican Restrepo comments that Enrile had a good 
reputation, but the royalist Captain General Cajigal described him 
as “con demasiado amor propio, invariable en opinión, seco, 
despreciado, y todo esto sobre una figura poco recomendable” .
Both agreed that he enjoyed great influence over Morillo.11 This 
influence was to prove largely counter-productive, as Enrile was
7 Sec Stoan, rublo Morillo and Venezuela, pp. 64-65; and Daniel Florencio 
O ’Lcary. Bolívar and the War of Independence, University o f Texas Press, 
(Austin and London. 1970), pp. 186-187.
8Francisco Xavier A rám barri, Hechos del General Pablo Morillo en América, 
Ediciones de la Embajada de Venezuela en España (Madrid, 1971), p. 20.
9Juan Manuel de Cajigal, Memorias del Mariscal de Campo Don Juan Manuel 
de Cajigal sobre la revolución de Venezuela, B iblioteca Venezolana de 
Historia (Caracas, I960), p. 149.
*°José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, vol 2, 
Ediciones Bcdout (Bogotá, 1969), pp. 137, 139.
1 'Cajigal, Memorias, pp. 149. 158; and Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, 
vol 2, pp. 135-136.
even more uncompromising than Morillo, and many felt he 
brought out the worst aspects of the general’s nature.12
§ 2 .  Moril lo  in Venezuela
Venezuela’s First Republic had fallen in 1812, but its 
collapse had not ended the war. The same Blacks who had fought 
with the royalists against their republican masters rebelled again, 
this time against the restored royalists, once it became clear that a 
return to Spanish rule would bring them no benefits. Within 
three months of Monteverde’s triumph, an anti-royalist revolt had 
broken out on the coast, and pardo  bands, “half-brigands, half­
revolutionaries” , ranged across the country, robbing and 
p i l la g in g .13 Meanwhile, the creole revolutionaries, led by Simón 
Bolívar, planned a comeback. Returning from Cartagena, where he 
had taken refuge after the fall of the First Republic, Bolivar 
marched a force of some 700 men from New Granada into 
Venezuela in mid-1813. He won a series of victories in his 
“Campaña Admirable”, capturing Caracas in August 1813. The 
royalists, however, were a far from spent force.
One royalist leader was particularly responsible for the 
revival of Spain’s fortunes. José Tomás Boves, a Spaniard resident 
in the Venezuelan Llanos, appeared on the military stage in 
February 1814. Leading a band of nominally royalist Llanero 
horsemen, Boves enjoyed victory after victory over the 
republicans, recapturing Caracas on 16 July 1814. Ignoring the
12For alleged comments by Morillo himself, see Simón Bolívar to Francisco 
dc Paula Santander, Trujillo, 29 November 1820, in Selected Writings of 
Rollvar, vol 1, Vicente Lecuna (editor). The Colonial Press (New York, 1851), 
pp. 244-247.
13John Lynch. The Spanish American Revolutions, IH08-IH26, W.W. Norton, 
(New York, 1986) p. 200. For a description of the war in Venezuela, see 
Lynch, pp. 190-207.
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existing royalist administrative hierarchy, he declared himself 
governor of Caracas, president of the Audiencia, captain-general of 
Venezuela and commander of the royalist army. As by this stage 
he commanded some 12,000 men, few were in a position to 
d isa g re e .14
Boves distinguished himself by the savagery of his attacks 
and lack of interest in differentiating between combatants and 
civilians. His troops routinely sacked the cities and towns that fell 
to them. He was widely accused of instituting a reign of terror in 
Caracas after its capture; secret nocturnal executions awaited 
those who had not already fled.15 Forced contributions and 
seizures of valuables followed. Among the republicans the name 
of Boves became a byword for atrocity, but the royalist 
commanders were often lukewarm in their condemnation of 
Boves’ activities. Captain General Montalvo praised his valour, 
and merely criticised his “ imprudence”; other royalist supporters 
appear to have regarded Boves as a hero.16
Boves had many followers. According to Venezuela’s 
Captain General Cajigal, this was because Boves had granted his 
troops
14 Boves’ force was the largest to fight in Venezuela’s war o f  independence. 
Sec German Carrera Damas, Boves, aspectos socio-económicos. Colección 
Vigilia (Caracas, 1968), p. 35.
l5 Sec José Francisco Heredia, Memorias del Regente Heredia (de las Reales 
Audiencias de Caracas y México) , Editorial América (Madrid, n.d.), pp. 278- 
285.
l6 Francisco Montalvo to the Regency, Santa Marta, 27 June 1814, Los 
últimos virreyes de Nueva Granada, Relación de Mando del Virrey Don 
Francisco Montalvo y noticias del Virrey Sámano sobre la pérdida del Reino 
( INIJ-1(119), Eduardo Posada and P.M. Ibáñcz (editors). Biblioteca de la 
Juventud Hispano-Americana, Editorial América, (M adrid, n .d .), pp. 47-48. 
For the views of a royalist civilian, sec Josef González Llórente to Juan 
Bautista Sacristan, Kingston, 14 April 1815, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, 
legajo 549. 3
/ S3
los dos puntos de atracción más poderosos: el malo 
encontraba el camino de saciar su depravación con el 
permitido robo (bajo el voz saqueo), asesinatos, fuerzas y 
toda clase de depredaciones; el bueno no hallaba otra 
seguridad por la garantía de su persona que la de alistarse 
en el ejército de Boves.17
There were of course other reasons for the Llaneros’ anti­
republicanism. Since the First Republic, Venezuelan creoles had 
been attempting to reduce the Llaneros to  a “regimented peon 
c lass” . 18 The ‘Ordenanzas de los Llanos’ issued in 1811 prohibited 
virtually all the activities previously carried out by the Llaneros. 
The plainsmen were not to travel without a passport, or they 
would be lashed, the rounding-up of wild cattle was outlawed, and 
all Llaneros were to obtain permanent employment, or they would 
be forced to work on a ranch. As Miguel Izard observed, the 
Ordenanzas by themselves explain the ease with which Boves 
recruited the Llaneros to his cause.19
Venezuela, then, had been virtually restored to the royalists 
by Boves’ troops during 1814. Boves was killed in December 
1814, but his place was taken by Francisco Tomás Morales, a man 
cut from the same cloth as his predecessor. On 15 March 1815, 
the Expeditionary Army of General Pablo Morillo landed in
17Cajigal, Memorias , p. 133.
18David Bushncll, “The Independence of Spanish South America,” in The 
Independence of Latin America, edited by L eslie Bcthcll, Cambridge 
University Press, (Cam bridge, 1987), p. 109
19See Miguel Izard, El miedo a la revolución: la lucha por la libertad en 
Venezuela (1777-1R30), Editorial Tecnos (M adrid, 1979), pp. 132-133.
Other factors served to further alienate many Venezuelans from the 
republican cause. Rcstrcpo reports that within a few months of Bolivar's 
triumphant entry into Caracas, the inhabitants o f  Venezuela grew tired of 
the continual drafting of men into the army, the forced contributions 
demanded by the republicans, and the destruction  of property com mitted 
by poorly controlled republican troops. (Sec C arrera Damas, Boves, p. 77.)
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Venezuela with a force of 10,500 men, equipped with thousands 
o f guns, swords, and other weapons. M orillo’s intention was to 
reestablish Spanish control, but he soon learned that this had 
already been accomplished by Boves. Indeed, the only remaining 
military objective was the recapture of the Island o f Margarita, 
which had become the base of republicans under the leadership of 
Juan Bautista Arismendi. This was accomplished with great speed 
and efficiency by Brigadier Francisco Tomás Morales. Morales 
regained the island with a battalion of za m b o s ,  “que era el terror 
del enem igo” .20 Morillo pardoned Arismendi, contrary to all 
advice, and a military governor was placed in charge of the island.
The capture of M argarita effectively completed the 
reconquest of Venezuela. Few insurgents had survived Boves’ 
terrible slaughter of 1814, and those rem aining were quickly 
captured by M orillo’s troops in the months that followed. Indeed, 
the arrival of M orillo’s army in Venezuela initially altered little 
the course of the conflict, as the royalists were everywhere in 
military ascendancy. The army of Boves was not, however, used 
to best advantage by M orillo, as it suffered from several great 
defects. To begin with, even the most cold blooded royalists had 
to admit that Boves’ troops had comm itted some “excesses”, and 
were perhaps not model soldiers. More importantly, this army 
was composed mostly of pardos, to whom, Stephen Stoan writes, 
“ Boves had made promises . . . that |none| in Spain were disposed 
to honor” .21 Morillo, like the Venezuelan creoles, feared he was 
witnessing the start of a caste war. Rather than rewarding Boves’ 
pardos for their defeat of the insurgents. Morillo demoted many
2,lRodrígucz Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 1 (1920), p. 123. 
21 Sec Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, pp. 71-73.
and retired more. Such disaffected men became ready converts to 
Bolivar’s cause.
The royalists were thus hoist on their own petard. Unable to 
learn from their experiences in 1812, when disgruntled p a r d o s  
had deserted M onteverde’s royalist governm ent, the triumphant 
royalists again failed to acknowledge pardo  demands.
Particularly after the death of Boves in December 1814, the 
Llaneros’ contribution to the survival of Venezuelan royalism 
went unappreciated by other royalist leaders. When Morillo 
dismissed and demoted llanero leaders, what followed was a 
repeat of events in 1812. The Llaneros first returned to the plains 
of Casanare and Apure, and then raised the banner of 
independence, “que era la voz con que podian robar”, commented 
M orillo dryly .22 Thus republicanism, which had been virtually 
eliminated from Venezuela in 1814, enjoyed ever-greater 
popularity after the arrival of M orillo’s army.
After M orillo’s entry into Caracas, a military government 
was established. Morillo set up courts to try suspected traitors 
and reorganised the c ity ’s bureaucracy, in particular suspending 
the Audiencia, and action that was to generate years of 
controversy. He also irritated virtually the entirety of the c ity ’s 
existing civilian government. He demanded unreasonable 
quantities of food for the troops, and was gratuitously rude to 
government officials. Captain General Cajigal claimed that one 
official was so badly insulted that he fell into a coma and went 
m ad .23 This claim, while no doubt exaggerated, illustrates the
22Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Cura, 26 February 1818, Rodrigue/. Villa, 
Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 510-518.
23Cajigal, Memorlas , p. 153 and Ardmbarri, Hechos del General Morillo , p. 
19. See Cajigal. Memorias , pp. 148-176 for details of M orillo’s stay in 
C aracas.
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strength of anti-M orillo feeling among Caracas royalists. Outside 
Caracas, the army confiscated vast amounts of food, livestock and 
seeds. In everything they behaved, Cajigal reported 
enigm atically, “con el desenfado que facilita unos grandes 
b igo tes” .24
By May 1X15 Morillo had com pleted the reorganisation of 
Caracas, and in July he left Venezuela for New Granada, leaving 
Brigadier Salvador Moxo in charge o f  administering the Captaincy 
General. Moxo, whom Stephen Stoan regards as the true villain of 
the Venezuelan reconquest, was thus responsible both for the 
day-to-day running of the dictatorship, and for supplying the 
Expeditionary Army. Serious disagreem ents were soon to develop 
between Moxo and Morillo over the latter aspect of M oxo’s duties. 
Morillo repeatedly accused Moxo of failing to respond to his 
orders with sufficient alacrity, and in the end Moxo was 
re p la c e d .25 3
S 3 .  The Siege of Cartagena26
On 22 July 1815, Morillo arrived in Santa Marta, 
accompanied by some 8,000 troops, o f whom over 3,000 were
24Cajigal, Memorias , p. 157.
25Sec Stoan, rabio Morillo and Venezuela, esp. pp. 88-89, 111-115; Pablo 
Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, el campo del Paso del Frío, en el Río Apure, 2 
February 1817, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3 , p. 265; Pablo Morillo to 
Salvador de Moxó, Chaparro, 27 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 
386; Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, Cumaná, 8 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia 
de Caracas, legajo 110 (and 386); and Salvador de Moxó to Ministers of State 
and Universal de Indias. Caracas, 30 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, 
legajo 110.
26The following section is drawn, where not otherwise indicated, from the 
following sources: Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2; Gabriel 
Jim énez M olinarcs, Los mártires de Cartagena de 1816 ante el consejo de 
guerra y ante la historia, vol. 2, Im prenta Departamental (Cartagena, 1950); 
and Gabriel Porras Troconis, La magna epopeya de Cartagena: el sitio del 
año 1818, Editorial Tcntis (Bogotá, 1965); Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Los 
grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuestra historia, vol 2,
Ediciones Tercer Mundo, (Bogotá, 1984).
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V e n e z u e la n .27 From Santa Marta, he began to plan the recapture 
o f Cartagena. At the time of M orillo’s arrival in New Granada, 
Cartagena had only recently survived Simón Bolivar’s siege: 
disagreem ents between Simón Bolívar and Manuel del Castillo y 
Rada, the leader of Cartagena’s insurgents, had led the future 
liberator to blockade the city. His efforts failed, and on 9 May 
1815 Bolivar had departed for Jamaica. At the time, Cartagena 
contained one or two thousand insurgent troops.28 Perfect trust 
had not, however, been established between Castillo and the 
Venezuelan troops left behind by Bolivar. This distracted the 
insurgent leaders from  concentrating on the royalist threat, which 
they indeed largely discounted until it was too late.
Many of the towns and villages surrounding Cartagena were 
quickly captured by the royalists, and thousands of their 
inhabitants swore loyalty to Ferdinand V II.29 The division of 
Brigadier Morales, as well as M orillo’s Venezuelan vanguard, were 
sent ahead from Santa Marta towards Cartagena, and Brigadier 
Pedro Ruiz de Porras, governor of Santa Marta, marched towards 
Mompós with 1,000 men. The general royalist headquarters was 
established at the hacienda de Torrecilla (now Parenquillo). The 
siege began on 22 August 1815, although a blockade was 
established some weeks earlier, and foreign governments in the 
Caribbean were told to warn their subjects against trying to reach 
C a r ta g e n a .10 Morillo did not at first attempt to negotiate with the 
insurgents in Cartagena, nor did he offer any conditions other than
27Scc Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, pp. 51-52.
28 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 61.
2 9 Sec Oath of Loyalty and Lists o f those swearing loyalty, August-Septcmbcr 
IK 15, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717.
10Scc Pablo Morillo to Admiral Douglas, the Captain General of the Antilles, 
Santa Marta. 50 July 1815, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 2, pp. 573-574.
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com plete surrender. He did, however, issue numerous 
proclamations urging the Cartageneros to submit to Spain’s gentle 
yoke .
The effects of the siege were soon felt. Inside the city walls, 
Cartagena was reduced to terrible misery and hunger, despite the 
periodic shipments of flour and other foods they received from 
English vessels able to evade the Spanish blockade. The Spanish 
had several times captured funds intended for the purchase of 
food in the Antilles, and towards the end of the siege those 
Cartageneros who survived were reduced to eating boiled 
le a th e r .31 Moreover, thousands of people from the surrounding 
countryside had swarmed into Cartagena, placing even greater 
strains on the food supply. The city’s leaders nonetheless did not 
wish to surrender. Indeed, in October Castillo was removed from 
office in a coup organised by individuals who suspected him of 
negotiating secretly with Morillo to arrange the c ity ’s capitulation.
José Francisco Bermúdez, a Venezuelan who had fled from the 
Island of Margarita after its recapture, was then elevated to 
commander. Bermudez tried to reorganise the c ity ’s meagre food 
reserves, and ordered all “bocas inútiles” to leave the city.
Meanwhile, the Spanish troops were them selves suffering. 
Thousands of soldiers died from infectious diseases during the 
siege. Morillo reported in October 1815, two months into the 
siege, that “sufrimos una baja considerable de españoles (a causa 
de | este perverso clima que es fatal para los europeos”.32 By 
December the royalists has lost over 3,000 troops to death and
31Sce Testimonios contra los insurgentes en Cartagena, December 1815- 
January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 891 A.
,2 Pahlo Morillo to José de Abascal, Torrecillas, 21 October 1815, AGI,
Diversos, legajo 4, ramo 1. Sec also Restrepo, Historia (le la revolución, vol.
2, p. 78.
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desertion. In an attempt to bring the siege to a close, the royalists 
tried in November 1815 to storm the city. They did not succeed, 
and the blockade continued.
Although Cartagena’s insurgent leadership was expecting the 
arrival o f help from the interior, no assistance arrived. The 
m isleading and unrealistic propaganda about the small size of 
M orillo’s army and the false reports of their own strength 
circulated by Cartagena’s republican leaders had redounded to 
their detriment; few in the in terior realised the desperate state of 
C artagena’s republicans, and those who did apparently shared the 
unfounded confidence in C artagena’s ability to survive.
Accordingly no reinforcements were sent, and one of New 
G ranada’s manor cities was left to defend itself.33 Increasingly 
desperate, Cartagena’s leaders considered plans to place Cartagena 
under British protection. M oreover, a mass exodus of over 2,000 
people attempted to leave the city in late November 1815. This 
prompted Morillo to warn the insurgents on 4 December 1815 
that he would forcibly return any émigrés to Cartagena if they did 
not agree to surrender. A last flo tilla  of escapees put to sea on 5 
December. The next day, on 6 December 1815, the city 
capitulated to the Spanish.34
The siege had lasted 106 days. The long blockade had 
reduced the city to a pitiful state. Morillo reported that Cartagena 
after the surrender was “el espectáculo más doloroso de mi 
v id a ” .35 Over 7,000 people had died of hunger and disease; more
33See Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 65-66.
34See Rodríguez Villa, rabio Morillo, vol 1 (1920), pp. 156-157.
35Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 1, p. 447
than a third of the city’s total population perished in the siege.36 
Corpses lay unburied in the houses and the streets. Those who 
had survived “no eran hombres, sino esqueletas; hombres y 
mujeres vivos retratos de la m uerte,” recorded Rafael Sevilla.37 
Those who survived had “un semblante cadavérico en que 
manifiestan las necesidades y m iserias que han sufrido” .38 The 
Spanish imm ediately began fumigating the city, prohibited the 
sick from entering, and opened large communal graves into which 
the dead were thrown. This latter action was strongly criticised 
by the government in Madrid, which, with its typical concern for 
pointless detail, decreed that all the dead, whether royalist or 
insurgent, should be given a Christian burial.39 Public soup 
kitchens were also established, and by all accounts the Spanish 
troops were generous in sharing their rations with the starving 
citizens of Cartagena.
The army was less generous in its treatment of captured 
émigrés. At the time of the surrender rumours had circulated 
that Morillo intended to “pasar todos los habitantes de . . . 
Cartagena de Indias a cuchillo” . Accordingly, hundreds of
36Scc Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 86; Donaldo Bossa Herazo, 
Cartagena independiente : tradición y desarrollo. Ediciones Tercer Mundo 
(Bogotá, 1967),pp. 24-29 for estimates o f C artagena’s population; and 
Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los 
últimos virreyes, p. 88.
Pascual Enrile estimated that about 2,000 people died of hunger (see 
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol I (1920), p. 177); while the bishop of 
Cartagena claimed that over 3,000 died (Juan José Odcriz to Minister 
Universal dc Indias, Cartagena, 28 December 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Santa 
Fe, legajo 747, ramo 2).
37Sevilla, Memorias, p. 68. See also Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand,
Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9 (this document is 
also printed in Bossa Herazo, Cartagena independiente, pp. 69-76).
38Juan José Odcriz to Minister Universal de Indias, Cartagena, 28 December 
1815, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 747, ramo 2.
39Scc the various Bandos o f Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, December 1815, 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717; and Ruling by Ferdinand, Madrid, 16 April 
1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742.
frightened Cartageneros had attem pted to escape the royalists by 
putting to sea in small, overcrowded boats, but without pilots 
many lost their way and the passengers either died of hunger or 
were captured by the Spanish off the coasts of Panama and New 
G ra n a d a .40 One survivor reported that he and about 100 other 
people had left Cartagena in early D ecem ber 1815; when he was 
picked up by the Spanish a few weeks later only about 20 people 
rem ained alive.41 Dozens of captured emigres were executed. 
Restrepo further reports that over 400 m en, women and children 
from Cartagena were massacred in cold blood near Bocachica after 
having surrendered to Brigadier M orales.42
The blockade of Cartagena was extended to the entire Atrato 
River region on 20 December 1815 and was not lifted until mid- 
A ugust 1816.43 From its recapture on 6 December 1815 until
Juan Samano became viceroy in 1818, Cartagena served as the 
adm inistrative capital of royalist New Granada. Francisco 
Montalvo, who had been promoted to viceroy on 28 April 1816, 
set up residence in the city, where he was joined by the 
Audiencia, the Tribunal de Cuentas, and a variety of other 
officials. Morillo also established a perm anent court martial to try 
in f id en te s ,  and restored the Inquisition to its former dwellings.
The relationship between Morillo and M ontalvo, the courts 
m artial, and the other reconquest institu tions will be considered 
in the next chapter.
4(,Porras Troconis, La magna epopeya< P- 60, fig, lists many of the emigrés 
4 te s t im o n io s  contra los insurgentes en C artagena. December 1815-January 
1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 891 A.
42Scc Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Cartagena, 1° February 1816, 
Rodríguez Villa, rabio Morillo, vol 3, pp. 131-132. f°r a partial list of those 
shot; and Restrepo, Historia cje /a revolución, vol 2, P- 86.
43Pablo Morillo to Luis dc Onis, Santa Fe, I July and 17 August 1816,
Rodriguez. Villa, rabio Morillo, vol 3. PP- 24-26.
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§ 4 .  Consol idating the Conquest
The arrival of M orillo’s army greatly alarmed the 
inhabitants of New Granada. In his diary, José María Caballero 
recorded the increasing anxiety and sadness that enveloped Santa 
Fe after the fall of Cartagena.44 Moreover, faith in the republican 
Congress had plummeted, despite a change of leader. Camilo 
Torres, who in 1815 had been forced to accept the presidency in 
spite of his belief that “la república se hallaba expirante”, 
resigned, and José Fernández Madrid took office.45 Madrid, well 
liked and eloquent, was considered more energetic than Torres, 
but he proved unable to restore confidence in the government. 
Indeed, when in early 1816 he asked for new volunteers to enlist 
in the army, no more than six individuals responded to his plea.46 
Little hope remained for the young republic.
Meanwhile, following the successful recapture of Cartagena, 
the Expeditionary Army began to move toward Santa Fe, with the 
exception of the Regimiento de León, the Batallones del Rey, de 
Puerto Rico, de Albuera (later Valencia), and de Granada, and 
several smaller companies. These were left in Cartagena as a 
garrison, and numbered some 2,500 troops. Morillo him self left 
Cartagena on 16 February 1816, but already some officers who 
had not participated in the blockade of Cartagena had begun 
working their way into the interior.
44Scc José María Caballero, Diario, Biblioteca de Bogotá, (Editorial Villegas, 
1990).
45Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 73.
46Sce Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 101.
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These expeditions took several routes.47 First, Pedro Ruiz de 
Porras and Vicente Sánchez Lima went directly to Mompós in 
September 1815. Sánchez Lima soon captured various insurgent 
leaders, such as Pantaleón Germán Ribón and Martín Amador. 
(Sánchez Lima subsequently assisted Francisco W arleta in 
capturing Antioquia, where he rem ained as governor until 
removed from office by Morillo for being excessively conciliatory.) 
A second force led by Lieutenant Colonel Julián Bayer had also left 
Cartagena for the Chocó, going by boat up the Atrato River in 
December 1815. Leading a force of 200 men, he captured 150 
insurgents who, having managed to flee Cartagena, had been 
shipwrecked and were starving.48 Although initially obliged to 
withdraw from the Chocó, he returned and, in June 1816, opened 
communications with Colonel Francisco W arleta in Antioquia.49 
Finally, Colonel Sebastián de la Calzada had been working his way 
into New Granada from Barinas.
Sebastián de la Calzada, an uneducated and illiterate fighter, 
whose troops were regarded by Morillo as “unos guerrilleros sin 
disciplina” , played an important part in the reconquest of New 
G ra n a d a .50 In late 1815, he had assembled a force of over 2,000
47There arc several secondary sources which describe the military 
campaigns of 1816-1818. Sec, for example, Julio Albi, Banderas Olvidadas: el 
ejército realista en América, Ediciones Cultura Hispánica (M adrid, 1990); 
and Jorge Mercado, Campaña de invasión del Teniente General Don Pablo 
Morillo, 1815-1816, Ejército de Colombia, Estado Mayor General (Bogotá.
1919). José Cervcra Pcry, La marina española en la emancipación de 
hispanoamérica, MAPFRE (Madrid. 1992), gives an account o f the naval 
actions in the Caribbean.
4 8 For inform ation about the capture o f Cartagenero insurgents, sec 
Expedición del Rio Atrato en Diciembre de 1815 por el Teniente Coronel Don 
Julián Bayer, In AGI, Mapas y Planes: Panama, ff. 313-318.
49Borrador de Ystoria del Cuartel General, desde 30 de Mayo de 1816 a 18 de 
Agosto del mismo, entry for 8 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A.
S0Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Ocaña, 25 March 1816, AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8717, doc. 48. Sec also Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 77.
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men in Venezuela, and began marching into New Granada through 
the Llanos de Casanare. He had suffered one defeat at the hands 
of Joaquin Ricaurte, but managed to arrive in Cúcuta with about 
three-quarters of his force intact. He there defeated first Rafael 
Urdaneta, and then the combined force o f Custodio García Rovira 
and Francisco de Paula Santander at Cachin' on 21-22 February 
1816 in a bloody battle that cost the republicans over 1,500 
m e n .51 This latter victory effectively destroyed the republican 
resistance in New Granada; henceforth nothing stood between the 
royalists and the capital. Calzada then joined Miguel de La Torre 
and their two forces entered Santa Fe on 6 May 1816. They faced 
no resistance, as the republican reserves and indeed the 
republican government had fled on 3 May. After occupying the 
capital. Calzada pursued the republican General Serviez, who had 
fled south towards Cáqueza. Serviez was defeated on 11 May, and 
the image of the Virgin of Chiquinquirá, which Serviez had taken 
from its shrine, was recovered and returned to Chiquinquirá.
Colonel Miguel de la Torre, in charge of the Second Division, 
had meanwhile been proceeding towards Santa Fe via Ocaña, 
Bucaramanga, Girón, Socorro, and Vêlez, where he was to join the 
Fifth Division led by Calzada. Girón distinguished itself as a centre 
of royalism, and the city indeed organised a ball for the troops, 
but all towns in this region, including the once fervently insurgent 
Socorro, welcomed Calzada.52 Tunja was captured in April 1816, 
and the republican Congress was obliged to dissolve itself. La
51 For reports on the battle of Cachiri, see Sebastián de la Calzada to Pablo 
Morillo, Suratá. 23 February IK 16, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, p.
30; and Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Mompós, 9 March 1816, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. The Spanish reportedly gave no quarter. Sec 
Liévano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos, p. 917
52Rodrígucz Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 1 (1920), p. 210, and Restrepo, Historia 
de la revolución, vol 2, p. 99.
Torre advanced uneventfully towards Santa Fe, which he entered 
together with the troops of Calzada. Although Calzada and La 
Torre worked in unison, the two disliked each other intensely.
Morillo himself went toward Santa Fe, via Mompós, Ocaña, 
Girón, San Gil, Socorro, San Benito and Zipaquirá. On 16 May 1816, 
he entered Santa Fe without a battle, amid triumphal arches and 
festivities. Far from participating in these celebrations he retired 
immediately to a house that had been prepared for him. All 
efforts to convince him of the sincerity of the Bogotanos’ 
conversion to royalism failed, and he rebuffed a collective plea for 
mercy delivered to him soon after his arrival by a party of upper 
class women. He did however agree to pardon lower-ranking 
so ld ie rs .53
Meanwhile, Colonel Francisco de Paula W arleta, who had 
already proceeded from Cartagena to Antioquia, was on his way 
up the Cauca River to Nechi and Zaragosa. On 22 March 1816, he 
defeated Andrés José Linares at Ceja Alta, south of Remedios. The 
battle lasted four days, and involved over a thousand troops, 
although W arleta reported that the insurgents tended to flee 
rather than fight.54 This important victory sealed Spanish control 
of the region, and by early April 1816, W arleta was in command 
of all Antioquia.55 In August 1816, he moved south to Cali, and in 
September was named comm ander of royalist forces in Popayán.
5 3 The delegation of Bogotanas is described in Sevilla, Memorias, p. 95, and 
Caballero, Diario, pp. 214-215.
54 For official reports of the battle of Ceja Alta, see the two letters of 
Francisco Warlcta to Pablo M orillo, Cancan, 23 March 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 707 (also in legajo 717).
5 5 Information on the royalist campaign in Antioquia may be found in Josd 
Manuel Rcslrcpo, Autobiographia, con apuntamientos sobre la emigración 
que hice en ISI6 de la provincia de Antioquia a la de Popayán, Biblioteca de 
la Presidencia de Colombia, vol 30 (Bogotá, 1957), pp. 65-69 of 
Apuntamientos and Autobiographia, p. 17.
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Both in Antioquia and in the south he arrested and executed large 
numbers of people, often for the most minor offences. Indeed, 
W arleta aroused great hostility even among royalists, who accused 
him of undermining attempts at reconciliation.56 (He remained in 
New Granada until 1820, when he left Cartagena in order to avoid 
having to swear loyalty to the Constitution of 1812.)
Colonel Donato Ruiz de Santa Cruz, in turn, left Cartagena to 
join Brigadier Juan Sámano in Pasto, going via the Magdalena 
River to Honda, and thence to La Plata. He captured Nare in late 
April 1816.57 Meanwhile, Juan Sámano, commander of the Third 
Division, marched north from Quito to destroy the remaining 
insurgent forces in the Cauca region. Sámano, commanding some 
1,300 troops, defeated insurgents troops at the battle of the 
Cuchilla del Tambo, outside Popayán, on 29 June 1816. The 
insurgent troops, who had numbered some 700, lost all their 
heavy artillery, and most of their officers were killed.58 This 
im portant victory delivered Popayán into Spanish hands and 
secured the south for the royalists. The remaining republican 
forces, led by Pedro Monsalve, fled east to La Plata, where they 
were defeated by Carlos Tolrá on 10 July 1816. (Tolrá had fought 
at the battle of Cachin', and then proceeded south to Popayán as 
commander of the Second Batallón of Numancia. He remained 
there, terrorising the inhabitants and angering the civilian
56Sce José María Rcstrcpo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, 
Imprenta Nacional (Bogotá, 1932) vol 1, pp. 289-304; Francisco Warleta to 
Juan Sámano, Cali, 22 August 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 60-61; 
and Pablo Morillo to Miguel de La Torre, Barquisimeto, 17 December 1819, 
AHNM. Estado, legajo 8717, Doc. 281.
57Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Bucaramanga, 13 May 1816, Rodriguez 
Villa, rabio Morillo, vol 3, pp. 156-157
58Borrador dc Ystoria del Cuartel General, desde 30 dc Mayo dc 1816 a 18 dc 
Agosto del mismo, entry for 27 July 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 759A; 
and Juan Sámano to Torihio Montes, Cuchilla de Tambo, 30 June 1816, BRAH, 
sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 18-19.
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authorities, until, in 1817 he was sent to the Llanos to defeat the 
insurgency led by the Almeida Brothers. This he did, with much
loss of life.*'9)
Thus, with the exception of the Llanos de Casanare, to which 
a handful of republicans had escaped, all New Granada was again 
in royalist hands. The entire reconquest was completed by the 
end of July 1816, one year after Morillo’s landing in Santa Marta,
and seven months after the end of the siege of Cartagena. After
examining the Spanish reconquest of New Granada, the military 
historian Jorge Mercado concluded:
Nada militar se opuso en puridad de verdad a la realización
[del plan de Morillo]. El país estaba en completa anarquía y
el ejército independiente--si podemos dar tal nombre a las 
montaneras que aquí y allá se decoraron con apelativos 
m ilitares--reproducían fielm ente ese estado de confusión y 
de desorden.
The reconquest, he concluded, was a mere “paseo m ilitar” .* 60 This 
evaluation, while perhaps exaggerated, does draw attention to the 
relative ease with which the Spanish recaptured New Granada. 
W hile the insurgents offered real resistance at the battles of 
Cachin', Ceja Alta, and the Cuchilla del Tambo, and during the siege 
of Cartagena, the inhabitants o f New Granada did not oppose the 
invaders en masse. The capital itself surrendered w ithout a 
battle, and indeed welcomed the reconquerers. The reasons for 
this are not difficult to discover. By 1816 the inhabitants of New 
Granada were deeply disillusioned with their new republican 
leaders. Independence had brought civil war and conflict, “ fatigas
6 9 Biographical material on Tolrá is contained in Restrcpo Saenz, 
Gobernadores de Antioquia , pp. 343-367.
60Mercado, Campaña de invasión, p. 201.
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y penalidades” .61 Morillo benefited from what Juan Friede has 
called a “protest vote” against the republicans.62 Moreover, the 
defeat of Napoleon in Spain and the return of Ferdinand to the 
throne further discouraged republican troops. A captured 
insurgent officer reported in 1815 that the news of Ferdinand’s 
return was having a terrible effect on his troops: “ha notado 
mucho abatimiento, y . . . diariamente se experimentan renuncias 
de los oficiales y em pleos” .63 Morillo’s task was an easy one.
Sent to reconquer a populace ready to be reconquered, he profited 
from the divisions and ineptitude of the governments of the Patria 
Boba. Restrepo speculated that even had the republicans 
succeeded in uniting their disparate forces, the populace itself 
would have risen up to welcome the Spanish.64 Under such 
circumstances, M orillo’s early success is easy to understand.
§ 5 .  The Composit ion of  the Army
Despite its initial successes, the Expeditionary Army was not 
an unfailing bulwark protecting the restored royal regime. On 
arriving in America, it had consisted mostly of veterans of the 
Peninsular War. This did not necessarily mean they were well 
disciplined, and in any event the stock of veterans was soon 
exhausted. Indeed, in 1818 Morillo was obliged to request that 
greater care be exercised in selecting soldiers:
61 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, pp. 105, 156. 
ft2Juan Friede, La otra verdad: la independencia americano vista por los
españoles. Tercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1972), pp. 14-15; and Rcstrcpo, 
Autobiographia, p. 65.
63Dcclaration of Vicente Vancgas, Pasto, 25 October 1815, AGI, Audiencia de 
Quito, legajo 275. Sec also Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol 1, 
Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol 6, Ediciones Lcrncr (Bogotá, 1964), p. 64.
64Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 132.
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Las tropas que se destinen a América deben en mi concepto 
ser compuestas de hombres honrados y de buena conducta, 
y no de la multitud de desertores y malos soldados que 
suelen reunir en los depósitos de ultramar, . . . cuyos 
hombres aquí hacen más daño que los mismos enemigos. No 
pueden oirse sin horor los excesos cometidos por el 
extinguido batallón de Granada, compañías sueltas 
americanas, y los llamados Curros de Monteverde. Estos 
cuerpos, com puestos por la m ayor parte de desertores, 
ladrones, presidiarios y los soldados más perversos de todo 
el ejército, com etieron toda clase de crímenes cuando 
llegaron a estas provincias. . ,65
“Con este clase de pacificadores,” warned Morillo, “crea vuestra 
excelencia que jam ás las provincias sublevadas de América se 
reducirán a sus deberes” .66 Recruitm ent of Americans produced 
equally undesirable troops. It is telling that Morillo regarded it as 
m erely desirable, rather than essential, that recruits be well 
behaved and support the royalist cause.67
Numerically, M orillo’s forces and those opposing him were 
fairly evenly matched when Morillo arrived in America, although 
some Colombian historians have preferred to describe the 
Expeditionary Army as an invincible war machine. The Colombian 
m ilitary historian, Jorge Mercado, reported that at the time of the
66Pablo Morillo to Ministry o f War, Valencia, 22 April 18IS, Rodriguez Villa, 
Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 563-567. See also Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, 
Barquisimeto, 22 July 1818, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 596-600, 
for more complaints about the poor quality o f the troops. Also see Christon 
Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, I760-IBI0, University of New M exico 
Press (Albuquerque, 1977), pp. 254-255, for general comments about the 
unsavoury  character o f e igh teen th -cen tu ry  arm ies.
66Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Cafio dc Atamayca, 28 February 1819, 
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 4, pp. 10-14
67Valcntin Capmany to Gabriel dc Torres, Mompós, 4 April 1816, AGI,
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 712.
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reconquest the insurgent armies in New Granada num bered 
roughly 6,000. These were spread across New Granada, with the 
largest group concentrated in Cartagena, where about 1,600 troops 
were garrisoned.68 M any of the insurgent soldiers had 
previously been members of the royal army, and had thus 
received some military training, although this of course did not 
mean they had gained any actual experience of w arfare.69 The 
great difference with the royalists was that the insurgent forces 
were not united under a single command, and were scattered 
across New Granada under different political entities.
While the Expeditionary Army numbered some 10,500 
troops at the time of its arrival in Venezuela, only about 5,000 of 
these accompanied Morillo to New Granada. The rem ainder 
stayed in Venezuela under the command of Salvador de Moxo. A 
further 3,000-odd Venezuelan troops followed M orillo to 
Cartagena as well.70 After the siege of Cartagena, royalist forces 
were reduced by some 3,000, although new recruits from  New 
Granada increased num bers considerably. By m id-1817, Morillo 
had some 7,000 to 8,000 men in New Granada, while a further 
3,000 to 4,000 remained in Venezuela. Bolivar, Paez, and their 
allies had by this time recruited an estimated 14,000 troops.71
68Mercado, Campaña de invasión, p. 26
69Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los 
últimos virreyes, p. 21.
70Laura Ullriek, “M orillo’s Attempt to Pacify Venezuela”, HAHR,  vol 3 
(1920), pp. 541-542; and Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 31 May 
1816, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, p. 162.
71 Ministry of State to Ministry o f War, Madrid, 15 March 1817, Rodriguez 
Villa. Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 646-648; Bartolomé de Azparren to Director 
General of Correos, Caracas, 28 August 1817, AGI, Estado, legajo 64; and 
Ejército Expedicionario, Resumen histórico de las operaciones y 
movimientos de las columnas y tropas . . . desde el mes de noviembre de 
1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B.
The Expeditionary Army was rapidly creoleized. Already in 
early IS 15, 2,500 Venezuelan troops participated in the assault on 
the Island of M argarita, and thousands of Americans were 
recruited to accompany Morillo to New Granada.72 Moreover, 
many new units were formed in both New Granada and 
Venezuela. Following Sámano’s victory at the Cuchilla del Tambo, 
for example, Morillo requested permission to form a ‘Batallión del 
Tambo’. Both officers and soldiers were preferably to be from 
Pasto, in order to reward the bravery of the Pastusos.73 In 1817, 
Lieutenant Colonel Simón Sicilia attempted to form a regiment of 
gente de color in the Chocó, but was stopped by Viceroy Montalvo. 
M ontalvo’s intercession was greeted with “ una general alegría”, 
which gives some indication of the level of enthusiasm for 
military service.74 A battalion of slaves was, however, formed by 
Morillo himself in Venezuela in IS IS .75
While new battalions were formed, others were dissolved, 
either because the majority of the troops had died or deserted, or 
because they were guilty of misdeeds. The latter was the fate of
72See Sebastián González García, “El aniquilamiento del ejército 
expedicionario de Costa Firme (1815-1823)”, Revista de Indias, vol 22, p. 138.
73Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 17 September 1816, Rodríguez 
Villa, rabio Morillo, vol 3, pp. 216-217. The Third Battalion of Numancia was 
composed entirely o f Americans. Sec Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, 
Valencia, 22 April 1818, Rodriguez Villa, rabio Morillo, vol 3, pp. 563-567. A 
battalion of Cachiri was formed in 1816 to commemorate the royalist victory 
(see Sevilla. Memorias, p. 124); and an Esquadrón del Chocó was formed by 
Julián Bayer in the Chocó in 1816. Sec Julián Bayer to Pascual Enrile,
Citaré, I July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897. See also Diary of the 
Primer Batallón del Regimiento Infantería de Numancia. July 1817, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A, for details of much recruitment in the south.
74Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Caracas, 5 October 1817, Rodriguez Villa, 
rabio Morillo, vol 3, pp, 448-450. Sicilia also attempted to form a cavalry 
company in the Patia in July 1817. Sec Ruperto Delgado to José Solis,
Popayán, 14 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
7 'Pahlo  Morillo to Ministry o f War, Valencia, 25 January 1818, Rodriguez. 
Villa, rabio Morillo, vol 3, pp, 493-498
the Third Batallón del Rey, for exam ple.76 Virtually all branches 
of the Expeditionary Army suffered terrible losses during the 
years of the war. The Second Batallón del Rey, for example, 
contained 750 soldiers in February 1816. By October 1821, it had 
been reduced to a mere 3 men. Similarly, the Regimiento de León, 
stationed in Cartagena, started 1816 with some 1,000 troops. By 
1819, numbers had declined to roughly 800, and when the city 
was evacuated in October 1821, only about 500 soldiers remained 
alive. From April to December 1819, the 10th Ligero de Valencia 
declined from 715 men to 625. Overall, by 1817, there were 
reportedly no European troops at all in New Granada, with the 
exception of the Regimiento de Leon in Cartagena.77 This implies 
that over 4,000 expeditionaries had died, a loss of 80% in two 
y ears .
There were two principal causes o f this decline in troop 
numbers. The first, and most important, was the high mortality 
suffered by the soldiers. Death did not result only from injury 
during armed conflict. Thousands of royalist troops, Spanish and 
American, died of disease while serving in the army. The arm y’s 
health will be discussed in Chapter 9; it is, however, worth noting 
that disease, and not battle, was the primary cause of death 
during the War of Independence. A small inkling of the medical 
problems that were to confront royalist troops, not only in New 
Granada, but indeed in all of Spanish America, may be gained 
from the fate of the 5,000 Spanish troops sent to Río de la Plata in 
1813. Over 800 (16%) had already fallen sick before the ships
76Pascual Enrilc to Pablo Morillo, Madrid, 15 July 1817, Rodriguez Villa, 
rabio Morillo, vol 3, pp. 331-332. Sec also Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, 
Valencia, 22 April 1818, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 563-567.
77Francisco Montalvo to M inister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 
September 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
even docked in Montevideo. Comparatively, this is a high sickness 
rate for a transatlantic crossing.78
The other great cause of falling troop numbers was, as 
always, desertion. During the war against their own revolted 
American colonies, the British had lost nearly 30% of their soldiers 
to desertion.79 Four decades later, the magnitude of this insoluble 
problem had in no way diminished. Desertion plagued the 
Expeditionary Army even before it left Cádiz. There, many 
conscripts tried to desert, and the garrisons were constantly 
guarded to prevent escapes.80 The problem merely worsened on 
arrival in the Americas. In May 1816, Morillo complained that in 
Caracas royalist troops were “deserting in flocks” .81 By 1817 
roughly a fifth of the Battalion de Infantería de Tambo had 
d e se r te d .82 By 1819, entire battalions were deserting.83 Neither 
repeated orders that soldiers caught deserting would be shot, nor 
offers of generous prizes for those apprehending deserters appear 
to have had much effect.84 Problems with desertion were, of
78For the Spanish figures, see Margaret Woodward, "The Spanish Army and 
the Loss of America, 1810-1824", HAHR,  vol 48 (1968), pp. 587-588. For 
com parative figures o f sickness rates among British sailors during the 
eighteenth century, see Richard Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the 
Eighteenth Century: The British Expedition to the West Indies, 1740-1742,
The Royal Historical Society (Irthlingborough, 1991), pp. 83-4; and Piers 
Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783, Longmans (London, 1964), p. 526.
79Sce Mackesy, The War for America, p. 176.
80Sce Comellas, Los primeros pronunciamientos, p. 307.
81 Woodward, "The Spanish Army and the Loss of America,” p. 590.
82List o f individuals who have deserted the Battalion de Infantería de 
Tambo, 1817, AHNC, Archivo Anexo, Guerra y Marina, tomo 152, ff. 218-219.
83Woodward, “Spain and the Loss o f America," p. 591 Sec also Toribio 
Montes to Ministers o f State and Overseas, Quito, 22 July 1815, AGI, Audiencia 
de Quito, legajo 275; Valentín Capmany to Gabriel de Torres, Mompós, 17 
October 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; Minister o f State to Minister 
o f War, Madrid, 15 March 1818, Rodrigue/. Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 646- 
648; Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Barquisimcto, 31 October 1820, 
AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568; List of deserters from 27 August 1821 
to 8 October 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
84Bando de Pablo Morillo, Cunianá. 2 May 1815. BRAH, Sig. 9/7651 (leg. 8); 
Circular of Francisco Montalvo, Torrecillas, 20 September 1815, AGI, Papeles
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course, not confined to M orillo’s expedition; President Montes of 
Quito complained in 1814 that troops under Juan Sámano were 
deserting at such a rate that in six months the number of soldiers 
had fallen from 1,700 to 300. This level of desertion compares 
very poorly with those found in the insurgent armies in Río de la 
Plata during the same period.85
Morale among Spanish troops appears to have been 
generally poor. Few Spanish soldiers wanted to be in the 
Americas in the first place. Few had volunteered; most were 
conscripts, and the prospect of death far from Spain had little 
appeal. “The lusty spirit of the conquistadores was nowhere to be 
seen” , M argaret W oodward comments harshly.86 Certainly the 
reports on life in the Americas that reached Spain were often 
alarming. W oodward records that soldiers “brought back to Spain 
hair-raising descriptions of dense jungles, of deserts ‘like petrified 
seas’ and tales of ‘putrefying corpses, impenetrable forests, man- 
eating reptiles,’ and of tigers ‘roaring in the night’” .87 Moreover, it 
soon became clear to the troops that they would see little material
dc Cuba, legajo 707; Circular de Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 19 March 1816, 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717; Orden General del Día, 5 February 1817, 
BRAH, Sig. 9/7651 (leg. 8); Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Parapara, 23 
January 1819, BRAH, Colección Morillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 76-77; 
Bando dc Pablo Morillo, Calabozo, 30 June 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, 
doc. 248 (this document may also be found in Los ejércitos del Rey, 1819, vol 
2, Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República 
(Bogotá, 1989), pp. 188-190.).
85Toribio Montes to Ministers o f State and War, Quito, 7 July 1814, AG1, 
Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 260. For comparative figures from Rio de la Plata, 
see Hans Vogel, “The Wars of Independence in Northwest Argentina, 1810- 
1814,” 4th Spanish-Duteh Historical Colloquium (Avila, 1991).
86Woodward, “The Spanish Army and the Loss of America”, p. 587. See also 
Costcloe, “The Comisión de Reemplazos", p. 230, and Alcalá Galiano’s 
comments in M elchor Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América y 
su reflejo en la consciencia española. Instituto de Estudios Políticos (M adrid, 
1954), pp. 92, 97-98.
87Woodward, "The Spanish Army and the Loss of America”, p. 593. See also 
Luis Miguel Enciso Recio, La opinión pública española y la independencia 
hispanoamericana, 1819-1820, Universidad de Valladolid (Valladolid, 1967), 
p. 54n.
benefit from their hardships. Salaries were not paid, and even 
during the heady successes of 1816 food and supplies were in 
short supply.
In the autumn of 1816, after the completion of the 
reconquest in New Granada, the majority of the royalist army 
returned to Venezuela. The royalist forces remaining in New 
Granada consisted of the Second, Third and Fifth Divisions of the 
Expeditionary Army. The Second Division was led by Miguel de 
la Torre, the Third Division by Juan Sámano, and the Fifth Division 
by Sebastián de la Calzada. The First and Fourth Divisions, in 
Venezuela, were commanded respectively by Pascual Real and 
Ramón Correa (later replaced by Tomás de Ciras).88 Only the 
Third Division remained in New Granada for the duration of the 
war. The Second and Fifth Divisions were sent to Venezuela in 
1817 and 1818.
Of the divisions operating in New Granada, the most 
important units were the First and Second Numancia Battalions, 
the First Battalion of the Regimiento del Rey, the Cazadores del 
Tambo, and the Regimiento de Leon, which formed the garrison in 
Cartagena. The Numancia Battalions and the Cazadores del Tambo 
were new units; only the Regimiento del Rey and the troops in 
Cartagena’s garrison had come with Morillo from Spain. By 1817 
there were virtually no Spanish troops remaining in New Granada; 
the royalist army was composed entirely of creoles, with the 
exception of the garrison in Cartagena. This situation alarmed 
M orillo, who predicted disasters would result from leaving the
88Scc Orden General del 28 al 29 de Noviembre de 1816, del 13 al 14 de 
Febrero de 1817, and del 21 al 22 de Junio de 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 759B.
defence of the colony in creole hands.89 He and other royalist 
officials sought consolation in history; Cortés had conquered 
Mexico with an army of natives, and the Romans had enjoyed 
their greatest m ilitary successes using foreign troops.
Philosophical musings aside, however, m ost Spanish officers 
retained the greatest distrust for their American troops. “Una 
fuerza efím era,” M orillo called them.90
Moreover, the relationship between the members of the 
newly-arrived Expeditionary Army and New G ranada’s existing 
Spanish military did not always run smoothly. Prior to the 
outbreak of the war. New Granada, and indeed all of Spanish 
America, had been defended by the Army of the Americas. In 
New Granada this force consisted of garrisons in Santa Fe, 
Cartagena, Santa Marta, Riohacha, the Chocó, Antioquia, Popayán, 
and Panama. Various local militia forces also existed, although 
many observers had doubts about their effectiveness and loyalty. 
Of the regular troops, the most important were the Batallón 
Auxiliar de Santa Fe, The Regimiento de Infantería Fijo of 
Cartagena (the “Fijo de Cartagena”), and the Batallón Fijo de 
P an am á .91
Difficulties between these and M orillo’s troops arose for 
several reasons. At one extreme were the units of the Army of
89Rodrígucz Villa, rabio Morillo, vol I (1920), pp. 240, 300. See also Ejército 
Expedicionario, Resumen histórico de las operaciones y m ovim ientos de las 
columnas y tropas . . . desde el mes de Noviembre de 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 759B.
90See Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 29 August 1818, BRAH, sig. 
9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 607-609; and González García, “El aniquilamiento del 
ejército expedicionario de Costa Firme ", pp. 138-139.
91Sec Camilo Riafio, Historia Militar : La independencia (1810-1815),
Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol 18, Ediciones Lcrncr (Bogotá, 1971), pp. 19- 
28. For dctails about thc militias, see Alian J. Kuethc, Military Reform and 
Society in New Granada, 1775-1808, University o f Florida Press (Gainsville, 
1978).
the Americas that supported the movement for independence and 
joined the insurgents. These units, which had to be struck from 
the list of official Spanish forces, included some of the most 
important in the colonial army. The Fijo de Cartagena was heavily 
implicated in the outbreak of revolution in Cartagena in 1810, and 
ceased to exist as a royalist unit. (A later ‘Fijo de Cartagena’ was 
in fact an entirely new battalion formed by Francisco M ontalvo in 
1815.) The Batallón Auxiliar de Santa Fe became the backbone of 
the Republic of Cundinam arca’s army, and, after the recapture of 
the capital by Morillo, it was replaced by the Batallión del Tambo, 
a new unit formed in 1816.92 Various other units were dissolved 
for sim ilar reasons.93 The shortage of royalist soldiers, however, 
made it necessary to recruit members of these extinguished units 
back into the Expeditionary Army in late 1816. This measure 
simply filled royalist ranks with republican supporters.94 *
An additional problem, which has already been m entioned, 
was the profound lack of respect for Americans troops felt by 
Spanish soldiers. The widely-held Spanish view that the 
Americans were bad soldiers with no understanding of m ilitary 
discipline did not endear the expeditionaries to Neogranadan 
troops. Morillo did little to counter the prevailing prejudices 
when in 1815 he issued orders that Spanish troops were under no 
circum stances to ridicule the native troops, despite their obvious 
and evident backw ardness.93 Spanish officers further distrusted
92Sec Albi. Honderas Olvidadas, p. 52.
93Franciseo Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los
últimos virreyes, pp. 94-100.
94Bando de Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 22 November 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 717.
93 Instrucciones particulares a los jefes del ejército, by Pablo Morillo, 
aboard the San Pedro, 1 April 1815, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 16.
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the Blacks, mulattos and castas  who made up a large part of the 
royalist army in Venezuela. These men, prone to insubordination, 
alarmed royalist officers, who, like their republican colleagues, 
came to fear race war.96 This mistrust of the section of 
V enezuela’s population most ready to support the royalists was a 
grave mistake on the part of the Spanish. The Venezuelan llanero 
and casta  troops increasingly joined the republican army, to 
devastating effect.
Another problem for the royalist forces arose over the 
question of who retained supreme command over troops in New 
Granada. Officers from the Expeditionary Army claimed authority 
over all other commanders who might already be in the Americas.
These officers, who had defended the rights of the crown from 
1810 to 1815, resented and resisted the expeditionaries’ attempts 
to appropriate the command. Viceroy Abascal of Peru, for 
example, apparently attempted in 1815 to convince the newly- 
arrived Morillo to place his soldiers under the viceroy’s 
c o m m a n d .97 The question of command proved particularly vexing 
in Venezuela. Before 1815, virtually all royalist successes had 
been due to José Tomâs Boves, Francisco Morales, and their 
guerrilla allies. None of these men held official posts in the 
royalist army, and indeed held that institution and its 
commanders in the greatest contempt. With the arrival of 
M orillo’s army came the restoration of a more professional 
structure, and Boves’ guerrilla leaders were demoted, demobilised, 
and dismissed. They were then replaced by Spanish officers. The
96Instructions to Francisco Gon/.âle/. dc Linares and Pedro José Mijarcs,
Caracas, 18 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24.
97Pablo Morillo to José de Abascal, Torrccillas, 21 October 1815, AGI,
Diversos, legajo 4.
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guerrilla leaders, who believed w ith reason that the recapture of 
Venezuela had been their doing, were deeply offended, and many 
joined the insurgents.98 The conflicts between the guerrillas and 
the professionals were typified by M orillo’s disagreem ents with 
Francisco Tomás Morales, Boves’ successor. Although Morillo 
retained Morales as an officer, against the advice of many civilian 
officials, he did not immediately award Morales the authority he 
might reasonably have expected. Bitter disagreem ents broke out 
during the recapture of the Island of Margarita, and their 
relationship never fully recovered.99 Similar conflicts developed 
between Miguel de la Torre, the young commander of the 
Expeditionary A rm y’s second division and eventual replacem ent 
to M orillo, and various royalist guerrilla leaders, in particular 
Sebastián de la Calzada and Francisco Tomás Morales. La Torre 
regarded both Calzada and M orales as uncultured hooligans, while 
these latter viewed La Torre as a rule-bound incom petent.100 
That these disagreem ents were serious and important should not 
be doubted. The disastrous royalist defeat at Carabobo in 1821, 
which effectively ended the war in Venezuela, has been attributed 
by some to the personal incom patibility of La Torre and Morales, 
the two participating royalist o fficers .101
Poor troops and personal divisions among the royalist officer 
corps were not, however, the sole problem facing the reconquest
98See David Bushncll, “The Independence of Spanish South America,” The 
independence of Latin America, edited hy Leslie Bcthcll, Cambridge 
University Press, (1988), p. 135.
" L ié v a n o  Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos, vol. 1, pp. 894-895; and Cajigal, 
M emorias, p. 148. Morillo did, however, retain considerable respect for 
M orales, as his correspondence with him  shows.
100See letters o f Pablo Morillo to Miguel dc La Torre, Fcbruary-March 1816, 
AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, docs. 42, 45, 48.
101Sec Sebastián González García, “El aniquilamineto del ejército 
expedicionario” , p. 140.
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regime. It also faced serious political challenges, not least of 
which was the need the deal with supporters of the independence 
movements of 1810-1815, and to win back loyal supporters from 
New Granada’s population. The way in which Spanish officials 
confronted these tasks is the subject of the following chapter.
Chapter 4: Conciliation or Conflict?
After the successful reconquest of New Granada in 1816, the 
royalist government had to decide how it would view the 
preceding six years of independence. One of the most divisive 
questions was how Spain would regard people who had supported 
the revolution. Should overt supporters of independence be 
punished, or should they be pardoned? Should punishment be 
exemplary, with principal insurgents being either imprisoned or 
executed, or should it be corrective, and consist mainly in fines or 
temporary dismissal? Officials in New Granada and Spain took 
various views on this issue, which occasioned much disagreement 
within the royalist camp.
These questions were of course not unique to New Granada 
in 1816. Many countries have been confronted with similar 
dilemmas following a change of government or civil war. One 
intriguing twentieth-century parallel to the situation in New 
Granada in 1816 concerns the Allied treatment of Nazi supporters 
after the Second World War. While some individual Nazis were 
indicted for specific crimes at the Nuremberg Trials, large 
numbers of Nazi supporters were “de-N azified” through the 
payment of a small fine or through temporary dismissal.
Although no one would suggest that the Neogranadan insurgents 
in 1816 were sim ilar to the German fascists, the process of de- 
Nazification does bear comparison to the royalist campaign against 
in fidencia  in New Granada. There, as we shall see, the leaders of 
the revolution were executed (usually after trials considerably 
less rigorous than those carried out at Nuremberg). As for rebel
sympathisers, many were “purified” by the payment of a fine, and 
some were also removed from public office. However, as was the 
case in post-Nazi Germany, many Neogranadans escaped with no 
punishment at all, to the great annoyance of those in government 
who wanted a wider purge.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in deciding what to do with 
the supporters of the revolution w as determining who had 
supported the revolution in the first place. Were colonial officials 
who remained in their posts after 1810 by definition traitors? 
Were individuals who accepted non-political posts in the new 
insurgent government traitors? W hat other actions indicated 
support for the rebels? Nevertheless, the re-established royal 
government was determined to do something to punish the 
disloyal and the disaffected. To accomplish this, it created new 
institutions and new laws, the workings of which we shall now 
outline in greater detail.
§ 1 .  Spain and the I n f i d e n t e  s
The question of what to do with government officials who 
had held posts during the years of republican rule was 
particularly vexing. After the arrival of M orillo’s Expeditionary 
Army in Cartagena, and the pacification of New Granada, the 
royalists set about reestablishing the colonial bureaucracy. To 
begin with, and as a matter of course, individuals who had served 
under the insurgents were removed from their posts until they 
presented a justification of their behaviour.* This invariably 
caused difficulties. The problem was that, by early 1816, there
'B uikIo dc Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 28 December 1815, AGI, Papclcs dc 
Cuba, legajo 717.
were often at least two and perhaps three individuals who could 
lay claim to any given job. Royalists who had held posts in 1810 
and who had been forced to leave New Granada during the Patria 
Boba naturally hoped to get their old jobs back, while those who 
had been appointed by the republicans to hold non-political posts 
argued that there was no reason for their removal. (Of course 
there were not always competing candidates for a post. When 
Morillo appointed a new administrator to the salt mines in 
Zipaquirá, the general could be certain that the former 
administrator would not petition to retain his post, as he had been 
shot on M orillo’s orders some time previously.2 ) On many 
occasions the matter was further complicated because General 
Morillo or Viceroy Montalvo preferred to appoint their own 
candidate to important posts, thus introducing a third claimant.
An illustrative case was the appointment of a postal 
administrator in Cartagena. In July 1816 Antonio García y Nieto 
petitioned the governm ent to ask for employment as the first 
post-insurgent adm inistrator of Correos in Cartagena, as he had 
held that post until 1811, when he was removed by the 
insurgents. From 1811 until 1816 he had been in royalist 
territory drawing 2/3 of his salary, with the understanding that 
he would be returned to his post when this became possible. 
Unfortunately, by the time García y Nieto made his request,
2Sec Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 12 November 1816, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549 and Relación de los principales cabezas de 
la rebelión. . . que han sufrido . . .  la pena capital, Santa Fe, 4 September 
1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1901.
Sometimes the royalists restored to their posts officials who had been 
removed by the republicans not for political reasons, but because the 
officials had been corrupt. For an example, see M argarita Garrido,
Reclamos y representaciones, variaciones sobre la política en el Nuevo 
Reino de Granada, 1750-1815, Banco de la República (Santafé de Bogotá, 
1993), pp. 298-301.
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Viceroy Montalvo had already appointed Toribio del Villar y Tatis 
to the post (on a supposedly temporary basis), as a reward for 
V illar’s assistance during the reconquest. Montalvo was thus 
unwilling to consider García y Nieto’s claims to the post. To 
further complicate matters, Ramón de Herrera, who had held the 
post during the years of insurgent rule, argued that he was a loyal 
subject of the crown and ought to be allowed to continue 
exercising his office. The matter was referred to Spain, where it 
dragged on for years, without any official conclusion being 
re a c h e d .3 It appears that in the interim Montalvo decided, 
independently, to return the job to Herrera, a decision strongly 
criticised by M ontalvo’s successor Juan Sámano, who took the 
view “once an insurgent, always an insurgent” . (Sámano had had 
a long career as an officer and an absolutist. During the 
reconquest, he was in his late 70s, unmarried, and reportedly 
going deaf.4) Sámano regarded Herrera as an unreformed traitor. 
He had, Sámano announced, “con una simple información de la que 
en estos países son tan fáciles de adquirirse, y tal vez por el 
respeto de alguna poderosa recomendación, consiguió . . 
aparentando sinceridad de conducta la reposición de su empleo” .5 
Herrera, it need hardly be said, was rapidly removed from office 
on Sámano’s elevation to viceroy in 1817.
3 Material on this case may be found in AGI, Correos, legajo 72A.
4Scc, for example, Pablo Morillo to Minister o f War, Santa Fe, 31 August
1816, Antonio Rodrigue?. Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo,
Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), Real 
Academia de la Historia (Madrid, 1908-1910), vol, 3, pp. 190-191; Francisco 
Montalvo to the Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September
1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Juan Sámano to Minister of 
War, Santa Fc, 29 May 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A.
5 Juan Sámano to Ministry of State, Santa Fc, 29 May 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 
53, Doc. 44.
This one example illustrates the considerable disagreem ents 
within the royalist camp over both the appropriate treatm ent of 
suspected insurgents, and the best definition of insurgency.
Viceroy Montalvo regarded Ram ón de Herrera as a reliable 
subject, while Juan Sámano considered him a traitor. Clearly some 
more codified system was needed, and various efforts were made 
to classify the different levels o f  insurgency.
One of the earliest classifications was produced by the Junta 
de Secuestros in Caracas, which in June 1815 described three 
different classes of individuals.6 The first were the leaders of the 
insurgency, people so well know n for their support of 
independence that the junta did not even regard it as necessary to 
try them. The second class consisted of people who had passively 
supported the revolution w ithout taking any active role in it. The 
third class contained those who fled the advancing royalist army. 
The junta considered members o f  the first and third classes fair 
game, and decreed that their goods could be embargoed at will, 
although the belongings of m em bers of the third class might 
possibly be returned to them later. Members of the second class 
had the right to a judicial hearing that would investigate their 
behaviour, as would wives of insurgents, minors and especially 
orphans, and those whose fam ily had been awarded special 
honours in the past. This distinction between active and passive 
support for the insurgency rem ained the touchstone of royalist 
justice, although other m odifications were introduced. In 
November 1817, for example, Ferdinand decided that even 
individuals who had voluntarily served in the insurgent
6Plan de Gobierno dc la Junta S uperior y Tribunal Especial de Scquestros dc 
Caracas, Caracas, 2 June IK 15, AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, legajos 109, 386.
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governments should not autom atically be considered traitorous. 
This was complemented by a decision of the Council of the Indies, 
taken in May 1818, that clear distinctions ought to be made 
between leaders of the insurgency and those who had merely 
fo llow ed.7
After the Spanish decided which activities were treasonous, 
they still had to determine who had carried out such activities.
The manner in which the royalists collected names of possible 
insurgents was itself open to all sorts of distortions. Juan Manuel 
de Cajigal, Captain General of Venezuela at the time of M orillo’s 
arrival, complained that he and other royalists were continually 
presented with anonymous denunciations of suspected insurgents. 
He reported that the accuracy of these denunciations was not 
always exam ined.8 Such anonymous accusations could be used to 
settle private quarrels and to exact vengeance. In 1819, for 
example, former corregidor José Joaquín de la Mota complained 
from prison that he had been falsely accused of treason by a 
couple whom he had earlier prosecuted for living in concubinage.9 
Similarly, Rosario Armenta, the repartidor de carnes in Ríohacha, 
suggested that the charge of treason levelled against him might 
have originated with “ uno de los ricos a quien no quiso darle 
rac ió n ” . 10 Viceroy Montalvo himself admitted that denunciations
7Rcport by the Council o f the Indies, Madrid, 18 May 1818, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 549.
8Juan Manuel de Cajigal, Memorias del Mariscal de Campo Don Juan Manuel 
de Cajigal sobre la revolución de Venezuela, Biblioteca Venezolana de 
Historia (Caracas, I960), p. 142, 163. Sec also Lista de los individuos que en la 
ciudad de Santa Marta opinan terriblemente contra la legitimidad de la 
autoridad suprema del Real y Supremo Consejo de Regencia, Santa Marta, 24 
November 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
9Report by the Council o f the Indies, 14 February 1819, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 551.
^ Investiga tion  into Rosario Armenta, Ríohacha, 13 November 1819, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 890A. See also Denunciations in Lorica, Lorica, 12
were often based on nothing more than malice, commenting that 
“nadie ignora que semejantes denuncias han sido muchas veces 
medios encubiertos de venganza, valiéndose así de la justicia com o 
de instrumento para tan vil objeto” .11
§ 2 .  Pol i tical  Repress ion  and Punishment
One model for colonial authorities seeking to purge and 
punish sedition from the body politic was provided by Spain itself. 
In 1X14, “juntas of purification” had been established in Spain 
after the return of Ferdinand VII to investigate the conduct of 
government officials during the French occupation. As the name 
suggests, the juntas were concerned to ‘purify’ those contam inated 
with in fidenc ia ,  a favourite word of the Fernandine period. 
Collaborators and a francesados  were removed from their posts, 
while those found to be “pure” were returned to their positions.
All those investigated were subjected to a long and harassing 
scrutiny. The wisdom of exacerbating hostility between Spaniards 
by these trials was questioned by such ministers as José García de 
León y Pizarro, but Ferdinand was committed to removing all 
collaborators from o ffice.12 It was not always easy to identify 
collaborators, and it was, in any event, impossible to arrest 
everyone who had supported either the intrusive King Joseph or
January 1X20, AGI, Papclcs dc Cuba, Icgajo 891 A; and letter of Ramdn Nufiez 
del Arco, Quito, 22 May 1813, AGI, Audicncia dc Quito, Icgajo 257.
11 Bando dc Francisco Montalvo, Santa Marta, 26 August 1814, AGI,
Audicncia de Caracas, Icgajo 109.
12Scc Timothy Anna. Spain and the Loss of America, University of N ebraska 
Press (Lincoln, 1983), p. 129; and Royal Order of 13 April 1815, Papcles dc 
Cuba, legajo 718. Similar tribunals o f purification were established in 1823 
alter the fall o f the liberal government. See E. Christiansen, The Origins o f 
Military Power in Spain, I800-1954, Oxford University Press, (1967), p. 31; 
Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 292; and Michael Costeloc, Response 
to Revolution: Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions, 1810- 
1840, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1986), p. 165.
the more radical of the liberals, who also fell under suspicion. 
Balancing retribution, reconciliation and realism proved to be a 
dilemma which, together w ith the juntas de purificación, followed 
the royalist armies to the Americas. Tribunals and juntas de 
purificación were established in Mexico, Venezuela and New 
Granada and possibly elsewhere. As in Spain, they proved both 
controversial and difficult to operate.
The unavoidable fac t was that very many Neogranadans had 
continued to exercise their professions during the Patria Boba, and 
many had served, with varying degrees of political fervour, on the 
various new committees and organisations set up by the 
insurgents. General M orillo himself recognised this fact. On 31 
May 1816 he wrote to the Minister of War, that:
Siendo innumerables las personas de este Reino que se 
hallan envueltos en la insurrección y pretendida 
independencia, de m odo que apenas se puede contar fam ilia 
que no tenga algún individuo tildado de este delito, entre los 
cuales se hallan m uchos que se han comprometido, ya por la 
necesidad de seguir ciertos destinos para subsistir, ya 
seducidos de personas mal intencionadas que han tenido 
ascendente sobre el pueblo, y los más, por ignorancia de su 
verdadero interés, obsesados de la malicia y de la mentira, 
de que resulta que si se fuese a proceder contra ellos, sería 
preciso poner en prisión una parte muy considerable del 
pueblo, imposible de juzgar.13 
It was obviously not possible to arrest all these people for 
insurgency, but neither was it clear who should be excused and
13Pablo Morillo to Ministry o f War, Santa Fc, 31 May 1816, Rodriguez Villa,
Pablo Morillo, vol 3, p. 159.
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who should be tried. Soon after the capture of Cartagena, Morillo 
tried to draft into the Expeditionary Army everyone who had 
served in the republican army up to the grade of sergeant, but 
was dissuaded from doing so by Viceroy Montalvo, who pointed 
out that, were Morillo to do this, the effect of the c ity ’s work-force 
would be catastrophic. Everyone, down to the shoemakers and 
blacksmiths, had fought for the republicans, M ontalvo noted.14 
Nonetheless, one of the first acts of the restored Spanish 
government in Cartagena was to suspend from their posts all 
government employees who had remained in Cartagena during 
the period of republican rule.15
The matter came to a head following the trial of the nine 
prominent Cartagenan republicans. The fate of these nine 
individuals, regarded by republican supporters as m á rt ire s ,  and 
by the Spanish at the time as reos,  generated a bitter debate 
within the royalist camp, although this debate had little 
immediate effect on the fate of future martyrs or criminals. All 
nine men were shot in February 1816, even though some had 
surrendered after the royalists had issued a pardon, and in spite 
of the fact that six of the nine men roundly denied being 
insurgents. No real trials were held, although the accused were 
allowed to submit statements in their defence. The death 
sentence was issued jointly by Montalvo and Morillo. The 
technical defects of these cases roused great alarm within the
14 Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 6 February 1816, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707.
15Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 13 December 1815, 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707. Identical measures were taken in Caracas 
in 1815 after the arrival o f the Expeditionary Army, in violation of the 
Armistice of San Mateo signed in June 1812. See Francisco Xavier 
Arámbarri, Hechos del General Pahlo Morillo en America, Ediciones dc la 
Embajada dc Venezuela en España (Murcia, 1971) p. 27.
royalist camp. Particularly vociferous in their objections were the 
members of the Audiencia. Under normal circumstances the 
Audiencia would have overseen the trial and sentencing of these 
men, and the oidores were incensed by this denial of their rights. 
The matter was referred to Spain, the first in a long line of 
appeals (in this case posthumous) against the royalist crackdown 
on insurgents.
The procedural defects of the case and the lack of any 
established procedure to trying cases of treason led General 
Morillo and Viceroy Montalvo to establish a Consejo de Guerra 
Permanente, or Permanent Court Martial, as had been done in 
Caracas, which was responsible for trying cases of in fidenc ia ,  a 
term that included virtually all forms of support for the 
re p u b lic .16 These Courts-M artial aroused great hostility, both 
among the public and among the members of the civil 
bureaucracy. The usual complaints by members of the public 
were procedural. The cases were heard verbally, that is, w ithout 
sim ultaneous written records being made, and defendants were 
allowed little chance to defend them selves.17 This in itself was, 
not surprisingly, unpopular. When, for example, Pantaleón 
Gutiérrez y Quijano was sentenced by the Consejo de Guerra 
Permanente to five years in Omoa fortress, his wife com plained 
that he had been condemned “sin oirle sus defensas con arreglo de
16Leallet by the Ministry of War, Madrid, 28 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 665. This document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 748.
l7 Scc Carlos Cortés Vargas, "De la época del terror,” BHA,  vol. 29 (1942), p.
89. It appears that a brief written record summarising the trial was made at 
the end of the hearing, in cases where the accused was a royalist soldier.
See Proclama de Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 5 August 1816, Rodriguez Villa, 
rabio Morillo, vol 3, p. 98-101.
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las leyes”, and asked that his case be reopened.18 Similar 
complaints were made by the relatives of Jorge Tadeo Lozano 
(N ariño’s successor as president of Cundinamarca), who was shot 
on 6 July 1816, following a hearing by the Consejo de Guerra 
P e rm a n e n te .19 In many cases the accused was not even 
perm itted to present witnesses in his defence.20
The conditions of the trials were, moreover, hardly 
conducive to reasoned deliberation. Juan Manuel Arrubla, a 
resident of Santa Fe tried by the Consejo de Guerra Permanente, 
described his trial: “Fui juzgado en medio de la confusión más 
horrorosa, pero a la verdad inevitable por atumultarse en el 
consejo de guerra perm anente excesiva número de causas, que 
toda se substantiaban a un tiempo se determinaban y se 
executaban las sentencias inmediatemente después de su 
p ro n u n ciam ien to ” .21 The sentences of the Consejo de Guerra 
were, as Arrubla notes, usually carried out “sin dilación”.22 In 
addition, many civilians objected to being tried by a military 
council in the first place. Camilo Manrique, for example, 
complained to the Council of the Indies in 1818 that he had been
18 Representation by Doña Francisca Morena e Isabella, Santa Fc, 19 
October IXI7, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549. Also sec José María 
Caballero, Diario. Biblioteca de Bogotá, Editores Villegas, (Bogotá, 1990), p. 
219.
19 Report on the case of Jorge Tadco Lozano, 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa 
Fc, legajo 551. Also sec Caballero, Diario, p. 218; and Report by the Minister 
of War, Palace, I October 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580.
20José María Restrepo Sacnz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, Imprenta 
Nacional (Bogotá, 1932), vol. I, p. .350.
21 Petition by Juan Manuel Arrubla, Valencia, 4 October 1817, AGI,
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
2 2 Report by the Fiscal de Perú, Madrid, 7 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 665.
tried by the Consejo de Guerra, despite the fact that he had been a 
civilian official.23
Such complaints about the violation of existing immunities 
were not confined to the Viceroyalty of New Granada. When in 
1812 Viceroy Venegas of Mexico attempted to abolish the 
ecclesiastical fu e ro ,  which prevented suspect priests from being 
tried in secular courts, his decision was universally condemned. 
The Council of the Indies indeed referred to the order rather 
extravagantly as “ the m ost inhuman, illegal, and pernicious 
document to appear in this unhappy epoch” .24 In neither Mexico 
nor New Granada were the public eager to see the colonial 
government replaced by a military one.
Further conflicts over the Consejos de Guerra developed in 
1817, after General Morillo had left for Venezuela. On 5 July 
1817, he wrote from Cumana to Juan Samano, the acting governor 
of Santa Fe, granting him permission to try cases of in fidencia  in 
Consejos de Guerra.25 Samano’s new powers were not welcomed 
by the judges of the Audiencia, which believed that their court, 
rather than Samano, ought to try cases of in f id en c ia , although they 
were prepared to accept a compromise tribunal run by the 
Audiencia, with Samano granted the right to inspect the results.26
23 Report by the Council o f  the Indies, 17 January 1818, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fe, legajo 551; Arámbarri, Hechos del General Pablo Morillo, p, 90; and 
Pablo Morillo to the Duke of Manchester, Mompox, 15 March 1816,
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, p. 4.
24See Timothy Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City, 
University o f Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), pp. 79-80.
25Pablo Morillo to Juan Sámano, Cumaná, 5 July 1817, Oswaldo Díaz Diaz, La 
reconquista española. H istoria Extensa dc Colombia, vol. 6, Ediciones Lerner 
(Bogotá, 1967), vol. 1, pp. 343-344.
2 6 Various documents relating to Juan Sám ano's right to try cases, Santa Fe 
and Cartagena, 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748. Juan Friede 
discusses the conflict between the Audiencia and Sámano in La otra verdad.
La independencia americana vista por los españoles. Editorial Tercer Mundo 
(Bogotá, 1972), pp. 35-39.
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The A udiencia’s m em bers immediately protested “ las tristes 
resultados que debían producir esta medida confiada al General 
S ám ano” .27 They wrote, first, to Sámano himself, asking him to 
renounce his new authority. Sámano consulted a lawyer, but, 
ignoring his advice, refused to renounce his new powers, claiming 
he was subordinate only to  Morillo. The Audiencia then turned to 
the fiscal, and, ultimately to Viceroy Montalvo, who was in 
Cartagena. The matter was referred to the Council of the Indies, 
but by the time it considered the matter, Sámano had been named 
viceroy, which settled the issue in his favour. The question of 
how cases were to be tried was nonetheless debated, and in the 
end, new guidelines were established for the treatm ent of political 
prisoners, including form er republican officials.
These guidelines were issued on 28 July 1817 in the form of 
a leaflet, which specified how different types of prisoners were to 
be tried .28 Eight different classes of criminal were established, 
and the appropriate m ethod of trial for each was listed. The most 
serious crimes were to be tried by court-martial: either a consejo 
de guerra ordinario or a consejo de guerra de oficiales generales, 
depending on whether the offender was a soldier or civilian, or an 
officer. If the individual wanted to appeal, the viceroy and 
oidores would rehear the case. The sentence would otherwise be 
carried out immediately. Less serious crimes committed by 
civilians would be tried by the civil authorities. The sentences 
would still be carried out immediately, preferably on the very 
spot of the supposed crim e.
27Rcport by the Fiscal del Peru, Madrid, 7 April 1818. AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 665: and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 1, p. 544.
28Lcaílct by the Ministry of W ar, Madrid, 28 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 665. This docum ent is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 748.
Trial by court-m artial was thus reserved for specific types 
of prisoner. The first was spies; the second was deserters from 
the royal army who recognised the republicans, even if they had 
not joined them. A third category consisted of officers in the 
insurgent army. A fourth type was those who “se han ejercitado o 
ejerciten en conmover y excitar a la rebelión a los pueblos 
tranquilos y aún se han puesto o pongan al frente de ellos, 
quemando, talando o destruyendo aquellos lugares de que 
perciben su subsistencia los ejércitos de Su Magestad”. Finally, all 
members of the colonial armed forces who served in the 
republican army were to  be tried by court-martial. O ther types of 
offence would then be tried by civil authorities. In particular, 
non-military trial was perm itted for those who had worked for 
the insurgent bureaucracy; and for those who “en sus proclamas, 
escritos u opiniones públicas se han dedicado o dediquen a 
encender o sostener el fuego de la revolución” . Also to be tried by 
civil authorities were those who, “abusando de la anarquía de un 
gobierno revolucionario han asesinado, persiguido, denunciado o 
sequeado a los vasallos tranquilos y fieles a Su M agestad” . 
Government officials who had remained in their post after the 
revolution o f 1X10, “jurando y reconociendo” the republican 
government were also to be accorded a civil trial. Thus, following 
the promulgation of these guidelines, no one who had served the 
republican governm ent in a non-m ilitary capacity should have 
been tried by court-m artial, although it remained possible for the 
viceroy to detain individuals without trial at his discretion.
Estimates for the number of people tried by the Consejos de 
Guerra vary considerably. Viceroy Montalvo reported in his 
Relación de Mando of 1818 that 7,000 people “de las principales
familias del virreinato” had been sentenced to death by the 
consejos, while Pascual Enrile insisted in 1817 that at most 90 
men had been executed by Morillo’s troops. Stephen Stoan has 
calculated that 101 men lost their lives in the Santa Fe “ terror” of 
1816, while in his diary entries for 1816 José Maria Caballero 
recorded 53 executions and another 62 arrests, giving a total of 
115 detainees.29
The consejos de guerra could not try everyone who had 
remained in republican territory during the Patria Boba, but the 
leaders of the royalist army were mistrustful of anyone who had 
been involved in any way with the insurgent authorities and 
forces. They were prepared to consider the merits of former 
republican em ployees only after the latter had “ purified” 
themselves before a Consejo de Purificación. This institution was 
first established in New Granada on 30 May 1816 in Santa Fe. On 
that day General Morillo issued a limited pardon to soldiers and 
some officers who had served in the republican army. Those 
individuals encompassed in the pardon were to be enlisted in the 
Expeditionary Army as common soldiers for a period of time 
proportional to their earlier support for the republicans. In order 
to determine the length of time each individual was to serve, as
29Francisco Montalvo, Relación de Mando, 30 January 1818, Los últimos 
virreyes de Nueva Granada, Relación de Mando del Virrey Don Francisco 
Montalvo y Noticias del Virrey Sdmano sobre la pérdida del Reino (1813- 
1819),  Eduardo Posada and P.M. Iháñez (editors). Biblioteca de la Juventud 
Hispano-Amcricana, Editorial América (Madrid, n.d.), p. 158; Exposition by 
Pascual Enrilc, Madrid, 19 June 1817. AGI. Estado, legajo 57, Doc 35-c (2a) 
(This document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748); 
Stephen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820, Ohio State 
University Press (Columbus, 1974), p. 141; and Caballero, Diario, pp. 210-228.
For other reports on executions, sec Relación de los principales 
cabezas de la rebelión . . . que han Sufrido . . .  la pena capital, Santa Fe, 4 
September 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1901; an extended version of 
which is published in Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol 1, pp. 119-25. 
Restrcpo reported 125 deaths. Sec José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la 
revolución de Colombia, vol. 2, Ediciones Bcdout (Bogotá, 1969), p. 142.
well as to decide whether the pardon applied at all to a given case, 
Morillo decided to establish “un consejo de purificación” , along the 
lines of those already operating in Spain.30
The consejo began operating on 16 June 1816, and consisted 
of a committee of six men. Individuals from not only the capital, 
but also Tunja, M ariquita, Neiva and Socorro were expected to 
appear before the consejo to purify themselves. (The 
establishment of a separate council for Antioquia was approved in 
December 1816).31 The consejo de purificación appears to have 
operated in conjunction with the consejo de guerra permanente, 
and began to consider the cases not only of those individuals 
specifically mentioned in the pardon of 30 May 1816, but also of 
those tried in the consejo de guerra for non-capital offences.32
The usual form of “purification” for republicanism  was 
either a spell in the royalist army or the payment of a large fine. 
Primo Groot, for example, was tried by the consejo de guerra in 
January 1817 and was sentenced to pay a fine o f $4,000. This 
sum was equivalent to more than the annual salary of a member 
of the Audiencia, and Groot complained in 1818 that because of 
this fine he was unable to support his family of six children.33 An 
alternative punishment was enlistm ent in the royalist army. Not 
everyone, of course, was found guilty. Some were found innocent
30Pardon by Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 30 May 1816, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa 
Fe, legajo 551.
31 Borrador dc Ystoria del Cuartel General, desde 30 dc Mayo de 1816 a 18 de 
Agosto del mismo, 15 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A, and 
Report by Audiencia de Santa Fe, Cartagena, 17 December 1816, AGI,
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
3 2In Venezuela some individuals were allegedly purified first in the 
consejo de purificación, and then charged with other offences in the 
consejo de guerra permanente. Sec Arámbarri, Hechos del General Pablo 
Morillo, p. 91.
33 Representation by Primo Groot, 9 August 1818, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa 
Fe, legajo 748.
of any crime, and these were issued with a certificate of 
purification, signed by the president and fiscal of the consejo.34
Guillermo Hernández de Alba has calculated that at least 
449 individuals were investigated by the consejo. O f these, 
roughly 60% were found guilty of involvement with the 
insurgency. Those found guilty were sentenced to serve in the 
royalist army, or to pay a fine ranging from 25 to 2,000 pesos, or 
both. The majority of those undergoing purification were public 
officials obliged to submit to examination in order to retain their 
p o s t35
Priests, who by virtue of their special fu e r o  could not be 
tried in secular courts, were not tried in these consejos. Instead, 
those suspected of insurgency were tried by the arm y’s head 
chaplain, an unpopular man him self charged with various 
m isd e e d s .36 Despite the Catholic church’s later reputation as a 
bastion o f royalism, it seems that many of New Granada’s priests 
in fact supported the insurgents. The participation, both active 
and passive, military and monetary, of Neogranadan clergy in the 
movement for independence is chronicled by Roberto Jaram illo in 
El clero en la independencia, which documents the activities of 
hundreds of clerics from all parts of the viceroyalty.37 By 1818,
34 Sec Certification of the Purification o f Martin Urdancta, Santa Fe, 27 
June 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
35See Guillermo Hernández de Alba, "Recuerdos de la reconquista: el 
Consejo de Purificación,” BHA,  vol. 22 (1935).
36Rodrígucz Villa, rabio Morillo, (1920), vol 1, pp. 234-235.
37Roberto Jaramillo, El clero en la independencia. Universidad de Antioquia 
(Medellin, 1946). Brian Hamnett has also written an article which contains, 
in addition to many errors, some useful information about the attitudes of 
Neogranadan clerics. See "The Counter Revolution of Morillo and the 
Insurgent Clerics o f New Granada. 1815-1820,” The Americas, vol. 32 (1976).
Royalist commanders certainly displayed a striking d istrust o f New 
Granada’s clergy. During the royalist occupation of Popayán in 1813,
Colonel Juan Sántano suspected many local clergymen were collaborating 
with the republicans and in itiated  disciplinary action against several.
the problem of delinquent clergy was perceived to be severe 
enough to warrant a special report by the Council of the Indies 
detailing the course of action to be taken when a priest left his 
post to join the republicans.38
It seems unlikely that many republican priests were 
removed from office as a consequence of the Council of the Indies’ 
recom mendations, as the procedure they advocated was 
complicated and slow. Some priests, however, did lose their seat 
because of their revolutionary activities. Morillo arrested a 
number of clerics in 1816, including several prominent 
c h u rc h m en .39 Other insurgent priests were not removed officially 
from office at all. Rather, they were simply hounded into exile. 
Domingo Belcinario Gomez, the priest of the small town of El 
Trapiche, for example, was forced to abandon his parish after 
having been detained on charges of insurgency. He had been 
absolved by President Montes of Quito, but, on his return home,
Brian Hamnett remarks that "such conflicts point to the evident tendency 
on the part of the royalist military to blame the American clergy for the 
outbreak and sustenance of the insurrection in New G ranada”. (See Brian 
Hamnett, “Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction: Colombian Regions, 
1810-1823”, Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru,
John Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane (editors), Louisiana 
State Press (Baton Rouge, 1990), pp. 306-307) Royalist suspicions of priests 
worsened as the war progressed. Morillo complained that, in all of New 
Granada, "ni uno parecía adicto a la causa del Rey". (See J.C. Mejia Mejia, “El 
clero de Pasto y la insurrección del 28 de octubre de 1822,” Boletín de 
Estudios Históricos, vol. 4 (1932), p. 353.) Similarly, during the campaign of 
1819, General Barreiro complained regularly on the behaviour of New 
Granada's priests. “Por lo que respeta a los sacerdotes,” he observed, “ la 
mayor parte son sospechosos, unos por desear nuestro exterm inio, y el 
triunfo de los rebeldes, y otros por ser verdaderos egoístas que están al 
partido que mas puede, y por cuya razón huyen de cuanto les pueda 
compromesa, afectado todos con una hipocrasia religiosa”. (See José María 
Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Paipa, 19 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
747. Sec also, for example, José Marfa Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 
July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.)
38Rcport by Council of the Indies, 31 May 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc.
37.
39Scc Morillo’s list o f insurgent clerics from New Granada, Santa Fc, 23 
October 1816, in Hamnett, "Morillo and the Insurgent C lerics,” pp. 615-617.
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was unable to occupy his post. During his absence, the cura  of 
Almaguer had spread such terrible rum ours about Gom ez’s 
revolutionary activities that he was unable to continue in office.40
§ 3 .  Conci l ia t ion  and Pardon
The question of what to do with individuals of doubtful 
loyalty was complicated by the many indu lto s  and olvidos del 
pasado  that were issued between 1810 and 1820. During this 
period more than twenty pardons were decreed by Ferdinand and 
the royalists in New Granada.41 Some of these were directed 
specifically at “ los reos americanos” , while others included Spain’s 
own a fra n c e sa d o s  and similar dubious types. While the pardons 
were supposed to clarify the circumstances in which an individual 
could be regarded as innocent, as often as not they muddied the 
waters further. The terms of the various pardons were frequently 
contradictory, and often failed to spell out the details of their 
application. Nonetheless, the promulgation of a pardon always 
raised hopes. Although a pardon rarely allowed officials who had 
served under the insurgents to return to their jobs, it might
40Report by Council of the Indies, 22 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa 
Fe, legajo 551. See also Hamnett, "Popular Insurrection and Royalist 
Reaction”, p. 506.
41Pardons were issued as follows: 15 October 1810 by the Cortes, 25 May 
1812 by President Toribio Montes (for Quito), 24 May 1814 by Ferdinand, 14 
October 1814 by Ferdinand, 23 September 1815 by General Pablo M orillo (for 
Cartagena). 9 April 1816 by Viceroy Francisco Montalvo (for Cartagena), 24 
April 1816 by General Morillo (for Ocaña), 17 April 1816 by Ferdinand (this 
pardon was approved by the Council of the Indies on 3 October 1816 and it 
scope extended on 10 December 1816), 31 May 1816 by General Morillo (for 
Santa Fe), 24 January 1817 by Ferdinand, 7 May 1817 by Governor Vicente 
Sánchez Lima (for Antioquia), 12 June 1817 by General Morillo (for 
Cariaco), 8 November 1817 by Ferdinand (for those under military fuero), 1 
March 18 18 by General Morillo, 24 April 1818 by General Morillo (for 
Valencia), 18 and 22 September 1818 by General Morillo (for Caracas), 9 
November 1819 by Ferdinand, 20 December 1819 by Ferdinand, 15 January 
1820 by Ferdinand, 9 March 1820 by Ferdinand, 19 July 1820 by Ferdinand,
27 September 1820 and 10 October 1820 by the Cortes.
commute im prisonm ent or other punishment inflicted for treason. 
Thus there was always a flurry of interest following the 
promulgation of each pardon.
The precise term s of these pardons were often little 
understood, and this in itself led to great confusion. On 9 April 
1816, for example, Francisco Montalvo issued a pardon intended 
specifically for the inhabitants of the province of Cartagena.42 
W ithin a few months further clarifications had to be issued, as 
individuals not living in the province had been applying, and as 
people living in Cartagena had been applying in the name of 
others not resident in the province. These practices were 
explicitly ruled out on 7 June 1816. Furthermore, it was often 
unclear who was supposed to determine whether the pardon 
applied to a given individual. Cases were on occasion referred to 
the Council of the Indies, and hence to the king, and sometimes 
people even applied directly to the Secretary of State for 
individual pardons tailored to their particular case.43
It was often believed that an olvido del pasado was 
precisely that, and that anyone who took advantage of it would be 
treated as if they had never supported the republicans. Very 
often this was not the case. The usual sticking point was whether 
a pardon allowed the indu ltado  to return to his job. José Maria 
Castillo, for example, who survived the 1816 massacre of upper- 
class insurgents, asked Viceroy Samano in 1819 to be allowed to
42Indulti> dc Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 9 April 1816, AGI, Papcles dc 
Cuba, legajo 747 (also AGI, Audicncia dc Santa Fe, legajo 747). See also 
Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 7 June 1816, AGI,
Papcles dc Cuba, legajo 707.
43 Sec, for example, Report by the Secretary of State, the Palace, 6 
September 1818, AGI, Audicncia dc Santa Fe, legajo 549; Pedro Groot to the 
Council of the Indies, Santa Fc, 19 March 1818, AGI, Audicncia dc Santa Fc, 
legajo 549; and Representation by Primo Groot, 9 August 1818, AGI,
Audicncia dc Santa Fc, legajo 748.
resume practising as a lawyer, since his wife had obtained a 
pardon for him. The matter was referred to the Council of the 
Indies, which determ ined that the pardon in question (probably 
the royal pardon of 24 January 1817) simply commuted 
sentences, and did not involve the restoration of jobs. However, 
an 1819 royal order affirmed that while a pardon did not 
guarantee the restoration of jobs, having been pardoned was not 
to count against an applicant either.44
A more fundam ental problem with the various pardons was 
perhaps that the m ilitary authorities were often unwilling to 
release known insurgents, whatever the terms o f a given pardon. 
During the course of the war Morillo in particular became 
increasingly distrustful of the expediency of issuing indultos.  In 
November 1816, for example, he complained that Viceroy 
M ontalvo’s pardon of 9 April 1816 for Cartagena had simply 
resulted in m alvados  emigrating from Santa Fe and elsewhere to 
Cartagena, where they would be pardoned.45 The m ilitary’s 
general mistrust of pardons echoed the divisions left by war in 
Spain itself. In 1816, for example, various moderate government 
m inisters proposed issuing an amnesty for Spaniards who had 
supported the French after 1808. The Minister of War Francisco 
Eguia objected, however, on the grounds that all amnesties were 
treasonous; the Council of the Indies was sim ilarly opposed to
4 4 Rcport by the Council o f the Indies, 22 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 551; and Francisco Xavier de Manzanos y Castillo to Minister 
Universal, Quito, 22 April 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 236. See also 
Report on Francisco Xavier de Torres y Roxas, 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba 
legajo 888.
45 Rodríguez Villa, rabio Morillo, vol 3, pp. 239-241. See also Valentín 
Capmany to Gabriel de Torres, Mompox, 16 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 712; and Ignacio Romero to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena. 30 April 
1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 710A, for examples o f military 
unwillingness to regard indultados  as innocent.
issuing pardons.46 Although the idea of issuing such a pardon 
was abandoned, it continued to fester. Minister of State José 
García de León y Pizarro, one of the prime advocates of a pardon, 
believed that the failure to pardon liberals and supporters of the 
French was one of the principal causes of Spain’s 1820 
rev o lu tio n .47
In New Granada, pardons were honoured grudgingly. On the 
occasions when Morillo felt compelled to honour a particular 
pardon, he did his best the enforce it in the narrowest sense. The 
case of Miguel Ibáñez provoked particular concern. Ibáñez, a 
form er government official in Ocaña, had been arrested in 1816 
for treason, but had fled before being executed. He then 
apparently obtained a personal pardon from the A udiencia in 
Cartagena. This made it impossible for Morillo to have him 
executed, but it was still possible, under the terms to the pardon 
issued, to send him to Spain. M orillo wrote innumerable letters 
about Ibáñez, who was finally rem itted to Spain by Viceroy 
Sámano in December 1818.48
On other occasions, Morillo felt able simply to ignore the 
terms of a pardon altogether. In 1818, various individuals who 
had been imprisoned in the fortress in Puerto Cabello petitioned 
to be released, on the grounds that Morillo had issued an o lv id o  
del pasado  at some unspecified point in the past, and that, in any 
event, the king himself had issued a pardon on 24 January 1817.
46Edmundo Heredia, Planes españoles para reconquistar hispanoamerica, 
1810/1818, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1974) pp. 
280-281.
47Scc Anna. Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 153-4.
48 Sec Pablo Morillo to the Council of the Indies, Barquisimento, 16 July 
1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551; Juan Sámano to Ministry of 
War, Santa Fc, 19 December 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A; José 
María de Alos to Ministry of War, 9 October 1819, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, 
Document 40.
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It is not clear to which of the several indultos issued by Morillo 
the prisoners referred, but the 24 January 1817 Royal Pardon 
most certainly applied. The pardon, which covered crimes 
committed in both Spain and overseas, stated explicitly that it 
included “ los reos | americanos] procesados o no procesados, 
presentes o ausentes por delito de insurrección cometido antes de 
la publicación de este indulto en dichas capitales”.49 This pardon 
was promulgated in Caracas on 21 September 1817, and was in 
effect at the time the prisoners made their petition. Nonetheless, 
Morillo refused to honour it. On 10 July 1819, the general wrote 
from Calabozo that he had already released those prisoners he 
considered to be reform ed, but that those who weren’t would 
remain in prison. He furthermore dismissed their petition as 
“ incierta” .50
The application o f the royal pardon of 24 January 1817 was 
in fact rather complicated. It was issued by Ferdinand in honour 
of his and his brother’s marriages to the Portuguese princesses 
Maria Isabel and Maria Francesca. The double wedding took place 
in September 1816, but the actual pardon was not promulgated 
until January 1817, after a delay of over four months. Moreover, 
the cédula announcing the pardon was itself delayed in arriving in 
New Granada. This caused confusion, as everyone was expecting 
the arrival of a pardon after the royal wedding, and all were at a 
loss to explain the delay. Viceroy Montalvo eventually verified 
from the 11 March 1817 issue of the Gaceta de Madrid  that the 
pardon had indeed been issued, but by the summer of 1817 he
49 Report o f the Royal Pardon of 24 January 1817, Caracas, 21 September 
1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, legajo 386.
50 Report by the Council o f the Indies, 20 June 1818, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fe, legajo 549; and Pablo Morillo to the Council of the Indies, Calabozo, 
10 July 1819, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 549.
still had not received an official copy. As the Gaceta de Madrid 
had printed the text of the pardon in full, he decided to publish 
that version. The text as printed in the G aceta ,  and indeed the 
actual pardon itself, left unclear several important questions, most 
notably whether the pardon mandated the all-im portant 
restitución de empleos. Montalvo decided not to permit banned 
individuals to return to their posts, but specified that this 
interpretation of the pardon was provisional, and would remain in 
force only until further instructions and an official copy of the 
pardon arrived from Madrid. A number of other technical 
modifications were also made. The viceroy had begun applying 
his version of the pardon to the prisoners in Cartagena when an 
official copy arrived. Montalvo then published the original 
without any restrictions, although this left unsettled the question 
of whether pardoned individuals would be returned to their posts. 
Meanwhile, both the Audiencia and M orillo’s supporters had 
begun complaining about M ontalvo’s m odifications, not, it appears, 
because they objected to the actual details of Montalvo's changes, 
but because they disapproved in principle of his altering a royal 
pardon. The whole matter had to be referred to the Council of the 
Indies, which eventually backed M ontalvo.51
The return of a liberal government in Spain in 1820 resulted 
in the promulgation of yet more pardons. Both Ferdinand and the 
newly-installed Cortes issued various indultos  to political 
prisoners and insurgents. Copies of the king’s March 1820 pardon
51 For copies o f M ontalvo's pardon, see Pardon, Cartagena. 18 June 1817, 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717 and AGI. Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 708. See 
also Report by the Council of the Indies, 18 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 549.
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reached Cartagena in early September 1820, but it is unlikely that 
they were put into effect.52
§ 4 The Viceroy and the  Generals
Disagreements about the causes of the war, and different 
opinions on how to end it, caused great friction both in Spain and 
in the Americas. This friction tended to widen an already-existing 
split within colonial society, as civilian and military officials in 
New Granada generally took very different views on the nature of 
the insurgency. Juan Friede has observed correctly that conflict 
between civil and military authorities was a standard feature of 
colonial life, and we will see that disagreements about the war 
exacerbated such conflicts.53 While the civil authorities resisted 
the arm y’s efforts to dom inate them, the consequence of this 
resistance was a bitter internecine struggle which damaged 
Spanish effectiveness and interfered with the reconquest. The 
most serious, open, and im m ediate rift developed between 
General Pablo Morillo and Viceroy Francisco Montalvo, and it is to 
this conflict that we will turn first.
M orillo’s Instructions from  Ferdinand express the hope that 
the newly-appointed general would work in harmony with the 
newly-elevated viceroy. Conflicts between the two nonetheless 
surfaced soon after their first meeting in Santa Marta in 1815; 
General Morillo claimed that Viceroy Montalvo had refused to 
make the necessary preparations for the army prior to its arrival, 
while Montalvo, for his part, asserted that M orillo’s arrival had
52Scc Royal Order o f 9 March 1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 888; and 
Gabriel dc Torres to Ministry of Overseas, Cartagena, 7 September 1820, AGI, 
Audicncia dc Santa Fc, legajo 580.
5 'F ricdc, La olra verdad, p 39.
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caught everyone by surprise, and complained that Morillo had not 
given him any advanced warning of the arm y’s impending arrival 
and of its vast food requirements.54 The initial conflict between 
the two revolved around the question of authority. Each man 
believed himself to be the supreme commander in New Granada, 
and regarded the other as a troublesome interloper. M orillo based 
his claims on the secret Instructions issued to him by the king. 
These, he claimed, granted him complete authority over all 
aspects of the reconquest.55 Montalvo, on the other hand, 
complained regularly that M orillo acted without his approval and 
interfered with the viceroy’s own actions. He further expressed 
doubt about the very existence of the Instructions, commenting on 
. . .  el misterio con que [ Morillo] ha querido cubrir sus 
faculdades, difundiendo por todas partes la idea de que S.M. 
se las había concedido ilimitadas, y otras especias 
semejantes, sin que hasta ahora haya mostrado Real Orden, 
cédula, o documento que lo autorice de este modo, ni se me 
haya dicho o indicado siquiera esta novedad por ningún 
m in is te rio .56
54Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fc, 17 September 1816, Rodriguez 
Villa, rabio Morillo , vol 3, pp. 218-223. Such disagreements were at first 
covered up. In October o f 1815 Morillo wrote to Viceroy Abascal o f Peru 
that he got on excellently with Montalvo. See Pablo Morillo to Francisco de 
Abascal, Torrecilla, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 4.
5 5 Sec Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 17 September 1816 and 
Calabazo, 22 December 1817, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo , vol 3, pp. 218- 
223, 469-474; and Pablo Morillo to Juan Sániano, Santa Fe, 6 September 1816, 
BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (legajo 22), fol. 76. The instructions arc printed in 
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 2, pp. 437-448. A copy may also be found 
in AGI, Estado, legajo 64, Doc. 18. The Instructions will be considered 
further in Chapter 8.
56Francisco Montalvo to Ministry o f Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 
September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fc, legajo 631. See also Francisco 
Montalvo to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 19 August 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 
8739, Doc. 139; and Report by the Council of the Indies, 14 February 1817, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
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Morillo was in fact no longer in possession of a physical copy of 
his Instructions, as it had been lost in the fire on his flagship, the 
San Pedro Alcántara, earlier in 1815.57 His inability to produce
any document verifying his claims about the extent of his 
authority did not enhance his position in M ontalvo’s eyes.
Matters came to a head over the Tribunal de Cuentas, the 
body responsible for auditing the viceroyalty’s accounts. T he 
institution played an essential role in managing the governm ent’s 
finances, and thus the location of the Tribunal was an im portant 
matter. During the years from 1810 to 1813, when royalist 
government was confined to Panama, the tribunal apparently 
ceased to function altogether.58 The royalist enclaves of New 
Granada remained without a Tribunal de Cuentas until 1816.
Upon his arrival in Santa Fe in May of that year, General M orillo 
decided that the Tribunal de Cuentas ought properly to reside in 
the capital.59 This decision was to cause immense problems, as a 
provisional Tribunal had already been set up in Cartagena by 
Montalvo. Montalvo refused to allow this provisional Tribunal to 
move to the capital, and Morillo therefore set up a second, rival 
Tribunal in Santa Fe. He furthermore appointed a second Asesor, 
Faustino Martínez, a man regarded by Montalvo as incom petent. 
Montalvo refused to allow the original Tribunal to move to Santa 
Fe because he disliked Morillo and did not want to surrender 
control of this important institution to him. He feared that once in 
the capital, the Tribunal would fall under the control of the
57Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, p. 74.
58Council of the Indies to Juan Antonio de la Mata, Cádiz, 26 December 1811.
59Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Santa Fe, 13 July 1816; Pablo Morillo 
to Francisco Montalvo, Santa Fc, 9 August 1816; Francisco Montalvo to  Pablo 
Morillo, Cartagena, 9 August 1816; Francisco Montalvo to Pablo M orillo, 
Cartagena, 20 August 1816; Francisco Montalvo to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 
30 August 1816; all in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fc, legajo 631.
Expeditionary Army, which would then take for its own uses 
money which should have gone to the civil government. Montalvo 
moreover objected that Morillo was overstepping the lim its of his 
mandate, which M ontalvo stressed was to reconquer the rebel 
provinces, not to reorganise the viceroyalty’s infrastructure. 
However, the effect of M ontalvo’s intransigence was to multiply 
administrative disorder, which had already reached dangerous 
levels. The conflict was referred to Spain, and was not settled 
until 1X17, when it was decided to abolish M orillo’s new tribunal 
and to transfer the old one from Cartagena to Santa Fe.60 
Montalvo similarly refused to allow the Audiencia to move to 
Santa Fe until Morillo had left the capital.61
The conflict over the Tribunal de Cuentas was but one battle 
in a struggle that lasted until Montalvo was replaced by Juan 
Sarnano, M orillo’s protégé and friend. The continual battles over 
authority convinced Viceroy Montalvo of the advantages of having 
a single figure in charge of both political and military matters, and 
he frequently tried to convince the government in Madrid of 
th is .62 A divided command, he stressed, caused confusion and 
interfered with the smooth running of either branch. Naturally he 
hoped that, should his suggestions be taken up, he and not Morillo 
would be granted supreme control. The viceroy’s complaints 
eventually yielded fruit: in 1X18, the crown sent a series of 
condemnations to M orillo and to his second-in-command Pascual 
Enrile, deploring their refusal to carry out M ontalvo’s orders. The
6,lRcport hy Council o f the Indies, 14 February 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fc, legajo 549.
6 lFrancisco Montalvo to Ministry of Hacienda, Cartagena, 11 August 1817, 
AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fc, legajo 549.
62Scc, for example, Francisco Montalvo to the Ministry of Grace and Justice, 
Cartagena, 20 August 1816, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 747.
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crown furthermore revoked M orillo’s mando absoluto. (The 
mando absoluto, which Morillo had been granted on his departure 
from Cadiz, and which had already been revoked twice before, 
granted Morillo vague but substantial powers to appropriate 
funds from the civilian governm ent.63)
Morillo too complained bitterly of the limitations placed on 
him by the civilian government, and longed to be able to act 
unhindered. He felt that the various laws dictated to protect 
civilians from arbitrary arrest handicapped his army unfairly, as 
the republicans were not bound to observe any such restrictions. 
He further regarded M ontalvo as a whining and paranoid 
in co m p e ten t.64
The question of whose authority was supreme held such 
urgency precisely because M ontalvo and Morillo differed greatly 
in their understanding of the insurrection. The two took entirely 
different views on the pacification, and this difference in approach 
was one of the major obstacles to greater co-operation between 
Morillo and Montalvo. Montalvo was deeply opposed to M orillo’s 
handling of the war. The viceroy favoured a generally pacific 
approach, typified by his issuing of a pardon on 9 April 1816. 
Montalvo deluged the court in Madrid with denunciations of 
M orillo’s misdeeds. He denounced M orillo’s harsh treatment of 
those suspected of treason, his confrontational manner, his failure 
to control his subordinates, and his rapacious requisitioning of
63Thc Crown to Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 13 January 1818; and The Crown to 
Pahlo Morillo, Madrid, 13 January 1818; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, 
legajo 549. Also sec Sloan, Pahlo Morillo and Venezuela, pp. 134-135.
64José María Restrepo Saenz, Biografías de los mandatarios y ministros de la 
real Audiencia (I67I-INI9),  Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 84, Editorial 
Cromos, (Bogotá. 1952), p 258. Sec also Rodríguez Villa, Pahlo Morillo,
(1920), voi 2, pp. 65-66.
1 40
goods and money from the populace. The consequences of this 
behaviour were serious, Montalvo charged:
De aquí han resultado infinitos males; males que sólo el 
tiempo y mucha prudencia en los que gobiernen estos paises 
pueden ir sanando con lentitud. La real hacienda ha 
quedado destruida; las fuentes de donde sacaba su ser y sus 
incrementos, o están exhaustas, o tan arruinadas que apenas 
rinden la décima parte de su producto; los que se 
mantuvieron afectos al Rey entre los insurgents, y por lo 
mismo expuestos a sus persecuciones, se hallan resentidos, 
agraviados y quejosos por el desprecio con que los ha 
mirado; los que creían encontrar el perdón de sus yerros, 
burlados en sus esperanzas, ofendidos y deseosos de 
venganza, o prófugos y desconfiados de indultos y 
ofrecimientos, y todo el Reyno destrozado. . . Buen exemplo 
es Venezuela asolada por partidos llenos de furor, y que 
siendo la primera que se pacificó todavía arde y se abrará 
en el fuego de la guerra civil.65
General Morillo, on the other hand, came to favour a 
complete eradication of all traces of insurgency. To Morillo, 
M ontalvo’s conciliatory approach was practically treasonous. 
Indeed, in December 1X17, he informed the M inistry of War that 
Montalvo was sheltering known insurgents, thus tacitly accusing 
the viceroy of corruption, if not treason.66 M ontalvo’s attempts to 
curb the arm y’s worst abuses in the south were sim ilarly viewed
65Francisco Montalvo to Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 
September IS 17, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
66Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Calabozo, 22 December IS 17; and 
Caracas. 9 October ISIS, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo , vol 3, pp. 469-474, 
614-619.
(It was not howeveras part of a p lot to undermine the army.67 
until M orillo’s protégé Juan Sámano became viceroy that these 
accusations of treason were made openly.68) Morillo moreover 
disliked M ontalvo intensely on a personal level. He regarded 
Montalvo as inept and inexperienced with both nature of the 
country he headed and with warfare in general; M ontalvo’s sword, 
Morillo comm ented sarcastically in 1818, was “todavía virgen en 
la luenga carrera de sus servicios, no tendrá otro mérito que el de 
haber pertenecido a un dueño que ha vivido muchos años”.69 
Indeed, at an early stage he had begun a surreptitious campaign 
to remove Montalvo from office. In late August 1816, he wrote to 
the Ministry o f War, informing them that Montalvo wanted to 
resign, and recommending Juan Sámano as his replacement. As 
Montalvo him self had given no indication of wanting to resign in 
any of his own correspondence, one can be confident that Morillo 
invented this story simply in order to eliminate a rival.70
The bad feeling between Morillo and Montalvo was widely 
known, and various mysterious plots were attributed to M orillo’s 
dislike of M ontalvo.71 In 1818, for example, the governor of
67Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 22 March 1818, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 
(leg. 22), fol. 565.
68Scc, for exam ple, Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 7 September 
1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fol. 466.
69Restrcpo Saenz, Biografías de los mandatarios y ministros, p. 258. See 
also Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 31 May 1816, and Calabozo, 
22 December 1817, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 164-169, 469- 
474; and Report by Pascual Enrilc, Madrid, 18 May 1819, AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8739, Doc. 139.
7,)Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fc, 31 August 1816, Rodriguez 
Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 190-191.
7 'Sec, for example, Anselmo de Biema y Maza to Ministry of Grace and 
Justice. Cartagena, 17 October 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fc, legajo 551; 
Report by Pascual Enrile, Madrid. 18 May 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8739, 
Doc. 139; Report by Council o f the Indies, 18 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fc, legajo 549; and Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 7 April 
1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fol. 246.
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Cartagena, Gabriel de Torres, complained to the Council of the 
Indies that a certain Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Javier Cerberiz 
had arrived in Cartagena on a secret mission from Morillo.
Cerberiz refused to reveal to the governor the details of his 
mission, but, Torres commented, “el comisionado tiene en su casa a 
puertas cerradas continuas conferencias con personas desafectos 
de Montalvo”. The governor feared that the supporters of Morillo 
were engaged in some plot which would destablise the province. 
(As it turned out, Cerberiz was indeed investigating M orillo’s and 
Sámano’s charges that M ontalvo and his secretary José María 
Ramírez had sold offices to known insurgents.)72
If Viceroy Montalvo was a moderate conciliator, the 
president of Quito, Toribio Montes, represented the extreme wing 
of the party of conciliation. Montes governed Quito from 1812 
until 1817, and had thus been responsible for restoring royal 
order after the defeat of Q uito’s second independent junta.
Montes adopted an exceedingly conciliatory approach, and very 
few republicans were prosecuted during his tenure in office. 
Montes, however, attracted considerable opposition. Many 
believed that, far from having wooed former insurgents back into 
the loyalist camp, Montes had capitulated to the republicans. 
Complaints were made regularly that he sheltered unreformed 
insurgents and indeed appointed them to important posts. Montes 
apparently felt this was the best way to reconcile former 
republicans to Spain. He stressed in virtually every letter written
72Gabriel dc Torres |the document is erroneously attributed to Ignacio 
Torres] to Council of the Indies, Cartagena, 23 July 1818, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 551. Also sec Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 29 
August 1818, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 607-609; Report on Cerberiz, 
12 August 1814, AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, legajo 386; Juan Sámano to 
Ministry of War, Santa Fc, 19 September 1818, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 
720A; and Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 173.
to Spain that the Audiencia de Quito was the only part of New 
Granada untroubled by revolution, and that th is  was due entirely 
to his good government and political wisdom.73 Montes objected 
strongly to M orillo’s approach to the reconquest, and complained 
to Spain about its bad effect. He stated openly that Sám ano’s 
despotic rule in Popayán in 1812-1813 had driven the city back 
into the republican camp, and was similarly dism issive about 
Peruvian Viceroy José de Abascal’s approach to  the reconquest.74
Montes was not without allies. He got on well with Viceroy 
Montalvo, and the cabildo of Quito indeed petitioned for Montes to 
be granted the title of Marqués de la Conciliación for his efforts to 
end the war.75 Nonetheless, many people objected strongly to his 
approach to the reconquest. To begin with, Montes had been 
appointed by the Regency, and had been responsible for the 
implementation of the Constitution of 1812. Many absolutists did
73Report by Toribio Montes, Quito, 7 April 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, 
legajo 257; Proclama de Montes, Quito, 1 July 1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg.
22), fol. 470; Toribio Montes to Ministry of State, Quito, 26 July 1817, AGI, 
Audiencia de Quito, legajo 259; and Juan Ramírez to Ministry of Hacienda, 
Quito, 21 November 1818. AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.
74José de Abascal to Toribio Montes, Lima, 7 December 1813, AGI, Audiencia 
de Quito, legajo 258; Toribio Montes to Ministers of State and War, Quito, 7 
July 1814, AGI, Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 260; Toribio Montes to Ministry of 
Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260; Toribio 
Monies to Ministry of State, Quito, 22 May 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, 
legajo 258; Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Report by M inistry of War, 29 
January 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, Doc 35C.
75Joaqufn Miguel dc Araujo to Juan Sámano, Quito, 21 November 1816,
BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fol. 146; and Suplica particular del 
Ayunlamicnto dc Quito, n.d., AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.
For M ontalvo's relations with Montes, see Francisco Montalvo to 
Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia 
dc Santa Fe, legajo 631. See, however, Montes’ com plaints about Montalvo 
in Toribio Montes to Ministry of Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 260; and Montalvo’s criticism s of Montes in 
Francisco Montalvo to José dc Abascal, Torrecilla, 21 October 1815, AGI, 
Diversos, legajo 4. It seems that Montes and Montalvo agreed in their 
approach to the rcconqucst, but not on more specific matters.
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not forgive the president for his liberal past.76 Secondly, he was 
frequently accused of openly protecting insurgents. One such case 
involved M ariano Guillermo Valdivieso, the vice-president of 
Quito’s short-lived independent junta. Valdivieso had loaned 
$80,000 to the insurgent army to fund an attack on Cuenca in 
1812, and was repaid by Pedro Montufar with gold taken from 
the Casa de Moneda in Popayán. Montes’ asesor , León Pereda de 
Sarabia, tried  to initiate proceedings in 1815 against Valdivieso, 
whom he wanted to return the money, but Pereda complained 
that Montes obstructed his attempts. It was even difficult for the 
asesor  to ge t a private appointment with Montes. Montes, he 
claimed was trying to prevent Spain’s government from 
discovering his cosy relationship with Quito’s insurgents.77 He 
alleged that the president was surrounded by insurgents all day 
long: “son los que dominan al gobierno y disfrutan de toda su 
p ro tecc ió n ” .78 A form er government employee even stated that
76Montes, o f  course, later denied having felt any enthusiasm for the 
Constitution. See Torihio Montes to Despacho Universal de Indias, Quito, 7 
November 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275. Interestingly, the Quito 
insurgents o f  1812 accused Montes o f being an afrancesado. Sec Carlos 
Montufar to Toribio Montes, Quito, 6 November 1812, AGI, Audiencia de 
Quito, legajo 257.
77Lcón Pereda de Sarabia to Despacho Universal de Indias, Quito, 20 
February 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275; Various documents 
relating to the case of Mariano Guillermo Valdivieso, AGI, Audiencia de 
Quito, legajo 258; and Juan Ramírez to Ministries of State and Hacienda,
Quito, 19 August 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.
V aldivieso, along with other alleged insurgents accused in the same 
case, them selves accused Pereda of misconduct. This accusation was, in 
turn, dism issed by M ontes' successor, Juan Ramirez dc Orosco, who claimed 
the accusation was made simply in order to deflect attention away from 
their own cases. See Juan Ramirez to Ministries of State and Hacienda,
Quito, 22 October 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 275.
78León Pereda dc Sarabia to Pedro Macanas, Quito, 7 December 1814 and 
León Pereda dc Sarabia to Cristóbal de Góngora, Quito, 20 December 1814, 
AGI, Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 275. Also sec Juan Ramirez to Ministry of 
Hacienda, Quito, 21 December 1818, AGI, Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 260; 
Andrés, Bishop of Cuenca to Toribio Acebal, Cuenca, 14 January 1813, AGI, 
Diversos, legajo 3.
Montes “declaró a favor de los insurgentes”.79 This is surely 
untrue, but illustrates well M ontes’ reputation. Moreover, Montes 
and the Quito Audiencia (resident in Cuenca) had been in conflict 
since early 1815. The Audiencia, which was reduced to two 
members, accused Montes of displaying an “ irregular conducto y 
arbitrario modo de proceder”, and of sheltering insurgents and 
other evil-doers.80 M ontes’ unpopularity with certain royalists 
was such that periodic attempts were made to engineer his 
removal from office. The most dramatic and complicated incident 
occurred in 1815.
On 7 November 1815, Montes wrote to the Secretary o f the 
Despacho Universal de Indias, to inform him that an attempted 
military coup had occurred in Quito on 27 June 1815.81 He 
described how at 2pm, as he was sitting down to lunch, his 
secretary announced that “una conmoción popular” was about to 
begin. Montes ignored this warning, as such rumours of 
impending revolt circulated constantly in Quito. He did, however, 
hear a noise in the plaza, and so looked out from the balcony, from 
which he could see no sign of disorder. At that moment he 
observed that someone had sounded the alarm, and that troops
79Complaint by Manuel María de Guevara y Paz, Cuenca, 8 June 1814, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Pe, legajo 631. Of the many complaints about Montes, sec 
Silvestre Collar to Marqués de Casa Calderón, Madrid, 25 February 1817, AGI, 
Audiencia de Quito, legajo 251; and Fernando Dávalos to the king, Riohamha, 
3 January 1814 and 20 April 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 276.
80Silvestrc Collar to Marqués de Casa Calderón, Madrid, 25 February 1817, 
AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 251. The members of the Audiencia were 
friends of M ontes' distrusted asesor, León Pereda de Sarabia. Pereda and 
most of the Audiencia were from Buenos Aires. The Regent of the 
Audiencia was furthermore a particular friend of Pereda de Sarabia, and 
was married to a Porteña. See also Historia de la Rebelión de América en 35 
Cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42. 
8 *Toribio Montes to the Despacho Universal de Indias, Quito, 7 November 
1815 and 7 December 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275. Also sec 
Historia de la Rebelión de América en 35 Cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz,
Quito, 6 May 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.
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were streaming onto the street from the garrison. The city was 
entirely calm, however, and Montes could discern no signs of 
unrest. Montes described how members of the military (including 
future viceroy Juan Sámano) rushed through the streets of Quito, 
arresting the townspeople, all despite the absence of any unrest. 
Various members of the nobility were detained, including several 
who had served on the revolutionary junta o f 1809, some in the 
presence of Montes himself. In particular, the Marqués de San 
José (Manuel Larrea), Colonel Joaquín Sánchez Orellano, and 
Alcalde Ordinario Manuel Mateu (brother of the Conde de 
Puñorrostro, one of Ferdinand’s ministers) were arrested.82
Montes was then pressured by the arm y into initiating 
proceedings against those arrested, despite the fact that he was 
certain they were innocent of any wrongdoing.83 He appointed his 
asesor, León Pereda de Sarabia, to investigate their cases. Pereda 
subsequently drew up a report that affirmed that a republican 
uprising had indeed been underway, and that swift action by the 
royalist garrison had prevented a general republican revolt. 
Antonio Nariño, imprisoned in Pasto, was pinpointed as the 
revolt’s leader.84 Montes, however, did not trust Pereda. (He had 
indeed already appointed his own, unofficial asesor, until 
complaints from Pereda forced Montes to dism iss the unofficial
82Both the Marqués de San José and Joaquín Sánchez Orcllano (a relative of 
the Marqués dc Villa Orcllano, Jacinto Sánchez dc Orellano) had been 
involved in the 1809 revolutionary junta. The Conde de Puñorrostro 
petitioned vigorously for the release of his brother; see Petition by Conde 
de Puñorrostro, Madrid, 6 September 1816, AGI, Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 
275.
83Toribio Montes to the Despacho Universal de Indias, Quito, 7 November 
1815, AGI, Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 275.
84Scc the various volumes of testimony, Quito, June-July 1815, AGI,
Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 275.
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o n e .85) Montes therefore commissioned his own private report on 
events. Montes found that Pereda’s investigation had been deeply 
flawed. W itnesses had been threatened into testifying that a 
republican uprising had taken place, and many testim onies had 
been altered by Pereda when the report was drawn up. Those 
questioned for M ontes’ report all agreed that no unrest had 
occurred, and that the royalist army had rampaged through the 
town for no apparent reason.86 Montes concluded that the entire 
incident had been planned by the c ity ’s military leaders. Its 
purpose, he felt, was to remove him from office and to detain 
certain members of Quito’s nobility.
Montes sent several letters to Spain describing these events, 
and naming the officers he regarded as responsible, but of the 
various individuals named by him as ringleaders, only one was 
subjected to a legal investigation. This was Colonel Juan Manuel 
Fromista, who was accused of being the motor of the revolt. On 18 
February 1817 a Real Cédula was issued ordering that he be tried. 
By this time, however, Montes had been replaced as President of 
Quito by Juan Ramirez, who belonged to the anti-M ontes faction.
85Various people complained about Pereda. The Canónigo Magistral de 
Quito, Francisco Rodriguez Soto, and Mariano Guillermo Valdivieso, the 
former insurgent vice-president, together wrote to Spain to praise Montes, 
and to accuse his successor, Juan Ramirez, of corruption. They moreover 
accused Pereda of being “lleno de crímenes los más horrendos, . . productos 
de la moral y corazón más corrompidos." (Sec Ministry of Overseas to 
Ministry o f Grace and Justice, Palace, 16 January 1821, AGI, Audiencia de 
Quito, legajo 275.) The Bishop of Quito, Jose Ysidoro Camacho, likewise 
condem ned Pereda as "turbulento, incivil y sanguinario”, and further 
accused him of being behind the 1815 revolt. (See Report by José Ysidro 
Camacho, Bishop of Quito, Quito, 20 May 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 
275.) S im ilar accusations were levelled against Pereda by Montes himself.
On the other hand, the Ayuntamiento de Quito, the new president Juan 
Ramirez, and Juan Sámano him self all praised him, and recommended lie be 
appointed to a more influential post.
86Sec M ontes’ investigation into the supposed riot, Quito, January-Fcbruary 
1816, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275, and Representations by relatives 
of those detained on 27 June 1815, Quito, June-July 1815, AGI, Audiencia de 
Quito, legajo 275.
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It was Ramirez who carried out the investigation into Fromista’s 
behaviour, and he came to the conclusion that there had in fact 
been a genuine conspiracy afoot in 1815, and that only the 
prompt action by the military had averted it. Fromista was thus 
acquitted of any wrongdoing and no further action was taken 
against him.87
It seems highly unlikely that a genuine anti-Spanish 
conspiracy had been planned in Quito. What is clear is that Quito’s 
royalist officers did not trust Montes; on the contrary, they 
apparently plotted to remove him from office. Moreover, it is 
striking that whether or not a real republican uprising was 
underway, none of the officers involved in fighting the alleged 
conspiracy chose to take Montes into their confidence, and no one 
provided the president with any information about the nature of 
the supposed conspiracy. He was evidently distrusted by most of 
the military establishment. Montes’ claims that through 
conciliation he had kept the province at peace were dismissed, 
and his approach was regarded by the army as little short of 
t reasonous.
Other advocates of reconciliation were similarly tarred. 
Vicente Sánchez Lima, appointed governor of Antioquia in June 
1816, soon attracted the displeasure of Morillo by failing to carry 
out orders to arrest a large number of Antioqueños, and by 
favouring a soft line.88 He attracted further hostility by issuing a 
pardon. This led hard-liners like Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Tolrá, 
the military commander of Popayán, to complain that Sánchez
87Foldcr on Don Juan Fromista, IS 17. AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.
88José Manuel Restrepo, Autobiografía, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de 
Colombia, vol. 30, (Bogotá, 1957), p. 19; and Vicente Sánchez Lima to 
Francisco Montalvo, Medellin, 4 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, 
legajo 631.
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Lima had pardoned “todo el mundo” .89 Morillo ordered Sánchez 
Lima to resign in October 1816, but he refused to step down until 
Viceroy Montalvo had been consulted. Montalvo initially 
supported Sánchez Lima, but, under continual pressure from 
Morillo, he too eventually backed the dismissal. Sánchez Lima in 
fact remained in office for some months, but then fled to Jamaica 
to escape arrest for disobeying orders. Following this escape, 
Sámano accused Montalvo of having provided the governor with 
the necessary passport and papers.90
The most serious conflicts between military and civilian 
officials occurred in the south, and there too, the approach to the 
war was usually the principal source of contention. In the 
province of Popayán in particular, the governor and local officials 
complained continuously that the army was running riot. The 
army’s arbitrary extractions of money, matériel and food incensed 
these officials because they believed such behaviour made the 
reconquest more difficult. José Solis, the governor of Popayán, 
stated bluntly, “ si acaso hay algún pueblo . . .  en que se disfrute 
reposa, sin chispa de la anterior revolución, es aquel en que no 
existen tropas lexpedicionarias]” .91 Governor Solis complained 
repeatedly to the viceroy about the counter-productive effect of 
the army in his province, but, although Montalvo agreed whole­
heartedly with the governor’s analysis, he was powerless to 
intervene. Officers refused to recognise any authority other than 
Sámano and Morillo, who both supported the actions of the
89Rcstrep<> Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, p. 358.
9(,Rcstrcp<> Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, p. 314-322; and Juan Sámano 
to Pahlo Morillo, Santa Fe, 7 April 1818, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 567- 
569.
9 ’Report to Ministry of War, 29 January 1818, AGI, Estado 57, Doc 35C; and 
Josd Solis to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 20 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 631.
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a rm y .92 While Governor Solis condemned the army’s harsh reign, 
many officers doubted that insurgents sympathisers might be won 
back by gentler treatment. Those who advocated pardons were 
either dupes or traitors; Ruperto Delgado, the Commander of the 
First Battalion of Numancia and one of the most important officers 
in the south, alleged that Governor Solis was “poseído de egoísmo 
o infidencia” because he had tried to stop the army from 
requisitioning goods and men to work on the construction of the 
road to Anchicayá.93
The Audiencia also came into conflict with the hard-liners, 
in particular Juan Sámano, over the handling of the war. As with 
the problems that developed between Viceroy Montalvo and 
General Morillo, the conflict between the Audiencia and Sámano 
involved the dual questions of approach to the reconquest and 
administrative authority. A particular bone of contention was the 
special authority to try cases of treason that Morillo had in 1817 
granted Sámano, then serving as governor of Santa Fe.94 As we 
saw, the Audiencia considered this as a threat to its own power; 
normally it, and not the governor, had jurisdiction over such cases. 
Moreover, the Audiencia, while not itself in favour of 
indiscriminate pardons, disliked Sámano’s vengeful approach to 
treason trials. This new authority, they feared, would further 
alienate the populace from Spanish rule. In a report on Sámano to 
the Council of the Indies the Audiencia complained, “ un conato por
92Scc Vicente Romero to José Solis, Anscrma, 22 May 1817; Ruperto Delgado 
to José Solis, Popayán, 13 July 1817; and Francisco Montalvo to José Solis, 
Cartagena. 18 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
93Rupcrto Delgado to Juan Sámano, Popayán. 20 July 1817. AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 631. Also sec José María Barrciro to Juan Sámano. Molinos. 
10 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.
94Pahlo Morillo to Juan Sámano, Cumaná, 5 July 1817, Díaz Díaz, La 
reconi/uista española, vol. 1, pp.
el terrorismo le devora y, negado de las artes de ganar el corazón 
humano, solamente emplea el rigor y la aspereza, que causan la 
desesperación, en lugar de la afición y confianza en el gobierno” .95 
Sámano, for his part, regarded the Audiencia as a refuge for 
traitors. Its members, he alleged, were well-known insurgents, 
and “a todos pone en libertad” .96
Sámano and the Audiencia then became embroiled in a 
bitter legal wrangle that overshadowed far more serious threats 
to Spanish control. While the Audiencia and the governor fought 
over jurisdiction and their respective approaches to the war, a 
wide-reaching and daring plan to expel the Spanish from Santa Fe 
was maturing. Led by a Santafereña named Policarpa 
Salavarrieta, the plan was to incite a revolt in the royalist 
barracks in the capital. Co-conspirators in the Llanos would then 
join the revolted troops in an assault on the very heart of Spanish 
government. Days before its execution the plot was discovered, 
and its leaders arrested.97 The discovery of this serious outbreak 
of insurgency simply fuelled the Audiencia’s conflict with Sámano. 
The tribunal instantly claimed jurisdiction over the case, and its 
long report (138 folios) on the plot contains only a handful of 
references to the planned uprising. The virtual entirety of the 
report concerns Sámano’s noxious influence on administration of 
justice in the capital, and the Audiencia’s efforts to retain its 
traditional prerogatives.98 The case was eventually referred to
95 Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 1, p. 344; and Report by the Fiscal 
del Peru, Madrid, 7 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 665.
96Scc Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 22 May 1817, BRAH, Sig.
9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 292-294.
97For details sec Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 1, pp. 233-263, 341- 
381.
98Audiencia’s report on the uprising in the barracks o f  Santa Fc, August 
1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748.
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the Council of the Indies, and led to  the establishment of 
guidelines for trying cases of treason discussed above.
While this conflict with Sámano was the most dramatic 
example of the Audiencia’s problems with the army, the issue was 
much more wide-reaching. The Audiencia had, for example, 
supported Viceroy Montalvo’s efforts to keep the tribunal in 
Cartagena, and to prevent its transfer to Santa Fe. The reason for 
this was that the Audiencia feared the army. In the capital, the 
Audiencia claimed, “no teniendo a su disposición la fuerza, se vería 
desairado por la oficialidad del Ejército Expedicionario que no 
conoce otra autoridad que la del General Morillo, y el jefe 
[Sámano] que dejó en Santa Fe”.99
The continual conflicts erupting between the army and the 
civilian authorities, the ongoing distrust of advocates of a different 
approach to the war, the constant sabotaging of the work of 
conciliators, and the unrelenting legal attacks on the army’s 
attempt to rule by decree all took their toll on the effectiveness of 
Spain’s effort to retain its hold on New Granada. The royalists did 
not constitute a unified force, nor could they agree on a unified 
plan for reconquering New Granada. In this they merely reflected 
the confusion present in Spain itself, for there too no single policy 
won the unqualified support of any government, and no 
agreement was ever reached on the causes of the war. It is to this 
division in Spain itself that we now turn.
" S e e  the various documents on the A udiencia 's conflict with Sámano in 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
Chapter 5: Responses and Representations
Spain never developed a coherent strategy for defeating the 
insurgents in the Americas, principally because it lacked a 
coherent understanding of the causes of the rebellion. Unable to 
decide why its subjects were in revolt, the crown was incapable of 
designing a realistic response. In this chapter we will examine the 
different measures taken by Spain to end the insurgency, and will 
contrast these with the advice and interpretations given by 
royalists in New Granada. The divergent views on the origin of 
the war limited Spain’s effectiveness in responding to it. We have 
already seen that Montalvo and Morillo differed in their attitude 
towards the insurgency. We will here see that this split was 
general. Different wings of colonial government disagreed 
profoundly about the causes of the war, and this disagreement 
crippled its response to revolution.
$1 .  Spain’s Response to the War
The first steps taken by the rump of the Spanish 
government to stop the war in the Indies came in July 1810. In 
that month the Council of the Indies first debated the causes of 
the newly-developing insurgencies, and proposed various half- 
baked plans for ending them. No decisive action was taken, 
however, and by the end of the year the Cortes in Cadiz had come 
to the conclusion that it was too ill-informed about the state of 
affairs in the Americas to be able to make reasonable decisions 
about how to end the war. It accordingly established a special 
junta to study the matter. The junta first met on 26 January
1811, when it discussed several proposals concerning Mexico. In 
the same month the Council of the Indies began work on an 
investigation into conditions in the Americas. It was not, 
however, until April 1812 that the Regency began to meet 
regularly with representatives from the Americas to gather 
information. By this time the Cortes had already drafted its great 
achievement, the Constitution of 1812, intended to unite both 
hemispheres in peace. Although regular debates were held on the 
American problem, American delegates grew angry with the 
Cortes’ failure to listen to their views and the ignorance of their 
Spanish counterparts. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the Cortes proved unable to come up with an 
adequate response to the war. Proposals submitted by the 
American deputies were generally rejected, and the debates on 
the war contributed little to the delegates’ understanding of 
events there. Furthermore, the leisurely pace with which 
proposals were considered meant that the Cortes, like the colonial 
administration before it, were ineffective in responding to urgent 
c r i s e s .1 (The restored Cortes of the 1820s was equally slow. In 
1821, one deputy was moved to complain that “al paso que 
llevamos, para mí no sería extraño que los disidentes concluyasen 
su obra antes que el Ministerio haya podido, no tomar, pero ni aún 
proponer, medidas al Cuerpo legislativo” .2)
'F o r  a discussion of the Cortes and their response to the American 
insurgencies, see Marie Laure Ricu-M illan. Los diputados americanos en las 
Cortes de Cádiz (igualdad o independencia). Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones C ientíficas (Madrid, 1990); Timothy Anna, Spain and the 
Loss of America, University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1983), pp. 64-114; 
and Edmundo Heredia, Planes españoles para reconquistar Hispanoamérica, 
ISIO/ l fUS,  Editorial Universitaria dc Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1974), pp. 
1-30.
2 Melchor Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América y su reflejo en 
la conciencia española. Instituto dc Estudios Políticos (Madrid, 1954), p. 103.
Little changed after the return of Ferdinand VII in May 
1814. Ignorance, and an inability to decide on any consistent 
course of action, characterised Ferdinand’s tenure as much as it 
had that of the Cortes. Ferdinand did recognise the need for 
sound information about Spanish America, and made regular 
efforts to learn more about events there, but the results of these 
exercises were seldom happy. One of his first actions on resuming 
command was to appoint several special consultants to inform him 
about affairs in Spanish America. The Quiteño Conde de 
Puñonrostro, a personal friend of Ferdinand and a delegate to the 
1812 Cortes, was appointed consultant on New Granada. The 
Count reported that New Granada was largely pacified, but did 
suggest that dishonest and corrupt officials be removed from 
office. Advice of this sort was worse than useless, for it denied 
the seriousness of the situation facing the Spanish in New 
G ranada.3
Various committees were also established to formulate 
policy regarding the war: in 1815, Ferdinand formed multiple 
juntas to study the possibility of British mediation, and a unified 
Junta de Pacificaciones was created in October 1816. Further 
committees, established in 1816 and 1817, considered the issuing 
of pardons and other war-related issues. Special colonial offices 
were set up within each ministry, a Junta de Generales met from 
July 1814, and the royal councils of war, treasury, the admiralty, 
and the state also considered matters relating to the war.
Lobbyists from the consulados met regularly with treasury 
officials to discuss the financial aspect of the war. Then, in 
November 1818, a combined committee composed of
3Scc Heredia, Planes españoles, pp. 124, 137-8.
representatives from the ministries of war, the admiralty and the 
Council of the Indies also began meeting.4 Although Michael 
Costeloe argues that the many ad-hoc committees formed to 
discuss the American question show that the Spanish government 
cared a great deal about the war, these various separate 
committees contributed very little to the evolution of a unified 
plan of attack.5 The different juntas and councils proposed 
different solutions, all of which were applied partially, sometimes 
simultaneously, and never consistently. Not surprisingly, this 
scatter-gun approach produced few positive results for Spain.
Not least of the problems was the tremendous number of 
(often conflicting) reports produced by the many different 
councils. Ferdinand’s Minister of the Navy, José Vásquez Figueroa, 
complained in December 1816 that decisions were being lost in 
“una verdadera lucha de papeles” .6 Ferdinand himself proved 
another obstacle to effective policy-making. Encouraged by his 
unofficial cabinet of friends, the cam arilla ,  Ferdinand embarked 
on policies without discussing them with his appointed ministers, 
occasionally with disastrous results. A particularly notable 
example of the danger of this approach occurred in 1817, when, at 
great expense, Ferdinand arranged the purchase of several 
Russian warships. The navy minister was not involved in the 
purchase, as it had been arranged entirely through Ferdinand’s
4Sec Michael Costeloe, Response to Revolution. Imperial Spain and the 
Spanish American Revolutions, 1810-1840, Cambridge University Press 
(Cambridge, 1986), pp. 10-13, for descriptions of these various groupings.
5See Heredia, Planes españoles, p. 284; Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, 
pp. 149-152; and Lino [de Pombo?] to Simón Bolívar, Philadelphia, 16 June 
1816, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 109. Bolivar’s correspondent 
comments that in Spain the government has been “hecho una babilonia 
con tanto m inistro nuevo a cada paso".
6 Michael Costeloe, "Spain and the Spanish American Wars of 
Independence: The Comisión de Reemplazos, 1811-1820”, JLAS,  vol. 13 (1981) 
p. 223.
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personal links to the Russian ambassador. At the time the navy 
minister was himself engaged in negotiating the purchase of 
French warships. This purchase would have been made 
unnecessary by the king’s acquisition of the Russian ships, had 
most of the Russian vessels not proved to be completely 
unseaworthy. The Spanish government was nonetheless required 
to pay the full sum agreed for the Russian ships, and indeed for 
the repatriation of their Russian crews. The incident illustrates 
well the danger of maintaining two parallel policies, one official 
and one informal.7
This failure of communication continued during the liberal 
trienio, when the king was hostile towards his own government, 
and disinclined to assist them. The Marqués de las Amarillas, a 
friend of the king and a minister during this period, described 
Ferdinand’s manner during ministerial consultations:
El rey estaba . . . ocupado en abrir libros o folletos que 
recibía de París o en liar y desliar un rollo de cinta para 
legajos que tenía sobre su mesa; siempre con un aire afable, 
pero entrando muy poco o nada en materia, y contestando 
sólo: “ Bien, sí; como te parezca . de modo que, al acabar la 
tarea, era difícil saber la opinión que Su Magestad había 
formado (si es que había formado alguna) de cada negocio, o 
del modo de presentarlo cada ministro.8 
The lack of direction so evident in Ferdinand’s policy towards 
Spanish America was characteristic. As Federico Suarez 
remarked, the fundamental feature o f  Ferdinand’s government
7Sce Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 110-15 for details o f the Russian 
ship purchase.
8Pcdro Voltes, Fernando Vil vida y reinado. Editorial Juventud (Barcelona, 
1985), pp. 182-183.
was precisely its lack of clear policies.9 This vagueness was 
recognised by Ferdinand’s own mother, who in 1808 wrote with 
exasperation, “De Fernando no podemos esperar jamás sino 
miserias y persecuciones . . .  no tiene carácter alguno”.10 1
Ferdinand’s indecision irritated other observers as well; British 
diplomats complained that Spain never committed itself decisively 
to any course of action.1 1
The many bodies established under Ferdinand to study the 
matter failed to produce a unified recommendation for ending the
war. Instead, several different and, on occasion, mutually 
exclusive policies were employed, often at the same time. There
was, however, a certain consistency in Spanish policy towards 
America throughout the independence period. The consistency 
lay in the persistence of three, sometimes contradictory, 
approaches to ending the war, all of which were employed by 
every government in power from 1810 until the mid-1820s.
These were the use of military force, conciliation, and negotiations, 
either mediated or direct.
Military force was tried most consistently. It is worth 
noting that it was not the absolutist Ferdinand, but rather the 
Cortes that sent the first troops. In 1811, a total of 1,068 troops 
were sent to four different destinations, and in 1812 some 5,800 
soldiers set sail for the Americas. By 1813 Spain was able to 
organise rather larger forces. In that year 9,200 soldiers were
yLuis Miguel Enciso Recio, La opinión pública española y la independencia 
hispanoamericana, 1819-1820, Universidad de Valladolid (Valladolid, 1967),
p. 34.
10José Luis Cornelias García Llera, Los primeros pronunciamientos en 
España, 1814-1820, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Madrid, 
1958), p. 78.
11 Sec, for example, Frederick Lamb to George Canning, Madrid, 25 February 
1826, in C.K. Webster (editor), Britain and the Independence of Latin 
America, 1812-1820, vol 2, Octagon Books (New York, 1970), p. 460.
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despatched to five different cities in Spanish America. In 1814, 
after the defeat of Napoleon, Spain was not only politically ready 
to throw itself frontally on the insurgents, but also had a large 
population of unemployed soldiers. Thus 1814 was spent 
organising Morillo’s Expeditionary Army, which left in February 
1815, with over 10,000 men. Three smaller expeditions totalling 
about 4,000 men altogether also left Spain that same year. Spain 
was not able to match this show of military muscle in the 
succeeding years, and only some 4,300 soldiers were sent 
annually for the next two years. By 1818, the number had fallen 
to only some 2,000. Another great expedition was prepared for 
1820, but the January revolt of Colonel Rafael Riego crippled this 
attempt at a military reconquest. In total, Spain sent some 41,000 
peninsular soldiers to fight in the Americas. Of these 
approximately 11,000 fought in New Granada.12
In the context of contemporary warfare these figures are 
small. Four decades earlier, the British had recruited 171,000 
men to fight against their American insurgents; and even the 
French, hard pressed by other militar commitments, had been 
able to raise over 60,000 soldiers to fight Haiti’s revolted slaves.13
l2 The Marqués de las Amarillas, the minister o f war during 1820, estimated 
that between 1811 and 1820 Spain had despatched some 42,000 men. Sec 
Costeloe, Response to Revolution, p. 89 and Lúeas Atamán, Historia de 
Méjico, Editorial Jus (Mexico City, 1969), vol 5, p. 14n. Note the discrepancy 
in the figures given by Costeloe and Alamán. The Comisión de Reemplazos 
estimated that 47,000 troops had been sent. See Anna, Spain and the Loss of 
America, p. 101. For modern estimates of the number of troops sent, see 
Heredia, Planes españoles, pp. 79, 94, 252-253; Margaret Woodward, “The 
Spanish Army and the Loss of America, 1810-1824”, HAHR,  vol 48 (1968), pp. 
587-9, with lower figures than those given by Heredia for the 1813 
expedition; Costeloe, "Spain and the Spanish American Wars of 
Independence” , pp. 223-237; and also Julio Albi, Banderas Olvidadas: el 
ejército realista en América, Ediciones de Cultura Hispánica (M adrid, 1990), 
pp. 401-405.
13Picrs Mackcsy, The War for America, 1775-1783, Longmans (London,
1964), p. 176; and C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins. Toussaint L'Overture and 
the San Domingo Revolution, Alison & Busby (London, 1984), p. 369.
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In European terms, the 41,000 soldiers Spain scattered across 
Spanish America might have constituted a respectable force for a 
single encounter, but not for an entire imperial army; in 
comparison, Spain lost over 35,000 men at the Battle of Ocana 
a lo n e .14 The 10,500 men who arrived with Morillo, while 
constituting the largest force ever sent by Spain to its colonies, 
scarcely formed an impressive army in European terms.
The military solution to the war was supported by a broad 
coalition of interests in Spain and the Americas. First, many 
Spaniards, both in the government and in the public, believed that 
the war was the result of the malicious influence of a few 
hombres oscuros . These malefactors, doubtless creoles, had 
incited the fundamentally loyal populace to revolt, perhaps by 
circulating false or distorted rumours about the true state of 
affairs in Spain.1'' This view implied that at the very least the 
revolt had no popular base, and suggested that a military force, 
possibly even a small military force, might easily defeat the 
rebels. “ Send a few troops from the peninsula and total 
pacification is certain,” proclaimed one Spanish newspaper in 
1X1 l . 16 This was the opinion o f  the commercial consulados and
14 Similarly, a force of 30,000 Spaniards defeated the French at Baildn, and 
Napoleon lost 20,000 men at the battle o f Essling in Austria. See Anna,
Spain and the Loss of America, p. 60, Christopher Duffy, The Military 
Experience in the Age of Reason, Routlcdgc and Kcgan Paul (London,
19X7), pp. 17-18; and George Rudd, Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815,
Fontana (London, 1989), pp. 267-269.
'"'See Costcloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 28-41 for comments on this 
theory. Also see the Royal Order o f 1 June 1814, where Ferdinand states that 
most people in the Indies are loyal, AGI, Papeles de Cuba legajo 718; and the 
Instructions for the Peace Com m issioners, 1820, AGI, Indiferente G eneral, 
legajo 1569, for persistence of this view until 1820.
ia £7 Redactor General, 7, 19 September 1811, quoted in Costcloe, Response to 
Revolution, p. 53. This view, sim ilar to the attitude taken by British 
ministers in the early years of the American Revolution, was shared by 
some officials in the Americas. Sec Joaquin Carridn y Moreno to Regency, 
Havana, 10 March 1811, AGI, Audicncia dc Santa Fc, legajo 747; and for
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of their mouthpiece, the Comisión de Reemplazos. The Consulado 
de Cádiz was one of the most persistent supporters of armed 
intervention, and one of the most inflexible opponents of 
commercial reform, which would invariably reduce its control 
over the Atlantic trade. The Comisión thus encouraged the belief 
that it was only through force that Spain might retain its colonies. 
The insurgencies were supported only by “ la hez de la plebe” and 
were led only by self-seeking traitors.17 Other observers, 
particularly those with some direct experience of the American 
war, maintained that, on the contrary, the rebellion had deep 
popular roots. Paradoxically, this view led some of its adherents 
to advocate the same military solution advanced by those who 
believed the revolts had little popular base. Men such as Pablo 
Morillo came to believe that military force was the only way to 
defeat the rebellion. It was, he believed, impossible to convince 
the Americans to remain Spanish, as the populace wanted only 
independence. A decisive military victory was, in his view,
Spain’s only hope.18
Military force was not the only solution considered. Other, 
more conciliatory approaches were also advocated. To begin with, 
some who believed the revolutions were the result of republican 
rumour-mongering and deception (the so-called “ seduction 
theory”), maintained that the insurgents might be defeated simply
comments on the North American case, Mackesy, The War for America, p.
2.
l7 See La Comisión de Reemplazos representa a la Regencia del Reino el 
estado de insurrección en que se hallan algunas provincias de ultramar, 
Cádiz, 1 March 1814, AGI, I.A. 5/20.
l8 For a concise statement o f this view, sec Pablo Morillo to the Ministry of 
Overseas, Valencia, 26 July 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. An 
extract of this letter is also printed in Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, 
p. 240.
by an information campaign about events in Spain.19 
Consequently, when in 1810 the Council of the Indies made its 
first attempt at suffocating the revolt in Caracas, it determined to 
send nothing more than a special commissioner, charged with 
informing the public of the true state of affairs in Spain. (The 
government’s total lack of cash also influenced this choice of 
response). Similarly, in 1814, the government commissioned 
leading colonial officials to write pamphlets “en estilo sencillo” 
which were to explain and correct the mistaken beliefs that had 
caused the war.20 The consistent failure of this approach did not 
dampen the enthusiasm of its adherents, as Edmundo Heredia has 
observed:
Así a la confianza en que se producirá la autopacificación 
cuando se conozca la instalación de un gobierno legal 
(Consejo de Regencia), sucederá la esperanza de que la paz 
sobrevendrá cuando se sepa de la instalación de las Cortes, 
lo mismo que dos años más tarde la ilusión será puesta en 
los efectos de la Constitución sancionada en Cádiz.21 
Of course, some observers believed the war was neither the result 
of misinformation campaigns nor soluble only through military 
force. Many Spaniards, both in government and out, blamed Spain 
itself for the outbreak of war. Although some conservatives 
insisted that a decline in absolutism had cleared the way for
19Scc Woodward, “The Spanish Army and the Loss of America", for 
comments on the seduction theory. See also Anna, Spain and the Loss o f 
America, p. 47; Jaime Delgado, La independencia de América en la prensa 
española. Seminario de Problemas Hispanoamericanos (Madrid, 1949), pp. 
223-225; and, for an example, Report by the Council of the Indies, 3 October 
IS 14, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 156S.
20 Fran cisco Montalvo to Ministry of War, 22 November IS 16, AGI, Audiencia 
dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
21 Sec Heredia, Planes españoles, p. 19. Heredia is referring here 
specifically to the revolution in Rio dc la Plata, hut the observation applies 
equally well elsewhere.
sedition, many others, both liberals and conservatives, agreed that 
Spain’s inept administration of the colonies was to blame.22 
Advocates of this view suggested that the war might be ended 
through a combination of reform and conciliation; the colonies 
were to be made to feel a part of Spain, and the grossest abuses 
were to be ended. It should be immediately clear that this 
approach would combine poorly with a military one; 
announcements that the Americas constituted an integral part of 
Spain, accompanied by the despatch of thousands of troops, would 
convince few that Spain did not regard America as its colony. 
Nonetheless, this was exactly what the Cortes attempted from 
1809 to 1813. Both in 1809, with the opening of the Cortes, and 
in 1812, following the publication of the Constitution, equality was 
proclaimed between peninsulars and creoles, yet from 1811 to 
1813, nearly 16,000 troops were sent to Spanish America.
This example illustrates the flaw in the conciliatory 
approach. No Spanish government was willing to commit itself 
solely to conciliation, which meant that the symbolic actions 
intended to assure Americans of Spain’s concern for their well­
being fell rather flat. Thus in 1820, the Cortes, while refusing to 
recognise the de facto independence of Río de la Plata, nonetheless 
voted to establish a university in Córdoba. This university would 
never be built, but the vote authorising it was intended to 
illustrate the Cortes’ benevolent attitude towards the 
v iceroyalty .23 Similarly, the very selective applications of the
22Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 7-8, 42-44.
23Scc Manifiesto a la Nación Española by José Moreno de García, Cádiz, 16 
February 1822, Iris Zavala. Masones, comuneros y carbonarios, Siglo XXI 
(Madrid, 1971). p. 259.
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more than 20 pardons issued between 1810 and 1820 dampened 
faith in Spain’s administration of justice.
Proposals for genuine commercial reform were an entirely 
different matter, compared to the tender declarations in favour of 
hispanic unity mouthed by both the Cortes and Ferdinand. Plans 
of real substance were advocated even by such bodies as 
Ferdinand’s Junta de Pacificaciones, which was set up in late 1815 
to discuss ways of ending the insurgency. In 1817, the Junta 
recommended that Spain offer the rebels a package of reforms, 
including free trade, affirming “ it is necessary and urgent to 
change the system”.24 The Junta’s proposal, which was linked 
with Minister of State José García de León y Pizarro’s ill-fated 
reform package, illustrates the depth of support for altering 
Spain’s mercantilist system. In the end, however, no commercial 
reforms of any substance were ever enacted.
The most problematic of the suggestions for reform 
concerned Spain’s commercial monopoly. Many proposals 
outlining such reforms as the abolition of the state monopolies and 
the licensing of free trade in the Americas were presented in the 
Cortes, and many were considered by Ferdinand’s government.
The most persistent advocate of reform was José García de León y 
Pizarro. In September 1817, Pizarro proposed a grand plan for 
ending the insurgency.25 This plan involved liberalising trade 
with the Americas and restarting the stalled British mediation. 
Although it was backed by many government bodies, Pizarro’s 
proposal was blocked by the ministers of war and justice, and in 
the end little came of it. Moreover, Pizarro was dismissed from
24Anna. Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 166-168.
25Fernández. Almagro, La emancipación de América , pp. 83-87.
office in September 1818, leaving the government in the hands of 
the hawks. Pizarro’s plan, like all earlier proposals for commercial 
reform, foundered on the rock of consular opposition. The 
Consulado de Cádiz in particular was determined to block any 
change to trading legislation. As the major source of funding for 
the government’s war effort (via the Comisión de Reemplazos), the 
Consulado de Cádiz was in a good position to dictate terms. During 
the Cortes of 1810-14, when the delegates were actually confined 
to Cádiz itself, the influence naturally made itself felt most 
directly, but the Consulado continued to influence policy after 
1814. The effect of both the consulados and ministerial 
opponents of free trade was that no real reforms of Spain’s 
commercial policy were undertaken, although many were 
cons ide red .26
The third strand in Spain’s response to the war concerned 
the role played by other countries in fomenting the insurgency. 
Behind it lay a suspicion that the revolt was the product of foreign 
intervention in Spain’s dominions. Spain’s successive 
governments knew that other countries were aiding the 
insurgents; Ferdinand in particular was much concerned that his 
supposed allies were assisting the rebels. All commented on the 
number of foreigners, especially British, fighting for the rebels, 
and the persistence of the insurgency was repeatedly attributed 
to the aid and support given to foreign mercenaries by their 
perfidious governm ents .27 Indeed, many expeditions did leave
26Sec Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 73-82, Chapter 5, esp. pp. 140- 
141.
27 Sec for example Timothy Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in 
Mexico City, University o f Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), p. 194; Pablo 
Morillo to Ministry of State (7), Cartagena. 31 December 1815, AGI, Estado, 
legajo 57; José García de León y Pizarro to Joaquín Campuzano, Madrid, 24
Great Britain to fight with the insurgents and the role of British 
battalions in many of Bolivar’s battles is well known. “Los 
ejércitos ingleses parece que quieren transladarse todos a este 
continente,” remarked General Pablo Morillo in May 1819.28 
General Morillo was, indeed, so concerned about the increasing 
numbers of British mercenaries that he went to the 
unprecedented step of issuing a proclamation in (rather fetching) 
English:
To the British chiefs, officers and soldiers now serving with 
the insurgents. . . Englishmen: to you I address myself who 
are already acquainted with that famous personage whom 
you no doubt (while in England) compared to a Washington 
at least, but now, having seen the Hero of this despreciable 
republic, his troops, his Generals, and the Wiseacres who 
compose his government, you must be convinced of having 
been most shamefully imposed upon. You are serving under 
the command of a man in every respect insignificant, and 
have joined an horde of banditti who are famed for the 
exercise of the most barbarous cruelties, which are so averse 
to your national character, that you must abhor them. He 
who retains the least spark of honour and justice cannot 
remain united with such a band of ragamuffins, who are 
abhorred by the very country that gave them birth whose 
soil they have sullied with crimes of all descriptions. The
May 1817, AGS, Estado, legajo 8287; and Pablo Morillo to the Duke of San 
Carlos, Caracas, 8 January 1819, AGS, Estado 8223.
28Enciso Recio, La opinión pública española, p . 55. Also see Pablo Morillo 
to the Ministry o f War, Caño de Atamayca, 28 February 1819 and Timaco, 24 
September 1819, Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo 
Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-18.17). Real 
Academia de la Historia (Madrid, 1908), vol 4, p. 10-14, 70-74; and Eric 
Lambert, Voluntarios británicos e irlandeses en la gesta bolivariana, vol. 1, 
Edición de la Corporación Venezolana de Guayana, (Caracas, 1981).
people of Venezuela only wish for peace and for the 
extermination of those monsters. I know that many of those 
misled Englishmen and other foreigners were prevented 
from separating themselves from this unjust cause for want 
of means. I therefore offer and guarantee to those who may 
present themselves to the army under my command, 
personal security, they will either be admitted in the service 
of H.C.M. or be sent free to the country of their own choice. .
. This offer of security tendered to you by a Spanish General 
who fought at your side for the liberty of Europe I trust you 
will consider as sincere and inviolable.29 
The involvement of British mercenaries and volunteers in the 
wars of independence, as well as Britain’s obvious commercial 
interest in an independent Spanish America, overshadowed all 
attempts at ending the war through diplomacy. Britain was the 
only country really interested in assisting Spain in negotiating 
with the insurgents, but the Spanish government was too 
suspicious of Britain’s intentions to give full support to any plan 
for a mediated settlement. Neither was Spain willing to grant 
Britain any commercial privileges in return for diplomatic 
assistance. In the end, Spain’s well-justified doubts about the 
impartiality of the British undermined all attempts at a mediated 
settlement of the war. The first round of British mediation, 
initiated by the Regency, reached a dead end by the middle of
1812, although directionless discussions continued until mid-
1813. As the Conde de Toreno remarked, the continued 
negotiations “served only to add to the number of documents in
29 Proclama de Morillo a los Jefcs. . . Ingleses, Achaguas, 26 March 1819, 
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo ,vol 4, pp. 108-109.
the archives that time casts into oblivion”.30 For their part, the 
insurgents would at first have been very willing to enter into 
negotiations. Participation in attempts at mediation gave the 
rebels a certain respectability, and also put pressure on Spain at 
least to appear flexible.3 1
In July IS 15, the newly-reestablished Council of the Indies 
advised the newly-restored Ferdinand to reopen discussions with 
Great Britain about British mediation, which the Council believed 
was Spain’s only real hope. The Council urged Ferdinand to 
support a mediated settlement, even if it obliged Spain to grant 
Britain special trading rights. Ferdinand approved this 
recommendation, and established several committees to 
investigate the matter. Plans to cede American territory in return 
for aid were also discussed, and other European powers were 
invited to assist Spain. Discussions wandered aimlessly until early 
1817, when Ferdinand decided to restart the discussion of British 
mediation. By September 1818, mediation was again 
ab a n d o n ed .32
Negotiations foundered because of Spanish distrust of the 
British. It was widely believed that Britain would benefit more 
from an independent America than from a colonial one.
Moreover, the flow of legionnaires from Britain to the Americas
'°A nna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 110. Anna, Spain and the Loss of 
America, pp. 104-110 contains details of the negotiations, as do Heredia, 
Planes españoles, pp. 74, 83, 193-225; and John Rydford, "British Mediation 
between Spain and her Colonies, 1811-1813", HAHR,  vol. 21 (1941).
31 Report by José María del Real, London, 7 December 1814, AGI, Estado, 
legajo 57, Doc. 34A, letter 2. The reports by Real, the Ncogranadan 
insurgent representative to London, may also he found in AGS, Estado, 
legajo 8287.
32Scc Heredia. Planes españoles, p. 193-206, 377; and AGI, Estado, legajo 88, 
Document 10, which contains much information on the British mediation. 
For the British side o f the negotiations, sec Webster (editor), Britain and the 
Independence of Latin America, vol 2, pp. 309-442.
did little to convince the Spanish of Great Britain’s neutrality. The 
British government, conscious that the presence of so many 
Britons in the insurgent armies discredited its offers to mediate, at 
various times prohibited its citizens from participating in the war, 
but these prohibitions did not staunch the flow of arms and 
m e n .33 Attempts at mediation were also hampered by Spain’s 
unwillingness to grant Britain the commercial concessions it 
wanted it return for help. It was not until the 1820s that Spain 
became willing to grant Britain trading privileges, and by then 
Spain was not in a position to deliver on any offers related to its 
colonies.
Direct negotiations with the insurgents were little tried until 
1X20, when, under the influence of the liberal revolt in Spain, 
authorities in the Americas were instructed to open discussions 
with the insurgent leaders. Special commissioners were also sent 
to the Americas to assist these efforts. The outcome of the 1820 
peace commission will be considered in Chapter 12. It is sufficient 
to note here that these efforts played little role in ending the war, 
and merely provided Morillo with a graceful exit from the conflict 
in Venezuela.
33Prohibitions were issued in 1814, 1817, and 1819. See Enciso Recio, La 
opinión pública española, pp. 37-38; Act by George III, 3 July 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742; and the Duke of San Carlos to Pablo Morillo, 
London, 23 July 1819, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo ,vol 4, pp. 111-112. See 
also D.A.G. W addell, “British Neutrality and Spanish-Am crican 
Independence: the Problem o f Foreign Enlistment” , JLAS,  vol. 19 (1987); 
and D.A.G. W addell, “Anglo-Spanish Relations and the ‘Pacification of 
Am erica’ during the ‘Constitutional triennium ’ 1820-1823”, Anuario de 
Estudios Americanos, vol. 44 (1989).
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§ 2 .  R oya lis ts  in New (« ra n a d a .
While Spanish ministers deluded themselves in believing 
that the  insurrection arose from American misunderstandings 
about events in Spain, Spain’s governments were themselves 
sadly ill-informed about events in the Americas. This problem, 
evident from the earliest years of the Cortes, grew proportionately 
as the war progressed. In 1817, Pascual Enrile, Morillo’s Naval 
Commander, ended a visit to Madrid disillusioned and irritated, 
asserting that no one at the court understood what was happening 
o v e r s e a s .34 Worse, the ministers appointed to end the war often 
lacked even a rudimentary grasp of American realities; a deputy 
to the 1821 Cortes lamented that the Minister for Overseas,
Ramón Pelegrin, believed the Mexican city of Valladolid, the site 
of the execution of over 400 Spaniards by Hidalgo’s troops in 
1810, was located in New Granada.35 (The same deputy later 
complained that, with regard to Spanish America, “ se sabe más en 
las tabernas de Londres que en el Congreso de España.”36) By 
1821, the Junta de Conciliación established in Caracas was 
prepared to admit that the prevailing ignorance in Spain about 
events in America had in the past “contribuido eficazmente a la 
prolongación de los males” .37
Unfamiliarity with events in the war cannot be blamed on 
the Americans themselves. Large numbers of Spanish Americans, 
both creole and peninsular, wrote to the government to acquaint
34Hercdia, Planes españoles, pp. 45, 348.
35 M anifiesto a la Nación Española, by José Moreno de García, Cádiz, 16 
February 1822, Zavala, Masones, comuneros y carbonarios, p. 261.
36Dcmetrio Ramos, “Las Cortes de Cádiz y América," Revista de estudios 
políticos, voi. 126 (1962), p. 434.
37Instructions to the royalist com m issioners, Junta de Concitación de 
Venezuela. Caracas, 18 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24.
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them with recent events in the colonies, and some even visited 
Spain to present their views in person. Edmundo Heredia has 
documented many such reports in his fine volume P lanes  
españoles para reconquistar hispanoamérica  ,38
The fate of the Regency’s special commissioner to New 
Granada, Antonio de Villavicencio, illustrates particularly well the 
problems facing those who tried to enlighten ministers to the 
American reality.39 Villavicencio had been sent by the Regency to 
inform the viceroyalty about the establishment of the Cortes and 
the Regency, and to obtain oaths of loyalty to these bodies. He 
arrived in Caracas in March 1810, passed through Cartagena, and 
reached Santa Fe on 1 August 1810. He thus witnessed the first 
outbreaks of revolt in the viceroyalty’s three most important 
cities. Throughout his period as commissioner he sent frequent 
reports that described in ever more urgent language the 
impending crisis that loomed before Spain. Yet, on reaching Spain, 
his letters languished in total oblivion. Indeed, the only response 
he ever received from Spain was an order issued in August 1810 
terminating his commission and commanding him to return to 
Spain.40 Villavicencio, a native of New Granada, grew so 
frustrated with Spain’s behaviour that he remained in Santa Fe,
3xScc Heredia, Planes españoles . Other reports not mentioned by Heredia 
may be found in AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.
39Antonio de Villaviccncio to Antonio Amar, Cartagena. 20 May 1810; 
Antonio dc Villacivcncio to the Cortes, Cartagena, 28 May 1810; Antonio de 
Villavicencio to the Cortes, Cartagena, 29 My 1810; Antonio dc Villavicencio 
to Antonio Amar. Cartagena. 30 May 1810; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, 
legajo 747; Antonio dc Villaviccncio to Minister o f State, Cartagena, 24 May 
1810, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 629; and José M arfa Caballero, 
Diario, Biblioteca dc Bogotá, Editorial Villegas, (Bogotá, 1990), p. 81.
40Antonio dc Villaviccncio to President of the Consejo de Regencia, Santa 
Fc, 9 February 1811, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 747.
and indeed joined the republicans. He was shot by Morillo’s 
troops in June 1816.41
The most marked contrast in Spanish responses to the war is 
not between the attitudes of officials in New Granada and in Spain. 
It is rather between the recommendations of officials in New 
Granada and the actions of the government in Spain. Although the 
Spanish government rarely tailored its actions to fit the 
recommendations expressed by its officials in New Granada, the 
views advanced by these officials did not differ dramatically from 
those put foreword in Spain itself. For example, after 1817 the 
opinion grew in Spain that Morillo’s cruelty was at least in part 
responsible for the continued insurgency in Venezuela and New 
Granada. Newspapers denounced the brutality of the reconquest, 
and even some government ministers argued that military 
intervention had done more harm than good.42 José García de 
León y Pizarro put this view succinctly: “since the arrival of the 
expedition of Captain General Pablo Morillo everything has gone 
from bad to worse,” in Venezuela.43 Indeed, when in 1820 
Spain’s new liberal government reopened negotiations, with the 
insurgents, the Council of State urged that Morillo and Sámano be 
recalled to Spain prior to beginning the talks, as a demonstration 
of the government’s good faith.44 As we shall see, this view was 
widely shared by royalists in the viceroyalty itself. Nonetheless, 
no effective action was taken to curb Spanish abuses, and the
41 Relación de los principales cabezas de la rebelión . . . que han sufrido . . . 
la pena capital. Santa Fe, 4 September 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
1901. Also Heredia, Planes españoles, p. 63.
42Dclgado, La / ndependencia de América, discusses the opinions advanced 
by newspapers o f  the period.
43Anna. Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 184-5.
44Rcport by the Council o f State, Palace, 22 April 1820, AGI, Indiferente 
General, legajo 1568.
pleas of royalist officials in New Granada for restraint went 
u n h e e d e d .
Many officials in both New Granada and Venezuela believed 
that the continuation of the insurgency was a direct consequence 
of the despotism of the royalist armies. This belief was especially 
widespread in Venezuela. Captain General José Manuel Cagigal, 
for example, repeatedly warned of the bad effects of Morillo’s 
behaviour. He believed the only way to pacify Venezuela was to 
attract support, rather than to destroy the opposition.45 His 
views were echoed by several regents of the Audiencia in Caracas, 
who claimed that the rapacity of Morillo’s army had made 
“execrable el nombre español”.46 Similar sentiments were 
expressed by officials in New Granada. Many felt that the 
behaviour of Morillo’s army was responsible for the resurgence of 
insurrection after 1816. Andrés Rosillo, former insurgent and 
canon of the cathedral in Santa Fe, described in a commissioned 
report the causes of the revival of insurgency. He blamed the 
reign of terror inaugurated by Morillo in the capital: “La 
multiplicación de arrestos, la ligereza, precipitación e ilegalidad de
45Juan Manuel Cagigal, Memorias del Mariscal de Campo Don Juan Manuel 
de Cajigal sobre la revolución de Venezuela, Biblioteca Venezolana de 
Historia (Caracas, 1960), p. 145,158-159. Sec also Report by the Council of 
the Indies, 3 October 1814. AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
46José Francisco Heredia, Memorias del Recente Heredia (de las Reales 
Audiencias de Caracas y México), Editorial América, (Madrid, n.d.), p. 278. 
Heredia, it should be noted, was a notorious soft-liner, who during the five 
years he was in office did not convict anyone of treason. Montevcrde 
com plained that Heredia had not even prosecuted a certain Navarrete, "who 
was urinating on the royal bust o f Ferdinand VII at the same time that I was 
proclaim ing him in the plaza”. See Stephen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and 
Venezuela, pp. 100-101.
This view of the effect o f the royalist army was general. See 
Woodward, “The Spanish Army and the Loss of America, 1810-1824”, p. 588; 
and Report on letters o f Regent Cecilio O 'Doardo of 4 December 1816, 5 
February 1817, 27 November 1819, and 19 February 1820, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 1017. Sec also Miguel dc La Torre to Ministry of Overseas, 
Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, legajo 55.
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los juicios y el extraordinario número de víctimas realizaron los 
prognósticos de los papeles revolucionarios, que predecían estas 
escenas del terror, y destruyeron toda la idea que los realistas 
hicieron formar del gobierno de V.M.” Such an interpretation was 
not unusual; Rosillo’s report was dismissed by the Council of the 
Indies as containing “pocas ideas nuevas”.47 * As we saw in the 
preceding chapter, Viceroy Francisco Montalvo concurred with 
Rosillo; in his view, “ la conducta nada regular” of Morillo and his 
army was the origin and cause of all continued unrest in the 
viceroyalty. Montalvo stressed that not only had Morillo reduced 
New Granada to a pitiful state, but, worst of all, he had not had the 
slightest success in stopping the rebellion. The remarkable thing, 
Montalvo felt, was not that insurrection continued in parts of the 
viceroyalty; it was that some parts were at peace.4K
Associated with the view that the continued insurgency was 
a result of Spanish mishandling was the belief that the war itself 
had been caused by poor government. In the Americas, as in 
Spain, many liberal royalists blamed absolutism and corruption 
for having pushed the inhabitants of Spanish America into revolt. 
In Peru, for example, future viceroy José de la Serna as one of a 
number of younger army officers who believed that intransigent 
absolutism was responsible for the revolution.49 Indeed, 
awareness of the extent of misrule reached even into the ranks of
47Rcport on letter by Andrés Rosillo, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 
1017; and Report on letter of Andrés Maria Rosillo to Ministry of Grace and 
Justice of 13 July 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, Document 36. Also see 
Celestino Bruguera, Paris, 12 July 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 
1568; and Reports of the Tercera División del Primer Batallón del 
Regimiento de Infantería dc Numancia, January to October 1817, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A.
4xFrancisco Montalvo to the Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 
September 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
49John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, IS0R-IS26, W.W. Norton 
(New York, 1986), p. 172
the most extreme absolutists. Conservative royalists in Quito, who 
condemned insurgents and liberals alike, nonetheless suggested 
many reforms which they believed would help restore order.
Such suggestions usually centred on removing from office all 
officials found guilty of misrule, and limiting the number of 
law y ers .50
The most widely held view on the causes of the war was, 
however, much more simpleminded. The vast majority of 
royalists in New Granada felt the war was the result of an entirely 
inexplicable desire for independence, which they were able 
neither to understand nor to analyse. This wish for independence 
was regarded by some as the result o f  contamination by European 
subversives; the Baron Alexander von Humboldt was singled out 
as a particular source of contagion.51 Napoleon was also blamed 
for inciting revolt; Peru’s conservative Viceroy José Fernando de 
Abascal felt Bonaparte had activated revolutionary sentiments in 
“hombres destinados por la naturaleza a solo vegetar en la 
o b sc u r id a d .” 52 This view begs the question of the real role of the 
French Revolution and Napoleonic wars in causing the Spanish 
American wars of independence. To royalist observers, however, 
such complicated influences were often reduced to a simple form 
of infection. Insurgents had either been infected with the germ of 
revolt, or it had generated itself spontaneously within them,
50Sec Carlos Lagomarsino to Ferdinand, Guayaquil, 13 May 1816, AGI, Estado, 
legajo 72, Doc. 69; and Historia de le rebelión de América en 35 cartas, by 
Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1816, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.
51 Sec, for example. Historia de le rebelión de América en 35 cartas, by 
Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1816, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42
52Proclama by José Fernando de Ahascal y Sousa, Lima, 13 July 1810, AGI, 
Audiencia de Panama, legajo 262. Suspicion of the French of course 
predated the emergence of Napoleon. Concern about the subversive role of 
Frenchmen in the Americas was rife during the 1790s. See, for example, 
Christon Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1760-1810, University of 
New Mexico Press (Albuquerque, 1977), pp. 82-84.
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producing revolutionaries. Others ascribed the revolts to “ la 
natural ingratitude de los hombres” .53
Of course, it was not always easy for the Spanish to gain an 
accurate impression of the motivations of their opponents.
Captured insurgents rarely defended their beliefs. Most denied 
hotly any accusations of republicanism, and instead affirmed their 
support for the crown. Even well-known leaders of the revolt 
tried this approach. José María García de Toledo and Manuel del 
Castillo y Rada, both leaders of the insurgent movement in 
Cartagena, claimed during their trials that they had never 
supported independence, and expressed “sentimientos de amor, 
obedencia, y lealtad a nuestro rey el señor Don Fernando V il”.54 
On those occasions where denial was clearly impossible most 
stressed that they had supported the insurgents only after having 
been threatened, or because of the financial loss entailed in 
emigrating to royalist-controlled areas. Tomás Vásquez of 
Cartagena was typical in claiming after his capture in 1816 that he 
had remained in Cartagena during the period of insurgent rule 
only because he had been harassed into staying by the insurgent 
government, and had needed to support his large family.55 
Naturally, those detained by the royalists had powerful motives 
for denying insurgency, as those openly admitting to supporting
53Delgado, La independencia de América, pp. 231-2.
54Sce Roberto Arrazola, Los Mártires responden. . . , Ediciones Hernández 
(Cartagena, 1973), pp. 9-35, for transcripts o f the trials. Sec also, for 
example, the Sumario contra Gabriel Chim unla, Almaguer, Novem ber IS 17, 
ACC, Independencia MI-3j, signatura 4393; and Confession of Miguel 
Rodriguez, Quito, (1813?). AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 259.
55Scc Interrogation of Tomás Vásquez, Havana, 15 February 1816; and 
Interrogation of Andrés Padilla, Rfohacha, 13 November 1819; both in AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 891 A; Representation of Doña Francisca Morena e 
Isabella, Santa Fc, 19 October 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 549; 
and Marqués dc Selva Alegre to Ferdinand, Chillo, 18 March 1815, AG1, 
Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 258.
the revolution were generally shot. Moreover, Viceroy Montalvo 
had announced in 1814 that the royalists should not regard as 
traitors those who had remained in rebel territory “por el fundado 
temor de ser maltratados”, which made this line of defence 
particularly a ttrac tive .5 6
One effect of this was that royalist officers had little 
opportunity to hear the republican position presented with 
conviction. Royalist officers typically regarded their insurgent 
counterparts as motivated solely by ambition and greed. After 
the republican capture of Riohacha its royalist governor reported 
that the insurgents had lost over 200 men, “que el cobarde, vil y 
desnaturalizado [General] MacGregor ha sacrificado a su perfidia y 
bru ta lidad” .* 57 The cabildo of Pasto encapsulated the logic of this 
attitude in 1814, when it remarked of the republicans in Cali, “ la 
buena fe no es la virtud de estos hombres; si lo fuese jamás 
hubieron pensado en ser insurgentes” .58 Choosing to support the 
insurgents, an iniquitous act, proved that the individual was vile, 
and this villainy explained their initial support for the insurgents.
Overall, the royalist in New Granada whose views on the 
reconquest most mattered was General Pablo Morillo. Morillo was 
confronted with the dilemma of evaluating the nature of the war 
soon after he arrived in Venezuela. In April 1815 royalist forces 
defeated the insurgents on the Island of Margarita and captured 
their leader, Juan Bautista Arismendi. Morillo, at this early stage 
in the war, retained great faith in the regenerative power of
5flBando dc Francisco Montalvo, Santa Marta, 26 August 1814, AGI, Audiencia 
dc Caracas, legajo 109.
57José Solis to Gabriel de Torres, Rfohacha, 4 October 1819, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 709.
58Cabildo of Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, London, Egerton, 
vol. 1809. This document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia dc Quito, legajo 
276.
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mercy, and, contrary to all advice, pardoned and released 
Arismendi, who had been responsible for various massacres of 
royalists. The occasion of Arismendi’s pardon was witnessed by 
Rafael Sevilla, a young Spanish officer, who described the event in 
his memoirs:
El día 11 ya en la ciudad de Asunción, capital de la isla, . . . 
se presentó a Morillo el sanguinario Arismendi. . .
“Señor,” le dijo, “soy un hijo pródigo que vuelve 
temblando a tocar la puerta del hogar paterno. Yo he sido 
un malvado, le confieso, pero prometo a Vuestra Excelencia 
que si me concede la vida que le imploro, la dedicaré entera 
en adelante al servicio de España.” . . .
En los ojos del Brigadier [Francisco Tomás] Morales, 
que estaba presente, brilló un relámpago de ira mal 
comprimido por les deberes que impone la disciplina. “Mi 
General,” dijo Morales apuntando con el índice al famoso 
cabecilla, “mi General, no haga usted semejante cosa. Este 
hombre que tiene usted a sus espaldas no está arrepentido; 
le está engañando a usted miserablemente. Este hombre 
que ve usted arrastrándose como un reptil, no es un hombre, 
es un tigre feroz, salido de las selvas o del infierno. . . Con 
esta misma lengua con que ahora pide perdón ha mandado, 
el miserable, quemar vivos a quinientos pacíficos 
comerciantes españoles, vecinos que eran de Caracas y la 
Guayra . . .  En nombre de sus manes, mi General, yo pido que 
se haga justicia; que se castige ejemplarmente como mandan 
las leyes, no al insurgente sino al reo de delitos comunes, 
que ha estremecido de horror a los mismos insurrectos.”
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“No importa,” contestó el General Morillo, “con todo 
esto le perdono; así quedará más obligado y comprenderá 
cuán sincero y grande tiene que ser su arrepentimiento para 
que iguale mi generosidad. Arismendi levántase Ud. y sea 
leal en adelante” . . .
El cabecilla se levantó y salió echanda una mirada de 
odio sobre el Brigadier. “ Mi General,” le dijo Morales a 
Morillo, “desde ahora le predigo que fracasará usted en su 
expedición. Al decretar el indulto de Arismendi y demás 
cabecillas que alberga esta Isla, ha decretado usted la 
muerte de millares de peninsulares y de venezolanos leales 
que por ellos han de ser asesinados. . . Mi General, se pierde 
estos dominios para España y usted pierde su fama de sabio 
político y de valiente militar si sigue el sistema que acaba de 
inaugurar en Margarita.”
“Señor Brigadier, no le he pedido a usted consejos,” 
contestó algo irritado Morillo.
“Es verdad, mi General, y en adelante me abstendré de 
dárselos. . . El tiempo, mi General, el tiempo dirá cuál de los 
dos se equivoca.”S9
Arismendi rebelled soon after Morillo left Venezuela, which 
Brigadier Morales felt vindicated his position. In fact, the 
rebellion of Arismendi illustrated the complexity of the problem. 
Arismendi, whose wife and children had earlier been killed by the 
royalist governor of Margarita, rejoined the insurrection only after 
the commanding officer stationed on the island by Morillo
 ^9 From Rafael Sevilla, Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, 
campañas contra Holívar y los separatistas de América, printed in Indalecio 
L iévano A guirre, Los grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuesta 
historia. Editorial Tercer Mundo, (Bogotá, 1985),vol 2, pp. 894-895. I have 
altered the punctuation somewhat, in the interests of clarity.
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attempted to extract a forced contribution of over $40,000 from 
the inhabitants, and began to confiscate their belongings. The 
regent of the Audiencia of Caracas alleged that it was only then, 
driven by desperation, that the inhabitants rebelled against the 
royalist garrison.60 Events on the Island of Margarita thus left 
unresolved the broader question of whether pardon or 
punishment was more effective. W hat should have been clear 
was that a combination of the two was unsuccessful.
Morillo had learned of Arism endi’s revolt by June 1816. 
According to Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, the news of Arism endi’s 
uprising provoked a great change in M orillo’s approach to the 
pacification. Rejecting explicitly his earlier faith in pardons,
Morillo wrote to Madrid that “es preciso que la Corte se 
desengañe, pues no cortando la cabeza de todos los que han sido 
revolucionarios, siempre darán qué hacer; así que no debe haber 
clemencia con estos picaros” .61 In fact, a fundamental change had 
already began to occur in M orillo’s attitude toward the war itself. 
Morillo became ever more convinced that the great mass o f the 
population in Venezuela and New Granada wanted independence, 
not a reconciliation with Spain.62 This conviction deeply affected *67
6,lRcport on letters of Regent Cecilio O ’Doardo of 4 December 1816, 5 
February 1817, 27 November 1819, 19 February 1820, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
6 ’Liévano Aguirre, Los Grandes conflictos, vol 2, p. 909. Also see Francisco 
Xavier Arámbarri, Hechos del General Pablo Morillo en América, Ediciones 
de Venezuela en España, (Murcia, 1971), p. 14; Pablo Morillo to the Duke of 
Manchester. Mompox, 15 March 1816 and Pablo Morillo to Luís de Onis,
Santa Fe, 23 June 1816, both in Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 4-5, 
22-23; and Proclama de Pablo Morillo a los hombres leales de Cartagena, 
Torrecilla, 23 September 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
62 Morillo rapidly came to this conclusion in regard to Venezuela. By early 
1816 he had decided that “cl deseo de todas las clases se dirigen al mismo 
objeto de la independencia”. See Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Mompox,
7 March 1816, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 134-138. This view 
was not shared by all royalist leaders. Sec Miguel Izard, El miedo a la 
revolución. La lucha por la libertad en Venezuela (1777-1830), Editorial 
Tecnos, (Madrid, 1979), pp. 146, 173.
M orillo’s attitude towards insurgents. If the populace wanted 
independence, no amount of generosity would alter their position. 
Clemency was thus pointless. Only during his last year in the 
Americas did an increasingly fatalistic Morillo waver in his 
rejection of conciliation. Many events combined to lead Morillo to 
the conclusion that pacification could be achieved only by force. 
Already in April 1816, on his arrival in Zipaquirá, he was forced 
to recognise the flimsy foundation of the reconquest. When asked 
by Morillo why the town had not treated Viceroy Antonio Amar 
with the same veneration which was now being shown to the 
Expeditionary Army, “un jefe viejo en el país” responded, “Es muy 
sencillo. Aquellos no tenían a su disposición tantas bayonetas 
como U d.”63 Victory depended on military strength, not on 
winning the hearts and minds of the public.
Indeed, it is unlikely that this change in attitude was 
brought about, as Liévano suggests, by A rism endi’s revolt.
Already in December 1815, after the defeat of Cartagena, Morillo 
had begun system atically to execute captured insurgent leaders. 
This behaviour was to culminate in the infamous execution of nine 
leading republicans on 24 February 1816.64 Some of the nine
men had surrendered to the royalists, believing themselves to be 
covered by a pardon issued by Morillo on 23 September 1815 
from the royalist camp in Torresillas. Despite this pardon, and in 
spite of the (adm ittedly disingenuous) protestations of loyalty 
made by virtually all of the nine men, the prisoners were 
e x e cu te d .65 Morillo did not attempt to repeat his Margaritan
63Scvilla, Memorias, p. X7.
64Scc AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707 for mueh information on the 
execution o f insurgents in the months following C artagena 's recapture.
65Thcy were José María García de Toledo, Manuel del Castillo y Rada,
Antonio José de Ayos, Miguel Día/. Granados, Pantalcón German Ribón,
clemency in Cartagena. This change in behaviour in part reflects 
M orillo’s anger over the long siege of Cartagena. He had 
repeatedly warned the c ity ’s leaders that he would not pardon 
them if they prolonged their resistance. When, defeated by 
hunger, the city at last surrendered, the royalists were shocked 
by what they saw. Corpses lying unburied in the streets, and 
skeletal figures scarcely able to stand greeted the conquerors. 
Morillo vented his distress on Cartagena’s republican leadership, 
whose obstinate resistance he blamed for the city’s state. The 
nine “ martyrs” served as scapegoats, absolving the royalist army 
of any responsibility for C artagena’s nightmare.
Executions continued after M orillo’s arrival in the capital in 
late May 1X16, and for the remainder of 1816 the execution of 
prominent creoles was a daily event in Santa Fe. The initial entry 
of the Expeditionary Army into Santa Fe had not been 
accompanied by mass arrests, however, as Field Marshal Miguel 
de La Torre, who arrived in the capital before Morillo, preferred a 
more conciliatory approach. He had urged refugees to return, 
issued a general pardon, and arrested only a few notorious 
insurgents. This behaviour was at variance with that ordered by 
M orillo, whose now entirely uncompromising attitude may be 
seen in his letter to La Torre of 19 May 1816 :
Mi estimado La Torre,
Sin duda que ha salido Listed de las Batuecas, se ha 
vuelto bobo, o no conoce aun los americanos. Me dice Listed 
en su carta que los pocos malos que hay estan arrepentidos. 
Lo mismo se decia de los de Margarita y nos han jeringado
Martin Amador, José Marfa Portocarrero, Santiago Stuart, and Manuel 
Anguiano. Sec Roberto Arrazola, Los Mdrtires responden, for transcripts of 
the ir tria l.
muy bien y falta el rabo por desollar. Entonces era otro 
tiempo, porque el ejército acababa de llegar a América, pero 
ahora estamos en otro caso y es preciso proceder como el 
Rey manda. Esto es, castigar las cabezas o motores de la 
revolución más que digan que están 80,000 veces 
arrepentidos, y su general deber de Usted luego que ocupa 
la capital era haberlos puesto presos inmediatemente. . . . 
Amigo mío, desengáñense Usted y abra el ojo con esta 
canalla que solo desean que los soldados se vayan 
minorando e inutilizando con las llagas y otras bajas, para 
echarse encima, en cuyo caso quizá sería Usted el primero a 
quien como tan clemente colgasen.66 
Morillo continued to advocate extensive and severe 
punishment of all insurgents until the last year of his mandate. 
During the autumn and winter of 1819, evidence of the depth of 
support for independence became overwhelming; in October 1819 
Morillo reported on the great outpouring of support for Bolivar in 
New Granada, “lo que prueba de un modo evidente hasta donde 
llega el entusiasmo con que han abrazado la insurrección los 
habitantes del reino, que eran los que nos parecían más dóciles y
66Sec Two letters of Pablo Morillo to Miguel de La Torre. Guadelupc, 19 May 
1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, Does 68 & 69 (doc. 69, quoted here, is also 
printed in full in Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 1, Historia 
Extensa dc Colombia, vol. 6, Ediciones Lerner (Bogotá, 1964), pp. 76-77);
Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, Santa Fc, 24 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Caracas, legajo 386; and Report on letter by Andrés Rosillo, AGI, Audiencia 
dc Santa Fc, legajo 1017.
The views expressed by Morillo in these letters arc not entirely 
consonant with those put forward in a letter to Miguel de La Torre dated 24 
July 1816, which is reprinted in Stephen Stoan. Pablo Morillo anti 
Venezuela, p. 232. In this letter Morillo urges La Torre to employ 
gentleness in order to win hack insurgents, and asserts that rigour must be 
used only with "the principal leaders”. This distinction between leaders 
and followers was not to he formalised until some time later, although 
Morillo did differentiate between the two when he issued a pardon on 31 
May 1816 for those imprisoned in Santa Fe.
en quienes teníam os mayor confianza” .67 It became increasingly 
clear to Morillo that Spain would lose New Granada. As his 
pessimism about the war grew Morillo did not however become 
ever more sanguinary. Towards the end of his mandate he began 
to reconsider the virtue of clemency, and indeed criticised fellow 
officers whose “ terrorismo” had lost the royalists support.68
Morillo’s changing views on the causes on the insurgency 
encapsulate the various positions adopted in both Spain and New 
Granada by officials and observers. They also mirror the 
profound lack o f  direction characteristic of the attempted 
reconquest. M orillo’s reconquest was perhaps inevitably an 
uneasy mix of conciliation and coercion. The tension between 
these two approaches was not resolved, and in the years after 
1816 the reconquest slowly unravelled. It remains, however, to 
examine one final element of the reconquest: the attempt to 
restore the Real Hacienda to its pre-revolutionary state, and at the 
same time revive government income. It is to this matter that we 
now turn in Chapter 6.
67Pahlo Morillo to Ministry of War, Tinaco, 10 October 1819, Rodrigue/. Villa, 
Pablo Morillo, vol 4. p. 80. Morillo frequently asserted that the inhabitants 
of New Granada were more docile than the Venezuelans.
68Pablo Morillo to Miguel dc La Torre, Barquisimcto, 17 December 1819, 
AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, Doc. 281.
C h a p t e r  6: T h e  R e c o n q u e s t  o f  t h e  E c o n o m y
The permanence of Spain’s military reconquest in New 
Granada depended in part on the success of the royalists’ fiscal 
reconquest. This reconquest was necessary for two reasons.
Firstly, many the viceroyalty’s prime sources of funds had been 
mismanaged, or, on occasion, abolished during the years of the 
First Republic. The royalists thus needed to revive the state 
monopolies and return taxation to central control, if they were to 
generate sufficient income to allow the colonial bureaucracy to 
function and to cover the costs of the military reconquest. 
Secondly, political motives impelled the Spanish to seek the 
restoration of colonial fiscal structures, as on his return to the 
throne in 1814, Ferdinand Vll had ordered that all aspects of 
Spanish government be returned to their precise condition in 
1808. Thus, one of the first actions taken by Viceroy Montalvo 
after M orillo’s arrival in New Granada was to issue an order 
restoring the “administración pública y el sistema de rentas” to 
their status in 1808.1
In the same document, Viceroy Montalvo lamented that, 
during the years of insurgent rule, colonial financial structures 
had been overturned. Before the outbreak of revolution, he 
asserted. New Granada had been governed “por un sistema 
conocido, todos sus ramos de administración en el pie más 
floreciente, pagados sus empleados, y con sobrantes en las cajas 
matrices para sus gastos extraordinarios, y todo en fin anunciando
'C ircu lar hy Francisco Montalvo, Torrecilla, 30 November 1815, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.
la mejor harmonia, que es el efecto de la regularidad de las leyes” . 
This happy picture was, however, a distortion o f the state of 
affairs during the colonial period. While during the previous 
decades income from state monopolies had increased, at the cost 
of much civil unrest, trade with Spain had declined vertiginously 
since the 1790s, and subsidies from Peru and M exico had played a 
vital role in viceregal finance.2 Thus Montalvo was confronted 
with a contradictory task: he was required to coax New Granada’s 
economy into yielding sufficient income to finance the reconquest 
and the restoration of the colonial bureaucracy, but obliged to do 
this by reintroducing fiscal structures that had never been wholly 
adequate, and which were, moreover, very often unpopular. This 
chapter will examine the royalists’ success in reconciling these 
goals.
It is difficult to form a complete picture o f  the state of 
government finances during the years of the war. To begin with, 
it seems little fiscal information was actually produced during the 
period. What information is available often lacks continuity, 
making longer-term analysis difficult. M oreover, some material 
was simply destroyed during the war.3 Finally, book-keeping 
procedures appear to have relaxed somewhat. In royalist- 
controlled areas, for example, governors som etim es failed to make 
the customary reports on financial affairs in their province.4
2Sce Anthony M cFarlane, Colombia before Independence: Economy,
Society, and Politics under Bourbon Rule, Cambridge University Press 
(Cambridge. 1993), csp. pp. 297-307; and also Malcolm Deas, “The Fiscal 
Problems of Nineteenth-Century Colombia,” JLAS, vol. 14 (1982), p. 291.
3Juan Ramirez to M inister of Hacienda, Quito, 6 February 1819, AGI, 
Audiencia de Quito, legajo 261.
4Josd Maria Ramirez to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 30 August 1817, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. Sec also Manuel Alonso Velasco to Juan 
Sámano, Popayán, 20 May 1819, AHNC, Visitas del Cauca, tomo 4, ff. 741-745, 
for comments on the breakdown of book-keeping during  the war.
Unclear, or dow nright contradictory fiscal reports abound, and the 
historian m ust tread carefully to avoid sinking into a morass of 
irreconcilable figures. With these limitations in mind, we will first 
consider the conditions of New Granada’s economy during the 
years of the war, and will then turn to the royalists’ attempts to 
restore the colonial fiscal structures and generate income.
§ 1. The Effect  of War on New Granada’s Economy
There is  little agreement on whether New Granada suffered 
an economic collapse as a consequence of the W ar of 
Independence, and we do not intend to delve too deeply into this 
matter. We will, however, attempt a brief survey of the state of 
certain key areas of New Granada’s economy, namely mining and 
agriculture, during the years of the war.
Gold w as New Granada’s most important export, and the 
presence in New Granada of accessible gold was the prime motive 
for Spain’s interest in the region. Neogranadan gold mining was a 
low-tech activity . Most gold was extracted by the most primitive 
methods; gold dust was separated from the surrounding mud by 
sifting gold-bearing sand in a wooden bowl, or by running a 
stream of w ater across an area of deposit. Neogranadan mining 
thus required little infrastructure or expense, aside from the 
gangs of slaves who performed much of the work. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, state revenue from m ining increased steadily. 
Placer mining in the Chocó accounted for much of this increase, 
and indeed fo r the region’s importance. Significant gold reserves 
were also to be found in Antioquia and the Cauca Valley. By the
/
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last years of the eighteenth century, New Granada’s m ines were 
yielding at least two million pesos worth of gold each year.5
During the years of the war, however, very little m ining was 
carried out. Indeed, Hermes Tovar has estimated that from  1811 
to 1820 mining activity declined by 40% from the level 
immediately before the war. In the Cauca Valley, in particular, 
mining activity had declined precipitously, as slaves either 
escaped or were seized by the royalist military to work on road­
building p ro jects.6 The natural consequence of this was that very 
little gold was brought to the Casas de Moneda to be minted. In 
Popayan’s Casa de Moneda during the whole of 1817 and 1818, 
only $10,920 worth of coins were minted.7 In contrast, in 1800 
alone Popayan’s Casa de Moneda had minted coins worth over 
$ 9 2 0 ,0 0 0 .8 The m int’s comparative poverty, the adm inistrators
stated, was due to several factors. First, the republicans had 
emptied the city’s reserves when they occupied the city. More 
importantly, little new gold was submitted for minting. Only a 
small amount was being extracted in the first place, and it was not 
brought to the mint. Miners were choosing to smuggle any gold 
out of the country rather than face the very real risk having it be 
seized by the royalist army while en route to Popayan.9
5See M cFarlanc, Colombia before Independence, pp. 71-95, for information 
about mining in New Granada. (Figures for gold production are on pp. 81- 
89.) Anne Twinain discusses mining in Antioquia; sec Ann Twinam . Miners, 
Merchants, and Farmers in Colonial Colombia, University of Texas Press 
(Austin, 1982).
6 Hermes Tovar Pinzón, "La lenta ruptura con el pasado colonial (1810- 
1850)” Historia económica de Colombia, José Antonio Ocampo (editor). Siglo 
Veintiuno (Bogotá, 1987), pp. 103-104; and Toribio Montes to Francisco 
Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
7José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, Ediciones 
Bcdout (Medellin, 1974), vol. 1, p. 25.
xM cFarlanc, Colombia before independence, p. 365.
9Sce Francisco Gregorio de Angulo to José Soils, Popayán, 16(7) July 1817, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and, for similar comments about gold
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The fact that little gold was mined or minted does not of 
necessity indicate that the country’s m ining infrastructure had 
been demolished, particularly as placer m ining requires little by 
way of infrastructure in the first place. Indeed, both Anthony 
McFarlane and Malcolm Deas have argued that mining was at most 
disrupted by the war, rather than destroyed .* 10 However, while 
mines themselves were not destroyed as they were in Mexico, the 
effect on Neogranadan mining of the flight, or requisitioning, of 
slaves should not be ignored. Much of the growth in mining 
production in the eighteenth century had been due to an 
increased supply of slaves; in the Choco, in particular, the use of 
slaves had expanded considerably.11 Slaves were thus an 
essential element of the mining system. W here slaves escaped 
from the control of their masters, or were seized by the royalist 
army to assist in building roads, mining became difficult. Thus, 
for example, mining in the Vega de Supia, near Anserma, stopped 
altogether after the workforce fled in 1817.12 The loss of labour 
prevented a rapid developm ent of the ‘industry ’ after
smuggling in Mompôs, see Report on the state o f  the real hacienda,
Mompôs, 24 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712.
l0 Scc Anthony McFarlanc, "The Transition from Colonialism in Colombia, 
1819-1875”, Latin America:, Economic Imperialism and the State: The 
Political Economy of the ExternaI Connection from Independence to the 
Present , Christopher Abel and Colin Lewis (editors). The Athlone Press 
(London, 1985), p. 102; Malcolm Dcas, “Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador”, 
Spanish America After Independence, C.I820-C.I870,  edited by Leslie 
Bcthcll, Cambridge University Press (1987), p. 210; and David Bushncll, The 
Makiny of Modern Colombia, a Nation in Spite of Itself, University of 
California Press (Berkeley, 1995), pp. 48-49.
1 1 McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, pp. 75-79.
12Vicente Romero to José Solis, Anserma, 22 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fc, legajo 651; and “Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction: 
Colombian Regions, 1810-1825”, Brian Hamnett, Reform and Insurrection in 
Bourbon New Granada and Peru, John Fisher, A llan J. Kucthe, and Anthony 
McFarlanc (editors). Louisiana State Press (Baton Rouge, 1990), pp. 297-298. 
Sec also Tulio Halperin Donglti, "Economy and Society,” Spanish America 
after Independence, c. 1820-1870, edited hy Leslie Bcthcll, Cambridge 
University Press (1987), pp. 9-11.
1 90
independence; it was not until the middle of the nineteenth 
century that production levels reached those attained in the late 
e igh teen th  cen tu ry .13
To turn now to New G ranada’s agricultural base, there is 
disagreem ent about how badly it was damaged by the war. 
Anthony McFarlane asserts that relatively little damage was 
wrought. Miguel Izard, on the other hand, stresses the sad state 
of New Granada’s agriculture by the 1820s, and claims that by the 
end of the war the country was unable to feed itself.14 The 
extent o f  damage surely varied considerably from  region to 
region, bu t some areas were affected quite severely. Although 
New Granada was not damaged as extensively as was Venezuela, 
and although the population did not decline as precipitously as it 
did there, the condition of New Granada’s agricultural base after 
the war was far from vibrant.
M any sources attest to the devastating effect of military 
forces on the countryside in southern New Granada. Leaving aside 
the deliberate destruction of farmland by troops, other factors 
combined to disrupt the agricultural cycle. To begin with, the 
requisitioning of farm animals meant that agricultural labour was 
continually  interrupted. In the area around Anserma, for 
example, the Third Division of the royalist army in 1817 
requisitioned all horses for its own use, and moreover ate all the 
cattle in the vicinity. This, combined with the fact that slaves 
were constantly being removed from their ow ners’ farms to
l3 Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia, p. 80.
l4 M cFarlanc, “The Transition from Colonialism in Colom bia", pp. 102-103; 
and Miguel Izard, El miedo a la revolución. La lucha por la libertad en 
Venezuela < I777-IN30), Editorial Tecnos, (Madrid, 1979), p. 40. See also 
Charles G riffin . Los temas sociales y económicos en la época de la 
independencia, Fundación John Boulton y Fundación Eugenio Mendoza. 
(Caracas, 1962), p. 50, for opinions supporting McFarlanc.
labour in the various road-building projects, meant that little 
work was accomplished on the region’s haciendas.15 Similar 
situations obtained elsewhere in the Cauca Valley. Already in 
1815, the haciendas of Pilamo and Jagual, for example, were 
described as “enteramente destruidas y reducidas a sólo terrenos, 
sin ninguna vaca ni otras bestias”.16 In Popayán, agriculture was 
described as being at a standstill by 1817, and the region’s sugar- 
mills were said to be completely abandoned.17 Miguel de 
Letamendi, a royalist military commander stationed in the Cauca 
Valley, summed up the situation in a report from March 1817:
La situación en el Valle de Cauca es en el extremo lastimosa, 
y al mismo tiempo terrible. Los pueblos están casi desiertos, 
los vecinos han formado su morada en los montes, los 
campos no se cultivan, una salida del madre del Cauca ha 
destruido las pocas labranzas que se habían vereficado, no 
hay más bestia que algunas yeguas flacas, y todo, todo 
parece que camina a su destrucción.18
l5 See, for example. Vicente Romero lo José Solís. Anserma, 22 May 1817,
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and also David Bushnell, The 
Santander Regime in Gran Colombia, Greenwood Press (Westport. 1970), pp. 
127-128.
l6 Zamira Díaz de Zuluaga, “La fuerza de trabajo en el Cauca grande: 1810- 
1830,” La independencia: ensayos de historia social, Germán Colmenares ct 
al.. Instituto Colombiano de Cultura (Bogotá. 1986), p. 57. Díaz de Zuluaga 
appears to be quoting from 1815 document listed in José María Arboleda 
Llórente (editor). Catálogo general detallado del Archivo Central del Cauca 
(época de la independencia), Universidad del Cauca (Popayán, 1975), vol. 4, 
p. 87. Sec also Díaz de Zuluaga, “La fuerza de trabajo en el Cauca grande", 
pp. 52-67 for further evidence of agricultural crisis in the Cauca.
17 Asesor Carvajal to José Solis, Popayán, 8 July 1817; Cabildo of Buga to José 
Solis, Buga, 30 June 1817, both in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631; and 
also Zamira Díaz dc Zuluaga, “El Cauca Grande en la independencia; 
estructura económ ico-social (1800-1830), Raíces Históricas, Academia 
Narificnsc dc Historia (Pasto, 1987), p. 99-100.
18Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería dc Numancia. 
March 1817, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 759A. For comments from a 
republican source, sec the report from Toro in 1820 cited in Arboleda 
Llórente (editor). Catálogo del Archivo Central del Cauca, vol. 3, pp. 327-328.
Further evidence of decline was provided in August 1817 by 
Governor Vicente Sánchez Lima of Antioquia. Sánchez Lima sent 
Viceroy Montalvo a collection of personal letters from an 
anonymous hacendado  in Popayán. The writer, who also 
complained that the postal service no longer functioned and that 
criminals roamed the country, worried that his relatives would be 
drafted into the army, that his slaves and anim als would be 
requisitioned to work on the new roads, and that he would be 
unable to feed his large family. In short, he wrote, “aquí es que 
todo es un desorden y que tiran a la ruina de este pobre 
vecindario .” 19
In Pasto, further south, the situation was equally serious. 
Many observers noted the damage to farm land wrought by the 
presence of troops in the heavily contested province. The British 
traveller John Hamilton, for example, described the Province of 
Pasto as “almost a desert waste” in 1825.20 Not only were farms
burned by republican armies, but the troops themselves, both 
royalist and republican, placed a major strain on the capacities of 
the local economy. This was, of course, a standard consequence of 
warfare. As the military historian John Keegan has noted, troops 
and their animals usually eat their way though more food than 
any region can support. That is why arm ies prefer not to remain 
too long in any one area.21 Simón Bolívar recognised this as well, 
commenting in the early 1820s that:
19Anonymous hacendado to Vicente Sánchez Lim a, Vicente Sánchez Lima to 
Francisco Montalvo, Medellin, 4 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, 
legajo 631.
2,,J.P. Hamilton, Travels through the Interior Provinces of Colombia, John 
Murray (London, 1827), vol. 2, p. 44 (also pp. 72, 90, 98-99). Sec also José 
Hilario López, Memorias, vol. 1, Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 
Editorial ABC, (Bogotá, 1942), p. 58.
21 Sec John Keegan. A History of Warfare, Hutchinson (London, 1993), pp. 
301-315.
Pasto no tiene recursos para mantener un grande ejército y 
[. . .] hace muchos años se está destruyendo el sur de 
Colombia por la guerra y muy particularmente el sur de 
Popayán y el norte de Quito. . . En esos países de sierra un 
ejército de 2,000 hombres se come en un año todo el ganado 
de toda una población.22
The presence of troops had sim ilarly destructive effects in the 
L lanos, although there damage tended to be concentrated around 
the region’s few towns. Lieutenant Colonel Donato Ruiz de Santa 
Cruz, writing from Chita, commented in 1817 on “ la miserable 
situación de estos pueblos inmediatos agotados de todo recurso 
por el considerable tránsito de tropas” .23
Agricultural activity was also affected by the war in other 
areas. When the Spanish army first arrived in Antioquia in 1816, 
they were impressed by the reg ion’s fertility and by the 
abundance of food.24 Within a few years this had changed; by 
1818, officials were commenting on the “notable decadencia de la 
a g r ic u ltu ra ” .25 Agricultural output in Panama, on the other hand, 
had been in crisis long before the war broke out. Little altered 
with the m ainland’s separation from Spain.26 In Santa Marta, 
decline in agricultural production was primarily a consequence of 
the war with Cartagena, and had been serious since 1811. When
22 Eduardo Pérez, Guerra irregular en la independencia de la Nueva 
Granada y Venezuela, 1810-1830, Publicaciones de la Universidad 
Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, (Tunja, 1982), p. 392.
23 D iario de operaciones de la Colunma Volante del Prim er Batallón del 
Regimiento de Infantería del Rey. 17 August 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 759A.
2 4 Plano de observaciones topográficas de la provincia de Antioquia, 12 May 
1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897.
2 5 Report by Council of the Indies on a letter from Antioquia, 22 January 
1818, AGI. Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 551.
26Rcport on letter of Benito Pérez to Minister of Hacienda, Panama, 30 
March 1812, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 579.
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Viceroy M ontalvo arrived in the city in 1813, he reported that 
virtually all food production had ground to a halt, and that the 
inhabitants were able to stave off starvation only by fishing.27 
Cartagena, in addition to suffering many years of warfare up to 
1815, was subjected to the added burden of serving as the 
royalist capital through much of the war. The region’s agriculture 
declined catastrophically; by 1819, it was reduced to small-scale 
production of sugar-cane and cotton.28 The city’s cabildo 
lamented in that year that “no hay en todo el reino una provincia 
tan atrasada y pobre” .29
Further problems were caused by the displacem ent of 
people that accompanied troop movements. The arrival of the 
royalist army often prompted entire villages to flee to the hills, 
leaving their houses and fields abandoned. This occurred 
particularly in the greater Cauca, where the royalist arm y’s many 
road-building projects were the main reason for flight. However, 
civilian emigration was not confined to the south, and 
contem poraries across New Granada recorded seeing whole 
villages retreating into the hills.30 In the area around Mompds,
27Francisco Montalvo to Minister of State, Santa Marta, 25 February 1815, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580; and Francisco Montalvo to Minister 
o f Hacienda, Santa Marta, 23 June 1815, Santa Fe, legajo 631.
28Gabricl dc Torres to (7), Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 
8725, doc. 9.
29Rcport by Martin de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 750.
3,,See José Manuel Restrepo, Apuntamientos sobre la emigración que hice 
en 1816 de la provincia de Antioquia a la de Popayán, Biblioteca de la 
Presidencia de Colombia, vol. 30, (Bogotá, 1957), p. 65; Rafael Sevilla, 
Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas contra Bolívar y los 
separatistas de América, Editorial América (Madrid, 1916), p. 87; Eusebio 
Pirón to Gabriel dc Torres, Turbaco, 19 January 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 712; Francisco Warlcta to Juan Sániano, Cali, 22 August 1816, BRAH, 
sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 60-61; Bando dc Francisco Warlcla, Cali, 25 August 
1816, BRAH. sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 67-68; Francisco Ximéncz to Juan 
Sániano, Apiay, 6 January 1817, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 199-200; 
Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería dc Numancia,
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for example, the population appears by 1816 to have fallen to 
roughly half its size in 1780.30 1 In addition to fleeing from fighting 
itself or from the ransacking by soldiers that came in its 
immediate afterm ath, many civilians decam ped to avoid being 
recruited into the army. Large num bers of people reportedly fled 
when Colonels Francisco W arleta and Antonio Pla attempted to 
recruit soldiers into the royalist army in the Cauca Valley.32 In 
royalist strongholds such as Pasto or Santa Marta, the situation 
was reversed; the inhabitants generally fled at the approach of 
the republicans. The effect was the same: the abandonment of 
villages and a decrease in agricultural productivity. The British 
traveller J.P. Hamilton noted during his visit to Pasto in the early 
1820s, “farm s once well cultivated [are] deserted, and nearly all 
the population is extirpated” .33 Flight was on this occasion the 
result of republican attacks. W hatever its cause, the effect of this
April 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; José Solis to Francisco 
Montalvo, Popayán, 20 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; 
Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817; AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 631; Report by Cabildo of Buga, Buga. 4 August 1817, AGI, 
Estado, legajo 57, doc. 35-D (Ib); José M aría Ramírez to Ferdinand, Cartagena,
30 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; José Antonio Arias to 
(?), Maganguc. 2 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 750; and 
Manuel Fiallo to Juan Sámano, Sitio Nuevo, 19 February 1820, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 747.
31 Compare population figures given in Estado que m anifiesta la población y 
rccuros de esta jurisdicción, Mompós, 16 Septem ber 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 712; and McFarlanc, Colombia before Independence, pp. 357- 
378. For other comparisons o f population, see Hamnett, “Popular 
Insurrection and Royalist Reaction”, p. 301.
32 Sec, for example. Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento de 
Infantería de Numancia, March 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A. 
"H am ilton , Travels through Colombia, p. 90; López, Memorias, vol. 1, p. 58;
Bishop o f Santa Marta to Council of the Indics(?), Santa Marta, 14 November 
1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; Cabildo o f Santa Marta to 
Ferdinand, Santa Marta, 28 July 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580. 
Similar flight from the republicans occurred in Riohacha in 1820, when 
the insurgents invaded the city. Sec Proclam a de Luis Brion, Riohacha, 13 
March 1820; and Mariano Montilla to Francisco dc Paula Santander, 
Vallcdupar, 5 April 1820; both in AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 745.
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displacem ent was, as Charles Griffin has noted, “ muy desfavorable 
para la agricultura, la ganadería y la minería” .34
The general condition of New Granada's economy, and of 
New Granada itself, after years of war was deplorable.
Commercial agriculture was abandoned, mining had virtually 
ceased, and whole villages lay deserted. It was on this fragile 
base that the restored royalists sought to rebuild their 
adm inistration. Not surprisingly, the adm inistrators were unable 
to generate an adequate income for the state. The crown 
monopolies failed to provide the accustomed revenues, direct 
forms of taxation proved difficult and unpopular, and trade 
suffered a further decline.
We will now turn out attention to the sources of income 
available to the reconquerers, and to their attem pt to re-establish 
New G ranada’s colonial fiscal structures.
§ 2 . .  Rees tab l i sh in g  Colonial  Fiscal  s tructures
The first and most ready source of cash available to the 
royalists was the possessions of suspected or convicted insurgents. 
These goods could be confiscated to swell royalist coffers. The 
role of forced contributions in funding the army itself will be 
discussed in Chapter 8. Here we will concern ourselves with the 
role played by confiscation and forced contributions in funding 
the civil government. Confiscation of goods was an easy 
punishment for “ infidencia”, and indeed the goods of royalists had 
been sim ilarly confiscated by the insurgents during the First
34Griffin, Los lemas sociales, p. 16. Also see Tovar Pinzón, "La lenta ruptura 
con cl pasado” , p. 90-94; and for the comments o f the Swedish traveler 
Sevcrin Lorich. sec Carlos Vidales, “El agente diplom ático sueco Severin 
Lorich y su misión en la Gran Colombia (1823),” Informes de Investigación, 
Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos (Stockholm, 1991), pp. 9-10.
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R ep u b lic .35 As we saw in Chapter 4, confiscation was imposed by 
the Junta de Purificación in Santa Fe. Fines of considerable size 
were imposed. José María Caballero recorded in his diary that, “el 
que menos culpado sale, tiene que dar $200, $300 o $500, y el que 
no los da, a las tropas, para el norte” .36 Numerous court appeals 
(“un torbellino de reclamos particulares”) and great quantities of 
paperwork were the inevitable result of the decision to confiscate 
private m onies and belongings.37 While most of the appeals 
revolved around the simple issue of whether the victim had in 
fact supported independence, a few raised separate and, at least 
to the Spanish government, interesting legal dilemmas. The most 
complicated of these centred around the confiscation of the 
belongings of José María de Toledo in February 1816. Toledo was 
executed on 24 February 1816 in Cartagena for his involvement in 
that c ity ’s revolutionary Junta, and left several young children. 
These were cared for after his death by T oledo’s brother-in-law 
Joaquín de Mosquera y Figueroa, a member of the Council of the 
Indies. Mosquera y Figueroa, acting as a responsible guardian, 
attempted to have Toledo’s goods disem bargoed, and, in his 
attempt, resorted to an ingenious legal nicety. M osquera y 
Figueroa claimed that Toledo’s children should not be penalised 
for their father’s errors, as they had been born before he 
“comenzó a andar en la traición” .38 Only those children born after
,5 Scc Tovar Pinzón, “La lenta ruptura con cl pasado”, pp. 92-93.
36José Marfa Caballero, Diario, Biblioteca de Bogotá, Editorial Villegas
(Bogotá, 1990), p. 233. The levels of fines recorded in Caballero’s diary 
agree with those cited by Guillermo Hernández de Alba, in his study of the 
Consejos de Purificación. See Guillermo Hernández de Alba, "Recuerdos de 
la reconquista: el Consejo de Purificación,” BHA,  vol. 22 (1935).
,7 Plan de Gobierno de la Junta Superior y Tribunal Especial de Scqucstros 
de Caracas. Caracas, 2 June 1X15. AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajos 109 and 
3X6.
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this should suffer the effects of a confiscation. This claim 
evidently struck a chord in Ferd inand’s government, as the matter 
was discussed at the highest levels, where it generated 
inexplicable amounts of paperw ork.
It was simple enough to confiscate money; confiscating 
belongings proved to be more difficult. After belongings were 
confiscated, the state was left with the problem of converting 
them into cash. This was not always easy, and generally such 
goods were placed in a governm ent warehouse for auction.
Further problems resulted from  keeping goods warehoused for 
long periods awaiting sale. Theft o f embargoed goods was a 
continuing problem .39 Confiscated haciendas in turn had to be 
administered if they could not be sold. In order to deal with these 
matters the Junta de Secuestros was established in Santa Fe after 
the city was recaptured. Its prim arily purpose was to oversee the 
sale or administration of confiscated good, although it could also 
order confiscations. Viceroy M ontalvo felt that similar juntas 
ought to be established in each m ajor town, although it is not clear 
whether any were.40 *
While confiscation provided an easy source of money, it was 
not a firm base on which to rebuild government finances.
3xScc Report by the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 16 August 1816; and 
Report by Council o f the Indies, Madrid. 18 March 1817; both in AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; and Silvestre Collar to Juan Lozano de 
Torres, Palacio, 10 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551.
39Franc isco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 29 February 1816,
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.
“" ’Francisco Montalvo to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 13 July 1816, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 707.
Other forms of confiscation also generated income for the state. In 
particular, the seizure of suspect boats o ff  the Caribbean coast provided an 
irregular but still sizeable income for the government. On occasion the 
value of contraband goods seized exceeded $30,000. Sec Reports by the 
Council o f the Indies on capture of suspect boats, 21 October 1815, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
1 99
Moreover, Ferdinand VII had ordered all aspects of government 
to return to their condition in 1808. The royalist administration 
thus made efforts to restore the institutions which had provided 
the bulk of New Granada’s income prior to 1808. The most 
significant of these was the tobacco monopoly. The tobacco 
monopoly had been introduced into New Granada in 1764 by the 
Marqués de Esquilache, and it rapidly became the single m ost 
important contributor to the viceregal treasury.41 Following 
changes introduced in the 1780s, the monopoly regularly 
generated between $80,000 and $100,000 each year in the 
Department of Cartagena alone.42 Nationally, it had produced an 
annual yield of some $300,000 for the crown.43 The war brought 
changes to the monopoly and its administration.
The monopoly had always been unpopular, and its abolition 
often accompanied the first outbreaks of independence; Q uito’s 
Supreme Junta simply abolished the monopoly in 1809.44 * Even in 
royalist Panama, the tobacco monopoly was abolished by 
gubernatorial decree in 1813, because of the “absoluta falta de 
tabacos” .43 (The monopoly was, moreover, abolished by the Cortes 
in March 1814, but this decree was rendered obsolete by the
4 'Allan J. Kucthc, "The Early Reforms of Charles III in the Viceroyalty of 
New Granada. 1759-1776", in Reform and Insurrection, p. 31.
4 ’ Report on the Tobacco Monopoly by Ramón dc Herrera, Cartagena, 12 
February 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717; Report on the Rentas Reales 
by Ventura Ferrer, Cartagena. I September 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 715.
4 , M cFarlanc, Colombia before Independence, pp. 222-223. Rcstrepo gives 
Ihc figure of $470,000 annually. See Rcstrepo, Historia de la revolución, 
vol. 1, pp. 28-29.
44Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 112, 150.
4 ,Carlos Mcyncr to (?), Panama, 29 November 1813, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Panama, legajo 262.
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return of Ferdinand.46) The insurgents in Cartagena did not 
abolish the tobacco monopoly outright, although in 1814 they 
combined it with several other monopolies to create the “Rentas 
U nidas” .47 During this period, tobacco was sold at a higher price 
than previously, but monopoly officials reported that income from 
tobacco actually fell during the years of insurgent rule. The 
various m onopolies were disaggregated as soon as the royalists 
recaptured Cartagena, although monopoly officials were unable to 
occupy the Casa de Tabacos, as it was being used to house part of 
the Regimiento de León.48 The tobacco monopoly was officially 
reestablished in the department on 20 August 1816, and local 
trade in tobacco slowly picked up during the remainder of 1816. 
That year the monopoly produced a net yield of some $7,800 in 
the department of Cartagena. Gross income had exceeded 
$15,000, but many expenses ate away the profits.49
46José María Ots y Capdequi, Las instituciones del Nuevo Reino de Granada 
al tiempo de la independencia, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas, (Madrid, 1958), pp. 354-355.
47Report on the Tobacco Monopoly by Ramón de Herrera, Cartagena, 12 
February 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. The Rentas Unidas 
combined the tobacco monopoly with the aguardiente and playing-card 
monopolies, along with Alcabalas and Correos.
48Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 22 June 1816, AG1, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707. Similar problems confronted the newly 
appointed adm inistrators of the Aduana in Cartagena in January of 1816. 
They found the Aduana building full o f soldiers who were billeted there; 
see Administrators of the Cartagena Aduana to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 
19 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
49A lot o f money had to be spent in early 1816 on new equipment. See Josef 
Maria de la Verga to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena. 21 March 1816, AGI,
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717. Sec also Estado general que demuestra los 
productos dc utilidad liquida que ha rendido la real renta de tabacos del 
Departamento dc Cartagena desde el día 20 dc agosto dc 1816 . . . hasta del día 
31 de diciembre del año pasado de 1818, Cartagena, 22 April 1819, AGI,
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 715; and Various documents related to tobacco 
monopoly in AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707.
Furtherm ore, income from the monopoly was always at risk o f being 
confiscated by the army, as regularly happened in Venezuela. (Sec German 
Carrera Dantas, Roves, aspectos socio-económicos. Colección Vigilia 
(Caracas, 1968), pp. 118-125.)
During 1817 and 1818 revenues improved considerably, 
despite the loss of over 17,000 pounds of tobacco from Giron 
which fell into a stream  near Mahates. In Cartagena the monopoly 
generated some $45,000 net each year. Nonetheless, overall 
income in the departm ent reached only half the average in the 
years before the war, and in some of the smaller estanquillos 
income was only about 7% of the average during the colonial 
p e rio d .50 Other regions were slowly reincorporated into the 
estanco’s orbit. One o f  the most important was Mompos, where 
the monopoly was reestablished on 17 May 1817. For the next 
two years it produced a respectable annual income of some 
$50 ,000 .51
In order to function, the monopoly needed a steady supply 
of tobacco. In some areas, especially around Ambalema, 
cultivation of tobacco had continued uninterrupted throughout the 
war, although this was not the case everywhere. Private, illegal 
production of tobacco also  continued in many regions, especially 
around V alledupar.52 After the battle of Boyaca and the loss of 
Santa Fe in 1819, the tobacco monopoly generated virtually no 
income for the royalists, as the areas around Mompos and 
Ambalema, where most of the tobacco was produced, had been
S(,Estado general que dem uestra los productos de utilidad liquida que ha 
rendido la real renta de tavacos del Departamento de Cartagena desde el día 
20 de agosto de 1816 . . . hasta del día 31 de diciembre del año pasado de 1818, 
Cartagena, 22 April 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715. See Izard, El  
miedo a la revolución, p. 117, for comments about the tobacco monopoly in 
Venezuela, where income declined by more than 80%.
S |Scc Monthly and annual reports from cajas reales de Mompós, 1817-1818, 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715. I have only very limited information 
about the restoration of the monopoly elsewhere.
52 See Griffin, Los temas sociales, p. 34; and Report on Tobacco in 
Vallcdupar, Cartagena, 15 October 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742.
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captured by the republicans.53 Tobacco then had to be imported 
from Cuba to supply the addictions of royalist Neogranadans.54
In the South, both the tobacco and aguardiente monopolies 
were reestablished in 1817, but neither appears to have produced 
any income of significance.55 The monopolies continued, however, 
to attract the same unwanted attention they had suffered in the 
previous century. In September 1819, after the battle of Boyacá, 
tobacco factories in the Cauca Valley were the first targets of 
resurgent republican guerrillas. The adm inistrator of the tobacco 
monopoly in Popayán reported that, on 29 Septem ber 1819,
Se quitó la máscara el pueblo de Santa Ana y el de 
Llanogrande, y lo primero que hicieron fue entrar en la 
factoría [de tabaco] echando sus puertas por tierra, y 
distribuir o robar todo el tabaco, que justam ente era mucho, 
pues estaban llenos todos los almacenes. Afirman varios 
que después de haber saqueado dicha factoría, la han 
quemado, pero no se nada de cierto.56 
The factory had indeed been burned, and the adm inistrator of the 
factory was killed, along with several other monopoly officials.
53Gabriel dc Torres to Alejandro Ramirez, Cartagena, 5 June 1820, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 714; and Report by administrador de tabacos, 
Cartagena, 24 September 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742.
54Report by administrador de tabacos, Cartagena, 24 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742. Excess tobacco from other royalist regions was 
also sent to Cartagena to augment the c ity 's  supply; see Report by contador 
general de tabacos, Cartagena, 18 November 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 742.
5 5 Isidro Villareal to Contador general de tabacos, Popayán, 21 September 
1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742; and José Solis to Simón Sicilia, 
Popayán, 16 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
5f’lsidro Villareal to José Rodríguez, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI,
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742. Sec also Isidro Villareal to contador general de 
tabacos, Popayán. 21 September 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742.
For inform ation on eighteenth-century opposition to the tobacco 
monopoly, see McFarlanc, Colombia before Independence, pp. 214-215; and, 
for example, Pedro de Bccaria to Crown, Popayán, 2 October 1781, BL,
Egcrton 1807, fol. 572.
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The other great arm of colonial finance was the aguardiente 
monopoly. Always unpopular, it had been abolished by Santa Fe’s 
insurgent Congress. It was, however, reestablished by the 
royalists even before the recapture of Cartagena, so im portant was 
it considered.57 At the time some slight, temporary, changes were 
made in its administration. In particular, Francisco M ontalvo 
decreed that individual d istillers would be allowed to set up 
personal contracts with the government for the production of 
ag u a rd ien te .58 (Since 1780 all distillation was to be carried out 
only by government distillers.) This liberalisation was, however, 
only temporary. On 11 May 1816, the monopoly was reopened in 
all its original glory. No more individual distillation was 
permitted, an adm inistrator was appointed, and the governor 
ordered h a cen d a d o s  to begin growing sugar-cane.59 Problems 
immediately became apparent. By 11 June 1816 not a single 
producer had presented him self to Governor Torres to state how 
much sugar-cane he intended to grow, and a shortage of excise 
guards prevented vigorous prosecution of illegal production.60
57Griffin, Los lemas sociales, p. 44; and Circular by Francisco Montalvo, 
Torrecilla, 30 November IS 15, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.
58Circular de Francisco Montalvo, Torrecilla, 30 November 1815, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
59 Circular de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 11 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 717; and Orders relating to the reestablishment of the 
aguardiente monopoly, Cartagena, May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo
707.
60Bando dc Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 11 June 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 717; and Lorenzo Hanguez(?) to Francisco Montalvo, C artagena, 11 
June 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707.
Sugar producers had opposed the monopoly for some decades, see 
Allan J. Kucthc, Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-180S, 
University o f  Florida Press (Gainsville, 1978), p. 64; Anthony M cFarlanc, 
‘"The Rebellion of the B arrios': Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Q u ito ,” 
Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru, John Fisher, 
Allan J. Kucthc, and Anthony M cFarlanc, (editors), Louisiana State Press 
(Baton Rouge, 1990), p. 287; and Rebecca Earle, “ Indian Rebellion and 
Bourbon Reform in New Granada: Riots in Pasto, 1780-1800,” HAHR,  vol. 73 
(1993), p. 104.
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Importation into New Granada of Peruvian aguardiente, “muy 
estimado alii”, according to Viceroy Montalvo, also reduced the 
sale of the Neogranadan product.61 Finally, in Cartagena much of 
the equipment used to make aguardiente had been destroyed and 
had to be replaced.62
The reconstructed aguardiente monopoly thus got off to a 
slow start. In 1816, it produced less than $600 net in the 
department of Cartagena. This situation led Governor Torres in 
early 1817 to repeat the order reestablishing the monopoly and 
outlawing private production.63 Income seems to have improved, 
but, even in 1818, the monopoly generated a net income in 
Cartagena of only about $8,000.64 This was a far cry from the 
$40,000 to $50,000 routinely produced in the province in the 
years before the w ar.65 Contraband and illegal production 
continued to be a problem until the end of the war. In 1819, for 
example, the adm inistrator of the aguardiente monopoly in 
Cartagena com plained of the flagrant violations of monopoly law 
occurring in the town of Chiriguana. There, he reported, all
6 'Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sániano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los  
últimos virreyes de Nueva Granada. Relación de mando del Virrey don 
Francisco Montalvo y noticias del Virrey Sámano sobre la pérdida del reino 
(1813-1819), Eduardo Posada and P. M. Ibáñc/ (editors). Biblioteca de la 
Juventud H ispano-am ericano, Editorial Am érica (M adrid, n.d.), p. 191.
62Rcport by Council o f  the Indies, 14 February 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 549.
63 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 27 January 1817, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 717.
í,4Sce Report by V entura Ferrer, Cartagena, 1 September 1817, and Various 
reports on the cajas reales de Cartagena; all in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
715.
65See Report by V entura Ferrer, Cartagena, 1 September 1817, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 715; and Report on income in Cartagena in 1809, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. The figures for the aguardiente monopoly arc 
less contradictory than those for tobacco.
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aguardiente was supplied by private clandestine distilleries, 
which operated with the full knowledge of the tow n’s officials.66
The aguardiente monopoly was, if anything, more unpopular 
than the tobacco monopoly, and even royalist officials tried to use 
the war as an excuse to abolish it.67 In Panama, the monopoly 
had been abolished outright by Viceroy Pérez, ostensibly to 
reward the province for its loyalty.68 In Cartagena, the c ity ’s 
cabildo complained that the reestablishm ent of the aguardiente 
monopoly had caused “ males incalculables” to the province, and 
suggested that the complete elim ination of the monopoly would be 
the best way to revive the region’s stagnant economy. Cartagena’s 
Governor Torres supported this view, and added his voice to the 
call for deregulation. Indeed, in early 1819 Viceroy Sámano 
himself was considering whether the monopoly served any useful 
purpose, and appointed a committee of experts to consider the 
issue .69 In the end, however, no changes were sanctioned.
66Rcport by contador general de aguardiente, Cartagena, 29 October 1819, 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742. Sec also Estado que manifiesta el consumo 
de caudales, Cartagena, 20, April 1819, nota 1, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
715.
67 For eighteenth-century opposition to the aguardiente monopoly, see 
Gilma Lucía Mora de Tovar, Aguardiente y conflictos sociales en la Nueva 
Granada durante el siglo XVIII, Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Bogotá, 
1988).
6 8 Th is measure was criticised by the Audiencia, which asserted that the 
treasury could not withstand the loss of income. Sec Michael Costeloe, 
Response to Revolution, Imperial Spain and the Spanish American 
Revolutions, 1810-11140, Cambridge University Press (1986), p. 122.
Similarly, the city of Cuenca petitioned to be allowed to practice free trade 
in aguardiente. Sec Report by Council o f the Indies, 8 November 1819, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
69Report by Martín de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 750; Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Santa Fe, 29 March 1819, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708; and Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 
15 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9. This last document is also 
printed in Donaldo Bossa Hcra/.o, Cartagena independiente: tradición y 
desarrollo. Ediciones Tercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1967), pp. 69-76.
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Other branches of the exchequer were sim ilarly affected by 
the oscillating forces of the royalists and insurgents. Indian 
tribute, for example, was repeatedly abolished, and restored by 
succeeding regimes. By 1810 its fate appeared to have been 
sealed. In that year it was abolished by both the insurgent Junta 
Suprema de Santa Fe and the Cortes in Spain.70 Tribute was, 
however, far from finished as a fiscal force. For both the Junta 
and the Cortes, abolition had been based on philosophical 
principles; no advice was given on how to replace the revenue 
previously provided by tributes. This was not a serious problem 
in areas like Cartagena, where tribute generated a m inute income, 
but it did pose difficulties for the authorities in Santa Marta, who 
still depended on tribute to pay its clergy.71 As a result, the 
suppression was effectively ignored in such areas both in New 
Granada and elsewhere. In Peru, where tribute accounted for 
one-third of all governm ent revenues, Viceroy Abascal simply 
continued collecting it, m erely changing the name to “ special 
co n trib u tio n ” .72 The problem of replacing income derived from 
tribute was rendered academ ic after Ferdinand’s return to the
70Bando de la suprema junta dc Santa Fe, Santa Fc, 24 September 1810, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 668; and Ots y Capdcqui, Las instituciones del 
Nuevo Reino de Granada, p. 364. Sec also Mark van Allen, “The Lingering 
Death of the Indian Tribute in Ecuador”, HAHR,  voi. 61 (1981).
7 'Tom ás dc Acosta to Regency, Santa Marta, 23 August 1811, AGI, Audiencia 
dc Santa Fe, legajo 745; and Ernesto Rcstrepo Tirado, Historia de la Provincia 
de Santa Marta, voi. 2, M inisterio de Educación Nacional, (Bogotá, 1953), p. 
336.
72Edmundo Heredia, Planes españoles para reconquistar hispanoamerica 
IHIO/ISiS,  Editorial Universitaria dc Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1874), p. 
120; and Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 94.
In Popayán and Quito, tribute was collected continuously throughout 
the First Republic, although the level of tribute payments oscillated 
greatly. See Brian Hamnett, “ Popular Insurrection and R oyalist R eaction”, 
p. 310; Cabildo of Pasto to Ferdinand. BL, Egcrton 1809, fol. 442; Sergio Elias 
Ortiz, Agustín Agualongo y su tiempo. Editorial ABC (Bogotá, 1958), p. 141; 
and the documents cited in Arboleda Llórente (editor), Catálogo de! Archivo 
Central del Cauca, voi. 3, p. 87, and voi. 5, pp. 39-41.
2 0 7
throne. The king announced tribute’s reestablishm ent under the 
new name of “contribución” in March 1815, and this order was 
repeated in New Granada in November 1815, during the siege of 
Cartagena. It was not until August 1817, however, that the 
viceregal governm ent in New Granada set about reassembling the 
lists of tribute payers for those regions where they had been 
lo st.71 *3 It is not clear how much money the royalists collected in 
tributes after its reinstitution.
§3. Specie and S o r t e o s
Thus far we have discussed the restoration of certain 
branches of the colonial administration, and their success in 
generating income for the royalist adm inistration. Spain’s 
governments were also prepared to consider other methods for 
producing capital. One of the more ingenious ideas for raising 
money for New Granada’s royalist governm ent was considered by 
the Council of the Indies in 1818. In that year the Council 
discussed a proposal to establish a national lottery in New 
G ranada.74 State lotteries already existed in Mexico City and 
Havana, as well as in Spain itself. The Mexico City lottery was 
itself relatively new and distinctive, in that the purchase of tickets 
was obligatory. Viceroy Calleja had established the forced lottery 
in 1815 to raise money for royal administration, but it was later
71Circular de Francisco Montalvo, Torrecilla. 30 November 1815, AGI,
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717; and Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel dc Torres,
Cartagena, 30 August 1817, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 708. Sec also Ots y 
Capdcqui, Las instituciones del Nuevo Reino de Granada, p. 383.
74Sec Report by the Council o f the Indies, 21 August 1818, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fe, legajo 549. Similar plans to establish a monthly lottery in Caracas 
had already been examined; sec Martin dc Garay to (?), Palacio, 13 March 
1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, legajo 386.
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abolished by his successor, Viceroy Apodaca.75 When the 
proposal for a (non-obligatory) lottery in New Granada was 
considered, the Council of the Indies was enthusiastic, as the plan 
seemed a painless way of raising money. In the end, nothing 
came of the proposal, as an exclusive right to establish lotteries in 
the Americas had already been granted to Gaspar Rico y Angulo, 
an honorary minister of the Cajas Reales in Lima. Rico had 
proposed extending the existing Lima-based lottery (known as the 
'suer te  ’) to all of South America. He predicted that the income 
from this lottery could be increased from the current level of 
$40,000 per year to $80,000. The government in Spain, 
completely ignorant of the existence of the Lima suerte ,  had at 
first been slightly suspicious of the plan, but in the end it was 
a p p ro v e d .76 Rico, however, did not exercise his right to set up a 
lottery in New Granada, and so the idea of a national lottery was 
abandoned until the republicans came to power.
A further feature of royalist fiscal policy during the war 
years was a constant concern with the supply of specie. Cash had 
been in short supply throughout the colonial period, primarily 
because most of New Granada’s supply of gold and silver was 
remitted to Spain. The unavailability of liquid assets hampered 
economic expansion, and frequently rebounded to the 
governm ent’s disadvantage. In the 1770s, for exam ple, the crown 
had been unable to sell many of the recently-confiscated Jesuit 
properties in southern New Granada precisely because potential
7^Scc Timothy Anna, “The Last Viceroys o f New Spain and Peru: An 
appraisal", American Historical Review, vol 81 (1976), p. 54; and Timothy 
Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City, University o f 
Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), p. 156.
76Scc Martin dc Garay to Josi Manuel de Aparici, Palacio, 30 December 1816, 
AGI. Audicncia dc Lima, legajo 1618; and also Juan S&mano to Comandantc of 
Mompbs, Santa Fc, 28 February 1819, AGI, Papclcs de Cuba, legajo 708.
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buyers could not lay hands on enough cash.77 This problem 
continued to plague New Granada during the war, which itself 
increased the financial pressures on governments and also 
encouraged the clandestine export of specie. One response was 
the printing of paper money. This measure, always wildly 
unpopular, was tried by the insurgents during the Patria Boba in 
Cartagena. There the paper currency imm ediately underwent 
trem endous in fla tion .78 The forced introduction of this inflated 
paper money into Santa Marta and the Guajiro Peninsula 
particularly incensed the royalists there79 Paper money was 
again printed in Cartagena during the years of royalist rule, when 
it too lost value to inflation.80
In addition to the disliked paper money, there were also 
various coins. Before the outbreak of the war, several debased 
coinages had circulated in New Granada; the most well known of 
these was a silver coin called ‘macuquina . These were joined 
during the war of independence by a collection of other unofficial 
coins minted by both insurgents and royalists. ‘C h in a s '  and 
‘C ascarillas , copper and silver coins, circulated throughout New 
Granada, while ‘C hip ich ipe ’ and ‘M orillera ' (named after Morillo)
77Gcrmán Colmenares, Haciendas de los jesuítas en el Nuevo Reino de 
Granada, si/flo XVIII, Tercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1969), pp. 135-136.
78From December 1813 to December 1815 the paper currency allegedly 
underwent a 100% inflation. See Ramón de Herrera to corregidor 
intendente dc Cartagena. Cartagena, 15 December 1814; and Report by Juan 
Ramón de Irujo on currency in Cartagena, Cartagena, 1 May 1817; both in 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 889B
79 Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa 
Marta. 16 September 1813, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 746. 
s,)Rcport by Martin de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 750. Paper money was also printed in Caracas by the republicans 
during the first and second republics. It was equally unpopular there. Sec
Carrera Dantas, Roves, pp. 126-140, for a discussion of the fiscal crisis in 
V enezue la .
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were used in Venezuela.81 These coins were known collectively as 
moneda provisional.  They were minted in very small 
denominations, and thus filled  the gap that had existed during the 
colonial period. Unfortunately, the quality of these coins was 
extremely poor, and their weights varied trem endously.82 For 
this reason, as soon as the Spanish began the siege of Cartagena 
they ordered that the circulation of all provisional money be 
limited to the Province of Cartagena. This measure met with great 
opposition; im m ediately after the recapture of Cartagena, for 
example, the governor of Santa Marta asked to be allowed to 
continue circulating moneda provisional  in his province, as there 
were no other small coins available.83 Accordingly, the 
restrictions on the coins’ circulation was lifted in May 1816.84 
The matter was nonetheless brought to the attention of King 
Ferdinand him self, who instigated plans to eliminate the m o n e d a  
prov is iona l  entirely.85 Serious efforts began in mid-1818, and, on 
18 January 1819, the order abolishing all moneda provisional  was
81 See Aviso al público, Cartagena, 28 September 1821, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 717; and Izard, El miedo a la revolución, p. 122.
82In some areas the moneda provisional underwent great inflation. In 
Antioquia it lost over 50% of its value in the course of a few days in 1818.
See José María Restrcpo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, vol. 1, 
Imprenta Nacional (Bogotá, 1932), p. 338. Pascual Enrilc sim ilarly asserts 
that, by 1817, insurgent-coined money had lost 78% of its face value. Sec 
Exposition by Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 19 June 1817, AGI, Estado 57, Doc 35-c 
(2a)
8 'Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 27 April 1816, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707. The silver macuquina had been introduced 
into Santa Marta province in 1813 by M ontalvo, who regarded the currency 
as extremely useful. See Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 
January 1818, in Los últimos virreyes, pp. 19, 24, 125; also Juan Fricde, La 
otra verdad. La independencia americana vista por los españoles. Editorial 
Tercer Mundo, (Bogotá, 1972), p. 51.
84Bando dc Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 2 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 717.
85Council of the Indies to Ferdinand, Madrid, 12 December 1817, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 551; and Royal Order, Madrid, 12 December 
1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 575-577.
is s u e d .86 All such money was to be surrendered to the 
government, which would not offer any compensation.
This plan naturally proved extremely unpopular. By June 
1820 a “disgusto general” reigned in Cartagena province because 
of the extinction of the m a c u q u in a  and other provisional coins.87 
To begin with, many people and institutions lost money, as no 
compensation was offered for surrendered coins.88 Moreover, the 
elimination of these coins deprived the country of a coinage in 
small denominations. This meant, for example, it was difficult to 
pay salaries or conduct business unless large amounts of money 
were owed.89 In response, the provincial government decided in 
mid-June 1820 to reissue the coinage with a different stamp; thus 
effectively reversing the w ithdraw al.90 The fate of the m o n e d a  
prov is iona l  was emblematic of the royalists’ economic policies 
during the years of the reconquest. In an effort to restore some 
sort of order to New G ranada’s economy, royalist administrators 
introduced policies which were guaranteed to be unpopular, were 
only partially implemented, and were ultim ately unsuccessful.
86Council of the Indies, Palace, 14 July 1818, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe. 
legajo 551; Petition by eight employees of Consulado dc Cartagena,
Cartagena, I December 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 711; and the 
various documents related to the extinction of the macuquina  in Arboleda 
Llórente (editor). Catálogo del Archivo Central del Cauca, vol. 3, pp. 32-33, 
102-103, vol. 4. p. 2; Actual collection of coins did not appear to begin until 
some time later.
87Gabricl dc Torres to Ferdinand. Cartagena, 16 June )'820, AGI, Papeles dc 
Cuba, legajo 709.
88Sce First declaration of Gabriel dc Torres, Havana. 2 November 1824, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 21.36A, fol. 28; and Petition by Estchana Zchallos, 
Cartagcnaf?), 28 December 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 711.
89Scc, for example, Gabriel dc Torres to (?). Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9; and Report by Tomás dc Lara on the real 
administración de alcabalas dc Cartagena de Indias, Cartagena, 31 December 
1819, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
" R e p o r t by junta general de tribunales, Cartagena. 17 June 1820, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717.
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$¡4. The Free Trade Dilemma in Cartagena
Intimately connected to New G ranada’s financial viability, 
and hence to the royalists’ survival, was the status of external 
trade. We will here examine the royalists’ success in stimulating 
commercial activity in New Granada, looking specifically at the 
viceroyalty’s main port, Cartagena.
Cartagena had long been in economic difficulty. The 
underlying problem was a steady and long-term  decline in trade. 
Once the mainstay of the economy, commerce had in fact been 
shrinking since the m id-eighteenth century, while contraband 
steadily increased further up the coast in Santa Marta and 
R io h ach a .91 Various efforts had been made at reviving the c ity ’s 
commerce, but the m ost fundamental revolved around the 
question of free trade.
The question o f whether to permit com pletely free trade 
between Spain’s rem aining colonies and other countries rem ained 
unresolved throughout the years of the war. As might be 
expected, the measures advocated by Spain’s governm ents and 
the behaviour of individuals in New Granada did not always 
converge. In Spain itself, there was little agitation for freer trade. 
As the merchants in Cádiz played the principal role in raising 
money for royalist troops via the Comisión de Reemplazos, their 
opposition to any commercial reforms weighed especially heavily. 
Moreover, the Consulado de Cádiz was extremely unwilling to
9 lScc McFarlanc, Colombia before Independence, pp. 126-184 passim, 297- 
307; Report by Martin de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papclcs de 
Cuba, legajo 750; Lance Graltn, “An irresoluble Dilemma: Smuggling in New 
Granada. 1713-1763”, Reform and Insurrection, pp. 123-146; and John 
Fisher, Trade, War and Revolution: Exports from Spain to Spanish America, 
1797-1820, Institute o f Latin American Studies (University of Liverpool, 
1992), p. 25, 91. Sec also Estado que manifiesta el consumo de caudales, 
Cartagena, 20, April 1819, nota 3; and Report on expenses in Cartagena 
before the war, n.d.; both in AGI, Papclcs dc Cuba, legajo 715.
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relinquish its virtual monopoly on the American trade.92 Indeed, 
the very formation of the Comision de Reemplazos had been in 
part motivated by the desire to block moves toward free trade 
with friendly countries. The Cortes and the Regency consequently 
showed slight interest in enacting free-trade legislation, and it 
was not until February 1823 that Ferdinand belatedly sanctioned 
free trade in the Americas.
In the Americas, on the other hand, a considerable number 
of viceregal and local officials favoured free trade with friendly 
colonies. Viceroy Pezuela of Peru, for example, repeatedly urged 
the m etropolis to legalise neutral trade, and perm itted foreign 
ships to sell goods in Peru.93 In New Granada, merchants had 
been agitating for permission to trade with friendly colonies in the 
Caribbean for decades, and in 1808 Viceroy Antonio Amar had at 
last granted Cartagena’s traders the right to do business with 
fo re ig n e rs .94 During the First Republic, Cartagena’s trading links 
with the Caribbean and the United States were further 
strengthened. Then, after M orillo’s capture of Cartagena, the 
general imposed a total blockade on Cartagena’s ports, thus ending 
all trade with these regions. However, there were soon calls for 
the blockade to be lifted. In view of the catastrophic economic 
situation in Cartagena, exacerbated by the royalist blockade, 
governm ent officials recom mended that the ports in Cartagena, 
Santa Marta and Riohacha be reopened, and that trade with 
friendly colonies be perm itted according to the terms agreed in
92For com ments about the attitude to free trade of S pain 's governments 
during the war, see Costcloc, Response to Revolution, pp, 119-148.
93See Timothy Anna. Spain and the Loss of America , University of 
Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1983), pp. 229-231; and also Gabriel de Torres to 
(?). Cartagena. 15 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9.
94For Viceroy A m ar's introduction of free trade in 1808, sec McFarlane, 
Colombia before Independence, pp. 338-339, and also pp. 298-307.
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1808 by Viceroy Amar. Morillo agreed to open Cartagena’s port 
two months later, in August 1816, and trade with the British 
colonies in the Caribbean was then perm itted.95 This decision to 
reintroduce limited free trade was made w ithout consulting Spain, 
which would doubtless not have approved. Considerable 
restrictions were nonetheless place on this trade. In particular, an 
import tax of 21% was imposed on goods brought into New 
Granada, and duties between 2% and 7 % were levied on exported 
goods. All trade had to be carried out via Spanish agents, and 
merchants who imported more goods than they exported were 
p e n a lise d .96 Moreover, certain imports were still restricted; the 
sale of cotton cloth produced outside the Spanish colonies, for 
exam ple, rem ained p rohib ited .97 Nonetheless, this very partial 
liberalisation seems to have had a beneficial effect on Cartagena’s 
trade. Income from the Cartagena customs house roughly doubled 
from 1816 to 1817.98
These alterations to the trading laws did not attract much 
praise from New Granada’s neighbours; on the contrary, the high 
import duties levied at Cartagena and Panama City were strongly 
criticised. In September 1819, Sir Home Popham, the Admiral of 
Jamaica and a great advocate o f free trade, wrote to Viceroy 
Samano to express his worries about the incredibly high taxes
95Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena. 3 Scptcmbcr 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 717; and Pablo Morillo to Luis de Onís, Santa Fe, 17 August 1816, 
Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer 
Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), Real Academia de la 
Historia (Madrid, 1908), vol. 3, p. 26.
96Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena. 3 Scptcmbcr 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 717,
97 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena. 16 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 717.
98Sec Various reports on thc Aduana in Cartagena, 1816-1817, in AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
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being charged on British goods imported into New G ran ad a ."  He 
pointed out that British goods imported into Panama paid a tax of 
24% of their value (increased to 36% if not paid in advance). On 
leaving Panama, British goods were charged an additional 2% 
export tax. Further taxes were then levied at the next port of 
arrival. In Lima an import tax of 42% was levied on British goods. 
British goods imported into Lima via Panam a were thus taxed at 
68%. This figure increased to a staggering 80% if the import tax in 
Panama had not been paid in advance. Further taxes were levied 
on any cash exported from Panama. These sums were obviously 
excessive, and Popham observed that, under these circum stances, 
contraband was inevitable. He suggested that import taxes in 
Panama be lowered from 24% to 17%, which had been the level 
charged during Benito Pérez’s tenure as viceroy. Governor Torres 
of Cartagena concurred, and remarked that under current 
circumstances smuggling was merely a form  of speculation.* 100
Popham ’s suggestions met with no success. Viceroy Sámano 
did not shared Governor Torres’ views on freer trade. He claimed 
that the undeniable decline in trade with the British Caribbean 
was, rather, the result of republican piracy, and did his best to 
reduce, rather than expand, the size of Anglo-Spanish trade.101 
He regarded free trade as an open door to fraud, and felt it was 
inherently disadvantageous to Spaniards. It was not until 1820 
that trade with the Caribbean colonies was again perm itted. In
" H o m e  Popham to Juan Sámano, Jamaica, 21 September 1819, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 741B. Sir Home Popham was the leader of the disastrous 
British invasion o f  Rio dc la Plata in 1806.
100See Gabriel dc Torres to (?), Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 
8725, doc. 9. See also sim ilar comments on contraband in McFarlanc, 
Colombia before Independence, p. 154n.
101 Juan Sámano to  Gabriel dc Torres, Santa Fe, 29 March 1819, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 708.
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July 1820, the republican General Mariano M ontilla laid siege to 
Cartagena, cutting off the city’s supply of food from the mainland. 
Even before the official establishment o f the blockade M ontilla’s 
troops had advanced steadily into the province, and, as a 
consequence, food had been rationed since April 1820.102 The 
blockade intensified the c ity ’s comestible and financial difficulties, 
and increasing amounts of government money had to be spent on 
purchasing food from abroad.103 In an attempt to stave off total 
collapse. Governor Torres decided to abolish all taxes on the 
importation of food, and to allow food-bearing ships to import an 
additional amount of non-edible m erchandise tax -free .104 
Although these measures were initially successful, they did not 
provide enough food to supply the city, and, in any event, by 
early 1821 the government was unable even to pay for food 
already  pu rchased .105 In September 1821 the city surrendered 
to General Montilla “por falta de víveres” .106 Spanish officials 
during the war of independence thus continued the traditional 
practice of loosening restrictions on trade in times of exceptional 
crises. By 1820 this approach succeeded neither in stimulating
102Lorenzo Corbacho and Carlos Joaquín de Urisorri to Gabriel de Torres, 
Cartagena, 5 April 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
103See Gabriel de Torres to Alejandro Ramirez, Cartagena, 19 August 1820; 
and José Maria Ramirez to Juan Sámano, Havana, 7 November 1819; both in 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
11)4 Merchants could import up to 1/3 the value of the food in other 
merchandise. Sec Proclama de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena. 13 September 
1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
103Marcos de Caz to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 3 January 1821, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715. The treasury contained only $1,500, all of it 
moneda provisional, which had become worthless after the extinction of 
this coinage; sec First declaration of Gabriel dc Torres, Havana, 2 November 
1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A.
106Declarations of Ramón Pérez and Francisco Pérez Dâvila, Havana, 11 
November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A. Sec also the lengthy 
investigation into the reasons for Cartagena’s surrender contained in AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajos 2I36A-D.
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much commercial activity in Cartagena, nor in solving the grave 
alim entary problem s that confronted the city.
Indeed, the royalist fiscal m anagement of Cartagena, their 
quasi-capital, was plagued with difficulties throughout the 
reconquest period. Within months of the Spanish occupation, 
Cartagena was suffering from considerable inflation.107 Moreover, 
by June 1816, the city was reportedly spending over $46,000 each 
month, while monthly income was less than $5,000.108 As a 
result of the c ity ’s ever-decreasing financial reserves, drastic cuts 
were made in the governm ent’s staffing levels.109 For example, 
the custom s-house, which in 1810 had em ployed nine men, was 
combined with the offices of Contaduría and the Treasury, which 
in 1810 had employed eleven. This new, combined office was 
then staffed by only seven employees. The work-force of the 
three branches was thus reduced by nearly tw o-thirds.110
Provincial income rose somewhat in 1817. The introduction 
of trade with friendly colonies seems to have permitted a 
doubling of receipts in the Aduana, but few of the other branches
107Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 29 February 1816, 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707; and also Pedro Rodriguez and Vicente 
Colorete to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 23 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 717.
108Report by Junta in Cartagena, Cartagena, 28 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 707. Most o f the city's income was spent on military salaries 
and expenses. See Sumario de los valores de los ramos dc cargo y data dc las 
reales cajas dc Cartagena . . .  en el año corrido desde 1 dc enero hasta 31 de 
diciembre dc 1816, Cartagena, 1 January 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
715.
l0 9 Franciseo Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 2 August 
1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. Also sec Pedro Rodríguez and 
Vicente Colorete to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 23 May 1816, AGI, Papeles 
dc Cuba, legajo 717.
l l 0 Complaint by officials at the Aduana. Cartagena, 1816, AGI, Papeles dc 
Cuba, legajo 717. Similar job losses occurred elsewhere. The governor of 
Ríohacha, José Solis, was obliged in 1819 to make a number of state 
employees redundant in an effort to save money; see José Solis to Juan 
Sámano, Ríohacha, 10 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745.
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of the exchequer showed sim ilar growth. None of the royal 
m onopolies generated income even remotely approaching that 
yielded before the war. M oreover, military expenses continued to 
rise. By 1818 the Cajas Reales de Cartagena reported a deficit of 
$ 2 2 0 ,6 5 9 .111 Various treasury officials drew attention to the 
decline in income. In a report from 1819, for example, Tomás de 
Lara, an administrator in the Renta de Alcabalas, compared the 
income from alcabalas during the three year periods from 1805 to 
1808, and from 1817 to 1819. His report is a litany of decline: 
“Ramo de Tiendas de Pulperías: no puede producir como entonces, 
por haber demolido el gobierno muchas, y las mejores, que se 
hallaban situadas en el Camellón del Puente. Ramo de 
M ercaderes: tampoco puede producir tanto, por haberse cerrado 
muchas en razón a la pobreza del comercio. . ."112 Average annual 
income from the Renta de Alcabalas in Cartagena had by 1819 
fallen to nearly half the level before the war.
The financial strain on Cartagena’s citizenry was increased 
by the arm y’s continual demands for food and money, and by the 
various taxes and forced contributions extracted from the public, 
which will be detailed in subsequent chapters. At first, forced 
contributions were imposed on suspected republicans, but this 
source of money eventually dried up. Cartagena’s royalists then 
found themselves obliged to dig deeply into their own pockets. 
Starting in February 1819, a forced loan of $22,000 was levied
1 1 1 The economic data on Cartagena is extremely contradictory: other 
figures appear to show the Cajas to he $225 in credit. (See the many 
documents in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715). The figures offered here 
seems to me the best interpretation o f the wildly differing figures 
available, but are certainly not definitive.
l l 2 Rcport by Tomás dc Lara on the real administración de alcabalas dc 
Cartagena de Indias, Cartagena, 31 December 1X19, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa 
Fe, legajo 1017.
2 1 9
monthly on the province.113 This was predictably unpopular, but, 
contrary to all expectations, was paid regularly. The forced loan 
was followed swiftly in March 1819 by a new tax. From that 
month a l* /2%  tax was levied on all properties in the province. 
The alcabala was, moreover, raised from 2% to 5 % J 14 Cartagena’s 
property-owners regarded this as the final blow. The cabildo 
denied roundly any possibility of paying the tax, and suggested 
that instead efforts should be made to end the “ inmoderado y 
crim inal” contraband trade based in Riohacha and Santa Marta. 
They also advised eliminating the aguardiente monopoly, a 
suggestion which was ignored.115
Such m easures proved wholly inadequate to Cartagena’s 
desperate financial state. By August 1820, the public treasury 
had been reduced to “una absoluta nulidad”. “Una nulidad,” 
Governor Torres added:
De que no podrá salir en muchos años, aún suponiendo se 
consiguiese muy pronto la total pacificación de estos países, 
porque las rentas, el comercio, y la agricultura han 
desaparecido de ellos casi enterem ente por consecuencia de 
la guerra encarnizada y destructora que sufre hace diez 
a ñ o s .116
113Gabricl de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 16 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 709.
114Rcport by Martin de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 750; and Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Santa Fe, 19 June 
1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708.
115Report by Martín de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 750. There were also complaints about the manner in which 
property-values were assessed; see Representation by Juan Berenguer and 
Juan Simó, Cartagena, 30 October 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747; and 
also Various requests for exemptions from the l* /2%  tax, Cartagena, August 
1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 711.
llf lGabriel de Torres to Minister o f Hacienda, Cartagena, 18 August 1820,
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017. Sec also Gabriel de Torres to Juan 
Sámano, Cartagena, 20 March 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, 1819, vol. 2,
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Cartagena’s fate illustrates the insufficiency of the royalists’ 
efforts to restore New Granada to the flourishing pre­
revolutionary state lauded by Viceroy Montalvo in 1815. W hile 
attempts were made to restore the royal monopolies, and to 
revive trade, these efforts failed. Profits from the royal 
monopolies, which in the later years of the eighteenth century had 
been reckoned in hundreds of thousands of pesos, fell to a few 
thousand, or at most, tens of thousands of pesos during the years 
of the reconquest. Similar declines occurred in most other areas 
of imperial receipts. By the time of its surrender to the 
republicans in 1821, the quasi-capital city of Cartagena was 
bankrupt. The economic reconquest was a failure. It was not, 
however, the only failure. In the following section, we will 
examine the increasing air of crisis that enveloped the reconquest, 
as the state o f military finance, the troops’ health, and their 
relations with Neogranadans deteriorated.
Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República, 
(Bogotá, 1989), pp. 18-21; and Ventura Ferrcr and Vicente Colorete to (?), 
Cartagena, 9 Scptcmbcr 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.
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Chapter 7: Spaniard and R e i n o s o
In 1816, while the Spanish army was winning military 
victories in New Granada, the republicans were enjoying a 
comeback in Venezuela. In May 1816, Bolivar returned to the 
mainland, and Arismendi recaptured M argarita. Consequently, in 
November 1816, Morillo returned to Venezuela, leaving Juan 
Sámano as governor of Santa Fe. Some 5,000 royalist troops 
remained behind in New Granada, although various of these units 
left New Granada in the ensuing months. All had to march across 
the Llanos of Casanare and San Martin, and many experienced 
considerable difficulties in obtaining sufficient food, despite the 
efforts Morillo had made to ensure that the routes were stocked 
with p rov isions.1
After M orillo’s return to Venezuela, the royalists’ military 
hold on New Granada slowly weakened. Small uprisings in 
Purificación, Vêlez, Natagaima, and Prado in 1816 were 
suppressed w ithout great difficulty, but matters soon took a 
dramatic turn for the worse. In March 1817, the insurgent Nonato 
Pérez and local Indians killed Lieutenant Colonel Julián Bayer and 
captured Chire and Pore. Meanwhile, Pamplona rose in revolt, and 
forces led by José Hilario Mora harassed royalists across the Cauca 
Valley. Guerrilla groups around Socorro, protected by Antonia 
Santos, engaged in small-scale operations until the execution of
1 See Proyecto de marcha para la vanguardia de la division de los Llanos 
para su movimiento desde Porc a Guasdualito, December, 1816, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 897
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Santos in July 1X19. The Almeyda brothers of Cucuta briefly 
occupied Choconta, less than fifty miles north of Santa Fe. In the 
capital itself, Policarpa Salavarrieta organised an am bitious (and 
unsuccessful) plot to subvert royalist troops in the c ity ’s garrison. 
Throughout 1X17 and 1X1X continuing insurgence, particularly in 
the Llanos de Casanare, occupied the arm y’s attention. In the 
Llanos and elsewhere, small groups of guerrillas launched attacks 
on royalist troops and then retreated, defying capture.2 None of 
these groups enjoyed any lasting success, but all succeeded in 
alarming the royalists and obliged them to spend months chasing 
small forces across large distances. Royalist officers, m aking little 
headway, lashed out at civilians, burning villages and arresting 
indiscriminately. The uprising in the Llanos led by the Almeyda 
brothers met with particularly fierce repression from Carlos Tolra, 
the royalist officer in charge of the counter-insurgency campaign. 
Tolra did not, however, succeed in crushing the revolt, and, by
2On the death of Bayer, see Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Chaguarama, 8 
May 1817 and Cumaná, 28 August 1817, Antonio Rodriguez Villa, El Teniente 
General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la 
Puerta (1778-1837), Real Academia de Historia (Madrid, 1980-1910),vol 3, pp. 
379-385 and 430-439. (Restrepo reports that it was Francisco Rodriguez, and 
not Nonato Pérez, who captured Bayer. See José Manuel Restrepo, Historia  
de la revolución de Colombia, Ediciones Bcdout (Medellin, 1969), vol 2, pp. 
163-164.) Bayer’s mother did not learn of her son’s death until the winter 
o f  1820. Sec Viuda dc Bayer to Miguel de la Torre, Isla dc Bugcn [Bolbin?], 9 
October 1820, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8739, doc. 41.
For the 1816 uprisings in Purificación and elsewhere, see Oswaldo 
Díaz Díaz, la reconquista española. Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol. 6, 
Ediciones Lcm er (Bogotá, 1967), vol 1, pp. 171-178; and Rafael Sevilla, 
Memorias de un oficial del ejército española, campañas contra Holívar y los 
separatistas de América, Editorial América (Madrid, 1916) pp. 86-87. For 
information on Mora, see Díaz Díaz, la reconquista española, vol 1, pp. 149- 
168, and Noticias sobre José Ylario Mora, Cartagena, 21 July 1817, AGI,
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717. For details about Santos and Salavarrieta, see 
Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, pp. 230-256; and vol. 1, pp. 335- 
395, respectively. Much inform ation about the many small republican 
guerrillas may be found throughout Díaz Díaz, la reconquista española .
2 2 4
early 1818, the royalists had been forced to withdraw entirely 
from the Llanos.3 The republican capture of Angostura in July 
1817 further weakened Spain’s hold on Venezuela.4
From 1817 onwards, then, the populace that had once 
welcomed the Spanish now turned against them. The 
Expeditionary Army was unable to win back the confidence of 
New Granada’s population. This was due in large part to M orillo’s 
approach to ‘pacification’. While military force enabled Spain to 
reassert its authority in the region and to re-erect the system of 
viceregal governm ent, the activities of the armed forced inflicted 
considerable dam age on relations between governm ent and its 
colonial subjects. Leaving aside the behaviour of troops during 
actual military engagem ents, their actions off the battlefield 
occasioned much com plaint and soured the reconquest years even 
for ardent royalists. Royalist soldiers were accused of virtually 
every possible crim e, from theft to murder. As Viceroy Montalvo 
put it, “en todos estos partes [se] vera las enormes contribuciones 
impuestas y exigidas violentamente, el m altrato, las vejaciones con 
que |las tropas han| oprimido a los pueblos, el desorden y licencia 
con que se han apoderado de bestia, ganado, alajas y cuanto han
3For information about the guerrilla war in the Llanos, see Díaz Diaz, la 
reconquista española, vol 2, pp. 29-112; and Jane Rausch, A Tropical Plains 
Frontier: the Llanos of Colombia, 1531-1831, University of New Mexico Press 
(Albuquerque, 1984), Chapter 7. For further information, see Pablo Morillo 
to Minister o f War. Cura, 26 February 1818, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, 
vol 3, pp. 510-518; Simón Bolívar to José Félix Blanco, San Miguel, 1 July
1817, Escritos del Libertador, vol 10, Sociedad Bolivariana de Venezuela, 
(Caracas, 1973), pp. 277-279; Simón Bolívar to Luis Brion, San Fernando, 15 
May 1818, and Simón Bolívar to José Leandro Palacios, Angostura, 11 July
1818, both in Selected Writings of Bolívar, vol 1, pp. 153-155, 161-162.
4Scc Sevilla, Memorias, pp. 171-200 for a royalist account o f the siege.
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creido convenirles” .5 After receiving a generally warm reception 
during their triumphant campaign of 1816, the royalists were to 
wear out their welcome in the years of military occupation that 
followed, so that, when challenged by republican forces in 1819, 
they found scant support from New G ranada’s population.
Relations between royal governm ent and its Neogranadan 
subjects were disrupted by several factors, but the behaviour of 
the army must be counted among the m ost important.
Antagonism between the civilian population and crown forces, 
both regular troops and militias, was not new to New Granada. 
Allan J. Kuethe has shown that, after the reform of the military 
following the Comunero rebellion of 1781, the higher ranks of 
officer were reserved for peninsulars, and, to make desertion 
more difficult, recruits were usually posted far from their homes. 
As a consequence, the troops were regarded more as “a foreign 
army of occupation” than as an legitim ate native institution.6 
However, these earlier problems paled into insignificance 
compared to those generated by M orillo’s invading troops when 
the Spanish army entered New Granada in force after 1815. The 
royalists arrived as a conquering army, charged with defeating 
what they were told was a group of traitors and ‘egoists’. These 
in fiden tes ,  the troops were told, were to be regarded as common 
criminals, not enemy combatants entitled to any rights under the
<iFrancisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 
September 1817, AGI, Audicncia dc Santa Fc, legajo 631.
6Allan J. Kuethe, Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-1808, 
University of Florida Press (Gainsville, 1978), p. 102; and, for comments 
about the unpopularity o f military service in Mexico, sec Christon Archer, 
The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1700-1810, University o f New Mexico Press 
(Albuquerque, 1977), pp. 223-253.
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laws of war. Second, the army was consistently under-funded, as 
we will see in Chapter 8. It was thus forced to live o ff  the land, 
which in practice meant living off New Granada’s populace. This 
inevitably caused conflict. Finally, the royalist soldiers who 
arrived in Venezuela with Morillo in 1815 were Spanish, not 
American. Spanish officers found New Granada surprisingly 
different from Spain and generally distrusted A m ericans, and 
they communicated these views to their peninsular troops in the 
early years of the war, before the army was largely creolised. 
These facts coloured the royalist arm y’s interactions with 
Neogranadans, and set the sharply confrontational tone that was 
to characterise the entire reconquest and its afterm ath. 
Continually in search of supplies and labour, and inherently 
suspicious of the populace, the royalist army perhaps inevitably 
abused both republican troops and local inhabitants.
§ 1 .  Soldiers  and Civi l ians
The geography of South America was quite unlike anything 
the Spanish soldiers had seen before, and it made a deep 
impression on the expeditionaries. Surprised officers commented 
on the unfamiliar landscapes in their official reports and private 
communications. The vast size of the Llanos de Casanare 
particularly impressed the Spanish, while the region north of 
Santa Fe struck several officers as very attractive.7 The wildlife
7Sec, for example, Sevilla, Memorias , p. 84; Francisco Ximénez. to Juan 
Sániano, Apiay, 6 January 1817, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 199-200; 
Ejército Expedicionario, Resumen histórico de las operaciones y 
movimientos de las columnas y tropas . . . desde el mes de Noviembre de 
1816, AGI. Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B; Description of route past Mogotes,
227
was also unfamiliar. Tigers, armadillos, snakes, and many species 
of birds confronted Spanish troops. Like travellers everywhere, 
Spanish soldiers collected souvenirs of the unusual sights; officer 
Rafael Sevilla brought home some alligator teeth as a memento.8
M any expeditionaries regarded Neogranadans them selves as 
equally different. Hostility between creoles and peninsulars had 
increased markedly in the last decades of the eighteenth century. 
The im pact of the enlightenm ent and Bourbon reforms had fed 
tensions which were heightened by the outbreak of revolution.
The m ovem ent for independence was led by creoles; this merely 
confirmed Spanish suspicions about creole loyalty. Nor were the 
Spanish prepared to view Indians with a more favourable eye. 
Centuries of prejudice encouraged peninsulars to find Indians 
docile, unthinking and subm issive.9 Official military 
comm uniqués reinforced these views; army reports on New 
Granada tended to classify civilians into various uncomplimentary 
categories. The inhabitants of Rionegro, for example, were 
described as being “de genio altivo, delicados, apáticos, 
inconstantes, rencillosos, m urm uradores” . W orse, the women
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897; and Margaret Woodward, “The Spanish 
Army and the Loss of America, 1810-1824”, HAHR, vol. 48 (1968), p. 593. 
8Sevilla, Memorias, p. 138.
9For com m ents about rivalry between creoles and peninsulars, see 
Anthony M cFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Cam bridge U niversity 
Press (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 272-346. For a discussion of Spanish 
prejudices, see Anthony Pagden, "Identity Formation in Spanish America", 
in N. Canny and A. Pagden, editors. Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World , 
Princeton University Press (Princeton, 1987). Also see Tim othy Anna,
Spain and the Loss of America, University o f Nebraska Press (Lincoln,
1983), pp. 74-75, for a memorandum on the nature of the Americans written 
by the Consulado de México in 1811; and Margarita Garrido, Reclamos y 
representaciones, variaciones sobre la política en el Nuevo reino de 
Granada, 1770-1815, Banco de la República (Santafé de Bogotá, 1993), p. 292, 
for Spanish insults to creole officials.
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couldn’t keep secrets and didn’t go to church.10 M oreover, many 
Spaniards were quite unprepared for the racial heterogeneity of 
both New Granada and Venezuela. Sevilla, on his arrival in 
Venezuela, was shocked by the appearance of the first Black 
woman he saw: “el pelo erizado de aquella mujer, sus miembros 
demacrados y su desaseo me hicieron volver la cara de puro asco. 
Parecía la estampa de la herejía” .11 Such low opinions about 
Venezuela’s Black population extended to the Black or mulatto 
soldiers fighting for Spain, whom Spanish officers com pared to 
desert Arabs, a designation that was not intended as a 
c o m p lim e n t.12
The Spanish were by and large no more impressed by New 
Granada’s creole population. Indeed, the arrogant behaviour of 
young Spanish officers, and their open contempt for middle-aged 
creoles incensed the latter, who expected to being treated with 
some measure of respect. The Spanish officers, who were often 
quite young, lorded it over the Americans and displayed what can 
at best be called a lack of tact. Old age was certainly not 
respected; Francisco Xavier Arámbarri, an official in Caracas, 
commented that royalist officers generally believed that, “ los que 
pasamos de 40 años de edad, somos una pobre y despreciable
" ’Plano de observación topográfica de la Provincia de Antioquia, 12 May 
1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897. Sec also Morillo’s Instrucciones 
particulares a los jefes del ejército, aboard the San Pedro, 1 April 1815, 
AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 16.
1’Sevilla, Memorias, p. 38.
12Instructions to Francisco González de Linares and Pedro José Mijares, 
Caracas, 18 January 1821, AHNM. Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24. For 
comparisons to Arabs, see David Brading. The First America: the Spanish 
Monarchy, Creole Patriots and the Liberal State, 1492-1867, Cam bridge 
University Press (1991), pp. 622, 626.
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gente que para nada sirve”.13 In the Cauca Valley, the military 
was said to be occupying private homes, leaving the owners to 
sleep in the street. “Somos tratados peores que esclavos y m uías,” 
complained one wealthy landowner from southern New 
G ra n a d a .14 Indeed, the entire cabildo of Cali was allegedly thrown 
into prison when it failed to provide requested goods.15
Moreover, the crude and abrasive m anner of some members 
of the Spanish m ilitary upset the American gente decente; even 
Viceroy Montalvo was offended by the “m aneras irritantes” 
displayed by Morillo and his subalterns.16 Spaniards were widely 
perceived as rude and vain; “la soberbia de esta nación,” 
commented José María Caballero, “compete con la de Lucifer” .17 
The army’s arrival in Santa Fe was accompanied by open and 
daily harassment of the Santafereños. Caballero added that panic 
reigned in the capital, caused, not merely by the arrests and 
executions, but also by “ los insultos y robos que a cada instante se 
recibián, tanto de los negros y mulatos como de los españoles” .1 x
l3 Franciseo Xavier Arámbarri, Hechos del General Morillo en América, 
Ediciones de la Embajada de Venezuela en España (M urcia, 1971), p. 31.
14This quotation is taken from a series o f letters from an anonymous Cauca 
Hacendado to Vicente Sánchez Lima, 1817. These letters, which were 
forwarded by Sánchez Lima to the viceroy, were clearly written by a well- 
to-do slaveowner. See Vicente Sánchez Lima to Francisco Montalvo, 
Medellin, 4 August 1817; and Sala Capitular dc Buga to José Solis, Buga. 30 
June 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631, doc. 64.
15 Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 
September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
l6 Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 
September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
l7 Caballero, Diario, p. 192.
1 ^Caballero, Diario, p. 213. Large groups of young men, especially when 
provided with weapons, rarely remain entirely decorous, and the soldiers 
of the royalist army were no exception. It was quite common for civilians 
to complain about the undisciplined behaviour of troops. In Mexico City, 
for example, efforts were made in 1814 to prohibit the royalist military 
from entering the Alameda park, as soldiers were said to  be vandalising the
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Indeed, one of the criticism s frequently levelled against the 
expeditionaries in 1816 was that both officers and troops used 
excessively vulgar and insulting language. Agustin de Velasco, a 
regidor  in Popayan’s cabildo, complained that in July 1817, 
following a quarrel with an officer, he was arrested and taken to 
the barracks. There he was insulted by the commander, Miguel 
de Letamendi, who shouted “palabras groseras y indecentes”, and 
furthermore beat Velasco with a stick .19 This demeaning 
treatment deeply offended the reg idor ,  who complained 
vigorously to the viceroy.
Com plaints about the behaviour of royalist troops in New 
Granada extended far beyond their use of offensive language. 
These com plaints ranged widely over the manner in which the 
army supplied itself, the arbitrary nature of military justice, the 
violent behaviour of individual officers, the disruptive effect of
park’s statues and benches. See Timothy Anna. The Fall of the Royal 
Government in Mexico City, University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), 
pp. 90-91. See also Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, pp. 255-258. 
l9 Sala capitular de Popayán to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 5 July 1817, 
AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631. See also Cabildo of Buga to José Solis, 
Buga, 9 August 1817; Cabildo of Buga to José Solis, Buga, 11 August 1817; and 
Cayetano Sarmiento to José Solis, Llanograndc, 19 August 1817; all in AG1, 
Estado, legajo 57, doc. 35-D (lb ); and the letter of Pablo Morillo in Horacio 
Rodríguez Plata, La antigua provincia del Socorro y la independencia. 
Biblioteca dc Historia Nacional, vol. 98 (Bogotá, 1963), p. 411, in which 
Morillo com plains about the "palabras poco decentes" used by the troops in 
the Fifth D ivision.
One may speculate that the expletives used by the Spanish military 
differed from those commonly in use in New Granada, where terms such as 
'picaro' or 'hijo de puta' were the insults of choice. Many examples of 
Ncogranadan insu lts arc contained in the crim inal investigations pursued 
in Santa Fc in the late eighteenth century. See, for example. Investigation 
into the murder o f Atanacio Silva, Santa Fe, 1794, AHNC, Juicios Criminales, 
tomo 45, ff. 534-670; and Investigation into abuses in Ocaña, Ocaña, 1775, 
AHNC, Juicios Criminales, tomo 45, ff. 372-411, esp. 390. Comparative 
material on insults in colonial Mexico may he found in William Taylor, 
Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages, Stanford 
University Press (Stanford, 1979), pp. 41, 82-83.
troop movements, and military engineering projects. A 
particularly large body of complaint emerged from southern New 
Granada in 1817 and 1818, and concerned the Third Division of 
the Expeditionary Army, which was under the nominal command 
of Juan Sámano. The Third Division numbered some 1,000 men 
and had been stationed in various towns in the Cauca Valley from 
late 1816. These troops were deeply unpopular, and many 
observers, both in Spain and America, claimed that the arrival of 
the Expeditionary Army had jeopardised the very pacification of 
New Granada.
It was generally agreed that the troops were eating all the 
cattle, had requisitioned all the horses, and had taken all the 
slaves to work on the army’s various road-building projects. It 
was thus extremely difficult to carry out any work on the 
numerous haciendas in the Cauca Valley, and work in the gold 
mines in the Vega de Supia had also been abandoned. The 
presence of the troops had furthermore led to an outbreak of 
smallpox and dysentery in the province.20 The cabildo of 
Anserma expressed the matter succinctly:
A nadie han presentado [las tropas] más orden que el fusil, y 
todo se les ha obedecido, y obedecen, por fuerza. Piden 
cuanto quieren, y todo en el momento; castigan a su arbitrio, 
y hacen cuanto es de su voluntad por precio en sus marchas.
. . Se ha hecho una injusta recoleción de toda bestia, no solo
2,,On occasion the presence of belligerents led more directly to  outbreaks of 
disease. President Toribio Montes allegedly fired rockets filled with 
smallpox-infected material into Quito during the royalist siege o f  1812. Sec 
Pedro Pérez Múfiez, H istoria de la revolución de América en 35 cartas, 
Guayaquil, 31 December 1815, carta 18, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.
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con fin de servicio del Rey, sino de que muera la mayor 
parte de dichas bestias y perjudican a todo hombre.21 
The cabildo’s suspicion that the army was collecting animals not 
only for their own uses, but also to punish the inhabitants, was 
probably well founded. Anserma, like Cali, Buga, Cartago, and 
Toro, which also complained of royalist oppression, had been a 
member of the insurgent Confederate Cities of the Cauca during 
the Patria Boba, and was thus regarded with suspicion by the 
royalist army. The army indeed considered willingness to provide 
for the troops as a good loyalty test.22 Forced contributions, 
appropriations of goods, and demands for labour tended to fall 
heaviest on those individuals or regions m ost heavily implicated 
in the insurgency, although the army did not necessarily admit 
this. Pasto, a noted bastion of royalism, was generally exempted 
from forced extractions of goods and provisions. It was for this 
reason that known loyalists responded with outrage when asked 
to assist the troops; they regarded them selves as exempt from 
such demeaning requirem ents. Indeed, many regarded it as 
practically an accusation of treason. When, for example, Maria 
Manuela de Angulo of Popayán complained of the insulting 
manner in which she had been ordered to sew uniforms for 
royalist troops, she drew attention to the fact that she was a 
member of an illustrious family which had distinguished itself in
21 Sala capitular dc Anserma to José Solis?, Anserma, 7 July 1817; AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Tomás de Hcrcs to Ruperto Delgado, 
Cali, 20 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
22See Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816,
Rodríguez Villa, rabio Morillo, vol 3, p. 227. See also Brian Hamnett, 
“Royalist Counterinsurgency and the Continuity o f  Rebellion: G uanajuato 
and Michoacán, 1813-1820," HAHR,  vol. 62 (1982), p. 34, for similar attitudes 
among royalist officers in Mexico.
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loyalty to the crown. In Angulo’s view it was not for royalists like 
her to sew uniforms.23
One of the principal sources of dissatisfaction with the army 
in the Cauca Valley, and indeed throughout New Granada, arose 
from its penchant for roadbuilding. Various projects of military 
engineering were undertaken after 1816, but the road-building 
projects were probably the most unpopular. New roads were 
opened from Sonson to Mariquita, from Zapatoca to the 
Magdalena, from Honda to Santa Fe, from Santa Fe to the Llanos, 
from Cali to Buenaventura, from the Valle de Osos to Câceres, and 
from the Cauca Valley to Anchicayâ. Pre-existing roads were 
improved as well. There is no doubt that new roads were needed; 
complaints about the poor quality of the roads and of transport in 
general were made regularly throughout the eighteenth cen tury .24 
The royalists’ plans were, however, overly ambitious. José Manuel 
Restrepo, him self placed in charge of one of the road-construction 
projects in Antioquia, listed in his autobiography the orders a 
fellow overseer had been given:
Primero de que el camino tuviera 25 varas de ancho, 
segundo que los puentes fueron el mismo ancho, tercero que 
todo el camino de Sonson se cubieron de cascajo, quarto en 
fin, que se arrancan de raiz todos los arboles cortados. Son
23Testimony of María Manuela de Angulo to Sala capitular de Popayán, 
Popayán, 19 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
24McFarlanc, Colombia before Independence , pp. 137-138, 162, 261, 312, 
317-320. Sec also Francisco W arleta to Pablo Morillo, Remedios, 17 March 
1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15), fols. 38-39, where W arleta comments, 
“ ¡Que caminos tan fatales! Más se rueda por ellos que se anda.”
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tan disparatas estas instrucciones que no m erecen 
an a liza rse .25
It proved impossible to build roads to these standards, but, 
perhaps as a result, most of the new roads were swallowed up by 
undergrowth within a year of construction.26 The construction of 
these roads placed heavy demands on local labour supplies, and 
the royalists resorted to requisitioning slaves and labourers to 
work on the roads. Notable insurgents were placed in charge of 
overseeing the construction, and heavy fines were levied on 
overseers who allowed labourers to escape. Slave owners were 
also fined if their slaves fled the roadworks.
The road being built from the Cauca Valley to Anchicayá, 
south of Buenaventura, under the supervision of Ruperto Delgado 
and Francisco Warleta, was an object of particular com plaint.27 
“Cuando se habla del camino de Anchicayá. . . solo [el] nombre 
infunde un terror en todo el valle difícil de explicar” , wrote one 
o ffic e r .28 The military requisitioned slaves from haciendas in the 
Cauca Valley to work on the road, thereby bringing agricultural 
work to a standstill. Moreover, when the requisitioned slaves 
began to escape into the backlands, the army started imposing
25José Manuel Restrepo, Autobiographia, con apuntamientos sobre la 
emigración que hice en 1816 de la provincia de Antioquia a la de Popayán, 
Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, vol. 30 (Bogotá, 1957), p. 20. See 
also Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, San Gil, 16 May 1816, AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8717, where Morillo orders that the road from Honda to Santa Fe must 
be built in one week and must be as good as the camino reales of Spain. 
26Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, pp. 143-144.
27 Much information about the opposition to the road to Anchicayá, 
including reports by local cabildos, army officers, and private citizens, may 
be found in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631, ramo 64 ,
28 Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento dc Infantería dc Numancia 
(Third Division), March 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A. 23
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fines of $30 per escaped slave on the slave-owners, who were 
expected to prevent their slaves from running away.29 The 
cabildo of Buga, for example, complained that, in the two years 
from 1815 to 1817, slaveowners in the town had paid some 
$5,000 in such fines, which implies that on average one slave from 
Buga fled the roadworks every five days. The town also had been 
obliged to provided 343 additional unpaid labourers and 13 
fo re m en .30 Throughout 1817, constant com plaints about the road 
poured into government offices. Cabildos across the Cauca Valley 
protested against the project, and the governor of Popayan added 
his name to the protests. Eventually Viceroy Francisco Montalvo 
himself ordered construction to halt, but his command was 
entirely ignored. All efforts at stopping work on the road ran up 
against the brick wall of army intransigence. The officers 
involved refused to recognise the authority of civilian officials to 
stop the road, and brazenly rejected viceregal orders to halt 
c o n s tru c tio n .31 The matter was eventually referred to Spain, and 
all further road construction was forbidden.32 By this time, 
however, civilians throughout the Cauca Valley had come to fear 
and loathe the road to Anchicaya, and the royalist officers in 
charge of it.
29Viccntc Rom ero to José Solis, Anscrma, 22 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 631.
30Sala Capitular to Buga to José Solis, Buga, 30 March 1817 and 30 June 1817, 
both in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
' 1 Ruperto Delgado to José Solís, Popayán, 13 July 1817; Ruperto Delgado to 
Juan Sámano, Popayán, 20 July 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, 
legajo 631. Sec also Report by Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 18 May 1819, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8739, doc. 139.
32Scc Council o f  the Indies to Pablo Morillo, and to Pascual Enrile, Madrid,
13 January 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
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Physical labour was not the only resource requisitioned by 
the arm y. Large quantities of money were also required to keep 
the forces afloat, and these funds were by and large provided by 
the inhabitants of New Granada. W hile royalist troops in the 
south num bered at most 2,000, they caused a disproportionate 
drain on the region’s resources. There were several reason for 
this. To begin with, even a small army requires substantial 
logistical support to carry food and supplies. John Keegan indeed 
notes that during one Russian campaign in 1874, 8,800 camels 
were needed to carry food for 5,500 men.33 Secondly, stationary 
troops soon eat their way through much of an area’s food 
reserves, as Bolivar well knew.34 The troops of the Third Division, 
while relatively few in number, thus required considerable 
quantities of food and money. The continual demands for 
financial support further soured relations between the royalist 
army and Neogranadans. Various towns submitted complaints 
detailing the enormous amounts of money demanded by the 
arm y.
The cabildo of Popayán calculated that its royalist garrison 
absorbed nearly $5,000 a month in supplies alone, without taking 
into account the troops’ salaries, which the city also provided. 
A ltogether, the cabildo estim ated that its inhabitants provided 
over $7,000 a month to the garrison of 265 men stationed there.35 
In com parison, a top government functionary would earn an
33John Keegan, A History of Warfare, p. 302.
,4 Eduardo Pdrcz, Guerra irregular en la independencia de la Nueva Granada 
y Venezuela, 1810-1880, Publicaciones de la Universidad Pedagógica y 
Tecnológica de Colombia, Ediciones La Rana y el Aguila (Tunja, 1982), p. 392.
35This works out to be about $1 per day per solider.
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official salary of $3,300 a n n u a l ly ,36 In addition to this, Popayan 
had paid Colonel Francisco W arleta a forced contribution of 
$500,000, a truly enormous sum more than thirty times the 
annual salary of the viceroy.37 The huge amount of money being 
extracted from a city that had been invaded many times by both 
republicans and royalists prompted the cabildo to appeal to the 
viceroy in May 1817.38
The cabildo of Buga similarly reported that it was being 
asked to provide outrageous sums of money to the army. The 
cabildo calculated that in the two years from  1815 to 1817 the 
town had given the arm y over $90,000, plus hundreds of horses 
and mules and 50,000 meals for the troops.39 Analogous 
complaints emerged from  Cali, Toro, Cartago and Anserma.40 In 
addition to demanding cash, royalist troops further requisitioned 
cloth and food at will, and regularly dem anded that civilians 
transport luggage and run errands. Viceroy Francisco Montalvo
3flSee descriptions o f salaries of fiscales and oidores of the Audiencia de 
Santa Fc in 1807, 1812, 1816 and 1817 in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 
549.
37Viceroy Montalvo earned $14,000 annually. Sec Francisco Montalvo to 
Minister o f State, Santa M arta, 25 February 1815; Francisco Montalvo to 
Minister o f War, Havana, 30 May 1818; and M inister of War to Interim 
Secretary o f the Ministry o f  Hacienda, Palace, 21 December 1818; all in AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580; and also Francisco Montalvo to Consejo de 
Indias, Havana. 15 July 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
3XSala Capitular de Popayán to Francisco Montalvo and José Solis, Popayán,
3 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
39That is, Buga provided 68 meals each day for tw o years.
See, for example, Acta of the Cabildo of Buga, Buga, 11 December 1816; 
Cabildo of Buga to Francisco Montalvo, Buga, 30 March 1817; Cabildo of Buga 
to José Solis, Buga, 30 June 1817; and the many other extracts from the Actas 
of the Cabildo of Buga; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
4,,Cahildo de Toro to José Solís, Toro, 27 June 1817; and Sala capitular de 
Anserma to José Solís(7), Anserma. 7 July 1817; Cabildo de Anscmia to 
Francisco Montalvo, Anserma, 27 July 1817; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa 
Fc, legajo 631
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outlawed the use of unpaid transport in January 1817, but it is 
unlikely that this or any other such order was observed.41 As 
one official put it, every officer considered himself a governor, 
and, unlike the real governor, had the weapons necessary to 
enforce his will.42 Indeed, when it came to disobeying 
adm inistrative decisions, the army had several powerful 
advantages In addition to using brute force, officers could 
blackm ail civilians by threatening that their troops, made 
desperate by deprivation, might rebel and go on the rampage. 
Alternatively, the troops m ight desert, which would probably 
am ount to the same thing.43
Another potent source of unhappiness with the army 
stem med from its demand for recruits. We have already noted 
that hostility towards the Spanish army had existed long before 
the outbreak of revolution in 1809; m ilitary service was 
unpopular, and desertion had always been a problem. The arrival 
of M orillo’s army in 1815 aggravated these pre-existing hostilities. 
From almost the first moment of his arrival in Venezuela, Morillo 
began recruiting Americans to fill gaps in the Expeditionary Army 
left by death and desertion. Initially, the traditional exemptions
41 Sec José María Ramírez to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 30 August 1817, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631, for Montalvo's order outlawing 
unpaid transport.
42Sce Vicente Romero to José Solis, Anscrma, 22 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 631.
43Rupcrto Delgado to José Solís, Cali, 25 May 1817; Ruperto Delgado to José 
Solís. Popayán, 14 July 1817; and Simón Sicilia to José Solís, Popayán, 16 July 
1817, all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Diario de operaciones 
de la columna volante del prim er batallón del regimiento de infantería del 
rey, by Donato Ruíz de Santacruz, entry for 24 August 1817, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 759A. For comparisons with Venezuela, sec the comments 
about Boves' troops in Gemían Carrera Damas, Doves: aspectos socio­
económicos, Colección Vigilia (Caracas, 1968), p. 41.
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enjoyed by married men, the very young, and very old were 
honoured. As the war progressed, however, the depleted royalist 
ranks were increasingly filled by anyone fit enough to shoulder 
arms. This occasioned many bitter complaints both from those 
recruited and from civilian officials. The president of Quito,
Toribio Montes, complained in 1817 that Colonels Sámano and 
W arleta were in Pasto recruiting indiscriminately from the 
married and the single, the old and the young.44 ( ‘Young’ recruits 
m ight have been very young; it was not unknown for ten year 
olds to participate in fighting.45) Moreover, on occasion even the 
elites were forced to take arms; in 1817, rumour circulated in 
Popayán that the royalists were preparing to recruit 400 men, “sin 
excepción de clases”.46
In short, the army expected civilians to supply it with food, 
shelter, money, horses, labour, and recruits. All these demands 
alienated New Granada’s inhabitants. Rather than act as unpaid
44Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia 
dc Santa Fe, legajo 631. See also Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Popayán, 19 
August 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 55-58; Manuel Ficillo to 
Agirra, Sitio Nuevo, 17 February 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747; and, 
for efforts at drafting students, see José Más and Santiago de Lecuna to 
Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 16 March 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
716.
45 See Ayuntamiento dc Riohacha to Council of the Indies, Riohacha, 6 May 
1813, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 746; Cayetano Sarmiento to José 
Solis, Llanograndc, 12 August 1817 and Cayetano Sarmiento to José Solis, 
Llanograndc, 19 August 1817; both in AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 35-D (lb); 
and also Eduardo Pérez, Guerra irregular en la independencia de la Nueva 
Granada u Venezuela, 18 10-1 S.W, Publicaciones de la Universidad 
Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, Ediciones La Rana y el Aguila (Tunja, 
1982), p. 364.
46Vicente Sánchez Lima to Francisco Montalvo, Medellin, 4 August 1817, 
AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631. For many complaints about 
recruitment o f soldiers in Buga in 1817, see the numerous letters from the 
Cabildo dc Buga to the military commander of Buga, Buga. 1817, AGI, Estado, 
legajo 57, doc. 35-D (lb ). For comparisons with the royalist m ilitary in 
Mexico, sec Timothy Anna, in The Fall of Royal Government in Mexico City, 
University o f Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), pp. 84-86, 89-90.
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labour for the army, civilians fled to the woods and hills, and, 
increasingly, joined the insurgents. Numerous reports alleged that 
it was precisely these heavy demands for cash and resources that 
fuelled the recrudescence of insurgency. Santander, for example, 
asserted that the forced contributions imposed by the Spanish had 
been the principal cause of the royalists’ declining support. The 
forced loans and extortions had been much more unpopular than 
the executions of over 500 people in 1816, he believed.47 This 
view was shared even by many royalist officers, who urged that 
sensitivity and a measure of diplomacy be employed in all 
dealings with A m ericans.48 Indeed, in an attempt to reassure 
Neogranadans of the royalists’ good intentions, Morillo in 1816 
issued a proclamation asserting that, “ Los soldados del Rey son el 
ejemplo de la disciplina, y sus jefes no se separan un punto de 
cuanto les ordeno".49 Unfortunately, M orillo’s statement did not 
very accurately describe the actual behaviour of royalist troops, 
as Morillo himself knew.
47Francisco de Paula Santander to Simón Bolívar, Santa Fe, 1 October 1819, 
in Carlas Santander-Bolivar, vol. 1, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la 
República (Bogotá, 1988), pp. 133-135. See also Francisco de Paula 
Santander to Simón Bolívar, Santa Fe, 17 October 1819, Cartas Santander- 
Bolivar, vol. 1, pp. 154-156.
48See, for example, José Solis to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 20 June 1817, 
and Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, both in AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631; Matías Escuté to Miguel de la Torre, 
Socorro, 19 March 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8739, doc. 151; and Toribio 
M ontes’ correspondence with Juan Sámano, 1814, in Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La 
reconquista española, vol. 1, Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol. 6, (Bogotá, 
1967), pp. 84-85.
49Bando dc Morillo. (18167), AHNM, Estado, legajo 8740, doc. 40
§2 .  Royal is t  A t r o c i t i e s
Despite M orillo’s claim that his troops were discipline itself, 
civilians suffered considerably from the depredations of the 
royalist army, not only through the loss of horses, money or free 
time, but also from many “excesos” of one sort or another. 
Unprovoked attacks on innocent civilians, public brawls, acts of 
drunkenness, and unspecified “desordenes” were regularly 
denounced to the authorities.50 Captain José Oliva, for example, 
was deported to Spain in late 1816 for bad behaviour. 
“Continuamente en su trânsito a esta capital [comitio] mil bajesas y 
desordenes en los pueblos,” commented Morillo.51 Some army 
units were more notorious than others. Venezuelan troops were 
regarded by all as troublemakers, while the Battalion of Granada 
was actually dissolved as a consequence of the ‘excesos’ 
committed by its members. This battalion, Morillo commented, 
was composed primarily of thieves, deserters and convicts, and he 
was not surprised that its soldiers comm itted innumerable crimes.
50See, for example, Miguel dc la Torre to Sebastián de la Calzada. Mompós, 14 
March 1816, AHNM. Estado, legajo 8721, doc. 86; Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la 
Torre, Ocaña, 25 March 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 48; Two letters 
of Pablo Morillo to Gabriel dc Torres, Ocaña, 22 April 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 709; Lorenzo Josef Noriega to Gabriel de Torres, Fragata Atocha, 
4 April 1816; AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707; Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la 
Torre. Bucaramanga, 13 May 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 64; Pablo 
Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, 29 July 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707; 
Investigation into L ieutenant Juan José G uevara, Cartagena, 1 December 
1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 739; the various complaints from the 
Cauca Valley in 1817 in AHNC, Archivo Anexo, Guerra y Marina, tomo 152, 
Ibis. 226-241; Orden General del Día, 5 February 1817, BRAH, sig. 9/7651 
(legajo 8); Pablo Morillo to Miguel dc la Torres, Calabozo, 8 November 1817, 
AHNM, Estado 8171, doc. 147; the many complaints recorded in AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 719B; and Rodríguez Plata, La antigua Provincia tie Socorro, 
pp. 412-415.
5 'Pablo Morillo to Gabriel dc Torres, Sogamoso, 20 December 1816, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709. See also Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre,
Santa Fe, 4 October 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 98.
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Indeed, Morillo asserted that royalist ranks were routinely filled 
by the dregs of society, who inevitably committed atrocities.52 
Thus Morillo, unlike the insurgents, did not blame the royalist 
arm y’s misdeeds on deep-seated contem pt for Am ericans, but 
rather on the poor quality of the men recruited into the army. 
This view was echoed by other officers, who regarded the troops’ 
excesses as a standard consequence of their inadequate pay.53 
However, such interpretations did not fully explain the frequent 
complaints about the behaviour of royalist officers. The repeated 
reports of unacceptable behaviour by officers led some members 
o f the government to call for a serious examination of the quality 
of individuals appointed as officers, especially in Venezuela.54 
Nonetheless, little practical quality control was undertaken.
Not surprisingly, these ‘desórdenes’ and acts of violence 
served to alienate the populace and increase support for the 
republicans. José María Barreiro conceded in early 1X19 that the 
royalists enjoyed no support whatsoever in the Llanos as a 
consequence of the “excesos que habrán cometido algunos 
oficiales.” “Todos sus moradores son enemigos decididos 
nuestros,” he added.55 Similarly, the excesses committed by 
Colonel Juan Sámano’s troops in Popayán were held to be directly
52Pahlo Morillo to Ministry of War, Valencia, 22 April 1818, Rodriguez Villa, 
Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 563-567, and Stephen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and 
Venezuela, p. 206. Sec also Archer’s comments about the standard 
composition of Spanish armies in Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, p. 
255.
5 3Sec, for example. Instructions to Francisco González de Linares and Pedro 
José Mijares, Caracas, 18 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24.
54Rcport on Francisco Xavier Ccrberiz, Madrid, 12 August 1814, AGI, 
Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 386.
5 5 Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 326.
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responsible for that city’s republican uprising in 1813. Samano’s 
troops, who were stationed in Popayan during 1812-1813, had 
repeatedly been accused of offensive behaviour, in which they 
moreover had plenty of opportunity to indulge, as they allegedly 
spent much of their time “circulan[do] por las calles sin destino” .56 
The “desordenes” of the troops extended far beyond the occasional 
drunken brawl. During the war, the royalists, like the republicans, 
committed terrible atrocities and acts of inhumanity. These 
ranged from the massacres, extra-judicial executions, and acts of 
torture committed by individual officers and men, to the official 
policies of the commanders-in-chief. The bloody effects of 
Bolivar’s War to the Death and Boves’ reign of terror in Venezuela 
are well known; what we will here consider is the situation in New 
Granada, which has been less well studied.
To begin with, Morillo’s official policies towards New 
Granada, although generally acceptable to royalist officers, were to 
republican eyes a catalogue of abuse and horror. The execution of 
over 100 prominent republicans, usually after highly arbitrary 
trials, the revival of the ancient and repellent custom  of 
dismembering and displaying corpses in wire cages throughout 
the capital, the deliberate harassment of the relatives of suspected 
republicans, and the arbitrary behaviour of royalist officers all 
served to fulfil the worst predictions of New G ranada’s 
revolutionaries. Daniel Florencio O ’Leary expressed this bluntly; 
“The conduct of Morillo in Santa Fe did more damage to the
^6Cabildo dc Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BM, Egerton, 1809 (this 
document may also he found in AGI, Audicncia de Quito, legajo 276); Toribio 
Montes to Minister of Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AOI, Audiencia dc 
Quito, legajo 260.
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royalist cause than the most disastrous defeat” .57 The most 
appalling cases of abuse did not, however, take place in the capital 
under the auspices of Morillo or Samano themselves. They 
occurred, rather, in the provinces, where there existed more 
resistance to the royalists, and where the moderating influences of 
Viceroy M ontalvo and the Audiencia did not reach. In the 
provinces truly bloodthirsty officers such as Carlos Tolra enjoyed 
free reign. During his 1817 ‘pacification’ campaign in the Llanos, 
Tolra authorised the summary execution of all suspected 
insurgents, and indeed of anyone even suspected of assisting 
them. Oswaldo Diaz Diaz calculates that over one hundred 
individuals were executed by Tolra 's troops.58 Furthermore, in 
the Llanos and elsewhere, the arm y regularly burned houses and 
villages in insurgent areas, and destroyed food supplies in order 
to prevent either the insurgents o r anyone else from using 
th em .59 (Of course, when the republicans burned villages, the 
royalists did not hesitate to condemn them.60 )
570 ’Lcary, Bolivar and the War of Independence, pp. 93-94.
58Sec Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, pp. 53-112, for details o f the 
campaign. See also Bando de Carlos Tolrá, Chocontá, 23 November 1817, Díaz 
Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 101; and Carlos T olrá’s Instructions 
for Simón Sicilia, Tibiritá, 26 November 1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), f. 
517 (this document is also printed in Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 
104.)
59Sce, for exam ple, Diary of the Prim er Batallón del Regimiento Infantería 
dc Numancia (Third Division),1 January 1817, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 
759A; José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 2 January 1819, Los 
Ejércitos del Rey, vol. I, Alberto Lee López (editor). Biblioteca de la 
Presidencia dc la República, (Bogotá, 1989), pp. 131-132; and Restrepo, 
Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 182.
6,,Diario de operaciones de la Columna Volante del Primer Batallión del 
Regimiento dc Infantería del Rey, by Donato Ruíz de Santacruz, 20 August 
1817, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 759A.
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Republican prisoners were not treated well during captivity. 
Many were obliged to march across great distances from their 
place of capture to Santa Fe or Cartagena. Worse, their chances of 
surviving the march often depended entirely on the whim of their 
captors. Court cases attest to the frequency with which royalist 
officers murdered republican captives en route to their place of 
trial. In late 1818, for example, Sub-lieutenant Vicente Ruiz was 
transporting 45 republican prisoners from Santa Fe to Cartagena. 
O f these, 6 died en route. One was beaten to death when he 
became too tired to walk further; another was beaten, then shot 
and left unburied at the side of the road, because there had been 
a difficulty with the rope with which he was bound; a third, 
described as very ill, was beaten severely and then shot because 
he had fallen exhausted to the ground. The remaining three died 
in sim ilar circum stances.61 It must be said that such abuses were 
often investigated, and officers and men found guilty of gross 
abuse were usually disciplined. A three year confinement to a 
presid io  was a standard army punishment for rape, for example. 
Nonetheless it was not a punishable offence merely to execute 
suspected republicans. It was only when the execution took place 
in irregular circum stances that the judicial authorities m ight 
intervene. Even then, judicial investigations were not inevitable. 
Republican prisoners were sometimes massacred with im punity
61 Investigation into deaths of 6 prisoners, Cartagena, 1819, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 719B. See also Summary of letter by Pablo Morillo, Calabozo, 28 
July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742; Orden General, 9-10 September 
1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15); Carlos Cortés Vargas, “De la época del 
terror,” HHA vol. 29 (1942), p. 92; and Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, 
vol. 2, p. 147.
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on reaching the royalist camp under the very eyes of the royalist 
com m anding officers.62
The royalist army, like armies everywhere, on occasion 
resorted to torture in its attempt to obtain inform ation and punish 
captives. A few examples will suffice. In 1816 Manuel José 
Castrillón of Popayán allegedly had his fingernails torn off and 
replaced by sharp thorns, his feet burned with a hot iron, and was 
then left for three days in a sealed room without food. Colonel 
Francisco W arleta ordered this treatment because he believed 
Castrillón was feigning insanity in order to avoid revealing 
information about the insurgents.63 Nor was the army alone in its 
employment of torture; members of the rural police force, the 
Santa Hermandad, were also accused of torturing republican 
detainees. Not surprisingly, the information obtained on these 
occasions was often unreliable. Several individuals arrested by 
the Hermandad in February 1820, accused of participating in a 
republican plot, stated that their confessions had been obtained 
through torture. One of these, Pedro Martinez, affirm ed that he 
had been suspended by the hands until he confessed, on which 
occasion “dijo lo que se le vino a la boca”.64
It should be noted that the majority of the examples cited 
above and in the footnotes are drawn from royalist sources. 
Certainly plenty of evidence attesting to royalist atrocities was 
produced by the insurgents. They regularly com plained about
62 See José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 July 1819, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747. See also Francisco Warleta to Pablo Morillo, 
Cancan, 23 March 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15), fols. 49-50.
63Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, pp. 146-147, 149-150. 
64Investigation into an alleged conspiracy in Mompós, February 1820, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 719A.
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royalist cruelties, and republican sources refer to events not 
mentioned by the royalists. José Manuel Restrepo, for example, 
describes a massacre of over 400 men, women and children which 
allegedly occurred on the beach outside Cartagena in 1816.65 
Royalist sources make no mention o f the massacre. W hile there is 
no reason to regard such an event as inherently impossible, the 
constant use of propaganda by both royalists and republicans does 
make the evaluation of atrocity stories problematic. It is for this 
reason that this section concentrates on material originating from 
within the royalist camp. The royalists had no reason to 
exaggerate the number of ‘excesos’ committed by their own side, 
and one may consider the examples cited above as a minimal 
count o f royalist misdeeds.
§3 ,  Wom en and the Royalist  Army
This is not the place to detail the participation of women in 
the effort to oust the Spanish from New Granada. Those who wish 
to explore this subject are directed to Oswaldo Diaz Diaz’s La  
reconquista española .66 We offer here a brief sketch of the non­
military interactions between New G ranada’s female population 
and the royalist army. To begin with, in the absence of regular 
funding, the army relied on New Granada’s women to provide 
many of the services needed to maintain an army. In particular, 
royalist officers expected women to assist by sewing clothing and 
providing food. And, it seems, some women were indeed happy to
fisRcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución , vol. 2, pp. 86-87.
ílñDíaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 1. See also José Dolores Monsalve, 
Mujeres de la Independencia, Academia Colombiana de Historia, Biblioteca 
de Historia Nacional, vol. 38 (Bogotá, 1926).
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assist; the Marquesa de Torre Hoyos organised groups of women 
to sew sheets for the troops, and offered hospitality to W arleta 
and other officers. In return for her help W arleta proposed to 
give a ball in her honour, which, he remarked, “se ha de 
denominar el baile de las hilas” .67 The Marquesa de Santa María 
surpassed the Marquesa de Torre Hoyos in supporting the 
royalists: she reportedly married a lowly Spanish cadet in early 
1816.68
Interactions between Neogranadan women and the royalist 
army were not always so happy. Those who did not volunteer to 
help the troops were obliged to do so by force; as Colonel Francisco 
Warleta stated, “el bello sexo jam ás deja en ninguna parte del 
globo de acceder a nuestras suplicas” .69 To this end, the army 
established in Santa Fe a so-called Sociedad de Beneficencia y 
Caridad. Suspect women were ‘enrolled’ in this club, and then 
obliged to oversee the production of clothing and bed-linen.
These seamstresses were of course not paid; on the contrary, 
women forced to join the sociedad were required to make an 
additional donation to the arm y.70 Women also suffered in other 
ways. Many were detained by the army for questioning, on which 
occasion they were likely to be ill-treated; Colonel W arleta, for 
example, was said routinely to beat female prisoners.71 Women
67Rcstrcpo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, vol. 1, pp. 291-292.
68Sevilla, Memorias, p. 74.
69José María Rcstrcpo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, vol. 1, 
Imprenta Nacional (Bogotá, 1932), pp. 291-292. See also Testimony of Doña 
María Manuela de Angulo to Sala Capitular de Popayán, Popayán, 19 June 
1X17, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
70Sec Díaz Díaz, la reconquista española, vol. 2, pp. 157-158.
71Scc Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 148.
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suspected of supporting the insurgents were likely to be 
imprisoned or exiled. (Sometimes such women were instead 
confined to convents.72) On occasion, women were imprisoned not 
because they were themselves suspected of insurgency, but in 
order to prevent their from com m unicating with their insurgent 
husbands, or in order to extract information about their relatives’ 
lo c a tio n .73 It was moreover apparently standard practice for the 
female relatives of notable insurgents to  be exiled from their 
homes and confined to remote villages. Restrepo reports that 
many women were given only 48 hours to leave their homes, and 
were obliged to travel on foot if they did not themselves own
72See. for example, Arámbarri, Hechos del General Pablo Morillo, p. 92;
Diary o f the Primer Batallón del Regimiento Infantería de Numaneia, April 
1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B; H istoria de la Rebelión de América
en 35 Cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1815, carta 18, AGI,
Diversos, legajo 42; and Vicente Sánchez Lim a to Francisco Montalvo, 
Medellin, 4 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
One general consequence of the war seem s to have been to liberate 
large numbers of nuns from their convents. In 1812, for example, among
the terms of the surrender offered to insurgents in Ibarra was the
following: “Las monjas de Carmen Alto y del Bajo que han sido inducidas a 
quebrantar la clausura sean entregadas y rem itidas inmcdiatcm ente a sus 
monasterios, como lo han executado por si 5 de Santa Clara a instancias 
mias”. (Toribio Montes to Juan Sámano, Quito, 22 November 1812; and 
Report by Toribio Montes, Quito, 7 April 1813; AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 
257.) It was apparently not uncommon for nuns to flee their cloisters 
before an army attack. They, like many of their secular compatriots, feared 
being raped or murdered by the invaders. (In Quito, the nuns of the 
convents o f Carmen and Santa Clara fled on the orders o f the bishop, who 
told them they were likely to he raped. Sec Historia de la Rebelión dc 
América en 35 Cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1815, carta 18,
AGI, Diversos 42.) On other occasions women tied to convents in order to 
escape from the soldiers. The wife of royalist Governor Miguel Tacón of 
Popayán. for example, was too ill to travel and so retired to the city 's 
carmclitc convent in 1811 when Popayán w as abandoned by the royalists. 
(Miguel Tacón to Joaquin Molina, Pasto, 14 May 1811, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Quito, legajo 235.)
7 'M anuel Carmona to Gabriel dc Torres, Mompox, 10 March 1816, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; and Arámbarri, Hechos del General Pablo 
Morillo, pp. 93, 95. Also, see Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p.
146, for information about the detention of the relations of José María 
Cabal. They were sent to Sámano in chains.
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horses. Similar detentions evidently occurred in Mexico as well, 
where fem ale relatives of insurgents were arrested or expelled 
from  royalist regions.74
Women were, moreover, subjected to all types of sexual 
harassm ent and violence by both the insurgent and royalist 
armies. This fact was widely recognised by Spanish officers; the 
royalist commander in Venezuela Cajigal reported that the royalist 
Boves recruited every class of person into his army, with the 
exception of priests, because they were Christians, and women, 
“porque el jefe y su ejército las destinaba a otros usos, que 
contradecían aquel principio” .75 Similar practices occurred in New 
Granada. To begin with, women were generally treated as a form 
of booty. Following the recapture of Riohacha by the Spanish on 
1 1 October 1820, royalist soldiers, who were supposed to be 
collecting abandoned enemy rifles, instead abducted several 
“ mugeres de los enemigos”, whom they took to a nearby house.76 
Furtherm ore, Restrepo reports that royalist soldiers regularly
74Restrepi>, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, pp. 142-143; and Díaz Díaz, La 
reconquista española, vol. 1, pp. 131-132. For Mexico, see Hamnett, “Royalist 
C oun terinsu rgency ,” pp. 29-30.
75Juan Manuel de Cajigal, Memorias del Mariscal de Campo Don Juan 
Manuel de Cajigal, sobre la revolución de Venezuela, Biblioteca Venezolana 
de Historia (Caracas, 1960), p. 133. See also Announcement by Pascual 
Enrilc, Santa Fe, 9-10 September 1816, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, 
pp. 102-103.
76 The soldiers' behaviour was later criticised by their superiors, but it is 
not clear whether their crime was having assaulted the women, or merely 
having failed to carry out the order to collect the rifles. See Investigation 
into Mateo Llorcns and Francisco de Paula Orive, Riohacha, September 1819, 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745. See also Miguel dc la Torre to Sebastián de 
la Calzada. Momprts, 14 March 1816, AHNM, Estado 8721, doc. 86; and 
comments about the behaviour of royalist troops in Venezuela in Carrera 
Dantas, Boves, p. 55.
accused innocent men of insurgency in order to gain access to 
their wives and daughters.77
Condemnation of the sexual abuses carried out by the 
opposing side were a regular occurrence throughout the war. In 
1X14, for example, the Sala Constitucional de Cali issued a 
condemnation of the behaviour of Sám ano’s troops in their city. 
Their complaints included the (not uncommon) charge that women 
had been raped inside the church, where they had probably 
gathered to escape the fighting. “Todos saben,” they asserted,
“que el templo del Señor se ha profanado y que en su honor ha 
padecido la viuda y la doncella” .78 Such practices were not 
confined to royalists. A particularly alarming case of mass rape 
occurred outside of Cartagena in 1821, during the republican siege 
of the city. Sebastián Díaz, the royalist commander of the castle of 
San Felipe de Barajas, reported to Governor Gabriel Torres that 
groups of women who had left the besieged city were being 
detained, beaten, robbed, and then raped by the republican 
tro o p s .79 The royalists protested vociferously to the republicans, 
who replied that it was well known that inhabitants of a besieged 
city would not be permitted to leave. With regard to the alleged 
rapes, the republican comm ander Luis de Rieux remarked that he 
had no doubt his troops had committed some excesses, as always
77Rcstrcpo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 149-150.
78Sala Constitutional dc Cali to Congress, Cali, 30 January 1814, AGI, Papeles 
dc Cuba, legajo 897. See also Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p.
148; Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 163; Rodriguez Plata, La 
antigua Provincia de Socorro, p. 471; and the com plaints against Carlos 
Tolrá and Simón Sicilia in Hermes Tovar Pinsón. "G uerras dc opinión y 
represión en Colombia durante la independencia (1810-1820), Anuario  
Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura, no. 11 (1983), p. 226.
79Scbastián Díaz to Gabriel dc Torres, Castillo dc San Felipe de Barajas, 24 
August 1821, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717.
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happened when troops were some distance away from their 
co m m an d ers .80 Rape, Rieux thus acknowledged, was an expected 
companion of war.
Prostitution was also prevalent. Indeed, Pascual Enrile, in a 
report on the reorganisation of governm ent undertaken by the 
army in New Granada, made the enigm atic comm ent that “hasta 
las mugeres públicas se recogieron y trabajaban para el 
e jé rc ito ” .81 It is difficult to find much information about 
prostitution, as very little tends to be said about it in official 
documents. It does appear, as m ight be expected, that prostitutes 
routinely accompanied both arm ies, and were identified as 
supporters of the side they follow ed.82 Associating with enemy 
prostitutes was frowned upon; in 1817, the royalist cabildo of 
Popayán complained about the “prostitutas del partido 
insurgente” , with whom royalist so ldiers were allegedly 
c o n so rtin g .83 Prostitutes were a lso  regarded as a health menace. 
Several prostitutes, arrested by locals in the Llanos de Casanare in 
September 1817, were brought to the royalist comm ander of the
80Luis Francisco de Rieux to Gabriel de Torres, Turbaco, 27 August 1821, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. See also Orden General, 9-10 September 1816, 
BRAH, sig. 9/7558 (legajo 15); and, fo r general remarks, Susan Brownmillcr, 
Axainst our Will, Men, Women and Rape, Bantam Books (1986), chapter 3.
81 Exposition by Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 19 June 1817, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, 
Doc. 35-c(2a). (This document may also be found in AGI, Audiencia de Santa 
Fe, legajo 748.)
82Scc, for example, Matías Escuté to M iguel de la Torre, Socorro, 19 March 
1816, AHNM. Estado, legajo 8739, doc. 151.
83Sala capitular de Popayán to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 5 July 1817, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. Sec also Report on a republican 
prostitute, AHNC, Archivo Anexo, Guerra y Marina, tomo 152, f. 240.
garrison in Chita, who blamed them for the outbreak of venereal 
disease afflicting his troops.84
The question that naturally needs to be asked is what effect 
royalist atrocities had on the stability of the reconquest regime. 
Did royalist abuses help swing public opinion back towards the 
republicans, and was it indeed the critical factor in reviving the 
insurgency? Certainly many observers comm ented on the link 
between royalist excesses and revived support for the 
republicans. It was widely alleged that the royalist arm y’s 
excessive demands for labour and supplies led many 
Neogranadans to flee their homes and hide in the hills. Once 
outside the royalist-controlled villages, they were easily recruited 
by republicans. (It was for this reason that the royalists issued 
innum erable decrees forbidding civilians to abandon their homes 
and villages.) Further, much of New G ranada’s initial support for 
the reconquest had arisen from the widespread disillusion with 
the insurgents. The movement for independence had meant death 
and hardship for many, and it was hoped that with a return to 
royalism would come peace. As Restrepo put it, “ los pueblos de la 
Nueva Granada estaban cansados de la guerra, y anhelaban por 
disfrutar de su antigua quietud bajo el Gobierno español” .8íi When 
the arrival o f the Spanish brought, instead, more suffering and 
punishm ent, the royalists lost their one great advantage over the 
republicans. It is noteworthy that the areas that remained most
8 4 Diary of the First Battalion of the Regimiento de Infantería de Numancia, 
Third Division, entry for 21 September 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
759B.
^ Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 156.
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staunchly royalist throughout the war were precisely those that 
experienced least harassment from royalist troops. Pasto, and to a 
lesser degree Santa Marta, both of which had initially supported 
the crown for specific local reasons, were by and large exempted 
from providing supplies and money for the troops, and were 
moreover spared many of the atrocities committed elsewhere by 
royalists. These two regions remained in royalist hands until the 
conclusion of the war. Similarly Quito, which was for some years 
governed by the conciliatory Toribio Montes, remained tranquilly 
royalist until the battle of Pichincha in 1822. The royalist 
governor of Popayán, José Solis, expressed the matter concisely:
“Si acaso hay algún pueblo de aquellas provincias en que se 
desfrute reposo, sin chispa de la anterior revolución, es aquel en 
que no existen tropas” .86 It would be difficult to attempt to 
separate the loss of popular support which the royalists 
undoubtedly suffered, from the military difficulties and lack of 
direction which characterised Spain’s attempted reconquest. 
Nonetheless, the grave errors and abuses committed by the 
royalists alienated potential supporters and redoubled the resolve 
of committed republicans. The irony of M orillo’s title of “Pacifier” 
was not lost on his contemporaries, and the fatal effect of his 
scorched earth policies were widely condemned both at home and 
ab ro a d .87
86Rcport to the Secretary of War, 29 January 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57,
doc. 35c
87For contemporary comments about M orillo’s title of ‘Pacifier’, see the 
remarks by an anonymous royalist officer about Morillo in the C orreo  
General de Madrid, Arámbarri, Hechos del General Pablo Morillo, p. 86; and 
José Manuel Groot, Historia eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada, vol. 4, 
Editorial M. Rivas (Bogotá, 1893), p. 111.
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Chapter 8: The Cost  of Reconquest
The loss of support suffered by the Expeditionary Army, 
discussed in the previous chapter, was in part a consequence of 
the financial difficulties that confronted M orillo’s troops. Spain’s 
effort to re-impose royal authority in New Granada was 
consistently under-funded, and inadequate funding of the 
reconquest was a major impedim ent to royalist victory. We will 
now examine the ways in which Spain attempted to defray its 
military expenses, and will explore the destructive consequences 
of these methods.
§ 1 .  Paying for a War
Spanish participation in the American wars of independence 
was trem endously expensive, and placed enorm ous burdens on a 
system of government finance that had already been under great 
strain before 1808. (In the decades preceding the outbreak of 
war in the Americas, Spain’s Tesoreria General had been running 
an average annual deficit of over $ 15,()()(),()()().1) The sheer scale 
of the fiscal burden created by S pain’s determination to rebuild its 
empire can be gauged from global estimates of Spain’s 
expenditures on military matters in the decade after 1811.
Michael Costeloe has calculated that during these years the 
Peninsula spent over $25,000,000 on fighting the American 
insurgencies. This sum, which does not include the expenses of 
royalist governments in the colonies, implies that each royalist
'Jacques Barhicr, "Peninsular Finance and Colonial Trade: the Dilemma of 
Charles IV’s Spain.” JLAS , vol. 12 (1980), p. 23 (table 2).
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soldier sent to the Americas cost the governm ent between $150 
and $400.2 (For M orillo’s expedition the per capita cost was 
nearer to the higher figure.) This estimate is supported by the 
figures given in 1817 by the Spanish M inister of War and the 
Navy, the Marqués de Campo Sagrado. He placed the per capita 
cost at around $320 per soldier, an amount which he considered to 
be grossly excessive.3
Figures given by army officers in New Granada and 
Venezuela confirm the imm ense expense entailed by the 
reconquest. General Pablo Morillo estimated in m id-1817 that the 
garrison in Cumanâ consumed $250,000 each year in food alone.4 
The troops and sailors stationed in Cartagena, which remained the 
most important military base in New Granada during the war, 
absorbed similarly large amounts of money. In 1818, the city 
spent over $300,000 on the garrison and navy. This amount 
would have been considerably greater had the m ortality rates in 
the military had been lower. If all vacant posts in the army had 
been filled, over $500,000 would have been needed each year to 
cover expenses.5
2 Michael Costeloe, Response to Revolution. Imperial Spain and the Spanish 
American Revolutions, 1810-1840, Cambridge University Press (1986), pp. 
102, 104. The figure of $25,000,000 is larger than the total expenses of the 
Comisión of Reemplazos given in the table in Costeloe, Response to 
Revolution, p. 102 and in Michael Costeloe, “Spain and the Spanish 
American Wars o f Independence: the Comisión de Reemplazos, 1811-1820” , 
JLAS,  vol. 13 (1981), p. 236. I assume that the higher figure includes 
interest owed by the Comisión.
'Edm undo Heredia, Planes españoles para reconquistar hispano-américa, 
1810/1818, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1974), p. 
254; and also Lúeas Alamán, Historia de Méjico, volume 5, Editorial Jus 
(Mexico City, 1969), p. I4n for comments on other estimates.
4Antonio Rodriguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer 
Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), vol. 2, Editorial 
América (Madrid, 1920), p. 80.
'E stado que manifiesta el consum o de caudales que aproximadamente 
originan animalmente las atenciones de la plaza y provincia de Cartagena 
de Indias en la actualidad, el que causarían si los cuerpos de la guarnición
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These large sums of money were required to cover the 
many costs incurred by the Expeditionary Army once it reached 
its destination. Food, for one thing, was expensive. The 
commander of the navy stationed in Cartagena estim ated that it 
cost 2 reales per day to feed one sailor, which meant that each 
sailor consumed $36 a year in meals alone.6 Clothing damaged by 
battles or marches had to be replaced, and salaries had in theory 
to be paid. The necessary works of military engineering also cost 
money. Sums had to be found to pay for rented housing for 
officers. Furtherm ore, equipm ent was regularly destroyed or lost 
during the many long m arches undertaken by the Spanish troops, 
and needed replacing.7
Funds to cover these expenses had to be found in New 
Granada itself. The Spanish, unlike the British forty years earlier, 
made little effort to maintain transatlantic supply lines.8 On the 
contrary, very little cash and virtually no supplies were remitted 
from Spain to New Granada’s royalist army. The crow n’s reliance 
on local funding to support royalist troops was predictably 
unpopular with Neogranadans. Indeed, the ways in which the 
Expeditionary A rm y’s costs were defrayed played an im portant 
role in alienating support for the crown, as we have already seen
estuvieron con sus fuerzas y dotaciones completas . . , Cartagena, 20 April 
1X19, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715. The navy stationed in Cartagena, 
meanwhile, received an annual grant from the Cajas Reales o f $36,000, but 
treasury officials estimated that something on the order of $150,000 would 
be required to bring the navy into a reasonable condition. 
f’ManucI dc Cordero to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 12 November 1819 and 16 
December 1819; both in AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747.
7Sec, for example, Juan Sámano to Minister o f Hacienda, Santa Fe, 19 
December 1818, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 632; Juan Sámano to 
Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 15 January 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
708; and Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 22 January 1816, 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707.
8 For comments about British m ilitary funding during the American 
Revolution, sec Piers Mackcsy, The War for America, 1775-1783, Longmans 
(London, 1964), pp. 65-69, 118-120, 222-224.
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in the previous chapter. Here we will examine the sources of 
funding available to M orillo’s army, the inadequacy of these 
sources, and the effects of chronic under-funding on the royalist 
army itself.
Funds from Spain
Spain’s initial response to colonial rebellion was crippled by 
political and financial crises at home. When the Regency first 
resolved to act against the outbreak of revolt in the Americas in 
1810, it decided to adopt “ las medidas más enérgicas y eficaces 
para contener, reprim ir y castigar excesos tan trancendentales” .9 
The Council of the Indies, on the other hand, recommended that 
peaceful means, rather than m ilitary force, be employed. This 
approach, as Edmundo Heredia has noted, was dictated by the 
complete lack of money to fund military expeditions, rather than 
by diplom atic or strategic considerations. The war with 
Napoleonic France absorbed all available funds. Only in late 1811 
was the Regency in a financial position to mount any assault on 
the insurgents, as a result of the creation of the Comisión de 
Reem plazos.
This body, formed in Cádiz in September 1811, provided a 
means of raising funds for the war. Michael Costeloe has made an 
interesting study of the Com isión, and the following remarks 
about its role are based on his work.1H The Comisión developed
9Heredia, Planes españoles, p. 2.
l(,For details about the Comisión de Reemplazos, see Costeloe, “The Comisión  
de R e e m p la zo s and Costeloe. Response to Revolution, pp. 101-116. Also see 
“La Comisión de Reemplazos representa a la Regencia del Rcyno el estado de 
insurrección en que se hallan algunas provincias de ultram ar; la urgente 
ncccssidad de enérgicas medidas para la pacificación; clase y extensión de 
las que deben adoptarse con este objeto, y males que amenazen a la Nación 
Española, si el gobierno no remite los auxilios que se reclaman”, AGI, I.A. 
5 /20 .
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out of discussions between the Minister of the Navy and the Cádiz 
merchants. It was an essentially private organisation, not directly 
controlled by the governm ent, but permitted to levy taxes as if it 
were a governmental entity. The Cádiz merchants, who were 
perhaps the loudest advocates of m ilitary intervention in the 
Americas, were the principal contributors to Comisión funds. In 
1811, they promised to raise $400,000 for a military expedition to 
the Indies, to be used to pay for uniforms, transport, and other 
necessities. The Comisión also undertook to recruit soldiers. The 
merchants themselves prom ised to come up with a substantial 
portion of the total sum. Any remaining money would be 
generated by a series of special taxes. These included a 1% tax on 
agricultural produce and general m erchandise entering or leaving 
any Spanish port; a 1% tax on all gold imported into Spain; a 2% 
tax on imported silver; and a 3% tax on all other American goods 
brought into Spain. At first the Comisión was stunningly 
successful. Costeloe writes that “within twelve weeks on its 
formation, the Comisión had recruited, equipped and transported 
1,068 men at the cost of 3,197,825 reales [roughly $159,8911”. 1 1 
In 1812 and 1813, twelve more expeditions were organised, two 
of which went to New G ranada.1 2
As time went by, new measures were needed to raise 
money. In 1813 the Comisión was given control over the sale o f 
mercury from the mine at Almadén, and by 1820 had generated 
$1,500,000 from this source. Various old taxes were revived, new
11 Costeloe, "The Comisión de Reemplazos”, p. 228. The commission was thus 
spending some $150 per soldier, much less than the overall average for the 
w ar.
l2Ovcrall, 522 soldiers and officers were sent to Santa Marta, and 1,668 to 
Venezuela, in 1812 and 1813. Considerably more troops were sent further 
south. Sec Heredia. Planes españoles, pp. 79, 94.
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ones were invented, and a tax of one real was levied on tickets to 
the bullfight in Madrid. Forced loans were also extracted, 
primarily from Spain’s merchants. The largest of these forced 
loans was for some $1,200,000, to be repaid over ten months at 
8%. None of these measures proved popular, and some were hard 
to enforce. Moreover, the Comisión earned few friends with the 
snail-like pace with which it paid off its creditors. In the end, the 
Comisión resorted to the standard approach of previous Spanish 
governm ents: deficit financing .13 This method was initially very 
successful. The credit notes issued by the Comisión raised some 
$1,300,()()() between 1817 and 1820. However, such practices 
merely postponed the day of reckoning. When the Comisión was 
effectively abolished in 1826, it left a debt of over $5,500,000.
In 1814, the Comisión began work on raising money for 
what was to become M orillo’s Expeditionary Army. The Comisión, 
which believed the expedition was intended for the Comisión- 
approved destination of Río de la Plata, provided virtually all of 
the funding for the large army of over 12,000 m en and 79 ships. 
The Expeditionary Army and the three other, sm aller expeditions 
sent in 1815 cost over $5,280,000, or about a third of the 
Com isión’s total expenditure from 1811 to 1820. After this climax 
of fund-raising, the Comisión began to experience difficulties in 
raising money. In 1818, however, planning began for the doomed 
expedition to Rio de la Plata, in which the Comisión was to play a 
critical financial role. A further $6,000,000 was rounded up.
Most of this was spent on shipping costs, and very little of it was 
recovered after the liberal revolution of 1820 dism antled the
l3 For general comments on Spain 's financing of the late eighteenth 
century wars, sec Barbicr, “Peninsular Finance and C olonial Trade”.
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planned expedition. Costeloe estimates that from its creation in 
1811 to its effective dissolution in 1820, the Comisión spent over 
$17,529,000. This considerable amount of money was generated 
without the direct intervention of any of Spain’s governments. 
Spain’s financial contribution to the American wars was thus 
funded by an essentially private and independent institu tion .14 
The Com isión, however, did not provide money for troops once 
they had reached their destination. In particular, M orillo’s 
Expeditionary Army received very little money from Spain after 
its arrival in Venezuela in 1815.
Although the Comisión de Reemplazos was providing 
substantial sums for counter-revolutionary forces from 1811, it 
was not until the defeat of Napoleon that Spain could spare 
sufficient troops  to launch a concerted attack on American 
insurgents. Until then, Spain’s military effort focused largely on 
the Peninsula and it was only when Ferdinand returned to the 
throne in 1814 that m ilitary manpower was available for 
expeditions to America. The new government favoured a tw o­
pronged approach to funding this and all subsequent expeditions. 
Money was raised in Spain itself, via the Comisión de Reemplazos, 
and Spain’s overseas colonies were also expected to contribute to 
the costs o f the war.15 This approach was only moderately 
successful in New Granada. Although some of the other colonies 
did contribute substantial amounts of money, by 1813 most were 
themselves so hard-pressed that they were unable to make a
14T1u s  was not the first time that important governmental policy had been 
effected by a private agency. The Caja de Consolidación de Vales Reales, 
whose actions played an im portant role in the outbreak of revolution in 
Mexico, was "generally an independent agency” . Sec Barbier, "P eninsu lar 
Finance and Colonial Trade," p. 22.
15Sec, for example, Report by Hacienda de España y Ultramar, 1820, AGI, 
Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
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significant contribution to defeating the insurgency in New 
G ra n a d a .16
Nonetheless, in 1815 M orillo’s Expeditionary Army left 
Spain w ell-supplied and well-funded. The expedition departed 
from Cádiz in February 1815 equipped with thousands of guns, 
uniforms, pesos and other necessities. Much of this money and 
equipment was, however, lost before the army even arrived in 
Caracas. On 24 April 1815 a fire of suspicious origins broke out at 
sea on board the San Pedro de Alcántara. The vessel, one of the 
principal transport ships, was completely destroyed, and with it 
over $ 1,000,()()(), thousands of guns, uniforms, and much m ore.17 
This loss was a terrible blow to the army, and caused an 
immediate and serious shortage of food .18 Despite this setback, on
16 See Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816,
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 223-234. See also Francisco 
Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes 
de Nueva Granada; Relación de mando del Virrey Don Francisco Montalvo y 
noticias del Virrey Sámano sobre la pérdida del reino, (1813-1819), Eduardo 
Posada and P.M. Ibáñez (editors). Biblioteca de la Juventud Hispano­
americano, Editorial América (Madrid, n.d.) p. 18.
l7 Rafael Sevilla, Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas 
contra Bolívar y los separatistas de América, Editorial América (M adrid, 
1916), p. 44; and Pablo Morillo to José de Abascal, Torrecillas, 21 October 
1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 4. Jorge Mercado disagrees with Sevilla's 
figures, and estimates that at most $250,000 and some 1,000 weapons were 
destroyed. See Jorge Mercado, Campaña de invasión del Teniente General 
Don Pablo Morillo, IRIS-IHIfi, Ejército de Colombia, Estado Mayor General 
(Bogotá, 1919), p. 82. See Historia de la rebelión de América en 35 cartas, by 
Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 31 December 1815, letter 33, AGI, Diversos, legajo 
42, for report that the fire was the result o f an accident with a cask of 
a g u a rd ie n te .
18 It also led to a highly unsatisfactory encounter with the Jamaican firm of 
Bogles and Company. After the loss of the San Pedro de Alcántara Morillo 
sent envoys to the Caribbean to purchase food for the army. Bogles and Co. 
contracted to supply 352,707 pounds of salt cod. The codfish arrived on 21 
August 1815 in Venezuela, where it immediately aroused suspicions about 
its freshness. The port authorities embargoed the fish and set about 
locating "experts” who could attest to the fish 's unsuitability. Appropriate 
experts were not found until 10 September, by which tim e most o f the fish 
was "enteramente perdido”. Periodic checks were made until 6 December 
1815, when it was decided that none of the fish was edible, and the entire 
shipment was thrown into the sea. The army then refused to pay Bogles 
and Co, who responded by petitioning the Council of the Indies. The matter
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its arrival in Venezuela the army still retained enough equipm ent 
to impress the inhabitants. The Regent o f the Caracas Audiencia 
commented that M orillo’s troops were “ equipados com pletem ente 
y con magnificencia nunca vista en nuestros ejércitos” .19
Ferdinand’s government encouraged its colonies to 
contribute to the overseas war effort because it was itself poised 
on the edge of bankruptcy throughout the years of the war. The 
situation in 1817 was summed up by the Junta de Pacificación, 
which reported that Spain “had no m oney, no navy, no useful 
treaties with influential powers, no credit, and no concerted plan 
for defeating the rebels” .20 Ferdinand himself was resistant to 
these facts, and consistently maintained that there was enough 
money to fund further expeditions. His insistence that the w ar 
could be won without money, friends or policies puzzled the 
French ambassador to Spain, who rem arked in 1818:
1 never cease to be surprised at the calm with which they 
view the future here and the confidence which they have in 
their armies. On the basis of these, they isolate themselves, 
scorn the advice of friends, and clash with those whose 
friendship they ought to be seeking to preserve. And what 
resources do they count on to sustain such arrogant 
language and confront events? They have a cabinet lacking 
in unity where each member is daily  exposed to the risk of 
being sacked; an army callous and extremely discontented; a 
navy that cannot put to sea, despite the acquisition of the 
new fleet, because the stores are em pty, their arsenals
dragged on for some years without any evident resolution. See Report by 
Council of the Indies, 28 May 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549. 
|l ,Hcrcdia, Planes españoles, p. 299 
20Costcloe, Response to Revolution, p. 73.
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without work, their sailors without rations and their ports 
unprotected. Added to this, the treasury is com pletely
e m p ty .2 1
Spain’s inability to cover the costs o f its overseas campaigns 
inevitably caused great reliance on local sources of funding. This 
in turn provoked serious conflicts between the m ilitary and locals 
in New Granada itself, as we saw in Chapter 7. Here we will focus 
on the effects of this policy on the royalist army itself. Often 
unable to pay for basic necessities, the condition of M orillo’s proud 
army would deteriorate to such an extent that, in the later years 
of the war, officers would complain that their men were marching 
naked, and its com m ander-in-chief would describe him self as 
being rich “ sólo en m iserias, trabajos y peligros” .2 2
Funds from New ( ¡ranada
Prior to his departure from Spain, General Morillo was 
issued with secret instructions from the king which detailed the 
approved conduct for the war.23 These Instructions granted 
M orillo sweeping powers to appropriate money, but provided 
little guidance on how these powers were to be employed. Morillo 
was first of all empowered to confiscate funds from the royal 
monopolies in order to cover “urgencias de la guerra” . Although 
he was urged to take only what was strictly necessary, leaving the 
remainder for the civil governm ent, no prescribed lim it was set on 
the amount that could be diverted to the army.
2 lCosteloe, Response to Revolution, p. 85.
22Pablo Morillo to Miguel dc la Torre. Guanaparo, (1819?), AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8717, docs. 205-206.
23Instrucciones dadas a M orillo para su expedición a Costafirme, Madrid, 18 
November 1814, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, voi. 2, pp. 457-448. The 
Instructions may also be found in AGI, Estado, legajo 64, doc. 18.
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Military expenses in New Granada, and particularly in 
Cartagena, had always been high. One treasury official estimated 
that before 1X10 military salaries in Cartagena alone had cost the 
local treasury $454,000, roughly half its total expenses.24 Military 
salaries and gastos del ejército in fact never reached this level 
after 1X16. Annual m ilitary expenses in Cartagena varied instead 
between about $160,000 and $3X0,000, although other related 
expenses, such as hospital costs, did rise from their pre-war 
le v e l.25 The great difference from the pre-war years was, 
however, that the v iceroyalty’s income had fallen catastrophically. 
As Viceroy M ontalvo commented, “ la real hacienda ha quedado 
destruida; las fuentes de donde sacaba su ser y sus incrementos o 
están exhaustas, o tan arruinadas que apenas rinden la décima 
parte de su producto” .26 This left the treasury even less able to 
cover military expenses than it had been before the outbreak of 
w ar.
The right to appropriate unlimited treasury funds for war 
expenses granted to M orillo in his Instructions distressed civilian 
officials. Viceroy Montalvo, for example, complained regularly to 
the crown about the free hand with which Morillo helped himself 
to treasury m onies.27 More explosive, however, was the power 
granted to Morillo to “exigir empréstitos, |y) buscar fondos.
24List of estimated expenses from before the war, Cartagena, n.d., AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 715.
2 5Sec Sumario dc los valores dc los ramos dc cargo y data de las reales cajas 
dc Cartagena dc Indias, Cartagena, 31 December 1816; Report from cajas 
reales dc Cartagena, Cartagena, 31 Decembcr(?) 1817; Sumario dc cargo y 
data dc las cajas reales dc Cartagena, Cartagena, 31 December 1818; and 
estado dc todos los ramos que ingresan y egresan en estas reales cajas, 
Cartagena, 31 December 1819; all in AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 715
26Prancisco Montalvo to M inister o f  Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 
September 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
27Sec for example Report by Council of the Indies on various letters of 
Montalvo, 30 November 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 549.
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víveres y efectos para pagar las tropas de Su Magestad. y 
empleados, además de hacer frente a todos los gastos” . This 
power to extract forced loans, which the army employed to the 
full during its years in New Granada, alienated most of the 
v iceroyalty’s population and created great hostility.
The imposition of a “contribution” or forced loan, a technique 
often previously used in wartime, became a standard way of 
raising revenue following M orillo’s arrival. The military 
authorities would determine the am ount of money needed to keep 
the army afloat, and then would sim ply demand that the sum be 
raised. Specific individuals might be designated to provide 
particular quantities of money, or a tow n’s governing body, such 
as its cabildo, might be required to find contributors. Timothy 
Anna claims that in Mexico forced d irect contributions were 
simply a form of income tax, but in the Viceroyalty of New 
Granada the procedure for assigning contributions was 
considerably less form al.28 The Captain General of Venezuela,
Juan Manuel de Cajigal, provided a lively description of the 
process at work. Explaining how M orillo and Pascual Enrile raised 
$1 ()(),()()() in Caracas, he reported M orillo in conversation with 
Enrile:
“Fulano, seis mil pesos; zutano, cuatro mil; tal, ocho; 
cual, cinco, etc. Sume V.: ya está ochenta y cinco mil pesos.” 
“No, es necesario cien mil; añádase fulano, tres; a 
zutano, dos, etc. Ya está com pleta la suma, enhorabuena. . . 
Señor, al Prior del Consulado que inmediatamente venga 
aquí. . . Ahí viene el Prior del Consulado; mi amigo: muy
28Timothy Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City,
University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), p. 155.
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bien; vea V. esta lista y lo que asigno a cada sujeto; al 
momento que entreguen las cantidades.”
“Señor, eso no está arreglado, hay quien puede dar 
más, y algunos que nada tienen.”
“Pues bien, V. arréglelo a su arbitrio; el asunto es que 
vengan los cien mil pesos.”29
Both republicans and royalists resorted to forced contributions 
throughout the war. For example, following the capture of Pasto 
in 1822, Bolivar extracted a loan of $30,000 from suspected 
royalist leaders in the city.30 This sum, although large, was 
dwarfed by the contribution imposed on Cartagena after its 
recapture in December 1815, when Morillo forced the city to pay a 
total of $630,000 to the arm y.31 On this occasion the amount was 
divided between various known or suspected republicans, who 
were forced to supply cash payments. Maria Amador y Pombo, 
the wife of José Ignacio de Pombo (a member of Cartagena’s
29Quoted in German Carrera Damas, Boves, aspectos socio-económicos. 
Colección Vigilia (Caracas, 1968), pp. 58-59. I have altered the punctuation 
so m e w h at.
3(,Eduardo Pérez, Guerra irregular en la independencia de la Nueva Granada 
y Venezuela, 1810-1830, Publicaciones de la Universidad Pedagógica y 
Technológica de Colombia, (Tunja, 1982) p. 336.
3 'Report by Council of the Indies, 30 November 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 549. Further forced loans were imposed in January 1816. 
Goods confiscated from insurgents were used to secure the loans. See Pablo 
Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena. 22 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 707. An additional contribution o f $16,000 was imposed on the 
province of Cartagena in June 1816, in order to provide a steady supply of 
meat for the army. The sum o f money was divided between the various 
towns in the province. Sec C irculares de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 25 
June 1816 and 29 July 1816; both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
For other examples of forced loans imposed by royalists, see Julián 
Bayer to Pascual Enrile, Citaré, 1 July 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 897 
(for a donativo  imposed on the Chocó); Matías Escuté to Miguel dc la Torre, 
Socorro. 19 March 1816 and 25 March 1816; both in AHNM, Estado, legajo 
8739, docs, 151, 155 (for contributions of $10,000 were levied on 
Bucaramanga, Girón and Pie de Cuesta); and Germán Colmenares, “Castas, 
patrones dc pohlainicnto y conflictos sociales en las provincias del Cauca, 
1810-1830,” La independencia: ensayos de historia social, Germán 
Colmenares ct al.. Instituto Colombiano dc Cultura (Bogotá, 1986), p. 142 (for 
contributions on Socorro and C ali).
268
insurgent junta), for example, was assigned to pay $1,000.32 On 
other occasions the army demanded goods or services, rather than 
cash.
The primary sources of funding for the Expeditionary Army, 
once it had reached the colonies, were forced contributions and 
simple confiscations. This was necessary because neither Spain 
itself, nor the viceregal treasury in New Granada was able to 
provide enough money for the army. In Santa Fe, confiscations 
were carried out via the Junta de Purificación and the Junta de 
Secuestros. Morillo explained their operating procedure to the 
minister of war in November 1816: “No era dable hacer frente a 
los gastos [del ejército] con las rentas de un Estado dislocado y sin 
comercio, por cuya razón era preciso recurrir a un sistema 
económico uniforme y decidirse a un expediente para cubrir el 
gasto.” Morillo had therefore organised special committees, whose 
task was to determine the amount of money individuals should 
contribute to the army, and to oversee the confiscation of goods 
from convicted insurgents. With the funds thus generated, he had 
equipped the troops, purchased supplies and built army 
b a rra c k s .33
As Morillo stated, the possessions o f suspected republicans 
were routinely embargoed by the royalist army. In June 1816, 
for example, Rafael Sevilla, a young royalist officer stationed in 
Santa Fe, was sent to locate the savings of the Rubias family. The 
family was known to support the insurgents, which was regarded 
as sufficient reason to confiscate their belongings. Sevilla
' 2 Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 12 December IS 17,
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 708.
''P a b lo  Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816, Rodriguez 
Villa, rabio Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 223-234.
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discovered some $7,000 and a large quantity o f weapons, all of 
which were appropriated by the royalist arm y.34 Similarly, after 
their arrival in the capital, Morillo and Pascual Enrile, the 
com m ander-in-chief of the navy, confiscated the belongings o f the 
Lastra family, supporters of the insurgent Congress. The jew els 
and silver seized were allegedly worth over $1,800,000, an 
enorm ous sum .35
Confiscations and forced contributions were not imposed 
solely on the rich. All sectors of society were subject to 
involuntary donations to the royalist army. These extractions of 
money and goods were one of the chief sources of dissatisfaction 
with the royal army, and in particular the Third Division, 
stationed in southern New Granada. The heavy demands placed 
on the inhabitants of the Cauca Valley prompted many cabildos 
and private citizens to com plain to the civilian authorities, as we 
saw in Chapter 7. These com plaints reveal that the Expeditionary 
Army relied almost entirely on the public to provide for its needs. 
The town of Cartago, for example, was asked to provide a regular 
income of $600 per month for troops stationed nearby.36 The city 
of Popayan was obliged to cover all the costs of the local garrison, 
including the unitemised ‘expenses’ of the garrison’s 
c o m m a n d er.37 Buga likewise was expected to cover the expenses
34Sevilla, Memorias, p. 98ff.
35José María Caballero, Diario, Biblioteca de Bogotá Editorial Villegas 
(Bogotá, 1990) pp. 222-223.
36Scc Request enclosed in José Solis to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 
June 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
3 7 Sec List o f monthly expenses o f  the troops in Popayán enclosed in José 
Solis to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 June 1817; and Daily expenses of 
troops in Popayán enclosed in Vicente Romero to José Solis, Anscrma, 22 
May 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
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of Colonel Francisco W arleta’s troops.38 Even small towns like 
Toro were assigned regular contributions to the arm y.39 The 
army furthermore relied on locals to transport equipm ent and the 
in ju red .40
These demands incensed local cabildos, which urged that 
some other source of funding be found. For example, in May 1817 
the cabildo of Popayân appealed to Viceroy Montalvo to end the 
large amounts of money being extracted from its citizenry through 
forced contributions. The city had already suffered a forced 
contribution of $500,000, a substantial figure by any measure.
The inhabitants of Popayân, like the inhabitants of other towns 
occupied by royalist troops, were particularly distressed by the 
completely arbitrary nature of these contributions, which were 
imposed at entirely unregulated intervals. The cabildo wanted 
rules to be drawn up to regularise the whole procedure.41 These 
complaints were supported by Viceroy Montalvo, who forwarded 
them to Spain. There the matter was reviewed by Ferdinand’s 
government, and both M orillo and Pascual Enrile were roundly 
condemned for condoning such arbitrary behaviour. The Council 
of the Indies further asserted that, as viceroy, Francisco
18Sce Acta of the Cabildo of Buga, Buga, II December 1816; Cabildo of Buga 
to Francisco Montalvo, Buga, 30 March 1817; Cabildo of Buga to José Solis, 
Buga, 30 June 1817; all in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
39Cabildo dc Toro to José Solis, Toro, 27 June 1817; and Tomás de Hcrcs to 
Ruperto Delgado, Cali, 20 May 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, 
legajo 631. See also Cabildo dc Anscrma to José Solis(V), Anserma, 7 July 
1817; Cabildo dc Anscrma to Francisco Montalvo, Anscmia, 27 June 1817; and 
Ruperto Delgado to José Solis, Popayán, 14 July 1817; all in AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fe, legajo 631.
40See, for example, Cabildo o f  Anserma to Francisco Montalvo, Anscrma, 27 
June 1817, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631.
4 'See Cabildo of Popayán to José Solis and Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 3 
May 1817; Dictamen of Anselmo de Bicrna y Ma/.o, Cartagena, 29 August 
1817, José Solis to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 June 1817; and also 
Cabildo of Buga to José Solis, Buga, 30 June 1817; all in AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fe, legajo 631.
M ontalvo’s authority was superior to M orillo’s in all m atters 
except the purely m ilitary.42
This ruling, which was completely at variance with the 
position set out in M orillo’s Instructions, was typical of 
Ferdinand’s government. Unable to fund the army itself, and yet 
unwilling openly to sanction abuses in New Granada, the crown 
was caught in a difficult dilemma. This problem was repeated in 
New Granada itself. There too officials were unwilling to grasp the 
nettle of m ilitary funding. In response to the complaints from 
Popayân’s Governor José Solis about military excesses in the south, 
the Auditor de Guerra Anselmo de Bierna y Mazo decreed that the 
army should be paid purely from government income. O nly when 
this was impossible should the shortfall be provided by the 
inhabitants of the region where the troops were posted, and even 
then no one should not be forced to pay more than they could 
afford. Instead, the army should reduce its expenses. This, Bierna 
y Mazo suggested naively, could be done by eliminating 
unnecessary jobs and reducing salaries.43 These suggestions did 
nothing to increase the amount of money actually available to the 
troops, and provided no guidance on how the already small 
number of royalist troops should be further reduced.
Bierna y M azo’s ideas did not find a sympathetic audience 
within the royalist army. General Morillo himself initially 
advocated a fairly cavalier approach to funding the army. In June
1816, for example, he had ordered the Captain General of
42Couneil of the Indies to Pablo Morillo, Madrid, 13 January 1818; and 
Council of the Indies to Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 13 January 1818; both in 
AGI, Audicncia dc Santa Fe, legajo 549.
41Dictamcn dc Ansclmo dc Bierna y Mazo, Cartagena, 29 August 1817, AGI, 
Audicncia dc Santa Fc, legajo 631; also Francisco Montalvo to G abriel dc 
Torres, Cartagena. 6 September 1817, AGI, Papclcs dc Cuba, legajo 708.
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Venezuela to begin collecting supplies in Caracas “sin 
consideración con persona alguna” .44 When individual officers 
hesitated to seize private belongings and savings, they merely 
turned their attention to local governmental bodies, particularly 
cabildos, and to governm ent revenues.45 In June 1817, for 
example, Ruperto Delgado, the commander of Third Battalion of 
the Numancia Regiment, seized over $7,000 paid in alcabalas in 
Buenaventura. This sum, on route to be deposited in the Cajas 
Reales in Cartagena, was confiscated by Delgado with the evident 
intention of using the money for military expenses.46 Such 
behaviour was not new, of course. Already in 1814, royalist 
officers in Venezuela had pillaged the funds of the tobacco 
monopoly in order to meet their needs.47 M orillo’s Instructions 
m oreover permitted him to appropriate funds from the viceregal 
treasury for the arm y’s use. This privilege, although spelled out 
in black and white in the Instructions, was generally resisted by
44Pahlo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, Santa Fe, 24 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia 
de Caracas, legajo 386. Also sec Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, 
Cartagena. 22 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707; Pablo Morillo 
to Miguel de la Torre, Mompós, 29 February 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, 
doc. 42; Pablo Morillo to Sebastián de la Calzada, Mompós, 29 February 1816, 
Rodríguez Villa, rabio Morillo, vol. 3. pp. 30-32; and Pablo Morillo to 
Minister o f War. Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, 
vol. 3, pp. 175-188.
45Sec, for example. Diary of Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería 
de Numancia, March 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; and Ruperto 
Delgado to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 20 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, 
legajo 631.
46José Solis to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 631. Similarly, Montalvo complained that in 1816 Morillo 
had emptied the treasuries in Cartagena and Santa Fe, and had reallocated 
the income from the rentas estancadas “sin atención a las leyes” (Report by 
Council o f the Indies, .30 November 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 
549); and in 1820 officers in Cartagena took to helping themselves to 
whatever money was available in the Cajas Reales (Report from Cajas 
Reales, Cartagena, January 1820(7), AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 749).
47Scc Carrera Damas, Hoves, pp. 118-123.
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civilian authorities, who felt the treasury was already contributing 
more than enough to the army.
§ 2 .  The Effect of  Chronic  Underfunding
Minimal state backing and a haphazard system of 
confiscation and forced loans was not a stable base on which to 
finance an army. This is evident from an examination of the 
salaries paid to royalist troops. Soldiers fighting for the crown 
were supposed to receive a basic annual salary of about $100.48 
On top of this soldiers could, in theory, earn additional bonuses for 
exceptional feats of m ilitary prowess, and those joining M orillo’s 
expedition in 1814 were to be paid an extra amount as an 
inducem ent to enlist.49 The reality of the situation was quite 
different. For months, sometimes years on end, troops were paid 
nothing at all, or only a fraction of the full amount owed.50 (Such 
a situation was certainly not unknown in Spain itself.51)
4XSee Noticia de los sueldos que disfrutan en esta plaza las tropas de la 
guarnición, Cartagena, 26 August 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715; and 
List of daily expenses of troops in Popayán, enclosed in Vicente Romero to 
José Solis, Anserma, 22 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe. legajo 631. 
49Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 114, 245.
50 See various soldiers' wills in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B. Some 
individuals had not been paid for 8 years. See also Pablo Morillo to 
Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 22 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 707; Francisco Montalvo to  Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 6 August 
1817, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 708; Francisco Igrica to Minister of War, 6 
June 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 35E; José María Barreiro to Juan 
Sámano, Sogamoso, 23 March 1819, AGI. Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747 (also in 
Los ejércitos del Rey, 1819, vol. 2, Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la 
Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1989), pp. 31-33); Francisco Gascón,
Juan Otalora and others to Manuel Cordero, Cartagena, 23 November 1819; 
and Antonio Cano to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 22 September 1819, both in 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747; Pablo Morillo to Minister o f Overseas, 
Valencia, 26 July 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568; Gabriel dc 
Torres to Minister of Hacienda, Cartagena, 18 August 1820, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
51 Karl Marx described the normal state of the Spanish army as being “no 
pay, no food, no clothing". Sec Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Revolution  
in Spain, Greenwood Press (W estport, 1975), p. 159; Lino(?) to Simón 
Bolívar, Philadelphia, 16 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 109;
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Occasional efforts were made to overcome the arm y’s complete 
inability to pay troops’ wages, by, for example, declaring that a 
ration of food counted as a half-real. Thus in the course of a year 
soldiers would autom atically be credited about $27 tow ards their 
salary, regardless of whether they received any cash o r not.* 52 
(This is assuming that they received their rations regularly, which 
was not always the case.) Moreover, officers frequently 
complained that their troops were obliged to march without 
adequate clothing or even “desnudos” .53 In one unit in 1816, for 
example, there were only 32 pairs of shoes to be shared between 
over 300 recruits.54
The royal navy, stationed in Cartagena, seems to  have 
suffered particularly from shortages of money. M orillo noted in 
1816 that the navy was supposedly supplied directly from  Spain, 
rather than locally, “que es lo propio que destinarla a carecer de 
todo” .55 The navy, which was certainly not supplied from  Spain, 
appears moreover to have been less successful than the army in 
compelling civilians to provide food and money.56 The situation
and Josep Fontana, La quiebra de la monarquía absoluta, 1814-1820, Editorial 
Ariel, (Barcelona. 1987) p. 350.
52Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los 
últimos virreyes, p. 104.
53Scc, for example. Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 
1816, in Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 223-234; Sim ón Sicilia to 
José Solis, Popayán, 16 July 1817. AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and 
José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 3 July 1819 and 7 July 1819, in 
Los ejércitos del Re, vol. 2, pp. 216-217, 238-242, respectively; and Andrés 
Delgado to Juan Sámano, Maganguc, 23 April 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 747.
54Relación de la prendas que se hallan, Mompós, 26 November 1816, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712.
55Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, Rodriguez 
Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 195-207.
56 In February 1820, for example, the commander of the navy in Cartagena 
complained that, contrary to orders, the townspeople were no t bringing 
the sailors their breakfasts until 11.00am. He blamed this on “ la morosidad 
o acaso m ala intención contra la marina por la repugnancia con que este 
pueblo la lian mirado y miran" (Manuel Cordero to Juan Sám ano, Cartagena,
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grew so bad tha t an appeal was made to Spain, and Ferdinand 
himself intervened to order Viceroy Montalvo to provide more 
money. The king commented that there was no point having a 
navy if it had no funds, a sentiment with which virtually every 
officer stationed in New Granada agreed.57 Ferdinand did nothing, 
however, to increase the amount of money actually available to  
Montalvo for use by the navy.
Shortages of money were of course not confined to Spain’s 
armed forces. Paying salaries to officials in New Granada’s civil 
administration also proved difficult. Many restrictions were 
made. Governm ent employees in Cartagena were not paid a 
regular salary a t all during 1816. Instead they were supported 
by the local population, which was obliged to provide them with 
fo o d .58 Even the highest officials were obliged to accept sm aller 
salaries during the early years of the war. Francisco Montalvo, 
during his tenure as Captain General, and later Viceroy, was paid 
$14,000 annually. Previous viceroys had earned as much as 
$40,000 per year, and even Juan Samano, who succeeded 
Montalvo in the post, was paid $25,000. The reduction in 
M ontalvo’s salary  was motivated by the tight financial situation in 
Spain itself. W hen M ontalvo’s constant requests for a 
retrospective salary  increase were finally  approved in 1820,
I February 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747). See also Francisco 
Montalvo to G abriel de Torres, Cartagena, 28 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 707; Pablo Morillo to Minister o f War, Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, 
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 195-207; Various letters of Manuel 
Cordero to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 1819-1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
747; Complaints against Manuel Cordero, Cartagena, 9 June 1821, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 719B;and Heredia, Planes españoles, pp. 253-255, for 
arguments in F ernando ’s government about funding the navy; .
57Report to M inister of Hacienda, Palace, 12 December 1817, AGI, Audiencia 
de Santa Fe, legajo 580.
58Scc Francisco M ontalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 2 
August 1816, AGI. Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
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officials in Cartagena were unable to find any funds to pay him 
w ith .59
The effect of this overall shortage was to increase 
competition for funds, and to aggravate conflicts between the 
military and civilian wings of government. Morillo, for his part, 
blamed civilian officials for failing to put the army first. Viceroy 
Montalvo, he complained, was more willing to pay the salaries of 
civilians than to “vestir a la única tropa que lo había de sacar de 
riesgo y por la cual mandaba aquel corto cantón” .60 He was 
equally critical of V enezuela’s Captain General Salvador Moxó, 
whom he accused of gross negligence in failing to provide the 
army with food and supplies.61 Nonetheless, for all his 
differences with M orillo, Viceroy Montalvo consistently supported 
M orillo’s claims that the army needed more money. He merely 
thought funds should come from Spain, rather than New Granada. 
Montalvo opposed the requisitioning of food and supplies, and 
urged the government in Spain to provide a regular source of 
money to avoid the “violencias irrem ediables” invariably 
accom panying confiscations.62
59Scc docum ents related to M ontalvo’s request for a salary increase, 1815- 
1820, particularly Gabriel dc Torres to Minister o f Hacienda, Cartagena, 18 
August 1820; in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 580. This latter document 
is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
60Pablo Morillo to Minister o f  War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816, Rodriguez 
Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 223-234. Sec also Report by Council o f the 
Indies, 30 November 1817, AGI. Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 549; and also 
Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los 
últimos virreyes, p. 153.
6 'Sec Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, Chaparro, 27 May 1817, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Caracas, legajo 386. See also other letters of Pablo Morillo to 
Salvador de Moxó, 1817, in AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, legajos 110, and 386; 
Pablo Morillo to Duke of San Carlos, Caracas, 16 November 1818, AGS. Estado, 
legajo 8223; Rodriguez Villa. Pablo Morillo (1920), vol. 1, p. 303; and Pablo 
Morillo to Salvador dc Moxó, el campo del paso del Frío, en el Río Apure, 2 
February 1817, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, p. 265.
62 See Francisco Montalvo to Minister o f Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 2 
August 1816, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Francisco Montalvo
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It rapidly became clear to General M orillo that the 
Expeditionary Army was inadequately funded. Indeed, by 
January 1816, the arm y’s poverty had, in M orillo’s view, “ llegado 
a un caso extremo”.63 From then on, he became increasingly 
bitter about the shortages his troops were forced to endure.
Morillo summed up the situation in November 1819: “el 
numerario es socorro olvidado por nosotros todos” .64 His claim 
was supported by the republicans, who, after the capture of Santa 
Fe, gained access to royalist documents. Santander was shocked to 
learn of the financial hardships which had confronted M orillo, and 
commented that, according to the royalists’ own documents, “la 
tercera division no se pagaba”.65 Nor was M orillo alone in 
bemoaning the arm y’s poverty. Virtually every officer 
complained about shortages of essentials.66 These complaints 
served two purposes. First, and most im portantly, they were 
genuine appeals for aid; second, they were insurance against later 
reproof. If an officer could demonstrate that he had asked for 
help, he was less likely to be accused of incom petence should he
to José de Abascal, Torrecilla, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos 4. M ontalvo’s 
successor, Juan Sámano, was similarly unhappy with the arm y’s lack of 
money; sec Juan Sámano to  Joaquín de la Pczucla, Cartagena, 5 March 1820, 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709.
63Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo. Cartagena, 22 January 1816, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707. For complaints about M ontalvo’s failure to 
supply the army, sec Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 17 
September 1816, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 218-223.
64Pablo Morillo to Gabriel de Torres, Barquisimcto, 20 November 1819, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709. Sec also Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, 
Barquisimcto, 31 October 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. 
^ F ran c isc o  de Paula Santander to Simón Bolivar, Santa Fe, 7 January 1820, 
Carlas Santander-BoKvar, vol. 1, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República 
(Bogotá, 1988) pp. 263-265.
66Resumen histórico de las operaciones u movimientos que ha hecho la 
Iropa de fia Tercera División], 21 December 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 759A; José María Barrciro to Juan Sámano, Sogamoso, 23 March 1819, 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747; and Francisco W arleta to Pablo Morillo, 
Ruinas de Remedios, 17 March 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, 
pp. 34-35.
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suffer a defeat. Thus, on 20 December 1816 Lieutenant Colonel 
José M aría Herrera asserted that if he did not get the extra 25 
riflem en he had requested, he would regard him self as “releva[do 
de| toda responsabilidad, si como era de creer, le atacaban, y no se 
hallaba con el resfuerzo pedido” .67
The effect of this chronic failure to pay and equip the troops 
was both predictable and disabling for the army. Desertion, 
always a problem, grew worse when the troops were not paid on 
time. By 1820 the navy in Cartagena was owed over a year’s back 
pay. “ Es consecuente una deserción extraordinaria,” rem arked its 
c o m m a n d e r .68 Moreover, when there was no prospect of ever 
being paid, desertion became even more tempting. The royalist 
officers were well aware of this problem. They regularly begged 
the governm ent to send more m oney, and threatened civilian 
officials that entire regiments would desert if money were not 
fo rth c o m in g .69
The third division’s reliance on confiscation as a chief source 
of income was, furthermore, a direct consequence of the Spanish 
governm ent’s failure to provide regular salaries to the troops. The 
continual requisitioning of food, money and goods was highly 
unpopular, and deeply detrimental to the royalist arm y’s
67Resumen histórico de las operaciones u movimientos que ha hecho la 
tropa de (la Tercera División], 20 December 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 759A.
68Scc Manuel Cordero to Juan Sántano, Cartagena. 1 February 1820, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747. Sec also Miguel de Bustillo y Colina to Cortes, 
Kingston, 12 March 1813, printed in Gabriel Jiménez Molinarcs, Los 
mártires de Cartagena de 1816 ante el consejo de guerra y ante la historia, 
Edición Oficial (Cartagena, 1948), vol. 1, pp. 312-319, esp. p. 316.
69Sec Simón Sicilia to José Soils, Popayán, 16 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 631; Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fc, 31 August 
1816, Rodrigue/. Villa, rabio Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 195-207; José María Barrciro 
to Juan Sámano, Sogamoso, 23 March 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747 
(this docum ent may also be found in Los ejércitos del Rey, pp. 31-33.); and, 
for remarks about the troops in Spain, sec Lino (dc Pombo?) to Simón 
Bolívar, Philadelphia, 16 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, legajo 109.
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popularity. Many observers commented on the link between 
military extractions and revived support for the insurgency. 
Governor José Solis predicted that peace would never be restored 
in the northern Cauca Valley unless the army reduced its 
ex p en ses .70 Quito’s President Montes sim ilarly attributed the 
resurgence of republicanism in the Llanos, the Chocó, and the 
Socorro region on the excessive fines imposed by the Junta de 
Purificación and the Junta de Secuestros.71 These views received 
support from the highest level of civilian officials in New Granada. 
Viceroy Montalvo him self stated that the uncontrolled financial 
demands of junior officers were directly responsible for the 
continued unrest in the south.72
It is difficult to decide whether the war would have 
developed any differently if the royalist army had received more 
money at certain critical times, but this difficulty should not 
obscure the demonstrable fact that the army did not receive 
reinforcements at crucial moments. The catastrophic defeat of 
José María Barreiro’s forces at the battle of Boyacá is perhaps the 
most notable example. General Morillo regarded the loss of Santa 
Fe as a sad vindication o f his earlier pleas for reinforcements and 
funding. Shortly after the defeat he reminded the M inistry of 
War that, as early as April 1816 he had warned them what would 
happen if he did not receive more troops and more money, and
7llJosé Solis to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 20 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 631.
7 'Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia 
de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
72Sec Order by Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 18 August 1817, and 
Francisco Montalvo to M inister o f Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 
September 1817; and Francisco Montalvo to M inister o f Grace and Justice, 
Cartagena. 2 August 1816; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
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that he had been entirely correct.73 Perhaps even more important 
than these particular incidents was Spain’s long-term failure to 
provide for its army. By 1820 Morillo’s army was in a hopeless 
state. It is most unlikely that the royalists would have been able 
to defeat the republicans in 1821, even if  huge reinforcem ents 
had been sent. If, however, the army had been adequately 
funded in 1816 and 1817, the war might have developed quite 
d iffe re n tly .
We will now, in the final chapter o f this section, examine a 
further factor impeding royalist success. This was the health of 
the Expeditionary Army.
7 ,Pablo Morillo to Ministcr of War, Valencia, 12 Scptcmber 1819, Rodríguez 
Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 49-55.
Chapter 9: Health and Disease in the Army
Continual shortages of money, and the consequent 
harassment of New Granada’s population, proved to be substantial 
obstacles to royalist success in New Granada. There were, 
however, others. We will here examine a further impediment: 
disease. This factor is rarely granted sufficient importance, yet 
was a major hindrance to royalist plans. The Expeditionary Army 
suffered terrible losses to disease, and the resultant decline in 
troop strength was a constant limitation on Morillo’s actions. This 
chapter will consider, first, the effect of disease on M orillo’s forces. 
We will then survey briefly the available forms of healthcare in 
New Granada, and the efforts of royalist officers to counter the 
ravages of smallpox and other infirmities on their troops.
8 1. D isease and Mortal ity
Prior to the twentieth century, European soldiers were much 
more likely to die of disease than to fall in battle. This was the 
case whether the troops fought in Europe itself, or elsewhere, such 
as in the Am ericas.1 Certainly the losses suffered by British troops 
fighting in the Caribbean are well known; Michael Duffy, for 
exam ple, notes that during Britain’s fight against Revolutionary 
France, nearly 67% of the British soldiers stationed in Santo 
Domingo died of disease.2 Spanish troops fighting in the
1 See John Keegan. A History of Warfare, Hutchinson (London, 1993), p. 361.
2Scc Michael Duffy. Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower: The British Expedition to 
the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France, Oxford 
University Press (1987), Chapter 14 (pp. 326-367); Richard Harding. 
Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century: The British Expedition to 
the West Indies, 1740-1742, The Royal Historical Society (lrthlinghorough,
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Americas, particularly those stationed in coastal regions, also died 
in large numbers from yellow fever and o ther diseases. Indeed, 
during Cuba’s war of independence in the 1890s, five times as 
many Spanish soldiers died from disease than were killed in 
b a tt le .3
Spanish losses to disease during the earlier wars of 
independence on the mainland, while less w ell known, appear also 
to have been substantial. It was ill-health, rather than military 
engagements, that carried off the majority o f General M orillo’s 
army. Already on 5 December 1815, M orillo could report that in 
the six months since the army left Puerto Cabello, out of a total 
force of some 7,000, over 3,000 soldiers had either died or 
d e se r te d .4 As the arm y’s only military engagement during this 
period had been a handful of skirmishes outside Cartagena, it is 
clear that large numbers of soldiers were falling victim to the 
region’s notorious climate. Reports of the terrifying death rate 
from disease in the Spanish camps spread during the siege; in 
March 1816 the Royal Gazette and Bahama Advertiser stated that 
an enormous number of Spanish soldiers had died, not from 
battle-wounds, but from disease. The G a ze t te  blamed “ las 
excesivas lluvias, y . . .  el excesivo calor” .5 O f course, Cartagena,
1991), pp. 3, 83-4, 149; and also Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775- 
1783, Longmans (London, 1964), pp. 6, 336, 526.
3Scc Hugh Thomas, Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom, Eyre and Spottiswoodc 
(London, 1971), p. 414. For details about the role o f  disease in the colonial 
army, sec Juan Marchcna Fernández, Oficiales y soldados en el Ejército de 
America, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Amcricanos, (Sevilla, 1983), pp. 195- 
237, esp. p. 234; and Christon Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1760- 
1810, University of New Mexico Press (Albuquerque, 1977), pp. 38-61, esp. 
55, 61.
4 Antonio Rodriguez Villa El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer 
Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), vol. 1, Editorial 
América (Madrid, 1920), p. 181.
“'Translation from the Royal Gazette and Bahama Advertizer, 27 March 1816, 
AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 32. See also Pablo Morillo to José dc Abascal, 
Torrecillas, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 4, ramo 1.
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with its tropical climate, had long been a grave for soldiers; in 
1764, for example, a full 30% of the c ity ’s garrison were ill.6 
Throughout the war, the Atlantic coast was the region most 
afflicted by disease, and it was there that Spanish troops suffered 
the greatest loss.
The overall effect on M orillo’s army of the loss of so many 
soldiers to  disease was difficult to counteract. The army grew 
progressively smaller despite the efforts of its comm anders. After 
the capture of Cartagena, Morillo complained that the army had 
been reduced to “un numero muy lim itado”, because of “ las 
muchas y penosas enfermedades” suffered by the troops during 
the b lockade.7 In May 1816, M orillo noted that since he left 
Spain he had been unable to recruit enough new soldiers to 
replace those dead from disease; by November 1816, there 
remained only one regiment com posed entirely of Europeans.8
The actual recapture of Cartagena presented the Spanish with an 
additional medical crisis. Thousands o f  people died of starvation-related 
diseases, and of hunger itself, during the siege, and, when the army 
entered the city, they found heaps o f rotting cadavers lying unburied in 
the streets Morillo immediately ordered mass graves to he dug, and efforts
were made to fumigate the city in order to prevent the further spread of 
disease. See José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, 
vol. 2, Ediciones Bcdout (Bogotá. 1969), pp. 65, 81; Rafael Sevilla Memorias de 
un oficial del ejército español, campañas contra Bolívar y los separatistas de 
América, Editorial América, (Madrid, 1916), pp. 69-70; Rodríguez Villa Pablo 
Morillo, (1920), vol. 1, p. 177; and Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 12 
December 1815. AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. The sick and infected 
were, m oreover, prohibited from entering the city. See Bando dc Gabriel dc 
Torres, Cartagena, 28 December 1815, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717. 
6M archcna Fernández, Oficiales y soldados, pp. 210, 213, 214.
7 Pablo M orillo to Francisco dc Montalvo, Cartagena, 5 February 1816, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707. Also see Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, 
Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes de Nueva Granada,
Relación de Mando del Virrey Don Francisco Montalvo y noticias del Virrey 
Sámano sobre la pérdida del Reino (1813-1819), Eduardo Posada and P.M. 
Iháñcz (ed ito rs). Biblioteca de la Juventud H ispano-Am cricana, Editorial 
América. (M adrid, n.d.), pp. 94-95,
8 Pablo M orillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 31 May 1816; and Pablo Morillo 
to M inister o f War, Santa Fc, 9 November 1816, both in Antonio Rodriguez 
Villa, El. Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, 
Marqués de la Puerta (1778-11137), vol. 3, Real Academia dc la Historia, 
(Madrid, 1908), pp. 164-169, 229, respectively.
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The mortality rate from disease continued to grow 
throughout the rem ainder of the war, particularly in the area of 
the Atlantic coast. Already in early 1816 in Mompós, nearly 1 in 
every 7 men in the Second Battalion of Albuera was sick.9 In 
Cartagena during 1818 and 1819, nearly one in ten officers 
appears to have been ill at any given m om ent.10 By 1820, the 
situation was even worse. In Riohacha, officers estimated that 
only one third of the troops were in even “mediana salud” . 
Commanding officer Vicente Sánchez Lima lamented that 
“últimamente la desnudez, el hambre, y el horroroso espectáculo 
de la fiebre forman hoy el triste y melancólico carácter del 
so ld ad o ” . 11 By the start of the republican siege of Cartagena in 
1820, over 300 men from the Regimiento de León were in 
hospital. The total force of the regiment consisted in little over 
500 men, so nearly two-thirds of the regiment were ill. Blame 
again fell on the “estaciones muy calorosos o muy húmedas”.12
The loss of army members to disease and illness had other knock-on 
effects as well. Antonio Cano, the Commander of the Infantry Regiment of 
León, stationed in Cartagena, lamented in January of 1816 that almost all of 
the officers under his command were ill. This was particularly problematic 
as not only these officers, but also all the soldiers who knew how to write 
were also ill. He thus had no one to help him complete the enormous 
amount o f paperwork the army demanded. Sec Antonio Cano to Gabriel dc 
Torres. Cartagena, 5 January 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 711.
9Rcports on the Second Battalion of Albucra, Mompós, 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 738.
10 Sec Vicente Villctc to Subinspector General, Cartagena, 31 December 
1819; and also Report by Ignacio dc La Ruz, Cartagena, 3 February 1819, for 
comments about troop mortality in Santa Marta, both in AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 738.
1 •Vicente Sánchez Lima to Comandantes Militares dc la Hacha, Moreno, 26 
November 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
12First Declaration of Gabriel dc Torres, Havana, 2 November 1824, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 2I36A.
The local diet, regarded as unsuitable for European troops, was 
frequently blamed for causing illness. Sec Francisco Montalvo to Juan 
Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, p. 40.
Illness, however, afflicted troops across New Granada. In 
January 1816, half the troops stationed in Zaragosa were ill, and, 
in late 1817, outbreaks of smallpox struck troops stationed in 
various places. In the Llanos de Casanare, royalist troops were 
being sent to hospital at the rate of about one a day.13 From 
Venezuela, Morillo wrote to the M inister of War that between 
April 1815, when the Expeditionary Arm y had landed on the 
Island of Margarita, and September 1817, the army had lost one 
third of its members to disease. “La sim ple picada de un 
m osquito,” he wrote:
priva a veces de la vida a un hombre o se le origina una 
úlcera que después de tenerlo im pedido mucho tiempo, le 
deja inutilizado. El dormir al sereno en los campamentos, 
acaba de producir una multitud de ciegos en la división del 
Brigadier Canterac. Los alimentos del país causan a los 
europeos enfermedades de toda especie, y hay muy pocos 
que resistan a su fatal influjo. Los inmensos desiertos en 
que se hace la guerra, la falta de auxilio en todo género, las 
aguas encharcadas que por precisión han de beberse en 
muchas ocasiones, y la fatigua extraordinaria del soldado en 
distancias tan considerables por estaciones tan diversas y
13Scc, for example, Vicente Sánchez Lima to  Pedro Ruíz de Porras, Zaragosa, 
8 January 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8745; Antonio Mcléndez to Gabriel de 
Torres, Mompós, 5 April 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; Cabildo de 
Anscrma to Francisco Montalvo, Anscrma, 27 June 1817, AGI, Santa Fe, 
legajo 651; Diary o f the Primer Batallón del Regimiento Infantería de 
Numancia, 15 December 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba legajo 759A; Rodríguez 
Villa, rabio Morillo, (1920), vol. 2, p. 31; and José María Caballero, Diario, 
Biblioteca de Bogotá, Editores Villegas, (Bogotá, 1990), p. 217.
For an “especie de peste" in 1816, sec Francisco Montalvo to Juan 
Sámano. Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, p. 95; and Pablo 
Morillo, Description of the 1816 attack on the interior of New Granada, 
BRAH, sig. 9/7651 (legajo 8). In 1818, many troops in Santa Fe fell ill with 
smallpox, as well; sec José María Barrciro to Juan Sámano. Santa Fc, 2 
August 1818, Los ejércitos del Key, 1818-1819, vol. 1, Alberto Lee López 
(editor). Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1989), p. 39,
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variadas, todo contribuye a nuestra destrucción y a la 
aniquilación de las tropas.14
Various diseases afflicted both the Spanish and insurgent 
troops. The most common seem to have been dysentery, 
smallpox, scurvy, and a variety of tropical illnesses. Yellow fever 
and sexually transmitted diseases were also a problem , the latter 
particularly  among o fficers .15 Soldiers of course also suffered 
from  other types of infirm ity. For example, troops stationed in 
the Llanos in 1817 were struck with some sort of haemorrhaging 
disease (perhaps tuberculosis) that left them spitting b lood.16 
Inj ury also took a terrible toll, as infections were difficult to cure. 
U lcerated wounds of all kinds tormented officers and troops alike.
14 Pablo Morillo to Minister of War. La Guaira. 10 September 1817,
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, p. 442-443. Also see Miguel de La 
Torre to Pablo Morillo, Guayana, 4 May 1817, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8718, docs. 
51-52; and Pablo Morillo to M inister of War, Caño de Atamayca, 28 February
1819, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 10-14.
By 1820, Morillo himself was very ill from scurvy and 
haem orrhoids, as well as from a wound received during the battle o f  La 
Puerta on 16 March 1818. See Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, (1920), vol. 2,
p. 88.
15Sec Pablo Morillo to Minister o f  War, Maracay, 1 April 1817, Rodriguez 
Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, p. 369; Tomás de Heres to Ruperto Delgado, Cali, 20 
May 1817, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 631; Diary of the Primer Batallón del 
Regim iento Infantería de Numancia, 13 November, 15 December 1817, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; L ists o f sick officers in Venezuelan hospitals,
1820, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8728, docs. 379-408; Miguel de La Torre to 
M inister of Overseas, Caracas, 22 March 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, 
legajo 55; Juan de la Cruz Mourgcon to Minister of Overseas, Panama, 28 
August 1821, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 668; and Sevilla Memorias , p. 124.
For comments about republican illnesses, Oscar Bcaujón, "La 
m edicina en la Campaña del Sur,” Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la 
H istoria , Caracas, vol. 57 (1974), csp. p. 718; and Simón Bolívar to Juan 
B autista Arismcndi, Carúparo, 26 June 1816, Escritos del Libertador, vol. 9, 
Sociedad Bolivariana de Venezuela (Caracas, 1973), pp. 285-287.
16 Reports of Carlos Tolrá, Chocontá, November 1817, BRAH, sig. 7665 (leg. 
22), fol.,512. Sec also Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 29 August 
1818, BRAH, sig. 7665 (leg. 22), fols. 607-609; and Cabildo de Anscrma to 
Francisco Montalvo, Anscrma, 27 June 1817, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 631.
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W ounds in the feet, in particular, were notoriously fatal, and 
amputation was often the only viable option.17
Troops and officers also suffered from various mental 
disorders. In early IS 16, for example, Morillo reported that 
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Machado had been sent to Spain, as 
he was suffering from “dem encia” .18 This was evidently not an 
unusual occurrence, as in 1800, and again in 1802, Charles IV had 
issued orders about the treatment of soldiers, and officers who 
suffered mental breakdow n.19 M orillo’s forces were, however, 
generally spared one illness which decimated republican troops. 
Unlike Bolivar’s army, who was led across p á ram o  after p á ra m o  
from Venezuela to Bolivia, royalist troops in New Granada did not 
often fall ill from s o r o c h e , a p u nam ien to ,  or mal de páramo. This 
altitude sickness, which causes nausea, respiratory difficulties, 
lassitude, and, potentially, death, devastated republican troops 
both in 1819 during Bolivar’s crossing of the Colombian Andes, 
and in the 1820s during the campaign in Peru.20
l7 Sce Marchcna Fernández, Oficiales y soldados, pp. 219-220; List of invalids 
in Puerto Cabello, 20 November 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897; 
Francisco W arleta to Pablo Morillo, Remedios, 17 March 1816, BRAH, sig. 
9/7658 (legajo 15), fols. .18-39; Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Santa Fe, 
2.3 June 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717; Diary of the Primer Batallón del 
Regimiento Infantería de Numancia. 15 December 1817, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 759A; Pablo Morillo to Minister o f War, Barquisimeto, 22 July 
1818, Rodriguez Villa, rabio Morillo, vol. 3, p. 598; and Antonio Van Halen to 
Miguel dc la Torre, Caracas, March 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 
55.
l8 Francisco M ontalvo to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena. 21 February 1816, 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707.
19Royal Orders o f 12 July 1800 and 31 May 1802, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo
739.
20Bcaujón, “La medicina en la Campaña del Sur,” pp. 719-720.
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§ 2 .  Health Care
Soldiers tried various rem edies for the diseases that 
attacked them. One of the most common illness seems to have 
been ‘c a le n tu ra ’, a general term fo r feverish, heat-related 
illnesses, and possibly also malaria. Rafael Sevilla, who fought 
with General Morillo during most o f  the campaign, recorded 
several different ways of treating calentura. A sufferer could try 
eating a cubarro  fruit cooked in w ater, or could engage in other, 
more prolonged, treatments. One such consisted in drinking a cup 
of rum, then, one hour later, a cup o f orangeade (n a ra n ja d a ) boiled 
with spirit of nitrate, then, an hour after that, another cup o f rum, 
etc., combined with a cup of broth every four hours. Another 
possible treatment, invented by Sevilla himself, was to go on a 
long and vigorous walk as soon as the fever began. After this one 
rested and drank a cup of tea. This would bring on a 48-hour 
attack of high fever, followed by a complete cure. Sevilla found 
all of these methods effective. On one occasion, however, he was 
given quinine, which had no positive effect at all.21 Sevilla also 
fell ill with “el bicho”, a disease that caused nausea and fever, plus 
headache and pain in the bones. He was cured of this by a 
reportedly very unpleasant treatm ent involving lemons, the 
details of which were not spelled out in his memoirs.22
It was very common for soldiers (and indeed the public at 
large) to resort to folk remedies of this sort. Throughout the
2 'S e v illa , Memorias, p. 144, 166., 198. The effectiveness of quinine in 
treating even malaria was uneven. The amount of actual quinine in the 
chinchona bark-based remedies varied to such an extent that it could not 
be relied upon to effect a cure. Sec Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, p. 
359.
22 Sevilla, Memorias, p. 45. For inform ation about 'treatm ent’ of yellow 
fever in, Mexico, see Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, pp. 42-44; and 
for treatment o f soroche, see Julio Albi, Banderas Olvidadas: el ejército 
realista en América, Ediciones de Cultura Hispánica (Madrid, 1990), p. 162.
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eighteenth century, doctors had com plained about the prevalence 
of curanderos ,  and in 1815 Viceroy Montalvo reported that in 
Cartagena “la m edicina y cirugía yacen en el m ayor abandono, 
teniendo los vecinos que ponerse en manos de curanderos del 
país, a quienes prefieren por su práctica y conocimientos locales a 
los facultativos europeos que existen aquí, en lo que no dejan de 
tener razón, por la ignorancia de los últimos” .23
Not all popular treatments involved the use of folk medicine; 
some were matters o f simple hygiene. To prevent the potentially 
fatal infections of the feet that were crippling the Spanish army, 
soldiers were advised to wash their feet daily in aguardiente, or, 
failing that, warm water. Morillo likewise urged his men to keep 
clean and to wash as regularly as possible. Efforts were made to 
control the size of the dog population in Cartagena, in order to 
protect the troops and the public at large from the dangerous 
diseases supposedly spread by canines.24 Sensibly, soldiers were
23Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los 
últimos virreyes , pp. 136-137; and Memorial dc Francisco Flórez Moreno, 
Cádiz, 10 January 1811, AGI, Ultramar, legajo 811, for remarks by Spanish 
doctor about that state o f health care in the Americas in 1789. See also 
Marcelo Frías Núñez, "Enfermedad y sociedad en la crisis colonial del 
antiguo régimen: Nueva Granada en el tránsito del siglo XVIII al XIX. Las 
epidemias de viruelas”. Tesina dc Licenciatura, Centro de Estudios Históricos 
(Madrid, 1991), p. 66; and Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, p. 374, for 
comments about British sailors' use of “ folk-m edicine” (i.e. rum) in the 
West Indies.
24Bando dc Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 12 October 1818, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 717.
Torres reported that “se han multiplicado los perros y los males que 
traen a la población, en términos dc no poderse transitar por la ciudad”, 
and complained that this was an "abuso manifestamente peligroso a la 
seguridad personal por la natural ferocidad de estos anim ales, a la salud 
pública por las enferm edades funestres a que están sujetos, al aseo, 
comodidad y decencia del pública, y una carga inútil y aún dañosa al 
consumo general de los artículos para la subsistencia com ún” . He 
accordingly ordered that all dogs found roaming the streets would be killed 
within eight days by presidarios. The size of Cartagena’s dog problem is 
unclear. Mexico City, on the other hand, was struck by a real plague of wild 
dogs in 1813 and again in 1819. Packs of wild dogs roamed the streets, 
attacking people and anim als, and digging up graves. As a result, dog 
patrols analogous to those formed in Cartagena were established in Mexico
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frequently advised to avoid drinking water; aguardiente itself, or 
water mixed with aguardiente, was the preferred beverage.25 
Moreover, as the climate, or more specifically the humidity, was 
felt to be responsible for much of the ill health, the royalist army 
took m easures to construct barracks that prevented the soldiers 
from coming into contact with the damp ground and protected 
them from the warm air. Soldiers were also advised to keep out 
of the rain.26 Various other more experimental methods for 
preserving the soldiers’ health were also tried. In late 1815 
Morillo noted that few soldiers fell sick while their division was 
out on manoeuvres. He therefore ordered that all troops under 
Miguel de la Torre’s command be sent out daily on a lengthy 
circular march with full rucksacks. This measure was intended to 
improve the dismal health record of La Torre’s division.27
City. See Timothy Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City, 
University o f Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), pp. 169-170, 174.
25Bcaujón, "La medicina en la Campaña del Sur,” pp. 720-721; Pascual Enrile 
to Miguel dc la Torre, Santa Fe. 10 August 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8724, 
doc. 55; and M orillo’s Instrucciones para la marcha de los cuerpos, Caracas, 
30 May 1815. AHNM. Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 17.
26Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Santa Fe, 23 June 1816, AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8717, Doc. 78; Orden general del 19 dc Agosto 1818, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 759B; Ejército Expedicionario, Resumen histórico dc las 
operaciones y movimientos dc las columnas y tropas . . . desde el mes de 
Noviembre dc 1816, entry for 30 December 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
759B; Pablo Morillo to ?, 1815?, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 14.
South Am erica’s climate had long been blamed for the continent's 
supposed backwardness, and the role o f climate in determining the level o f  
development was much discussed during this period. It is impossible to tell 
whether royalist officers, in blaming New G ranada’s climate for their 
troops’ ill health, were reflecting a common prejudice, or simply observing 
a medical truth. For discussion of the climate debate, see Thomas Glick. 
“Science and Independence in Latin America (with special reference to 
New Granada)” , HAHR,  vol. 71 (1991); David Brading, The First America, the 
Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State 1492-1867, 
Cambridge University Press (1991), pp. 89, 197, 428-432; and Anthony 
Pagdcn, European Encounters with the New World, Yale University Press 
(New Haven, 1993).
27Pahlo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Torrecilla, 4 October 1815, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 33.
In December 1815, the king issued a directive to 
government officials urging them to provide good care for injured 
soldiers. As a consequence, following the reconquest, the 
government in each province was requested to produce a report 
on the state of health care in the region, detailing in particular the 
availability of hospitals. Unfortunately for historians, no reports 
were submitted from Quito, Cuenca, Mariquita, Panam a, Tunja, 
Socorro, the Llanos, and Darien, but Viceroy M ontalvo asserted 
that it was well known that these regions were too poor to 
construct any hospitals. The governments of Pam plona, Popayan 
and Antioquia all reported the existence of hospitals run by 
charitable institutions, which they claimed could cope with the 
few soldiers who sought adm ission.28 The low demand for 
hospital places was, M ontalvo felt, the result of the poor care 
provided in the hospitals, rather than an indication of the good 
health of the population.29 The only hospital in Panam a was the 
Hospital de San Juan de D ios in Portobelo, which M ontalvo 
described as antiquated and expensive. Nor were there any 
hospitals in the Choco or in Neiva.30
There was one hospital in Santa Marta (the Hospital de San 
Juan de Dios), but it was not equipped to deal with the huge influx 
of patients that occurred after the arrival of M orillo’s army.31 In
28In 1817 the hospital in Popayán was spending $40 per day, which 
suggests that it was not so tiny as Montalvo believed. See Daily army 
expenses in Popayán, 1817, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 631.
29This attitude towards hospitals was shared by many of the V iceroy’s 
contemporaries. See Duffy about hospitals in the British Caribbean: Duffy. 
Soldiers, Suyar and Seapower , pp. 348-349.
^''Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los 
últimos virreyes, pp. 113-137.
31 Montalvo described it as a place "en donde falta médico, medicina, y se 
puede decir de todo”. Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 
January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, p. 114.
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response, an entirely new hospital was constructed there for the 
army. The m ost important new hospitals, however, were built in 
the vicinity of Cartagena. The principal one was the Hospital 
Militar de San Carlos. This could comfortably hold 500 patients, 
and in extrem e cases up to 500 more could be accommodated in 
the hospital’s corridors and hallways. There were, however, only 
440 beds. Patients suffering from dysentery, which, Morillo 
reported “tanto ha afligido a este ejército”, were held in separate 
accommodations in the Convento de San Diego, where there was 
room for 72 patients.32 The hospitals were divided into various 
sections, and officers, sergeants, “enfermos pútridos”, and enemy 
prisoners were all housed separately. These two hospitals were 
run at governm ent expense, and each patient cost the hospital 
approximately 2 reales per day. Doctors received $500 per year 
as salary; non-medical staff received meals in lieu of pay. There 
was also the hospital of San Lázaro, in Cartagena, and another 
military hospital in Sabanalarga, which held over 150 patients.33
Meals for the hospital of San Carlos was provided in part by 
the surrounding towns and villages, which on rotation supplied 
food and m oney. Considerable amounts were needed; the 
hospital’s 97 non-medical staff alone consumed 126 pounds of 
bread, 126 pounds of meat, and some 20 pounds of rice every 
day. The patients themselves were fed either ordinary rations, 
which consisted of a breakfast of bread and soup, and a lunch and
32Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 June 1816, Rodriguez Villa, 
Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, p. 174; and Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, 
Torrecillas, 4 October 1815, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717. By the end of March 
1816 there were already over 500 patients in the two hospitals. See Estado 
de enfermos cn cl hospital dc San Carlos. Cartagena. 31 March 1816, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 715.
13 Sec various documents about hospitals in AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 
714.
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dinner, each consisting of some 8 ounces of meat, plus bacon, rice, 
bananas and bread, or, depending on their health, on half-rations, 
one-and-a-half-rations, or “ raciones de gallina”, in which a quarter 
chicken replaced the meat of the ordinary ration.34 Those 
suffering from “enfermedades pereaguadas” were offered only a 
bread or rice porridge, which was served every three hours.
The official hospital diet created problems of public order. 
Com plaints about its poor quality were frequent. Indeed, on 13 
May 1816 an order was issued that “el soldado cualquiera que sea 
que arroge la comida a pretexto de que está malhecho contra el 
asistente o asistenta, tratándole con voces indecorosas e 
indecentes e impropias a todo hombre de bien y honrada proceder 
será castigado con 15 días de cepo”.35 Moreover, on occasion the 
hospital assistants actually sold to villagers the food intended for 
the patien ts.36 Food was evidently so scarce in the hospital of 
Sabanalarga that patients began slaughtering their own pigs in the 
patio of the hospital, “con detrimento de su salud” , according to 
hospital staff. Attempts to outlaw this behaviour met with 
opposition from patients, who complained of the “despotism o y 
arbitrariedad” of the hospital staff.37
34Strangcly, in the hospital o f Sahanalarga bananas were strictly  
forbidden, and staff who brought bananas into the hospital com pound were 
reprimanded. Sec Orden no. I for Hospital in Sabanalarga, 13 May 1816,
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 714.
35Orden no. 1 for Hospital in Sabanalarga, 13 May 1816, AGI, Papeles dc 
Cuba, legajo 714.
36Ordcn no. I for Hospital in Sabanalarga, 13 May 1816, AGI, Papeles dc 
Cuba, legajo 714; Dictamen dc Anselmo de Bicrna y Ma/.a, Cartagena, 24 April 
1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 707; and Estado de enfermos cn el hospital 
dc San Carlos, Cartagena, 31 March 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 715, 
for com ments about the hardness of the bread.
' 7Antonio Marfa Diaz to Gabriel dc Torres, Sabanalarga, 17 May 1816, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 714.
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The am bience in these hospitals was, not surprisingly, 
disagreeable. Hostility reigned between the patients and the staff. 
The “Cabos de Sala”, or orderlies, complained of continual 
harassment, and the patients reportedly made their frequent 
criticisms with an excess of “altanería”.38 The overall atmosphere 
of a hospital w as summed up by a hospital inspector in July 1816. 
He commented that in a hospital:
La hum anidad sufre muchas veces más que las dolencias de 
sus males, la privaciones de la comodidad y subsistencia, los 
efectos de la corrupción de una atm ósfera no renovada, las 
nauseas del desalió, la horrible com pañía del vecino 
moribundo, y la dureza del mal trato, . . .  no contando con la 
carestía de ropa y sábanas, cuyo defecto redunda 
directam ente en perjuicio del enferm o.39 
Such was the lethal atmosphere of most hospitals that in 1818 a 
woman afflicted with leprosy pleaded not to be confined to one as, 
if she were, she would certainly die from “una melancolía” .40
Despite the presence of the new hospitals, health care still 
left a great deal to be desired, even by contem porary standards.
To begin with, the hospitals, particularly the one in Sabanalarga, 
suffered regularly from shortages of medical supplies. As a 
consequence, in 1817, the Junta de Hospitales in Cartagena, which 
had been created to supervise the running o f the m ilitary 
hospitals, proposed setting up a medicine factory, where the
38Ordcn no. 1 for Hospital in Sahanalarga. 13 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 714.
39Informe sobre hospitales militares de la Plaza de Cartagena de Indias, 
Cartagena, 29 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
40Josef Alvarez to Gabriel de Torres, Mompós, 13 May 1818, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 712. Sec also Archer’s comments about military hospitals in 
Mexico in Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, pp. 261-267.
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necessary rem edies could be m anufactured.41 As noted, the 
quality of the doctors practising in New Granada was also 
regarded as poor. Their lack of skills had already been causing 
concern before the outbreak of the war, which did nothing to 
improve m atters.42 Viceroy Montalvo, commenting on the high 
mortality suffered on the coast, remarked that on the rare 
occasions when a disease did not prove fatal, “no es por la 
asistencia de unos hombres que carecen de experiencia y nociones 
científicas, sino por alguna reacción o espontáneo esfuerzo de la 
n a tu ra leza” .43 Of course, during this period doctors were often 
held in no higher esteem in Europe itself, and for good reason.44
Construction of hospitals nonetheless continued throughout 
the years of the reconquest.45 Indeed, even on the eve of the 
Spanish defeat at Boyacá, work on new hospitals was continuing. 
General José Maria Barreiro reported in late 1818 and early 1819 
that great progress had been made in the construction of new 
hospitals in Chita and Sogamoso. Moreover, these had not cost the
41 See various documents in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714; Antonio María 
Díaz to Gabriel de Torres, Sahanalarga, 27 March 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 714; and various letters of Francisco Morales, BRAH, sig. 9/7660 
(legajo 17), fols. 561, 569, 345.
42See Memorial dc Francisco Flórez Moreno, Cádiz, 10 January 1811, AGI, 
Ultramar, legajo 811.
4 3 Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los 
últimos virreyes, p. 137.
44Sec Roy Porter, Disease, Medicine and Society in England, 1550-1860, The 
Economic History Society (London, 1993).
4 5 For example, in 1816 a new hospital was established in Mompós. It had, 
however, closed, by 1817. (See Antonio Mcléndez to Gabriel de Torres, 
Mompós, 26 May 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; and Miguel de la 
Torre to Pascual Enrilc, Mompós, 2 January 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8724, 
doc. 4.) Plans to construct a hospital in Mompós had been underway since 
1803, but had been interrupted by the war. (See Report on hospital in 
Mompós, Madrid, 3 August 1803, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 549.)
In 1816, Morillo ordered the construction o f various hospitals at 
intermediate points between Santa Fe and the Llanos. Sec Resumen 
histórico dc las operaciones y movimientos dc las columnas y tropas . . . 
desde el mes dc noviembre dc 1816, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 759B.
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government a penny. This was possible because o f the co­
operative attitude of the local residents, who reportedly donated 
both money and time to help in the completion o f the hospitals.46
It is worth recalling that the republican forces also erected 
many hospitals along their routes of travel, and several hundred 
doctors are thought to have assisted the insurgent troops.47 
Troops of either band might be accommodated in a given hospital. 
As hospitals appear generally not to have em ployed guards, 
prisoners well enough to do so could escape from  them with little 
difficulty, as happened in Mompós in 1817.48 Following the 
regularisation of the war agreed between M orillo and Bolivar in 
1820, the safety of troops in enemy hospitals was to be 
guaranteed, but the royalists, at least, did not alw ays respect this 
agreement. Republican convalescents in the hospital of Miraflores 
were attacked and killed by the royalists in 1822.49
S3,  The Smallpox  Vaccine
During the colonial period, smallpox had probably been the 
most lethal epidemic disease in the Am ericas.50 Unfortunately, 
until the discovery of Robert Jenner’s vaccine in 1798, there was 
no effective treatment. Prior to Jenner’s discovery, variolation, or 
inoculation with the live smallpox virus (as opposed to the cowpox
46Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, H istoria Extensa de 
Colombia, vol. 6, Academia Colombiana de Historia, Editorial Lerncr (Bogotá, 
1964). p. 285; and José Maria Barrciro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 16 October 
1818; and Juan Sámano to José Maria Barreiro, Santa Fe, 19 November 1818, 
both in Los ejércitos del Key, vol. 1, pp. 68-70, and 97-98.
47Scc Bcaujón, "La medicina en la Campaña del Sur,” pp. 717-724.
4xJosef Alvarez to Gabriel dc Torres, Mompós, 27 Novem ber 1817, AG1,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712.
49Bcaujón, “La medicina en la Campaña del Sur,’’, p. 718-719.
‘'"M orillo  ‘commented in 1816 that in New Granada sm allpox was “la única 
calamidad pública que se sufre”. Pablo Morillo to M inister of War, Santa Fe, 
31 August 1816, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, p. 205
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virus) was thought to provide protection, but the method was 
largely ineffective. Variolation had been introduced into New 
Granada in the 1780s, where it was generally well received, 
although the Indians around Santa Fe reportedly refused to be 
in o c u la te d .51 When, however, news of Jenner’s vaccine arrived in 
New Granada, immediate efforts were made to obtain the 
necessary cowpox-pus, and various expeditions were organised to 
locate an infected cow. These efforts met with no success, and it 
was not until the arrival of a Spanish vaccinating expedition in 
1804 that vaccination got underway in New Granada.52 Once 
vaccination was introduced, all in terest in inoculation disappeared, 
and w ithin a year Juntas de Vacuna had been established, many 
individuals had been trained in adm inistering the vaccine, and 
thousands of Neogranadans had been vaccinated. According to 
M arcelo Frias Nunez, by 1805 the use of the vaccine was firmly 
rooted in New Granada.55
The war of independence appears to have disrupted all 
vaccination programmes, and, by November 1816, Morillo could 
describe these programmes as being in a state of “abandono y
5 'F rías  Núñez, “Enfermedad y sociedad en la crisis colonial”, p. 45.
In Mexico too, Indians were sceptical of the European approach to 
the treatm ent of smallpox. Donald Cooper reports that Mexican Indians 
preferred a herbal remedy consisting o f borage and poppy tea. See Donald 
Cooper, Epidemic Disease in Mexico City, 1761-1813: an Administrative,
Social and Medical Study, University o f Texas Press (Austin, 1965), pp. 91-92. 
In teresting ly , Morillo reported that sm allpox epidem ics struck particularly 
hard in Indian communities. Sec Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fc, 
9 November 1816, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, p. 225.
Variolation was first introduced to the Indies in 1779, in Mexico. See 
Robert Jackson, "The Treatment or M istreatment o f Disease? Comments on 
Ronn P inco’s ‘Misery and Death in the Pearl of the Pacific: Health Care in 
Guayaquil. Equador, 1870-1925” ’, HAHR,  vol. 72 (1991), p. 366.
52Scc Frias Núñez, “Enfermedad y sociedad".
55Frias Núñez, "Enfermedad y sociedad", p. 128.
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d escu id o ” .54 The arrival of the Expeditionary Army seems, 
however, to have injected new energy into the anti-smallpox 
campaign. Indeed, at the same time that M orillo was lamenting 
the abandonment of the vaccine, the military commander of 
Ocaña, Francisco Tamariz, was engaged in a personal campaign to 
revive it. In November 1816 he wrote to Gabriel de Torres, the 
governor of Cartagena, requesting equipm ent and personnel 
trained in administering the vaccine. Governor Torres agreed to 
provide the necessary equipment, as in his view “ la vacuna [era] 
uno de los más grandes beneficios conocidos para la 
h u m an id ad ” .55 From his base in Ocaña, Tamariz revived the 
smallpox vaccine not only in Ocaña itself, but also in the 
surrounding region. He was later transferred to Socorro, where he 
continued to take an interest in the propagation of the vaccine. In 
May 1817, he reported excitedly to Governor Torres that in Ocaña 
the vaccine was being administered from  cultures grown under 
glass. This, he pointed out, disproved claims made by doctors that 
in New Granada the only way to obtain more vaccine was to 
extract m aterial from the arms of people infected with cowpox.56
Plans were also underway to introduce the vaccine in 
Cartagena, Santa Marta, Antioquia and Mompós. In June 1816, 
Gabriel de Torres wrote to Cuba to request the necessary 
materials (nam ely the culture from which the vaccine was
54Proclama dc Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 15 November 1816, AGI, Estado, legajo 
57, doe. 35A; Gabriel dc Torres to Pablo Morillo, Puerto Cabello, 6 June 1815, 
BRAH, sig. 9/7667 (leg. 24), fol. 54. Also see the so-called Mémoires du 
Général Morillo, Comte de Carthagène, Marquis de ta Puerta, réldtifs aux 
principaux événements de ses campagnes en Amérique de 1815 a 1821, 
suivis de deus précis de Don José Domingo Díaz et du Généra! Don Miguel de 
la Torre, P. Dufart, Paris, 1826, p. 263.
55Francisco Tamariz to Gabriel dc Torres, Ocaña, 22 November 1816, AGI, 
Papeles, dc Cuba, legajo 712.
5fiFraneisco Tamariz to Gabriel dc Torres, Socorro, 24 May 1817, AGI, Papeles 
dc Cuba, legajo 712.
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propagated, and glass dishes in which to grow it). These arrived 
in Cartagena in mid-December 1816, and more materials were 
required by August of the next year. On 8 August 1817, enough 
of the vaccine was sent from Santa Fe to vaccinate 12 people, the 
intention most likely being to cultivate more of the vaccine in 
Cartagena itself, using the material from Santa Fe as a starter. By 
January 1817 the “pus vacuno” arrived in Santa Marta, where it 
was immediately cultivated.57 In Antioquia, Governor Vicente 
Sánchez Lima supported the introduction of the vaccine in 1816, 
but the attempt to introduce the vaccine into Mompós failed, “por 
carecer [esta villa] de facultativos para su descubrimiento y 
co n serv ac ió n ” .58 A vaccination campaign was also begun in 
Popayán by Brigadier Juan Sámano in August 1816, although it 
too seems to have met with little success.59
Until 1817, the dissem ination of the vaccine appears to have 
depended on the zeal of individual officers, but, by August 1817, a 
special Commissioner for the Propagation of the Vaccine had been 
ap p o in ted .60 Francisco Dominguez, the first commissioner, was 
responsible for distributing the culture, which was cultivated in 
Santa Fe, and also for explaining the method of vaccination.61
57 Sec the many documents in AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 712.
58 Sec José Maria Rcstrcpo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, 
Imprenta Nacional, (Bogotá. 1932) Vol. 1, p. 312; and Antonio Mcléndez to 
Gabriel dc Torres, Mompós, 5 April 1817, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 712.
59 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Popayán, 19 August 1816; and Jaime Serra 
to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 31 August 1816; both in BRAH, sig. 7665 (leg. 22), 
fols. 52-53, 75, respectively.
60This thus revived the disbanded Juntas Centrales de Vacuna first 
established in 1804, which had overseen the propagation and 
administration of the vaccine. Sec Frias Núñez, “Enfermedad y sociedad", 
pp. HIf-121.
61 Juan Sámano to Gabriel dc Torres, Santa Fe, 8 August 1817, AGI, Papeles dc 
Cuba, legajo 709.
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The methods of administering the vaccine were indeed 
complicated, and individual doses of the vaccine often proved to 
be ineffective. The vaccine apparently had to be used within a 
week of its culture, since its effectiveness declined as it aged.62 
The vaccine also suffered when exposed to severe changes in 
temperature, and Francisco Tamariz pointed out that it was 
important that the lancet used for the vaccination “al diluir la 
materia no se oxide, lo cual producería su alteración y de 
consiguiente la falsa vacuna” .63 The most reliable method was to 
vaccinate with material taken directly from an infected pustule on 
an earlier vaccinee. This method of course made it difficult to 
introduce the vaccine into new areas, as the immunising team had 
to take with them someone who had recently been vaccinated. 
Some vaccinations were thus performed sim ply in order to 
cultivate the vaccine. Indeed, although normally a fee was 
charged for vaccination, in 1805 Viceroy Am ar had ordered that 
individuals vaccinated merely in order to propagate the vaccine 
should not be charged.64
During the last years of the war, the king himself took an 
interest in the developm ent of vaccination programmes in New 
Granada. In January 1821, the Minister of Overseas wrote to 
Gabriel de Torres, instructing the harassed and busy governor to 
report to the king on whether it had ever been necessary to re­
vaccinate anyone, and if so, whether this had been because the 
vaccine failed to take, or because the fluid used had deteriorated;
62 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Popayán, 19 August IS 16; and Jaime Scrra 
to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 31 August 1816; both in BRAH, sig. 7665 (leg. 22), 
fols. 52-53, 75, respectively.
63 Francisco Tamariz to Gabriel dc Torres, Ocafia, 22 and 27 November 1816, 
AGI. Pápeles dc Cuba, legajo 712
64 Frías Núñez, “Enfermedad y sociedad", p. 130.
whether anyone who had been vaccinated had ever developed 
smallpox, and if so whether the illness had been less virulent; 
whether the vaccine worked in adults as well as children; w hether 
vaccination speeded up the process of teething in infants and 
whether it made the discomfort of teething greater or less; 
whether the smallpox vaccine worked on any other diseases as 
well; whether the vaccine had any effect on the vaccinated 
person’s physical constitution; and whether smallpox had been 
eradicated anywhere. Governor Torres does not appear to have 
responded to this early health survey.65
§ 4 .  Health and the Population at Large
The army was certainly not the only sector of the population 
to suffer from disease. Many of the officials employed by the 
crown complained of ill-health, and the population of New 
Granada itself could not remain immune from the many infectious 
diseases spread by the army and by the deprivation caused by 
the war. In Cartagena in early 1816, for example, civilian 
mortality was running at a rate of 70 per day.66 The deadly 
royalist siege had ended, but these deaths were almost certainly a 
consequence of the blockade and resulting food shortage; during 
famine more deaths result from opportunistic disease than from 
starvation itself. The presence of the royalist army surely 
assisted the spread of infections disease as well. Soon after his
65 Minister of Overseas to Gabriel de Torres, Madrid, 30 January 1821, AGI, 
Papcles dc Cuba, legajo 741 A. Following the introduction of the vaccine to 
Cartagena in May of 1804, reports had circulated that the vaccine not only 
reduced the discomfort o f teething, hut also cured intestinal worms and 
prevented menstrual disorders. See Frias NuAez, “Enfermcdad y sociedad” ,
p. 118.
66Pablo Murillo to Duke of Manchester, Mompds, 15 March 1816, Rodrigue/. 
Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 4-5.
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arrival in Cartagena, the viceroy commented on the unhealthy and 
unpleasant “ inmundencias” that filled the city’s streets, and added, 
“ no se me esconde que las referidas inmundencias pueden ser 
efecto de excesos de la tropa” .67 Of course, not all ill-health was a 
direct consequence of the war. In September 1819, for example, 
the Contador General de Tabacos  in Cartagena expressed concerns 
about the health threats posed by his office, which he described as 
“ oscura, llena de mosquitoes, y excesivamente cálida, en términos 
que los empleados están expuestos a caer enfermos” .68 
Furtherm ore, various officers and important governm ent officials 
fell victim to the tropical clim ate of coastal New Granada. For 
example, Field Marshal A lejandro Hore, the Governor of Panama, 
died suddenly on 8 July 1820 of “una maligna fiebre que le 
devoró en cortas días” at the age of 41 or 42.69 Many of those 
who survived the war returned to Spain with ruined health. 
M orillo’s successor Miguel de la Torre left office after seven years 
o f service with his formerly robust health entirely 
“ q u eb ran tad a” .70 On occasion, of course, ill heath would be used
67Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 31 December 1815, 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707. In Pasto epidemics which broke out among 
republican prisoners spread to the population at large. See, for example, 
Historia de la Rebelión de América en 35 Cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz,
Quito, 6 May 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.
68 Complaint by contador general de tabacos, Cartagena, 25 Septem ber 1819, 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
69 Manuel de Urriola to Juan Sámano, Panama, 9 July 1820, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 742. He had been described only a few months before as of 
robust health; see Hoja de Servicio de Alejandro Hore, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 742.
70Hoja de Servicio of Miguel de la Torre, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8718, doc. 100. 
A few other examples will suffice. Lieutenant. Colonel Donato Ruiz dc Santa 
Cruz was reportedly very ill with tuberculoses by 1818; see Juan Sámano to 
Pablo Morillo. Santa Fe. 29 August 1818, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 607- 
609. The long-serving Pedro Ruiz de Porras, governor o f Santa Marta, was 
seriously ill in 1819; sec Report on Pedro Ruiz de Porras. Madrid, 16 May 
1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 739. He had already intended to resign in 
1817 on grounds of ill health; see Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel dc Torres, 
Cartagena, 16 May 1817, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 708. Francisco Warlcta,
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as an excuse to resign from unwanted posts. Both Francisco 
Montalvo and Juan Sámano claimed on stepping down as viceroy 
that their health was “gravem ente quebrantada” .71 Numerous 
other suspect reports of ill health similarly poured into 
government offices during the years of the w ar.72
It should be clear that disease played an important role in 
the defeat of M orillo’s forces. Thousands of soldiers died in the 
epidemics of dysentery, smallpox, and other illnesses, and, as a 
consequence, the royalist army shrank irreversibly in size. Julio 
Albi has calculated that Spanish troops fighting in Venezuela and 
New Granada suffered a fatality rate of between 90% and 96%.
This astonishingly high figure is attributed by Albi in large part to 
“el clima, las enfermedades, la dificiente alimentación y los 
prim itivos servicios de sanidad” .73 Other factors, such as the 
protracted length of the war, surely contributed as well, but the 
role of disease in defeating the Expeditionary Army cannot be 
ignored. In 1818, Morillo had compared himself to Cortés, who,
who hail also enjoyed robust health, fell sick with scurvy in 1818; see 
Report on Francisco W arleta. Cahudare, 14 February 1818, BRAH, sig. 9/
7658 (legajo 15), fol. 91. Vicente Sánchez Lima, “y casi todos los oficiales y 
mucha parte de la tropa” were very sick from fevers and infections in 
early 1816; see Francisco Warlcta to Pablo Morillo, Remedios, 17 March 1816, 
BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15). The royal commissioner Juan Barry 
developed an “enfermedad gástrica" in Curasao; see Juan Barry to M inister 
of Overseas, Curasao, 4 September 1822, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 
1571.
71 Sec Francisco Montalvo to Council o f the Indies, Havana, 9 April 1818,
AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 580; and Juan Sámano to Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 9 
June 1820, both in the Resumen Documentado . . .  by Gabriel dc Torres, 
Cartagena, 1 August 1820, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo K ill and also in AGI, Papeles 
dc Cuba, legajo 890B.
72Juan Ramirez, the president of Quito, for example, bolstered his requests 
for a transfer to a different post with the claim that the climate in Quito was 
unhealthy; see Juan Ramirez to José de Abascal, Quito, 6 September 1818,
AGI, Diversos, legajo 5. Similarly, José Sartorio, the royal commissioner to 
Venezuela, claimed to suffer from all sorts of infirm ities when he was 
appointed to a new, unwanted, commission in Santa Fe; see José Sartorio to 
Minister, of Overseas, Havana, 31 May 1823, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 
1571.
7 3Albi, Honderas olvidadas, pp. 403-405.
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like him, had relied on native troops to achieve Spanish 
su ccesses.74 He could as accurately have drawn a comparison 
with M ontezuma, whose forces were destroyed by smallpox and 
other diseases.
Civilians, too, caught and died of the many diseases spread 
by the armies. Inadequate health care and inept doctors did little 
to prevent deaths. The use of the few truly effective medical 
treatments, such as the smallpox vaccine, was disrupted by the 
war, and the widespread vaccination programmes operating 
before the outbreak of war were reconstructed only partially and 
on a very small scale. Although the War of Independence did not 
achieve the terrifying death rates suffered by the British in the 
Caribbean two decades earlier, when whole regiments had died 
from disease, the Spanish, like the British before them, correctly 
regarded warfare in the Americas as “fatal para los europeos” .75
In this section of the thesis, we have studied a number of 
factors which weakened Spain’s hold on New Granada. Now, in the 
last section, we turn to the final collapse of royal authority, 
beginning with the Battle of Boyaca in 1819.
74Juan Sámano to Pahlo Morillo, Santa Fe, 29 August 1818, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 
(leg. 22), fols. 607-609.
7SScc Duffy. Soldiers, SuRar and Seapower, pp. 326, 337-338; and Pahlo 
Morillo to José de Ahascal, Torrecillas, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 
4, ramo 1.
305


Chapter 10: The Battle of Boyacá
From 1819, the royalists began to reap the fruits they had 
sown. New Granada’s increasingly hostile population gained the 
opportunity to reject the Spanish when Bolivar led his forces into 
New Granada in July 1819. Royalist troops, sick, underpaid, ill- 
supplied and divided, proved no match for the invaders. Then, in 
1820, events in Spain dealt a final blow to New Granada’s 
royalists. After the liberal revolution of 1820, political divisions 
in New Granada prevented royalists from concentrating on the 
republican threat. By 1822, no serious royalist presence remained 
in New Granada. This final section of the thesis will chart the 
collapse of royal authority in New Granada.
We begin with events in 1819. In that year, the problem s of 
the restored royal governm ent stemming from financial 
difficulties, lack of co-ordination between civil and m ilitary 
powers, and the evaporation of the army, were compounded by a 
new threat. The republican army of Simón Bolivar launched a 
vigorous attack on royalist New Granada, which delivered a fatal 
blow to a reconquest government which, weak and divided, could 
neither withstand Bolivar’s assaults nor regroup its forces to  
protect royal authority.
§ 1 .  The Campaign of  1819
The royalist campaign that would culminate in d isaster on 7 
August 1819 in the Battle of Boyacá began inauspiciously at the 
end o f , 1818. The year began moderately well for the royalists. 
Although Bolivar enjoyed a phyrric victory over royalist forces at
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Calabozo on 12 February 1818, in March 1818, Morillo had won an 
important battle at La Puerta, in Venezuela. Within a month, 
Bolivar had captured San Fernando de Apure, but other royalist 
victories followed at Sombrero, Maracay, and elsewhere. By 
November 1818, however, Morillo reported that although the 
troops were in good spirits, the “absoluta falta de recursos en un 
país arruinado” was crippling the entire army and impeding the 
start of the new cam paign.1 The army’s shortages o f money and 
supplies had in no way diminished. M orillo’s primary concern 
was to eliminate the many bands of republican guerrillas in the 
Llanos between New Granada and Venezuela. The Llanos de 
Casanare had long served as a refuge from colonial justice, and 
republican partisans were following tradition when they retreated 
to the Llanos in 1816, after Morillo’s reconquest.2 Throughout 
1817 and 1818, small bands of guerrillas harassed royalist troops, 
and occasionally penetrated into the interior of New Granada. 
General Francisco de Paula Santander had reorganised the rather 
chaotic republican troops into various companies, but they 
continued to fight an essentially guerrilla war. A number of 
royalist outposts had already been established in the Llanos, but 
control of the Llanos proved elusive.
From 1819, the royalist campaign in the Llanos de Casanare 
was led by General José Maria Barreiro. Neither General Morillo 
nor the Viceroy Juan Sámano appear to have known Barreiro 
personally, but Sám ano in particular displayed a touching
'Pablo Morillo to Duque dc San Carlos, Caracas, 16 November 1818, AGS, 
Estado, legajo 8223.
2For details o f the republican guerrillas in the Llanos, see Oswaldo Diaz 
Díaz, La reconquista española, Ediciones Lerner (Bogotá, 1967), vol. 2, pp 
279ff; and Jane Rausch. A Tropical Plains Frontier: the Llanos of Colombia,
I S 31-1831, University o f  New Mexico Press (Albuquerque, 1984), Chapter 7.
/
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confidence in his capacity. “Estoy esperando con impaciencia la 
llegada de Don José Barreiro,” he wrote to Morillo in April 1818. 
The mere fact that Barreiro was Spanish filled Sámano with hope.3 
Nonetheless, reality soon dawned, and Barreiro was revealed to be 
an unimaginative officer and a disastrous general.
Barreiro soon began to experience difficulties in the 
campaign in the Llanos, which began in March 1819. By early 
April, he was obliged to report that in the past few  weeks “ se nos 
desertaron la m ayor parte de los indios y bien pronto siguieron 
su ejemplo los restantes, quedando sólo con nosotros 2 tenientes 
y 304 del partido de Támara”.4 The desertion eventually became 
so extreme that Barreiro was forced to withdraw completely from 
the Llanos into New Granada’s interior.5 The 1819 royalist 
campaign in the Llanos was, in short, a complete failure.
Santander reported to Simón Bolívar on 29 April 1819 that:
La deserción que han sufrido [las tropas de Barreiro) es 
numerosa; nuestros batallones de infantería han recibido con 
ella notable aumento; sus caballos han quedado inútiles con 
las marchas, contramarchas y continuas alarm as; el hambre 
que han padecido sus tropas es increíble, pues la mayor 
ración que recibía el soldado era de dos onzas de carne; no
3Juan Sámano lo Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 7 April 181S, BRAH. sig. 9/7665 
(legajo 22), fols. 567-569.
4Caniilo Riaño, La campaña libertadora de 1819, Editorial Andes (Bogotá, 
1969), p. 52. Sec also Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 287-288, 
for problems with the weather; and José María Barreiro to  Juan Sámano, 
Sogamoso, 23 March 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747 (also in Los 
ejércitos del Key, 1819, vol. 2, Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la 
Presidencia dc ia República (Bogotá, 1989), pp. 31-33).
5Juan Sámano to M inister o f War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacd, 7 de agosto de 
1819, a través de los archivos españoles, Juan Fricdc (editor). Banco dc la 
República (Bogotá, 1969), pp. 284-288). Sec also Díaz Díaz. La reconquista 
española, vol. 2, p. 299.
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han sido dueños de otro terreno que aquel que ocupaban sus
co lu m n as.6
Moreover, in late June 1819, Barreiro, like so many soldiers before 
him, fell ill and was unable to undertake any work at all. Viceroy 
Sámano prepared to substitute Sebastián de la Calzada, but before 
Calzada could take command, Barreiro declared himself fully 
recovered, and resumed control.7 Had Calzada taken over 
command of the Third Division, events might have proceeded 
rather d ifferen tly .
Meanwhile, a fundamental change had occurred in the 
military strategy of the republicans. Rather than try to capture 
Caracas, they decided to concentrate on the recapture of New 
Granada, and in particular of Santa Fe. This decision was 
motivated by a desire to capitalise on Santander’s organisation of 
the Llaneros, and to open a new front while M orillo was 
immobilised by bad weather in Venezuela. Efforts were made to 
co-ordinate the planned attack on the capital with invasions of the 
Caribbean coast, and Bolivar set about moving his Llanero troops 
from Venezuela into the Neogranadan interior.8
The royalists were aware of this change. On 17 June 1819 
Colonel Antonio Tobar wrote to Barreiro from Barinas to warn him 
that Bolivar and Páez, accompanied by 1,400 soldiers, were
6Francisco dc Paula Santander to Simón Bolivar, La Palma, 29 April 1819,
Cartas Santander-Rollvar, 1813-1820, vol. 1, Biblioteca de la Presidencia dc la 
República (Bogotá, 1988), pp. 83-85.
7José Maria Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 28 June 1819, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Ratalla de Royacd, pp. 25-26; and Diaz Diaz, La 
reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 361); Juan Sámano to José Maria Barreiro,
Santa Fc, 6 July 1819 and the exchange of letters between Calzada, Barreiro 
and Sámano, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 231, 244-246; Juan Sámano to 
Minister o f War. Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 
720A (also in La Ratalla de Royacd, pp. 284-288); and Diaz. Diaz, La 
reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 361.
8Riaflo, La campaña libertadora, pp. 71,78, 108. Sec also Diaz Diaz, La 
reconquista española, vol. 2, pp. 309-310.
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m arching w estw ard .9 This warning was followed by a virtual 
flood of reports about the republican advance; on 5 July 1819, 
Sergeant Juan Figueroa y Ladrón informed Barreiro that:
Santander y Arredondo han entrado para el reino, que sus 
disignios es tomar a Santa Fe, que su primer paso es ir a 
encontrarse con Páez que viene por Piedecuesta, que Bolívar, 
Donato Pérez y un colonel llamado Moreno están en Paya, 
que esperan dos batallones que el jueves 1 del corriente 
salieron de Pisba para Socotá.10
The royalists were thus well informed about the progress of the 
republican arm y across the Andes. Some of their intelligence was 
flawed; Barreiro was supplied with inaccurate information about 
the difficulty of crossing the flooded Llanos, but these errors were 
c o rre c te d .11 Indeed, the Colombian military historian Camilo 
Riaño comm ents on “el magnífico servicio de inteligencia de Don 
Pablo M orillo” .12 The Spanish furthermore began preparations for 
the coming encounter. Both Viceroy Sámano and General Morillo 
set about trying to acquire additional armaments for use in the
9 Antonio Tohar to José María Barreiro, Barinas, 17 June 1819, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 53-54).
10Juan Figueroa y Ladrón to José María Barreiro, Labranzagrande, 5 July 
1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, p. 229. See also José María Barreiro to Juan 
Sámano, Tunja, 25 June 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708. (also in La 
Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 22-24, and Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 162-163); 
Juan Figueroa y Ladrón to José María Barreiro, Labranzagrande, 2 July 
1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, p. 204; 2 letters of Juan Sámano to José 
María Barreiro, Santa Fe, 3 July 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 205- 
206, 207; José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 3 July 1819, Los 
ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, p. 217; Pablo Morillo to Juan Sámano, Calabozo, 12 
July 1819, BRÁH, Colección Morillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 80-83 (also in 
Los ejércitos de! Rey, vol. 2, pp. 267-268, and AHNM, Estado 8717.); and 
Antonio Plá to Juan Sámano, Scsquilé, 24 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 742.
1 *José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 3 July 1819; and José María 
Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 5 July 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 
218-219, 225-226, respectively.
12Riaflo, La campaña libertadora, p. 85.
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campaign. Stocks of weapons within New Granada were 
distributed to places felt to be in particular need, and both men 
wrote to the Captain General of Cuba to request guns from the 
stockpiles there. Unfortunately for the Spanish, Cuba did not 
provide any weapons until December 1819, by which time they 
were too late to be of help.13
The republican march from the Llanos to the Andean 
highland stretched Bolivar’s troops to the utm ost limits. The 
Llanos were flooded, which made progress across them slow and 
unpleasant, but the crossing of the Páramo de Pisba, to the north 
of Sogamoso, on 5 and 6 July 1819, is regarded as the most 
gruelling feature of the march. Most of the Llanero soldiers had 
never before experienced either the cold or the thinner air of the 
sierra. Nonetheless, Bolivar succeeded in getting some 2,000 
troops over the mountains into New Granada.
As Bolivar’s army crossed into New Granada, news of its 
arrival spread to republican guerrillas throughout the provinces of 
Tunja, Socorro and Pamplona. Guerrilla groups had been 
operating in these regions since 1816, but had usually succeeded 
only in harassing small royalist detachments and in intercepting 
c o m m u n ic a tio n s .14 During the spring and summer of 1819 these 
guerrilla groups increasingly became a real problem for Barreiro’s 
troops. Barreiro com m ented frequently on their apparently 
growing number, com plaining that the country was plagued by 
“ bandidos, protegidos por los pueblos”, or, in other words,
13José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 25 June 1819, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 708 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 22-24). Sec also Juan 
Sántano to José Cicnfucgos, Santa Fc, 14 July 1819; Alejandro Ramirez, to 
Intendente (del Ejército?), Havana, 19 August 1819, both in AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 1945; and Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 18 
December 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708.
l4 Scc Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, pp. 259-276, csp. p. 273.
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republican guerrillas. Barreiro found it necessary to establish 
m ilitary outposts in Tunja, Ventaquem ada, Chocontá and 
elsewhere, and even finding couriers for official communiqués 
proved d ifficu lt.15 Barreiro was bitter about the behaviour of the 
alcaldes and priests he had encountered. Most of them, he 
com plained, were republican, and provided great help to the 
republicans, “sin comunicarnos el menor parte” .16 Overall, it is 
evident that Barreiro enjoyed very poor relations with the 
civilians in the area of conflict. The Expeditionary Army was thus 
reaping the fruits of earlier errors. The very regions which had 
welcomed Morillo in IS 16 during his trium phal journey to Santa 
Fe now rose against his army, providing invaluable support to 
Bolivar.
Nonetheless, as the summer progressed, Barreiro’s 
confidence about the campaign increased. Although the royalists 
suffered several defeats at the hands of republican forces, they 
also won several victories in July 1819, and Barreiro reported to 
Viceroy Sámano that after an encounter on 10 July, “ los soldados 
se han llenado de tal emulación, que necesito mucho trabajo para 
calmar sus impetus, pues todos quieren batir los primeros, y tener 
parte en el destrozo de los rebeldes” .17 Barreiro, however, greatly
underestimated the capacities of the republican troops. After his 
arrival in New Granada, Bolivar had drafted large numbers of men
15José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 3 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Hutalla de Bogotá, pp. 33-34; and Díaz Diaz, La 
reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 319). Sec also La Batalla de Bogotá, pp. lii-lv. 
,6 José Maria Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de
Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Batalla de Boyará, pp. 63-65). See also José María
Barreiro to Juna Sámano, Paipa, 19 July 1819; and Juan Sámano to José María 
Barreiro, Santa Fe, 14 July 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 290, 321 - 
322; and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 327.
17José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano. Molinos, 10 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de
Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 63-65, and Los ejércitos del
Rey, vol. 2, pp. 261-262).
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into the army, which came to be composed of Llanero and British 
soldiers, and local conscripts, in roughly equal proportions.
Barreiro was dismissive of these soldiers, particularly the “ indios 
muy flojos”, but in reality, those fighting with the royalists were 
no more professional. Barreiro reported that after the battle at 
Gameza on 10 July, most of the enemy prisoners were killed as 
soon as they arrived at the royalist camp. This occurred with 
Barreiro’s permission, as “ la clase de soldados que tenemos 
necesita ensangrentarlos para enardecerlos” .18
During the last week in July 1819, several encounters took 
place between the Spanish and Bolivar’s vanguard, but for the 
first six days in August no fighting took place. Barreiro appears to 
have written no letters after 31 July 1819, so it is difficult to 
know what his intentions were during this period.19 On 5 August 
he received news that Bolivar was marching on Tunja, and so set 
off immediately towards that c ity .20 He encountered Bolivar’s 
army at the Puente de Boyaca on 7 August.
The republicans had approximately 2,800 troops, “muchos 
de ellos ingleses y negros de la Isla de Santo Domingo”, according 
to the Spanish.21 These were the soldiers Bolivar had brought at
18José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Paipa. 31 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 708 (also in La Hatalla de Boyacd, pp. 100-104, and Díaz Diaz, La 
reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 287). Sec also Francisco de Paula Santander 
to  Simón Bolívar, La Trinidad, 19 January 1819, Cartas Santander-Bollvar, 
vol. 1. pp. 44-46; José Maria Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 July 1819, 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708 (also in La Batalla de Boyacd, pp. 63-65); and 
La Batalla de Boyacd, pp. liv-lv.
19Juan Sámano to Minister o f War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacd, pp. 284-288). 
Fricde reports that Barreiro did write a report on 6 August 1819, but that it 
has been lost (see La Batalla de Boyacd, p. Ivii).
20 Declaration of Manuel Martínez de Aparicio, Santa Fc, 8 August 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747.
21 Riaño, La campaña libertadora, pp. 226-228, 270. The royalists estimated 
4,000. Sec Gabriel García Vallccillos to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 10 October 
1819, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fc, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacd, pp.
such cost over the Andes. The royalists had perhaps 2,700.22 The 
Spanish were not immediately aware that they were confronting 
Bolivar’s entire army, but they were soon disabused of this error. 
When the republican cavalry charged the royalist columns, the 
Spanish army simply disintegrated. The royalist captain Manuel 
Martinez de Aparicio, who survived the battle, described the 
chaos that followed the successful republican charge: “los infantes 
volvieron caras y desordenaron como no fue posible creer” .23 The 
battle was fairly short (some 2 hours); indeed one member of the 
Audiencia wrote that there had been “ [n i] batalla ni mortandad”.24 
Over 1,600 royalist prisoners were taken, and the bulk of the 
Spanish officer corps was captured.25 It was the end of Spanish 
control of New G ranada’s interior.
After this royalist catastrophe, there was effectively nothing 
to stop the republican advance on Santa Fe, as the capital was less 
than 75 miles from the site of the battle. It was thus essential for 
the Spanish to warn the viceroy of the impending attack as 
quickly as possible. Indeed, “ la infausta noticia de que la [Tercera] 
Division habia sido enteremente derrotada” reached Santa Fe the
289-291). See also Antonio Rodrigue/. Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo 
Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-18.17), Real 
Academia de la Historia. (Madrid. 1908), vol. 4, p. 80.
22 Riaño. La ' campaña libertadora, pp. 226-228, 270. Bolívar reported that 
the royalists had 4,000 to 5,000 troops. Sec Simón Bolívar to Francisco 
Antonio Zea, Bogotá, 14 August 1819, Selected Writings of Bolivar, Vicente 
Lccuna (editor). The Colonial Press (New York, 1951), pp. 205-206.
23 Declaration of Manuel Martine/ de Aparicio, Santa Fc, 8 August 1819, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747 (also in Los ejércitos del Key, vol. 2, pp. 432-434). 
Also sec declarations of Juan Loflo and Sebastián Díaz, Turbaco, 9 October 
1819, La Batalla de Boy acá, pp 124-140.
24Gabricl Garcia Vallccillos to Ferdinand. Cartagena. 10 October 1819, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacd, pp. 289-291). 
25 Declaration of Manuel Martinez dc Aparicio, Santa Fc, 8 August 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747.
follow ing day .26 Several officers who had survived the defeat 
arrived in the capital between 8.00pm and 9.00pm on 8 August 
1819, and informed the viceroy of the imminent occupation of 
Santa Fe. Samano decided to leave the capital immediately. The 
night of 8 August 1819 was spent arranging for his departure: 
boats were to be waiting at Honda, and news of the impending 
invasion was circulated to o ther government officials.27 At 
9.00pm Samano wrote to M orillo that he intended to go to 
Poyayan, but in fact he set o ff  toward Cartagena at 6.00am the 
next morning, on 9 August 1819. He reported left the capital 
disguised in a green ruana and a large hat.28 He left behind 
virtually all of his belongings and papers.29 The Audiencia also 
fled to safety in Cartagena, bu t the years of bad feeling between 
Samano and the Audiencia were reflected in the fact that the 
viceroy delayed some hours in informing the Audiencia of the 
state of affairs. Its members were thus obliged to depart with 
even less preparation than the viceroy. Some of the oidores were 
for this reason unable to provide themselves with horses.30
It is not at all clear that Samano made the right decision in 
choosing to leave. Contemporary opinion was divided, and some 
observers, in particular the governor of Cartagena, were
26 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo. Santa Fe, 8 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 742 (also in Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, pp. 375-376).
27 Juan Sámano to Minister of W ar, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).
28 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 8 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 742 (also in Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, pp. 375-376). 
Sec also Melchor Aymcrich to M inister of War, Quito, 6 September 1819, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 257-260); 
and Riafio, La campaña libertadora, p. 287.
29 Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 13 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708; and Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena,
18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de 
Boyacá, pp. 296-303).
30Riaflo, La campaña libertadora, p. 287.
I 3 1 7
extremely critical of the decision to abandon Santa Fe. Governor 
Torres commented that “aunque había previsto la ruina del Reino, 
jamás me había figurado que de una pequeña acción resultase la 
pérdida de la capital y cerca de 300 leguas, pero ello ha 
suced id o ” .31 Others believed the withdrawal to have been the 
only possible response. The capital had a garrison of some 400 
troops, which would clearly not have been enough to resist the 
entire republican arm y.32 In the event, Bolivar entered Santa Fe 
unchallenged on the evening o f 9 August 1819, some three years 
after Morillo’s arrival in May 1816.33 In addition to seizing the 
money left behind by Sámano, the republicans further acquired a 
substantial quantity of weapons, although the departing Spanish 
had set fire to the royalists’ stores of gunpowder.34
Defeat of the Spanish reconquering army at the centre of 
New Granada had an immediate and profound effect on the 
regime it supported. Royalist troops took the opportunity to 
desert, and several provincial governm ents in the interior 
collapsed. The Governor of Antioquia, for example, fled, and the 
governor of the Chocó was captured and shot by the republicans.35 
Further problems were caused by the breakdown in the chain of
31 Gabriel dc Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI,
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 296-303); 
and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 378.
32Gabricl García Vallccillos to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 10 October 1819, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá. pp. 289-291).
33 Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Canagcna, 26 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).
34 Riaño, La campaña libertadora, p. 287; and Sebastián dc la Calzada to 
Melchor Aymcrich, Paso dc Flandes, 12 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa 
Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 231-232).
35 See Francisco dc Paula Santander to Simón Bolívar, Santa Fe, 3 December 
1819, Cartas Santander-Bollvar, vol. 1, pp. 249-252; Gabriel García to 
Faustino Martínez, Antioquia, 29 August 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
745 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 319-320); and Juan Sámano to Miguel 
dc La Torre, Cartagena, 18 November 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742.
command resulting from the rapid retreat from Santa Fe and the 
capture of so many officers. Royalist forces were divided, and old 
rivalries resurfaced. Particular difficulties occurred in the south, 
where Sebastián de la Calzada and Melchor Aymerich argued over 
who inherited Sám ano’s powers after the viceroy’s flight.36
Sámano him self arrived in Cartagena in early October 1819. 
He was accompanied by large numbers of royalists from Santa Fe, 
many of whom arrived penniless at the coast. Governor Torres 
informed the king that, following the emigration to Cartagena, 
“vasallos de V.M. que antes contaban con una fortuna de m ás de 
$200,000, han quedado reducidos a la mendicidad” .37 The 
Audiencia itself also set up in Cartagena, where it was to rem ain 
until 1820, when, as a consequence o f the republican siege, it 
moved to Jamaica. Safe within Cartagena, Sámano claimed to  be 
organising the recapture of the capital, but he was never again to 
return to Santa Fe.38 Indeed, from the moment of his arrival in 
Cartagena he ceased to play any significant role in the m ilitary 
campaign. Governor Torres complained that, despite the critical 
state of the affairs in Cartagena and his own efforts to engage the 
viceroy, “hasta ahora [Sámano no ha| hecho otra cosa que reducir a
Melchor Aymerich to  Minister of War, Quito, 6 September 1819; and 
Melchor Aymerich to Sebastián de la Calzada, Quito, 6 September 1819; AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Hoyará, pp. 257-260, 
and 240-242, respectively).
37 Riaño, La campaña libertadora, p. 289; and Gabriel de Torres to 
Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 
748 (also in La Batalla de Boyará, pp. 296-303). Sec also the 1820 letter by 
Sámano cited in José María Arboleda Llórente (editor). Catálogo general 
detallado del Archivo Central del Cauca (época de la independencia), vol. 3, 
Universidad del Cauca (Popayán, 1975), pp. 110-111.
,8 Juan Sámano to M inister of War, Cartagena. 26 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyará, pp. 284-288).
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expedientes com plicados las operaciones más sencillas del arte de 
la guerra, con el enemigo casi a la vista”.39
News of the momentous event rapidly spread throughout 
New Granada, but did not immediately reach Morillo in Venezuela, 
who in mid-August was still complaining that he had heard 
nothing from the luckless Barreiro.40 Morillo appears not to have 
learned of the battle until early September, although Sámano 
wrote to him im m ediately before leaving Santa Fe on 8 August.4 1 
When Morillo did a t last hear the news, he immediately 
determined that General Miguel de la Torre should take command 
of the surviving troops and lead a guerrilla war against the 
republicans, but this did not happen, as we shall see. He further 
appointed La Torre to  replace Sámano in the event of the latter’s 
death or capture.42 It was not until some days later that Morillo 
learned that Sámano was safe in Cartagena.
§ 2 .  M il i tary  R e p e r c u s s io n s
Following Bolivar's victory at Boyacá, the prospects of the 
Expeditionary Army worsened considerably. Groups of republican 
guerrillas that had been lurking in the background came out into 
the open all at once. For some months the situation looked quite 
hopeless for Spain. In Socorro alone, various republican leaders 
managed to assemble a force of over 2,000 in just three days, and
39 Gabriel dc Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI,
Audiencia dc Santa Fe. legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 296-303). 
Sec also Gabriel dc Torres to Pablo Morillo. Cartagena. 8 July 1820, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
40 Pablo Morillo to Miguel dc La Torre, Valencia, 16 August 1819, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8717. doc. 256.
41 Pablo Morillo to Miguel dc La Torre, Valencia, 6 September 1819, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 261.
42 Pablo Morillo to M iguel dc La Torre, Valencia, 7 September 1819, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 261.
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the city was occupied by republicans, who executed some 15 
S p an iard s .43 In Pamplona, the entire garrison of El Tambo, the 
prisoners, and the population at large rebelled.44 Riohacha, 
meanwhile, was invaded by republicans led by General MacGregor 
on 4 October 1819. They were driven out within a week, but not 
all revolts were as short lived.45 On 10 November 1819, royalist 
troops in Ocaña rebelled, killed three officers and one soldier, and 
fled from the barracks. This resulted not only in the loss of Ocaña 
to the republicans, but also to the cessation of all communication 
between Sámano in Cartagena and Morillo in Venezuela.46 In 
Mompós an attempted uprising broke out on 17 November 
1819.47 From Cartagena, Sámano made a slight attempt to co­
ordinate a counter-attack, but his efforts were viewed as derisory 
even by his own allies. Governor Torres reported that:
Con respecto a operaciones militares se han mandado cerca 
de 80 hombres al gobernador de Antioquia para que 
reconquiste una provincia levantada casi en masa; se han 
enviado cerca de otros 100 al punto de Ocaña, que allí 
subsisten sin poder operar de modo alguno, por más que el 
punto sea como es m ilitar e interesante, por hallarse
43 List of Spaniards executed in Socorro, Ocaña. 12 October 1819, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 749.
44Juan Sámano to Miguel de La Torre, Turbaco, 15 September 1819, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 267.
45Sec the extensive docum entation o f the republican invasion o f Riohacha 
in AGI. Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 745. The majority of this legajo consists of 
documents related to the siege and recapture of the city. Many other 
legajos in the AGI also contain information about its capture and recapture.
46 Juan Sámano to Miguel dc La Torre, Cartagena, 17 November 1819, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 272; and Sumario contra Gerónimo Caro, Camilo 
Almansa, y Julián Carbcllo, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 743.
47Thc plan had been for various townspeople to assault the barracks and 
capture the garrison, but one p lo tter informed on his co-conspirators, and 
the plan thus collapsed. The m ajority of those arrested were artisans. Sec 
Proceso criminal contra |various], Mompós, 17 November 1819, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 741 A.
incomunicados con el interior, y se han reunido fuerzas 
sutiles para dominar el Río Magdalena. Este es el todo de las 
operaciones visibles que se han dispuesto en más de 2 
meses, que en mi pequeño concepto prometen pocos o 
ningunos progresos” .48
The Cauca Valley was thrown into immediate upheaval by 
the events to the north. We saw in Chapters 7 and 8 that the 
behaviour of the Third Division had provoked widespread 
opposition in the Cauca Valley. The collapse of royal authority in 
Santa Fe provided an opportunity for the Vallecaucanos to act on 
their anger. The Contador de Tabacos in Popayán reported in 
early September 1819 that the loss of the capital had had a 
considerable impact on the region, “que siempre ha sido decidido 
por la insurrección” . He went on to say that, on 29 August 1819, a 
republican uprising had broken out in Llanogrande and Santa Ana, 
and then spread throughout the region. Various tobacco 
es ta n q u il lo s  were destroyed, and it was subsequently learned that 
governor Pedro Dominguez, along with various officials of the 
tobacco monopoly and several other Spaniards had been killed.49 
It is noteworthy that among the first targets of popular hatred 
were the royal monopolies. The opposition to the state-run 
tobacco and aguardiente monopolies went back decades, and 
remained unaltered by the war, as we noted in Chapter 6. The 
identity of the individuals involved in these uprisings was
48Gabricl dc Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audicncia 
dc Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacd, pp. 296-303).
49 Isidro Villareal to José Rodriguez, Popayân, 8 September 1819, AGI,
Papcles dc Cuba, legajo 742. See also Brian Hamnett, "Popular Insurrection 
and Royalist Reaction: Colombian Regions, 1810-1823,” Reform and 
Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru, John Fisher, Allan J. 
Kucthc and Anthony McFarlanc (editors), Louisiana State U niversity Press 
(Baton Rouge, 1990), for information about the republican uprising  in the 
Cauca Valley.
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analysed by the Bishop of Popayán. He reported in early 
September 1819 that:
La Valle de Cauca ha habido alguna conmoción no por parte 
de mis curas, ni de las personas honradas, y de bienes de los 
pueblos, sino por los desertores y otros malvados, que de 
resultas de la revolución pasada, estaban escondidos por los 
montes, a causa de la enormidad de sus crímenes, y 
obstinación en su errado sistema, les había hecho no querer 
aprovecharse de los indultos que se le habían dispensado 
por el más benigno de los m onarcas.50 
In other words, the revolt was led by individuals in the Cauca 
Valley who had not been reconciled to Spain during the years of 
royalist occupation.
Despite the uprising, the royalist comm ander in the south, 
Sebastián de la Calzada, who had marched from Santa Fe with the 
c ity ’s garrison, was nonetheless fairly optim istic about royalist 
prospects. He reported on 8 September 1819 from Popayán that 
although the news of the Battle of Boyacá had caused great 
concern in the city , his assurances that “ no |era] nuestra pérdida 
tan grande como la ponderaban” had restored calm .51 Bishop 
Salvador de Enciso of Popayán was equally hopeful. Although he 
viewed the m ajority of the population of Valle with distrust (“un 
pueblo con el que no se podía contar para nada”), he reported in 
September 1819 that Popayán itself had remained entirely loyal.
50Salvador dc Enciso to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 743. Sec also Salvador dc Enciso to Minister of State, 
Popayán. 8 September 1819. AGI, Ultramar, legajo 811; and Sebastián dc la 
Cal/ada to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 747.
51 Sebastián dc la Cal/.ada to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747.
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and predicted that within four months Calzada would have 
recruited enough men to recapture Santa Fe.52
Events in the end were not so simple, and, following the 
desertion of many of his troops, Calzada was forced to withdraw 
from Popayan to Pasto. Popayan was then occupied by 
re p u b lica n s .53 Calzada’s only hope lay in the Pastusos, who had 
up to  this point been reliably royalist.54 The Pastusos, and in 
particular the “fieles naturales” , assembled a sizeable army which 
enabled Calzada to drive the republicans from Popayan on 24 
January  1820.55 When he learned of Popayan’s recapture, Bolivar
was livid. "I am going to give orders for the chief leaders, rich, 
noble, or plebeian, to be hanged in Pasto, and the rest of the 
population to be transported away to Venezuela, so that no one is 
left but women and children, who can do no harm to us for the 
present and may change their minds", he wrote to Santander.56 
Calzada, meanwhile, continued planning an attack on Santa Fe 
itself, and assembled several thousand men, armed with 1,300 
g u n s .57 Instead, Popayan was recaptured by the republicans in 
June 1820, and the royalists were forced to retreat once again to 
Pasto, never to regain Popayan.
52 Salvador dc Enciso to Juan Sámano, Popayán. 8 September 1819; and 
Salvador dc Enciso to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 14 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 743
5 ' Ramón Zambrano to Melchor Aymcrich, Sapuycs, 31 August 1819, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748.
54Scc Melchor Aymcrich to Ramón Zambrano, Quito, 5 September 1819, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748.
55 Sebastián de la Cal/.ada to Melchor Aymcrich, Popayán, 24 January 1820, 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 1945.
56Salvador dc Madariaga, Hollvar, Hollis and Carter (London, 1952), p. 417.
57Sebastián dc la Calzada to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747; and Melchor Aymcrich to Minister of State, 
Quito, 6 September 1819, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La 
Batalla de Boyacd, pp. 257-260).
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The royalist troops that survived the battle of Boyacá 
scattered in various directions. Governor Torres o f Cartagena 
explained that “unos se presentaron al enemigo, tomando partido, 
otros se fueron a sus casas y de toda la [Tercera] División sólo unos 
200 hombres de Infantería y Caballería lograron salir, reunidos a 
las orillas del Magdalena, en donde hallándose sin buques se han 
salvado construyendo balsas que los han traído hasta Mompós” .58 
According to Torres’ calculations, over 90% of the Third Division 
was captured or killed at Boyacá.
The royalist officers captured by the republicans were taken 
to Santa Fe in early September 1819. They included Barreiro 
himself, whom Santander claimed, “ tuvo la bajeza de ofrecer sus 
servicios a la República como simple soldado”.59 If this is true, 
M orillo’s and Sám ano’s suspicions about Barreiro were amply 
justified. Barreiro’s alleged willingness to change sides 
notwithstanding, on 11 October 1819, Barreiro and his fellow 
officers were shot on Santander’s orders, much to the annoyance 
of Bolivar.
Captured royalist soldiers, however, were fo r the most part 
not executed. They were instead incorporated in to  the republican 
a rm y .60 This was the standard practice, and M orillo expected it 
would be done. Given that many, or perhaps most, of Barreiro’s
58Gabricl dc Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia 
de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 296-303). See also 
Donato Ruíz dc Santa Cruz to Juan Sániano, Mompós, 26 August 1819, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 276. This (or a very similar) docum ent may also be 
found in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 115-122.
59Francisco de Paula Santander to Simón Bolivar, Santa Fc, 17 October 1819, 
Cartas Santander-Bollvar, vol. 1, pp. 154-156. An account of the execution is 
provided in Francisco dc Paula Santander to Simón Bolívar, Santa Fe, 17 
October 1819, Cartas Santander-Bollvar, vol. 1, pp. 157-158.
60Sce, for example, Miguel dc la Torre to Juan Sámanu, San Antonin dc 
Cúcuta, 29 October 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742: two new 
republican com panies named ‘T unja’ and ‘Boyacá’ were formed.
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troops w ere actually Americans, one m ight imagine that these 
troops would be happy to enlist in the republican army. This does 
not appear to have been entirely the case. In December 1819, in 
any event, Morillo claimed that the soldiers conscripted into the 
republican army after Boyacá were deserting in droves.61
In early  September 1819, Bolivar proposed to Sámano that 
the two arm ies exchange prisoners, and offered to release officers 
captured afte r Boyacá in return for republican troops captured 
during the royalists’ retaking of Portobelo in April 1819. This 
offer was sabotaged by Santander’s execution of the captured 
royalist officers. Neither Morillo, nor, it appears, Sámano, were 
aware of th is for some time, as in late November 1819 Morillo was 
still considering an exchange of prisoners. Morillo told Sámano 
that he was interested in obtaining the release of any officers or 
soldiers w ho had survived “la desgraciada acción de Boyacá”. He 
was clearly in favour of the idea, and pointed out that the viceroy 
of Peru had accepted similar offers on various occasions in the 
p as t.62 As it happened, no exchanges of prisoners of any sort took 
place until the signing of the armistice in 1820.
§ 3 .  S p a i n ’s Inst i tut ional  R esponse
There was at the time little agreem ent about the importance 
of the battle. On one hand, the republican Boletín del Ejército 
L ib e r ta d o r  reported that “no son calculables las ventajas que ha 
conseguido la República con la gloriosa victoria |de Boyacá)”, and 
the profound importance of the battle was not lost on General
61 Pablo M orillo to Miguel dc la Torre. Barquisimcto and Sararc, 13-31 
December 1819, AHNM. Estado, legajo 8717, docs. 281-288.
62 Pablo M orillo to Juan Sámano, Barquisimcto, 20 November 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742.
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M o rillo .63 In October 1819, he described himself as being in “una 
situación la más crítica en que me he visto desde que llegué a este 
co n tin e n te ” .64 He further informed the Ministry o f War that “el 
fatal éxito de esta batalla ha puesto a [la] disposición [del sedicioso 
Bolívar] todo el reino. . . , de donde sacará lo que necesite para 
continuar la guerra en [Venezuela]” .65 Governor Torres likewise 
felt that the battle and subsequent loss of the capital were a 
turning point in the war.66
Other royalist officials were more hopeful. Viceroy Sámano 
expressed apparently genuine confidence that with 3,000 
additional troops the Spanish could end the war once and for all.67 
Miguel de la Torre, more optimistic than Morillo, suggested in late 
October 1819 that the republicans in New Granada were in a very 
weak position, and vulnerable to attack.68 M oreover, Sebastián 
de la Calzada was, as we saw, convinced that Santa Fe could be 
recaptured, as were Bishop Gregorio of Cartagena and several 
o ther officials.69
6 3 Declaration of Manuel Martínez de Aparicio, Santa Fe, 18 August 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 747. See also Santander's comment in December 
18 19: "Morillo está lo que se llama un hombre apurado” (Francisco de Paula 
Santander to Joaquín Paris, Santa Fe, 6 December 1819. BHA, vol. 2 (1904), p. 
7 3 8 .)
64 Pablo Morillo to Juan Sámano, San Carlos, 10 October 1819, AGI, Papeles dc 
Cuba, legajo 742.
65 Pablo Morillo to Minister o f War, Valencia, 12 September 1819; Rodriguez 
Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 49-50 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 260- 
26 7 ).
66 Gabriel dc Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena. 18 October 1819, AGI,
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 296-303).
67 Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).
68 Miguel dc La Torre to Juan Sámano, San Antonio de Cúcuta, 29 October 
1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742
69 Sec, for example, José Maria Ramirez to Juan Manuel Cajigal, Havana, 14 
September 1819, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 1945; and Pamphlets of Bishop 
Gregorio of Cartagena, 18 August 1819, 3 September 1819, AGI, Papeles dc 
Cuba, legajo 743.
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Although royalist opinions differed as to the importance of 
the battle of Boyacá, everyone agreed that it was a defeat, and 
that it probably could have been avoided. Almost immediately 
after the actual battle on 7 August 1819, royalists in New Granada 
began casting about for explanations of the unexpected defeat. In 
no way was the republican victory view ed as evidence of Bolivar’s 
skill. Sámano described the former as “ un enemigo tan importuno 
que ha debido su ventaja a un accidente el más ináudito e 
in esp erad o ” .70 Responsibility was instead felt to lie with the 
Spanish them selves. Patterns of blame were established early; 
already on 8 August 1819, Viceroy Sám ano was implicitly blaming 
the defeat on General Barreiro’s incom petence, and this trend 
became the dom inant one in the follow ing months.71
Both Sámano and Morillo had been unhappy with Barreiro 
for some time prior to Boyacá. On 20 June 1819, Morillo had 
blamed the entire advance of Bolivar and Páez on “ la indolencia y 
apatía del Señor Barreiro” .72 Moreover, Barreiro had not been 
conscientious about sending reports to M orillo; in mid-July 1819, 
Morillo complained that he hadn’t received any news from 
Barreiro in m onths.73 Morillo had, by this stage, decided to 
replace Barreiro with Miguel de La T orre, but, unfortunately for 
the Spanish, by the time La Torre arrived in New Granada,
70 Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena. 26 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).
71 Juan Sámano to Juan Manuel Cajigal, Cartagena, 22 December 1819; and 
Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 8 August 1819; AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 742; Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819,
27 April 1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 720A (the former document may 
also be found in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288); and Díaz Díaz, La 
reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 375.
72 Pablo Morillo to Miguel dc la Torre, Calabozo, 20 June 1819, AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8717, doc. 245.
71 Pablo Morillo to Miguel dc la Torre, Calabozo, 12 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8717, doc. 249.
3 2 8
B arreiro’s army no longer existed.74 Ironically, the republicans 
described Barreiro as one of the “más hábiles del ejército 
ex p ed ic io n ario ” .75
Viceroy Sámano, for his part, a lso  blamed Carlos Tolrá, the 
m ilitary commander of Antioquia, for the loss of much of the 
Neogranadan interior. Tolrá abandoned his province in late 
August 1819, claiming that all Antioquia, with the exception of 
M edellin and Rionegro, supported the republicans, and that the 
royalist had had no realistic chance of defeating them. “Veo todos, 
todos los pueblos de la provincia dispuestos a dar el grito de 
independencia”, he wrote to Sámano on 24 August 1819.76 
M oreover, he pointed out that in February 1819 he had been 
ordered to send all his weapons to Santa Fe, and that he was thus 
com pletely unequipped for resistance, with a mere 86 troops 
under his com m and.77 He was, nonetheless, severely criticised by 
Sám ano, who believed that, had Tolrá remained, the republicans 
would not have gained control of Antioquia. Sámano indeed 
described the withdrawal as having been motivated “sin otro 
m otivo urgente que su sobrecogimiento por noticias vagas o dadas 
por sospechosos” .78
74 Pablo Morillo to Juan Sámano, Calabozo, 12 July 1819, BRAH, Colección 
M orillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 80-83 (also in Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, 
pp. 267-268. and AHNM, Estado 8717); and Juan Sámano to Ministcr o f War, 
Cartagena. 26 Scptcmhcr 1819, AGI. Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La 
Batalla de Hoyacá, pp. 284-288).
75Danicl Florencio O ’Lcary, Memorias, Editorial Santafé, (Bogotá, 1952), vol. 
3. p. 232.
7ft Carlos Tolrá to Juan Sámano. Bamhosa, 24 August 1819, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 745.
77 Carlos Tolrá to Juan Sámano, 15 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 
legajo  745.
78 Juan Sámano lo Pablo Morillo, Cartagena. 16 November 1819, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 742; and Carlos Tolrá to Juan Sámano, Magangué, 18 
Scptcmhcr 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745 (also in La Batalla de 
Boyacá, pp. 158-161).
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Sámano of course had a personal motive for blaming 
Barreiro and Tolrá. He wished to head off criticism  that he had 
behaved unwisely in having fled to Cartagena rather than take 
command of the rem aining royalist troops79. Attacks on Sámano’s 
behaviour came principally from Gabriel de Torres, the governor 
o f Cartagena, who was extremely critical of the viceroy’s rapid 
flight. Disagreements between Torres and Sámano were never 
resolved, and Sám ano’s relationship with the governor 
deteriorated steadily during the succeeding m onths.80
Torres, indeed, had much to say about the defeat at Boyacá, 
and his analysis provides a concise summary of the many errors 
o f the reconquest. An astute observer, he laid the blame 
primarily at the door of the Expeditionary Army. He had already 
warned that the m istreatm ent and excessive contributions 
imposed on the populace by the army would cause the loss of New 
Granada. In October 1819 he again wrote to the king, lamenting 
that his predictions had come true:
¿Pero cómo podía suceder otra cosa? La fuerza moral de los 
pueblos destruida; estos vejados; despojados en el mayor 
desorden de sus frutos, de sus ganados y de cuanto podía 
formar su subsistencia, sin satisfacerles jam ás el importe de 
estas exacciones, y la justicia con su balanza inclinada 
siempre a favor de los que cometían estas vejaciones. . .
Sámano also com plained that he hadn 't been provided with enough 
troops. He claimed that, had he been given additional troops immediately 
afte r the defeat, he could have reconquered the entire viceroyalty. Sec 
Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 27 April 1820, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 720A
79 Juan Sámano to Minister o f  War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).
80 Gabriel dc Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI,
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 296-303). 
Sec also Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Valencia, 29 March 1820,
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 165-172.
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Todas estas causas reunidas podrían producir afecto al 
servicio de V.M., a cuyo nombre se han hecho tantos 
infelices . . .  La fuerza física por otra parte estaba en la 
mayor licencia; destruida la disciplina militar, o a lo menos 
enervada, acostumbrados los soldados a ser m andados por 
jefes de valor si se quiere, pero sin casi otra virtud militar, 
arrancados por la fuerza sin orden, sin un repartim iento 
igual y sin discreción alguna de la agricultura, de las artes y 
del seno de las familias, conducidos siempre a desolar su 
misma patria. ¿Podría esperarse que fuesen jam ás soldados 
subordinados, y que lograsen victorias y honor para las 
Reales armas de V.M.?81
There was, however, one more blow to be struck at Spain’s 
pretensions in New Granada, which even Torres had not been able 
to predict, and which was to deliver the coup de grdce to the 
Spanish regime in the region. This was the 1820 liberal 
revolution in Spain, to which we now turn our attention.
81 Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 Octobcr 1819, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fc, legajo 748.
Chapter 11: The 1820 Revolution in New Granada
1820 was a year of great significance for Spaniards in both 
Spain and the Americas. The year opened with a revolution in 
Andalusia that prevented the despatch of troops to Río de la Plata, 
and moreover plunged Spain into a period of increased political 
strife. Crisis at home was succeeded by crisis in America. The 
year ended with virtually the entirety  of Spain’s American empire 
in ruins; by December 1820, only Peru, a few Caribbean islands, 
and a very reduced portion of New Granada remained in royalist 
hands, and within five years all but Cuba were to become 
independent. This chapter will exam ine the effect of Spain’s 1820 
revolution on the war in New Granada.
§ 1 .  Revolution in Spain
The roots o f the 1820 crisis in Spain itself must be traced to 
the political polarisation that came in the wake of the French 
invasion of 1808. The capture of the Bourbon monarchs, the 
coronation of Joseph Napoleon as king of Spain, and the creation of 
the various Spanish resistance jun tas had led to increasing 
political polarisation among Spaniards, and the rise of par tidos .
The different groupings coalesced around the so-called liberals, 
themselves divided into subfactions, and the absolutists. The 
precise nature of these nascent parties need not detain us here, 
nor are finer dissection into m o d e r a d o s , exa lta d o s , doceañ is ta s ,  
traga lis tas , a fra n c e sa d o s ,  u l tra m o n ta n o s  or serv iles  necessary for
/
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our purposes.1 The division between liberals and absolutists 
gathered momentum during the years of Ferdinand V II’s captivity  
in France, a period of liberal ascendancy.
After Ferdinand’s return, hostility between the king and 
liberals of all stripes simmered ominously until 1820, when an 
open rupture occurred. On New Year’s Day, 1820, an historic 
uprising began in the Andalucian town of Las Cabezas de San Juan. 
On that day Colonel Rafael Riego, the leader of the revolt, 
pronounced in favour o f the Constitution of 1812, and troops 
stationed in Las Cabezas rebelled. Over the next few days Riego 
marched through other towns in Andalucía, and then to Cádiz 
itself, where Colonel Antonio Quiroga attempted an assault on the 
city’s military warehouses. This attack on Cádiz was unsuccessful, 
and initially the revolt aroused little support. The rest of the 
army, however, did nothing to stop the unrest, and in the ensuing 
months pro-constitutional uprisings broke out across Spain. Three 
months later on 7 March 1820 the king was forced to re-convene 
the Cortes and proclaim the Constitution of 1812. On 9 March 
1820, Ferdinand was him self obliged to swear loyalty to the very 
constitution which he had personally overthrown in 1814. These 
events ushered in a three-year period of liberal, constitutional, 
rule in Spain.
The causes of the revolution of 1820 have been much 
discussed. It is clear that dissatisfaction with Ferdinand’s 
governm ent had increased throughout 1819, and various an ti-
Scc Timoihy Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, University o f  N ebraska 
Press, (Lincoln, 1983) p. 115; Iris Zavala, Masones, comuneros y 
carbonarios. Siglo XXI (Madrid, 1971), p. 46; and Joscp Fontana, La crisis del 
antinuo régimen, IftON-ltUJ, Editorial Crítica (Barcelona, 1988), pp. 141-153, 
for more detailed discussions of these various factions.
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governm ent plots had already been hatched.2 Certain features, 
however, distinguish the revolt of 1820 from previous 
conspiracies. In particular, the uprising was supported by the 
troops not out of liberal sentiment, but because o f their profound 
disgust with the arm y. The first troops to rebel were new recruits 
about to be shipped to Buenos Aires to fight the insurgents. They 
joined the revolt to avoid being sent to fight in the unpopular 
colonial war; A ntonio Alcalá Galiano indeed asserted that the 
revolt was entirely due to “the repugnance of the rank and file 
against embarking fo r America” .3 Nonetheless, their participation 
in the revolution was critical to events not only in Spain but also 
in the Americas. The effect of the revolt was expressed 
intemperately by one officer, who complained that “the Spanish 
continent of A m erica, |which was] discovered, conquered and 
civilised at a time when God and the Patria were respected, was 
lost because of (scandalous uprising of the army in Andalusia, 
whose authors] later called themselves patriots” .4 Because of the 
uprising, the 1819 expedition to Río de la Plata never left Spain, 
thereby guaranteeing the independence of Buenos Aires. The
2See José Luis Cornelias Garcia Llera, Los primeros pronunciamientos en 
España, 1814-1820, C onsejo Superior de Investigaciones C ientíficas (Madrid. 
1958); and also Josep Fontana, La crisis del antiguo régimen, pp. 127-140.
3Raymond Carr, Spain 1808- I9S9, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1975) p. 
127; and also Melchor Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América y 
su reflejo en la consciencia española, Instituto de Estudios Políticos (Madrid, 
1954), pp. 97-98. See also Comellas, Los primeros pronunciamientos, pp. 
303-309. The recruits w ere also unhappy with the choice of officers and 
the term s o f recruitm ent. Although liberalism was not the motor driving 
army unrest, liberal sentim ent in the Spanish army had grown during 
Ferdinand’s rule. F rancisco Eguia, minister o f war during much of the 
period, was violently anti-liberal and cashiered many liberals and heroes 
of the resistance. T h is  stimulated anti-governm ent, anti-conservative 
feeling within the officer corps. See E. Christiansen, The Origins of 
Military Power in Spain, 1800-1954. Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1967), 
p. 19.
4 Com cllas, Los primeros pronunciamientos, p. 304.
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royalist enclaves in Peru, New Granada and Venezuela were also 
deprived of essential reinforcem ents.
Equally importantly, the return of the liberals in Spain 
threw the surviving royalist governments in America into turmoil. 
Royalist officials were ju st as influenced by Spanish politics as 
their peninsular cousins, and political division was ju st as virulent 
among royalists in Spanish America as it was in Spain. Indeed, in 
Peru, the political splits within the royalist camp were so great 
that in the evacuation that followed the royalists’ defeat at 
Ayacucho, liberals returning to Spain would not even sit in the 
same section of the ship as absolutists. Constitutionalists and anti­
constitu tionalists rem ained segregated throughout the return 
v o y a g e .5 With the dram atic return of the liberals in Spain, 
political hatreds that had festered since the establishm ent of the 
Cortes burst open. As a consequence viceroys were overthrown in 
Mexico, in Peru, and in New Granada, as royalists in Spanish 
America sank into a mire o f  political infighting.6 We will here 
examine the reception of the restored Constitution in New 
G ranada.
§ 2 .  The Constitution in Cartagena
The first colony to learn of the liberal revolt was Cuba.
News of events in Spain arrived on 15 April 1820, and was 
greeted immediately with great enthusiasm. The Captain General 
of Cuba, José Manuel C ajigal, published the information without
5Juan M archcna Fernández, “ M ilitarism o y liberalism o en el Perú,” Prim er 
Sem inario Intensivo Erasmus de H istoria Latinoam ericana (F lorence), 24 
March 1994.
6 For the overthrow of Viceroys Juan Ruiz dc Apodaca and Joaquín de la 
Pczucla. sec Rebecca Earle, "The Spanish Political Crisis of 1820 and the Loss 
of New Granada," Colonial Latin American Historical Review, (1994).
delay, and on 16 April the entire government o f  Havana swore 
loyalty to the Constitution amidst general rejoicing. By the next 
day the Loteria Real of Havana had changed its name to the 
Loteria Constitutional.7
Despite the appearance of order, this transfer to the 
constitutional system was not accomplished w ithout discord. In 
fact, Captain General Cajigal had been forced to accept the 
Constitution by liberals who threatened to depose him if he did 
not. They intended to replace him with the liberal Francisco 
Montalvo, New Granada’s former viceroy, who was in retirement 
in Cuba.8 The reception of the Constitution in Cuba presaged its 
welcome on the mainland. There too the change of government in 
Spain was used to effect changes in the colonial administration, 
and there too these changes were accom plished through 
intimidation and threat.
It took several months for news of the R iego revolution to 
reach the surviving royalist government of New Granada in 
Cartagena. Rumours had been circulating for som e time about 
political divisions in Spain, and there were fears that the 
metropolis might be enveloped in another civil w ar.9 The first 
reports of the reinstitution of the 1812 C onstitution were, 
however, dism issed as republican propaganda by Cartagena’s
7 Diario Extraordinario Constitutional del Gobierno de la Habana. 17 April 
1820, AGI. Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580. Sec also José María Ramírez to 
Juan Sámano, Havana, 19 April 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580. 
Juan Manuel de Cajigal was the former captain general of Venezuela.
8Pedro Ruiz de Porras to Juan Sámano, Santa Marta, 15 May 1820, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580.
9Thc description o f  events in Cartagena is drawn, w here not otherwise 
indicated, from the Resumen Documentado que m anifiesta  el origen y 
sucesos ocurridos en la Plaza de Cartagena de Indias desde el día 7 de Junio 
hasta el 5 de Julio últimos, con motivo del juram ento de la constitución de la 
Monarquía Española by Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 1 August 1820, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011.
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Governor Gabriel de Torres.10 Then, in early May, Governor 
Torres learned unofficially from sources in Cuba that the king had 
indeed sworn loyalty to the Constitution. Torres, although a 
liberal, did not immediately publicise the news. Although he 
recognised that it would be difficult to prevent word from 
spreading throughout New Granada, he felt inclined to keep quiet, 
at least until further instructions from  Spain arrived. Torres 
wrote to Viceroy Juan Samano to ask for advice. Samano 
im m ediately urged suppression of the news. In fact, the viceroy 
had already learned in April of the revolution in Spain, but had 
not informed Governor Torres, preferring the keep the 
information under his hat as long as possible. He had however 
been no less astonished than the governor, and had sent an envoy 
to Spain to learn m ore.11
Definitive news that Ferdinand had sworn loyalty to the 
Constitution, and of its adoption in Cuba, was brought to Cartagena 
from Havana in early June 1X20. Viceroy Samano deeply opposed
1(1See Gabriel de Torres to Gabriel García Vallecilla, Cartagena, 23 March 
1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
Gabriel de Torres had accompanied General Pablo Morillo to 
Venezuela in 1815 as a brigadier in the Expeditionary Army. He was 
appointed governor of Cartagena in 1816, soon afte r its recapture from the 
insurgents, and remained in this post until the c ity 's  surrender to the 
republicans in 1821. He would have been 39 years old in 1820, and. 
according to General Morillo, was extremely ambitious. He was married to a 
criolla , the daughter of Oidor Juan Jurado. (Sec Pablo Morillo to José María 
Barreiro, Barquisimeto, 20 July 1818, Los ejércitos del Rey, 11118-1819,
Alberto Lee López (editor). Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República 
(Bogotá, 1989), Vol. 1, pp. 25-28; Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española. 
Historia Extensa de Colombia, Ediciones Lcm er (Bogotá, 1964), vol. 1, pp. 
353-354; and Hoja de Servicio de Gabriel de Torres, AGI, papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 2136B.)
^ G a b rie l de Torres to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 10 May 1820, AGI, Audiencia 
de Santa Fe, legajo 580; José María Ramírez to Juan Sámano, Havana, 19 
April 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580; and Report on letter by 
Juan Sámano from 30 May 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580. See 
also the comments about Torres’ reaction in José Manuel Groot, H istoria  
eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada, vol. 4, Editorial M. Rivas (Bogotá,
1893), p. 104.
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Governor Gabriel de T orres.10 Then, in early May, Governor 
Torres learned unofficially from sources in Cuba that the king had 
indeed sworn loyalty to the Constitution. Torres, although a 
liberal, did not immediately publicise the news. Although he 
recognised that it would be difficult to prevent word from 
spreading throughout New Granada, he felt inclined to keep quiet, 
at least until further instructions from Spain arrived. Torres 
wrote to Viceroy Juan Samano to ask for advice. Samano 
immediately urged suppression of the news. In fact, the viceroy 
had already learned in April of the revolution in Spain, but had 
not informed Governor Torres, preferring the keep the 
information under his hat as long as possible. He had however 
been no less astonished than the governor, and had sent an envoy 
to Spain to learn m ore.11
Definitive news that Ferdinand had sworn loyalty to the 
Constitution, and of its adoption in Cuba, was brought to Cartagena 
from Havana in early June 1820. Viceroy Samano deeply opposed
l( ,Sce Gabriel de Torres to Gabriel Garcia Vallecilla, Cartagena, 23 March 
1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
Gabriel de Torres had accompanied General Pablo Morillo to 
Venezuela in 1815 as a brigadier in the Expeditionary Army. He was
appointed governor of Cartagena in 1816, soon after its recapture from the
insurgents, and remained in th is post until the c ity 's  surrender to the 
republicans in 1821. He would have been 39 years old in 1820, and, 
according to General Morillo, was extremely ambitious. He was married to a 
criolla, the daughter o f Oidor Juan Jurado. (Sec Pablo Morillo to José Maria 
Barrciro, Barquisimcto, 20 July 1818, Los ejércitos del Key, 1818-1819,
Alberto Lee López (editor). Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República 
(Bogotá, 1989), Vol. 1, pp. 25-28; Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española. 
Historia Extensa de Colombia, Ediciones Lcmcr (Bogotá, 1964), vol. 1, pp. 
353-354; and Hoja de Servicio de Gabriel de Torres, AGI, papeles de Cuba, 
legajo 21.36B.)
I G ab rie l de Torres to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 10 May 1820, AGI, Audiencia
de Santa Fe, legajo 580; José María Ramírez to Juan Sámano, Havana, 19
April 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580; and Report on letter by 
Juan Sámano from .30 May 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580. Sec 
also the comments about T orres’ reaction in José Manuel Groot, H istoria  
eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada, vol. 4, Editorial M. Rivas (Bogotá.
1893), p. 104.
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to the Constitution, and was still not willing to make the news 
public, so he placed under house arrest a passenger who had 
actually witnessed the oath in Cuba. This measure proved 
completely ineffective, as within days o ther ships arrived with 
news confirming the earlier notices.
The news caused considerable uproar in the city, and 
matters came to a head on 7 June 1820. Around 4.30 in the 
afternoon the members of the Artillery Brigade, under the 
leadership of its commander Ignacio Rom ero, and the Regimiento 
de León, led, not by its commander, but by another officer, 
presented them selves at the Palacio de G obierno to demand the 
immediate promulgation of the 1812 Constitution. The troops 
brought four cannons with them, and some reports state that the 
soldiers were accompanied by “el pueblo” .12 The crowd called for 
Governor Torres, who informed them that, although he supported 
their demand for the restoration of the Constitution, he could take 
no action without the support of the other commanding officers 
and the viceroy. Viceroy Sámano had, however, already made his 
opposition to the Constitution known.
At this juncture, the commander of the Regimiento de León, 
Brigadier Antonio Cano, arrived in the plaza and made public his 
complete opposition to any adoption of the Constitution. This, 
Governor Torres reported, nearly caused an armed confrontation 
between the members oif the Artillery Brigade and C ano’s troops. 
Tension mounted further when C ano’s supporters thought they 
heard voices calling for his imprisonment, and it was only with
l2 José Santa Cruz to José Cienfuegos, Portobclo, 29 June 1820, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 1945.
great effort that Governor Torres succeeded in getting some of the 
troops to return to barracks.
Aware that swift action was necessary, Torres convoked a 
cabildo extraordinario and a jun ta  m ilitar.13 Both meetings agreed 
that Torres should send Samano all the available documentary 
evidence confirming that the king had indeed embraced the 
Constitution, in an effort to convince the viceroy to support the 
new system. It was further agreed to send a deputation to the 
bishop of Cartagena to enlist his support. All of this was done 
imm ediately, and the cabildo decided to remain in session until a 
reply from Samano was received, despite the fact that it was by 
then midnight.
While these groups were meeting, Samano allegedly sent 
agents throughout Cartagena to arrest everyone who had 
dem onstrated in favour of the Constitution that afternoon. Most 
liberals, suspecting something o f this sort would take place, had 
already gone into hiding, but Samano was able to detain two 
officers and an official from the c ity ’s customs house. These 
arrests provided Samano with the confidence to inform Torres at 
3.00am  on the morning of X June that there was no urgent need to 
im plem ent any changes to the governm ent, as Cartagena had 
returned to a state of complete calm, and as he in any event 
needed to study the matter. In fact, Cartagena was far from being 
calm; the troops by this stage no longer remained in even minimal 
subordination; in particular, one company of grenadiers had spent 
the entire night “sobre las arm as” in the Plaza de la Merced, deaf
*3 The cabildo extraordinario was attended by the members o f the cabildo, 
the governor, the asesor general de gnbierno, and the lieutenant governor. 
The ju n ta  militar was attended by m ost senior officers from the garrison, 
and G overnor Torres. Brigadier Antonio Cano did not attend.
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to the orders of Brigadier Cano to return to barracks. The 
townspeople were also reported to be in a state of extreme 
“efervescenc ia” .
Another cabildo extraordinario was held the next day on the 
morning of X June, and the viceroy was again urged to accept the 
new Constitution. Sámano, supported by the Audiencia, 
responded by denouncing the previous cabildo extraordinario as 
unnecessary and illegal, and deprived Torres of the authority to 
convoke any more m eetings without written perm ission from 
Sámano himself.
M eanwhile unrest in Cartagena continued to grow, and 
began to take on an anti-Spanish nature: members of the 
Compañía de Granaderos de León tried to expel all the Spaniards 
from the garrison. Violence was necessary to compel the troops to 
sleep in the barracks on the night of 8 June, but by the morning of 
9 June order could no longer be maintained. Soldiers leaving the 
barracks that morning openly disobeyed their officers and seized 
control of the Baluarte de Santo Domingo, where they were joined 
by more troops, who had overthrown their officers and forced 
open the barracks doors. Both the bishop and Brigadier Cano tried 
to persuade the men to return to barracks, and both were 
“groseram ente desa tend ido” . 14
The members of the Artillery Brigade and the Regimiento de 
León then set off in an orderly fashion toward the Plaza de la 
Inquisición with the intention of proclaiming the Constitution. The 
soldiers also demanded the back-pay owed to them. Members of
14Sec Resumen Documentado . . .  by Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 1 August 
1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011. The Bishop himself makes no 
mention of this in his own report on events. Sec Bishop Gregorio José to 
the Ministry of Grace and Justice, Guanahacoa, 4 October 1820, AGI,
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
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the public, in an attempt to avoid further unrest, began 
distributing money ($20 per soldier), and Viceroy Sámano, on 
learning of the gathering in the P laza de la Inquisición, supplied 
an additional amount. The distribution of cash lasted well into the 
afternoon, but did not succeed in diverting the troops from their 
principal demand of the establishm ent of the Constitution, and 
further messages were sent to Sám ano to this effect.
Viceroy Sámano then made a quite extraordinary decision.
He wrote to Governor Torres that afternoon that; “Hallándome 
gravem ente enferm o, he resuelto transladarm e al pueblo de 
Sabanalarga . . . , dejando encargado el mando político con arreglo 
de las Reales Ordenes que rigen en el asunto, al Señor Oidor 
Decano de la Real Audiencia, y el m ilitar a V.S.” .15 Sámano thus 
chose to resign temporarily. G overnor Torres, invested with this 
new authority, immediately convoked another junta 
extraordinario, which was attended by the m ilitary com m anders, 
and by civil and ecclesiastic authorities. The junta approved the 
adoption of the Constitution, and this resolution was put into 
effect immediately thereafter in front of the assembled troops, 
who greeted the oath with “ las m ayores demonstraciones de 
alegría”. The troops then returned to barracks in an orderly 
fash ion .
The following day (10 June), the adoption of the Constitution 
was formally announced, and orders to  swear loyalty were sent to 
the remaining Spanish officials throughout the province. At
l-^Sce Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 9 June 1820, printed in 
the Resumen Documentado . . .  by Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena. 1 August 
1820, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 1011 and also in AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 890B. Sec also Gabriel dc Torres to Juan Sámano, Cartagena. 10 
June 1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 890B; and Anselmo Bicma y Ma/u to 
Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 12 June 1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 890B.
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11.00am on 10 June, governm ent officials, civil and military, 
gathered in the cathedral to attend a Te Deum. Illuminations and 
public festivities were then held. Viceroy Samano did not attend 
these celebrations. Consequently, on 12 June, various officers 
informed Governor Torres that, in their view, Samano could not 
remain viceroy without him self swearing loyalty to the 
Constitution. After all, the Constitution itself, in Article 374, 
ordained that all officials swear loyalty to it before assuming 
office. A junta de guerra, attended also by some members o f the 
town cabildo, was immediately held to debate this m atter.16 The 
junta sent Samano an ultimatum, informing him that, if he did not 
accept the new Constitution, he would be deprived of authority. 
The following day Samano repeated that he could not accept the 
new Constitution until he received official orders to do so from 
Spain, and offered to leave the country. It was perhaps at this 
point that certain m em bers of the junta suggested that the easiest 
way to solve the problem would be to assassinate Sam ano.17 The 
Bishop of Cartagena tried to dissuade those in favour, pointing out 
that it was against the spirit of the Constitution itself to force 
Samano to “morir o ju rarla” . He was evidently successful, as no 
attempts were made on the viceroy’s life.
Furthermore, the jun ta  did not abandon its attempts to 
compel Samano’s obedience by peaceful means. On 13 June, the 
junta again petitioned Samano to reconsider, but two days later, 
on 15 June, he reiterated that he did not accept the Constitution,
, 6 No member of the Audicncia attended. In particular, the oidor decano 
whom Sdmano appointed to exercise the mando politico on 9 June did not 
attend. Sec both Rcsumen Documcntado . . .  by Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena. 
I August 1820, AGI, Audicncia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011; and the Report on 
the junta, Cartagena. 12 June 1820, AGI, Audicncia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
17Bishop Gregorio Josi to the Ministry o f Grace and Justice, Guanahacoa, 4 
October 1820, AGI, Audicncia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748.
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and could not even contem plate accepting it without consulting 
the opinion of the governors of the other royalist provinces (which 
at this stage consisted of southern-most New Granada and little 
else). Such a consultation would take months. The junta sent a 
final deputation to Samano in a last attempt to obtain his oath of 
lo y a l ty .18 The deputation made it clear to the viceroy that he 
would be removed from office if he did not accept the 
C onstitu tion .
Within half an hour the delegation returned. Samano 
persisted in his refusal to accept the Constitution, and announced 
his intention of resigning, citing his poor health as the motive.
The jun ta  then form ally removed Samano from office (something 
it had no real authority to do). Over the course of the next few 
days Oidor Decano Francisco de Mosquera y Cabrera resigned from 
exercising the mando po litico  that he had been granted by Samano 
on 9 June, and Governor Torres took up political control for the 
province of Cartagena, an action which he claimed was supported 
by article 324 of the Constitution. Torres thus became the de 
facto viceroy.
The initial response of the public in Cartagena to these 
events seems to have been uniformly positive. Torres, at least, 
claim ed that the troops were very pleased by Sam ano’s 
overthrow , especially given his reputation for vengefulness.
(Those who had taken part in the pro-constitutional uprising
*8Thc junta dc guerra also provided Sâmano with original copies of the 
reports front Spain and elsew here, testifying to  the introduction of the 
constitution. The junta was, by this stage, irritated by Sâm ano's 
insinuations that its m embers had acted disloyally in having sworn the 
constitution before the arrival o f official orders to do so. Its members 
pointed out that they had only accepted the constitution because of the 
reliable news that the king himself had done so.
3 4 3
feared they would be victim ised if Sámano regained pow er.19) 
Another officer also reported that immediately follow ing the 
public oath of loyalty to the Constitution on 10 June, large 
numbers of enthusiastic individuals enlisted in the arm y to fight 
the republican Luis Brion in the nearby town of Sabanilla.20 The 
reintroduction of the Constitution to Cartagena also resulted in 
other formal changes; C artagena’s cabildo began calling itself the 
“Ayuntamiento Constitucional” , and referred to Cartagena, not as 
“Cartagena de Indias”, but as “Cartagena de América” .21 There is, 
however, no evidence that the actual machinery of the 
Constitution was put into place. Elections for deputies to the 
Cortes, for example, do not appear to have been held.
No new upheavals occurred for the next week, but then, on 
28 June, a ship arrived from Spain with official orders to swear 
loyalty to the Constitution. Sámano immediately offered to take 
the oath of loyalty, but it was too late. Torres rem inded him that 
he was no longer viceroy.22 During the next few weeks Sámano 
made efforts to organise the anti-constitutional faction in 
Cartagena in order to regain command, but was unsuccessful. On 
5 July 1820, he set sail for Jamaica, leaving Gabriel de Torres in 
command of royalist forces in New Granada.
'^G abriel dc Torres to Ministry o f  Ultramar, Cartagena. 27 July 1820, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 748.
2()José Santa Cruz to José Cienfucgos, Portobelo, 29 June 1820, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 1945. Nonetheless, not enough people signed up, and, on 14 
June 1820, Governor Torres was obliged to issue a proclam ation reminding 
the citizens o f Cartagena that Article 9 of the Constitution obliged them to 
defend the Patria, and urging more to enlist. Sec Proclama de Gabriel dc 
Torres. Cartagena, 14 June 1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 1945.
21 Report by the Cabildo. Cartagena. 31 December 1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 716.
22Gabriel dc Torres to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 29 June 1820, printed in the 
Resumen Documentado . . .  by Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 1 August 1820, 
AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo K ill and also in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa 
Fe, legajo 748,
While this palace coup was occurring in Cartagena, the only 
important Neogranadan city remaining in Spanish hands, sim ilarly 
fraught developm ents were taking place in Venezuela, where the 
royalists were in an equally disheveled state. General M orillo was 
in desperate need of the reinforcem ents he supposed were about 
to depart from Spain. Unaware that these very troops had 
rebelled, M orillo continued to await their arrival until late March 
1820, when he at last learned of Riego’s revolution. News of 
Ferdinand’s adoption of the Constitution did not reach him until 
mid-May 1820. Morillo himself swore loyalty to the Constitution 
in Caracas on 7 June 1820.23 Not all officials were as enthusiastic,
and in Venezuela, as in New Granada, news of the constitutional 
revolution in Spain provoked high-level splits. Francisco Tomás 
Morales, one o f the highest-ranking royalist officers, indeed 
threatened to resign after learning of the réintroduction of the 
C onstitu tion .24 Ramón Correa, the acting captain general of 
Venezuela, at first refused to publish the Constitution in Caracas, 
and it was only after a commission of Caraqueño notables 
prevailed upon Morillo to intervene that the document was 
promulgated. These m anoeuvrings in Caracas were politically 
motivated, as they were elsewhere, although in Caracas the 
conflict seems to have revolved not around a liberal-absolutist 
split, but rather around the adm inistrative effects of 
implementing the Constitution. Members of the Caracas 
Audiencia, who backed the Constitution, hoped it would reduce
2 3 Sce Morillo’s letters to Miguel de la Torre in BRAH, Colección M orillo, Sig. 
9/7664 (legajo 21), fols. 104-157. See also Proclama de Pablo Morillo,
Caracas, 8 June 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568; and Pablo 
Morillo to Antonio López de Mendoza, Valencia, 4 August 1820, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 759B.
24Pablo Morillo to Francisco Tomás Morales, Valencia, 29 April 1820, BRAH, 
signatura 9/7662 (legajo 19), fols. 169-172.
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the authority of the captain general, who would be demoted to  a 
mere jefe  politico. Morillo, for his part, had doubts about the 
wisdom of im plem enting the Constitution in war-torn Venezuela, 
and repeatedly asked to  resign following its promulgation.25
§ 3 .  The  A n t i - C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s
We have seen that the introduction of the Constitution into 
Cartagena revealed a m ajor schism within New Granada’s royalist 
government. This schism  did not heal with the flight of the 
viceroy, for there rem ained in Cartagena many individuals 
opposed to the new liberal regime. Indeed, less than a month 
after the coup. Governor Torres was complaining that “personas 
afectando fidelidad al rey” were putting up offensive anti- 
constitu tional pasqu inades.26 The most important opponents of 
the new regime were two high-ranking officers, the com m ander of 
the Regimiento de León, Brigadier Antonio Cano, and Colonel 
Francisco Warleta. W arleta’s attitude to the Constitution may be 
deduced from his behaviour on learning of its reintroduction:
Luego que supo en le sitio de Barranca donde se hallaba, 
haberse jurado la Constitución, se arrancó las divisas de su 
empleo, quemó los botones en que estaban inscripto el 
nombre del regim iento, abrió y hecho al fuego toda la
2 5 Scc Stephen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820, Ohio State 
University Press (Columbus, 1974), pp. 222-229, and Antonio Rodríguez 
Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, 
Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid, 
1908-1910), vol. 1, p. 481.
An uprising also occurred in Maracaibo. Morillo reported to the 
Ministry of War that a sta te of anarchy reigned in the province following 
the promulgation of the Constitution, and that the governor, Feliciano 
Montenegro, had been deposed. See Pablo Morillo to the Ministry of W ar, 
Caracas, 30 September 1820, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo , vol. 4. pp. 234- 
235.
26 Bando dc Gabriel dc Torres, Cartagena, 3 August 1820, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 717.
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correspondencia en que se trataba de este  asunto, y se 
marchó bajo pretexto de enfermedad al pueblo de Soledad, 
dejando abandonado su encargo.27 
The effect of this high-level opposition was serious. Torres 
reported that “El carácter anti-constitucional del virrey, del 
Brigadier Colonel del regimiento de Leon Don Antonio Cano, y del 
Colonel Don Francisco Warleta pusieron esta plaza en el estado 
más aflictivo” .28 The public breach between the governor and the 
viceroy led to a breakdown in discipline in the army, and a 
general decline in respect for authority. M ariano Sixto, Governor 
Torres’s representative to General Morillo, reported in early 
December 1820 that, “ La guarnición de la plaza de Cartagena . . .  a 
causa del malísimo ejemplo que la dieron el Brigadier don Antonio 
Cano y el Colonel don Francisco Warleta cuando se juró la 
Constitución Política de la Monarquía esta enterem ente 
re la ja d a .”29 The breakdown in control perm itted increasing 
desertion from the royalist army in the m onths after the rift.30 
Moreover, Colonel W arleta’s refusal to accept the constitutional 
regime was directly responsible for the loss o f the town of 
Barranca, which was captured by republicans within days of the
27Gabricl de Torres to the Secretary of State, Cartagena. 10 July 1820, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8725. W arleta left New Granada altogether, going first to 
Jamaica, and thence to Spain. Sec José María Rcstrepo Saenz, Gobernadores 
de Antioquia, 1571-1819, Imprenta Nacional. (Bogotá. 1932), Vol. 1, p. 304. 
Also see Francisco W arleta to Juan Sámano, Barranca, 9 June 1820, AGI, 
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 713B. Colonel Antonio Cano also left his post, 
although the circum stances of his removal arc not clear. See José Santa 
Cruz to José Cicnfucgos, Portobelo, 29 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuna, legajo 
1945.
28Gabricl de Torres to the Secretary of State, Cartagena, 10 July 1820, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8725.
29Mariano Sixto to Pablo Morillo, Valencia, 11 December 1820, AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8725.
30Gabricl dc Torres to Francisco Mosquera y Cabrera, Cartagena. 18 June 
1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742.
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colonel’s decamping. Most importantly, the struggle between the 
viceroy and the governor distracted the royalists from the real 
threat to  the Spanish presence in New Granada: the republican 
army. While Sámano and Torres argued over politics, the 
republicans were preparing to lay siege to Cartagena. Four days 
after the  defeated Sámano left the city, General M ariano Montilla 
began the blockade that resulted in Cartagena’s surrender, as we 
shall see in Chapter 12. During the preceding weeks, Cartagena’s 
royalist government had focused little attention on preparing for 
this siege. Royalist energies had instead centred on the struggle 
between Governor Torres and Viceroy Sámano, and on containing 
the a rm y ’s pro-constitutional agitations.
Parenthetically, it might be noted that Sámano ended up not 
in Jam aica, but in Panama City, where he died the following year. 
Before his death he managed to stir up sufficient hostility to the 
isthm us’ liberals to provoke a riot. Although the city had sworn 
loyalty to  the Constitution on 3 July 1820, the constitutional 
system had not been implemented, and, as elsewhere, the 
Constitution remained more an ideal than an actual legal code. 
Sámano, and his ally, the equally absolutist former governor of 
Santa M arta Pedro Ruiz de Porras, allegedly so encouraged 
opposition to the Constitution that unrest broke out between 
supporters and opponents. Sám ano’s provocative behaviour, 
charged Panama’s captain general, had placed the city “en el 
ultimo estado de desesperación”, and the captain general further 
urged tha t Ruiz de Porras be expelled from the isthmus as an anti- 
constitu tiona l troub lem aker.31
31 Report by the Cabildo of Panama. Panama, 29 July 1X20, AGI. Audiencia de 
Panama, legajo 272; and Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon to Ministry o f  Overseas, 
Panama, 2X August 1X21, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 668. Also sec
/
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The 1820 liberal revolution had several consequences for 
royalists in New Granada. To begin with, the restoration of the 
1812 Constitution was directly responsible for the overthrow of 
Viceroy Sámano. Secondly, Spain’s new liberal regim e resolved to 
open direct talks with the insurgents, the results o f which 
dialogue will be considered in the next chapter. Finally, it remains 
to make one general point. This concerns the broader effect of the 
politicisation of the Spanish bureaucracy. We have already 
mentioned the direct repercussions of the Riego revolution in New 
Granada. In addition, the division within the royalist camp 
greatly discredited the Spanish cause in America. Spanish 
authority, already wounded by the long sequence o f  events in 
Spain starting in 1808, was finally shown to be not only 
enfeebled, but indeed irrelevant to the Americas. O ’Leary put it 
concisely: “el lazo que por muchos años había ligado el pueblo de 
Colombia a la nación española quedó al fin disuelto” .32 This 
remark might indeed be generalised to much of Spanish America. 
The Constitution had questioned the very basis of traditional 
Spanish governm ent, and the fight within the royalist camp over 
its implementation accentuated this. As Timothy Anna has 
pointed out, it was simply not possible to present Spain as a 
unified en tity .33 This situation was clear to the republican 
leadership in New Granada; Simón Bolívar wrote to Governor
Gabriel dc Torres to the Ministry of Overseas, Cadagcna, 27 July 1820, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, Legajo 748. Sámano had insisted on his arrival in 
Panama on being treated as though he were still viceroy, and nominated 
Pedro Ruiz de Porras to succeed him.
32Danicl Florencio O 'Leary, Memorias, Editorial Santafc, (Bogotá, 1952), vol. 
3, p. 299.
33The loss o f credit suffered by the royalist cause, as a result o f the political 
rifts in Spain, has been noted by Timothy Anna, who has argued in several 
works that this increasing loss o f prestige was one of the principal reasons 
for Spain 's loss o f America.
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Torres in August 1820, “Es el colmo de la demencia, y aún más de 
lo ridículo, proponerle a la República de Colombia su sumisión a la 
nación Española. . . ¿Cree Vs que la caduca y corrompida España 
pueda aún regir este mundo moderno?” .34 The inhabitants of 
New Granada could see that while the m yth of imperial unity 
dissolved, the republican forces marched ever closer to victory. It 
was clear the royalists, with or without the  Constitution, had little 
to offer.
However, this was not at all clear to Spain’s new liberal 
government. In Madrid, many officials rem ained convinced that 
the defeat of absolutism and the return of the Constitution of 
1812 provided an ideal format for reconciliation with Spain. Plans 
were immediately form ulated to send peace commissioners to the 
Americas, and for the first time, direct negotiations with the 
insurgent leadership were contem plated. These negotiations, and 
the subsequent surrender of royalist forces in Cartagena, form the 
subject of the next chapter.
34Simón Bolívar to Gabriel de Torres, Turbaco, 28 August 1820, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
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Chapter 12: Armist ice  and Surrender
One of the immediate consequences of the 1820 revolution 
was a renewed commitment on the part of Spain’s government to 
end the American war by diplomatic means. In early April 1820, 
the new  government announced a cease-fire in the overseas 
territories, and prepared to send commissioners to negotiate with 
rebel leaders. The goal of the commissioners was to convince the 
insurgents to accept the Constitution of 1812, as a first step 
tow ards reincorporation into the Spanish empire. Only if the 
insurgents failed to accept the Constitution was the war to 
continue. This decision to negotiate was, as Timothy Anna notes, 
“the first important policy breakthrough since 1814. Yet at its 
core was an idea that was not only not revolutionary but not even 
o r ig in a l.” 1 In 1812, officials in both Spain and the Americas had 
clung to the hope that the promulgation of the Constitution would 
in itse lf end the war, as it was felt that the Constitution corrected 
any errors in the administration of the colonies, and thus 
elim inated the need for independence.2 In the face of 
considerable evidence, the liberals of 1820 again placed their faith 
in the Constitution. “La insurrección de la América calmará 
probablem ente si se generaliza la Constitución,” proclaim ed the
'T im o thy  Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, University o f Nebraska 
Press (Lincoln, 1983), p. 225.
2See Edmundo Heredia, Planes españoles para reconquistar 
Hispanoamérica, 1810/1818, Editorial Universitaria dc Buenos Aires (Buenos 
Aires, 1974) p. 19; and Francisco Montalvo to the Regency, Santa Marta, 27 
June 1X14, Los últimos virreyes de Nueva Granada, Relación de Mando del 
Virrey Don Francisco Montalvo y noticias del Virrey Sámano sobre la 
pérdida del reino (181.1-1819), Eduardo Posada and P.M. Iháñcz (editors). 
B iblio teca dc la Juventud Hispano-Am cricana, Editorial Am érica (Madrid, 
n.d.), pp. 49-54.
liberal new spaper El U niversal.3 Evidently, no lessons had been 
learned from the past. The governm ent’s official line, echoing the 
failed hopes of 1812, was that the insurgents no longer had any 
reason to continue fighting, as the Constitution provided an ideal 
format for reconciliation. This view was advanced publicly by 
Ferdinand in his May 1820 declaration to the Americans, in which 
he announced the readoption of the Constitution.4 In fact, 
Ferdinand was privately convinced the 1820 liberal revolution 
was intended to cause the loss of America, notwithstanding his 
official pronouncem ents to the contrary. He summed up his views 
in a letter to Tsar Alexander I of Russia: “The Constitution formed 
in Cádiz, and the revolution made in Spain, were the work of the 
machinations o f those who desired to separate the Americas from 
the metropolis. Thus it has happened. Now they are lost, and 
only with difficulty can they be recovered” .5
Ferdinand’s private scepticism was shared by many royalist 
officials. General Morillo himself put the matter succinctly:
Es un delirio, a mi entender, persuadirse que esta parte de la 
América quiere unirse a ese hem ísfero, adaptando la 
Constitución Política de la Monarquía Española. . . . Ellos no 
quieren ser españoles; así lo han dicho altamente, desde que 
proclamaron la independencia, así lo han sostenido sin
5Jaimc Delgado, La independencia de América en la prensa española, 
Seminario de Problem as Hispanoamericanos (M adrid, 1949), pp. 264-284. 
esp. 265; and Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 225. Sec also Pablo 
Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Valencia, 19 August 1820, BRAH, Colección 
Morillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 181-183.
4 Declaration of the King to the Americas, Madrid, May, 1820, Spain under 
the Bourbons, 1700-i 833, W. H. Hargrcavcs-M awdsley (editor), University of 
South California Press (Columbia, South Carolina, 1973), p. 251-252. Sec also 
Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 225-7, 243, and Luis Miguel Enciso 
Recio, La opinión pública española y la independencia hispanoamericana, 
1819-1820, Universidad de Valladolid (Valladolid, 1967), pp. 150-151.
5 Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 272.
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desmentir jam ás su opinión en ningún circunstancia ni 
visisitud de la Península, eso repiten ahora sin dejar las 
armas de la mano, lo repiterán siempre, y sea cual fuese 
nuestra conducta, y nuestro gobierno, la absoluta 
independencia o la guerra es el sólo arbitrio que nos dejan a 
escoger.6
Nonetheless, the plans to send peace comm issioners to the 
Americas progressed. Unfortunately fo r Spain, the comm issioners 
proved to be too little, too late.
§ 1 .  The Peace Commiss ion
In April 1820 the Council of State drew up a set of 
instructions for the special com m issioners.7 These stipulated that, 
on arriving in the Americas, the comm issioners were to form 
juntas of reliable royalists to discuss the situation in each region, 
and were to then open negotiations w ith the insurgent leaders.
The commissioners were to offer a cease-fire and an “olvido 
eterno de lo pasado”, and to obtain oaths of loyalty to the
6Pabio Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Valencia, 26 July 1820, AGI, 
Indiferente General, legajo 1568 (also in Antonio Rodriguez Villa, El 
Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués 
,de la Puerta (1778-18.17), vol. 4, Real Academia de Historia (Madrid, 1908), 
pp. 204-209). See also Pablo Morillo to Francisco Tomás Morales, Valencia, 
25 July 1820, BRAH, Colección Morillo, sig. 9/7662 (legajo 19), ff. 220-223; 
Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Valencia, 6 August 1820, Rodriguez Villa, 
Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 214-217; Pablo M orillo to Miguel de la Torre,- 
Valencia, 19 August 1820, BRAH, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 181-183; Gabriel 
dc Torres to the Ministry of Overseas, C anagcna, 22 September 1820, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 1017; Report by Celestino Brugucra. Paris, 12 
July 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1586, and Ramón Ayala to 
Gabriel dc Torres, Turbaco, 23 December 1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 
709.
7Sec the documents related to the selection o f  the commissioners in AGI. 
Indiferente General, legajo 1568. See especially  Instrucciones reservadas 
para los comisionados que van . . .  a procurar la pacificación de los 
provincias disidentes dc ultram ar, |Palace, 15 April 1820], AGI, Indiferente 
General, legajo 1568; and Instrucciones reservadas, 9 June 1820, AGI, 
Indiferente General, legajo 1569.
/
3 5  3
Constitution from insurgent leaders. The com m issioners were 
instructed to then begin negotiations over trade restrictions; Spain 
was prepared to permit trade with other countries, provided 
certain tariff differentials were maintained. This concession, 
which would have been welcomed in 1808, was to be entirely 
ignored during the actual negotiations, and in itself indicates the 
hopelessly slow pace with which Spain’s governm ents assimilated 
new ideas.
The commissioners had been named by early June 1820.
Nine were appointed in total; Brigadier José Sartorio and Captain 
Francisco Espeluis were to go to Venezuela, while Captains Juan 
Barry and Tomás de Urrechea were to go to New Granada.8 
Arrangements for their support were finalised, and a code for 
communicating secret reports was devised. W ithin weeks of being 
named, however, the com m issioners began expressing doubts, and 
several, including Barry and Urrechea, tried to resign.9 Barry and 
Urrechea pointed out that everything they had read about the 
situation in the Americas suggested that the Americans were 
committed to independence, yet their instructions made no 
mention of th is.10 The commissioners were clearly dreading their 
task; the adjective they used most frequently to refer to their 
commission was “espinoso” . Moreover, in a foretaste of events to 
come, prior to departure they were already owed months of back-
8Sclcction of commissioners, Cádiz, 17 May 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, 
legajo 1568.
9Juan Jahat to Minister o f Overseas, Palace, 22 June 1820, AGI, Indiferente 
General, legajo 1568; Ligeros apuntes en el expediente sobre . . . los 
comisionados. . , n.d., AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569; Juan Barry to 
Antonio Porccl, Cádiz, 25 August 1820; AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe. legajo 668.
l0 Juan Barry and Tomás de Urrechea to Antonio Porccl, Cádiz, 13 October 
1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
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salary. They were eventually persuaded to leave Cádiz, and set 
sail on 11 November 1820.
By the time the commissioners arrived in Caracas, events 
had left them behind. Morillo had already opened negotiations 
with Bolivar, and an armistice had been arranged, which will be 
considered in §2. The commissioners nonetheless soldiered on, 
although they still had not been paid.11 The commissioners 
destined to New Granada decided to remain in Venezuela, and 
Barry and Urrechea wrote to Bolivar to explain their presence.12 
No answer was immediately forthcoming. Urrechea meanwhile 
fell ill and returned to Seville.13 Barry, Sartorio and another 
officer were eventually granted an audience with two Colombian 
officials, who politely rejected all of the Spaniards’ proposals.14 
Barry and Sartorio, disillusioned, informed the government that 
their com m ission was entirely pointless, and requested perm ission 
to return to Spain.15
Far from being permitted to return to Spain, the governm ent 
decided to keep the commissioners in the Americas, as part o f a
' 'J o s é  Sartorio to Minister of Overseas, Caracas, 26 April 1821, AGI,
Indiferente General, legajo 1571; Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas,
Caracas, 26 April 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1571; Juan Barry to 
* Minister o f Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 30 May 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, 
legajo 1569; Juan Barry to Minister o f Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 27 June 
1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569; and Juan Barry to M inister of 
Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 19 September 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, 
legajo 668.
l2 Juan Barry and Tomás to Urrechea to Simón Bolívar, Caracas, 25 
December 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
13Tomás de Urrechea to Miguel de la Torre, Caracas, 23 February 1821, 
AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 83; Tomás de Urrechea to Minister of 
Overseas, Seville, 23 June 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668. 
l4 Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 27 July 1821, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
l5 José Sartorio to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 19 November 1821, 
AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569 (also AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 
55, doc. 26); and Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 21 
November 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55, doc. 36.
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new commission established in 1821. (Espelius was perm itted to 
accompany the republican peace commissioners to Spain in 
1 8 2 1 .16) It was admitted that Spain had not been kind to its 
agents. The C ortes acknowledged that the 1820 comm issioners 
had still received no pay, and “ se sostienen en Puerto Cabello con 
la ración de un soldado, sin un real”.17 The Cortes nonetheless 
insisted that the comm issioners had a purpose, and drew up new 
orders for negotiations in 1821, 1822 and 1823. The 
commissioners them selves were not so sure. When, in 1821, 
Sartorio heard a rumour that another large military expedition 
was being organised to reconquer Mexico, under the command of 
the Conde de Abisbal, the disillusioned commissioner suggested,
“ lo mejor será dejar quietos los 11,500 hombres en Cádiz, o donde 
sea, |y) al Conde en Madrid, o donde fuese” .18 Barry and Sartorio 
were kept in the Americas, lamenting their fate and accom plishing 
nothing, until 1824, when the restored Ferdinand cancelled the 
credentials of all “so-called com m issioners” who asserted that 
Spain was about to recognise the independence of America and 
recalled them to Spain.19
lflJuan Barry too M inister of Overseas, Caracas, 17 March 1821, AGI, 
Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55, doc. 14.
l7 Dictamcn de la com isión de Cortes, 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 
1569.
18José Sartorio to Miguel de la Torre, Puerto Cabello, 23 December 1821, 
AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719.
l9 Ordcr of Ferdinand, 26 January 1824, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 
1571; and William Spence Robertson, “The Policy of Spain towards its 
Revolted Colonics, 1820-1823,” HAHR,  vol. 6 (1926), p. 45.
Sec the pathetic letters o f Juan Barry and José Sartorio from 1822- 
1824 in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1571.
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§ 2 .  The Armist ice  of  1820
The peregrinations of the special commissioners might be 
taken as a metaphor for Spain’s futile efforts to restore peace in 
the Viceroyalty of New Granada. They came too late, had too little 
authority, and were unsure about the m erits of their own mission. 
Moreover, they moved at the margins. W hile the commissioners 
were still in Cádiz, serious negotiations were already underway in 
Venezuela. At the same time as the special commission was being 
dreamed up, Ferdinand ordered M orillo to open direct 
negotiations with the insurgents, and, by June 1820, a special 
Junta de Conciliación had been established in Caracas. Morillo, 
responding to Ferd inand’s order, inform ed the republican 
commanders that he was instituting a unilateral cease-fire for the 
period of one m onth.20 He also appointed his own commissioners 
to negotiate with Bolivar and the republican Congress established 
in Guayana. Tomás de Cires and José Domingo Duarte were to 
negotiate with the Congress, while Francisco González de Linares 
and Ramón Correa were named to talk with Bolivar himself.
Miguel de la Torre and Gabriel de Torres also began direct 
negotiations with Bolívar. Morillo was from the start sceptical 
about the likelihood of success, confiding to La Torre his belief 
that the republicans would accept nothing short of full 
in d e p e n d e n c e .2 1
20Thc documents related to this announcement may he found in Rodriguez 
Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 258-268, 275-276. Duplicate documents may 
also he found in AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, docs. 1-7; and additional material 
is contained in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. Some of the acts o f 
the Junta de Conciliación arc located in AHNM, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24. 
The jun ta 's  records reveal that it took a very dim view of Blacks, castas, and 
insurgents in general.
21 Pahlo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Valencia, 27 July 1820, and 19 August 
1820, BRAH. Colección Morillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 278-178, 181-183. 
Sec also Pahlo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Valencia, 26 July 1820, AGI, 
Indiferente G eneral, legajo 1568.
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Preliminary contacts began in July 1820. Approaches were 
made to Simón Bolívar, José Antonio Páez, M ariano Mondila, and 
the Congress of Angostura, in Guayana. In their initial approach, 
the various com m issioners asked that the republicans accept the 
Constitution of 1812, and suggested that an arm istice be arranged 
One prom inent N eogranadan republican did believe that reunion 
with Spain under the constitutional system was possible. The 
great p ro c er  Antonio Nariño allegedly told the Spanish 
ambassador to England that “si por el sólo fuera, en la misma 
tarde en que se hablaba, firmaría la sumisión de su país al rey 
bajo el sistema constitucional”. He added, however, that most 
people in America did not share his views, and that “primero se 
sugetarían los insurgentes al dominio de los m oros, que al de los 
e sp a ñ o le s” .22 Nariño’s prediction of republican uninterest was 
correct. All republican officials in New Granada flatly refused to 
accept the Spanish Constitution of 1812. All further objected that 
the royalists had not even offered to recognise the sovereignty of 
the Republic of Colombia. Bolivar moreover observed that, as 
Colombian forces were poised to recapture all o f Venezuela and 
Quito, an armistice was not to their advantage. The Congress in 
Guayana and José Antonio Páez thus refused to open negotiations 
or even meet the royalist envoys, as the latter had failed to 
acknowledge the independence of Colom bia.23 Bolivar, however,
22Duque de Frias to Evaristo Pérez de Castro, London, 23 September 1820, 
AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
23José Antonio Páez to Francisco Tomás Morales, San Juan de Payana, 13 
July 1820; Fernando de Pcñalvcr to Pablo Morillo, Palace of Soberano 
Congreso, Nueva Guayana, 13 July 1820; Pablo Morillo to  Minister of 
Overseas, Valencia, 26 July 1820; Declaration of José Sánchez de Ron; and 
Pablo Morillo to Minister o f Overseas, Valencia, 8 Septem ber 1820, all in 
AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. See also O ’L eary’s account o f the 
negotiations in Daniel Florencio O ’Leary, Bolivar and the War of 
Independence, University o f  Texas (Austin, 1970), pp. 178-184.
agreed to discuss a cease-fire, and appointed Antonio José Sucre, 
Pedro Briceño Méndez and José Gabriel Pérez to negotiate for the 
r e p u b lic a n s .24
Despite thus expressing an interest in negotiating, Bolivar 
continued to manoeuvre his troops, and in the fall of 1820 
attacked the royalist Third Division at Bailadores.25 The royalists 
were forced to withdraw tow ards Cucuta, and Bolivar gained 
control o f most of M aracaibo and Barinas Provinces. Furthermore, 
Bolivar failed to abide by an arrangement to meet the royalist 
negotiators in San Fernando de Apure. This behaviour enraged 
royalist negotiators, who had journeyed needlessly to San 
Fernando, and also convinced Morillo of the “perfidia de estos 
enemigos de la Nación Española” .26 Negotiations nonetheless 
continued, and by November 1820 discussions about the arm istice 
began in earnest. The negotiators at last met face to face in
24Simón Bolívar to Pablo Morillo, San Cristóbal, 21 September 1820; Pablo 
Morillo to Simón Bolívar, San Carlos, 20 October 1820; Simón Bolívar to Pablo 
Morillo, Trujillo, 26 October 1820; and Poder de Simón Bolívar, Trujillo, 20 
November 1820; all in Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 271-272, 
278-280, 290-291. A helpful summary of the negotiations may be found in 
Manifiesto que de orden de la ju n ta  de conciliación hace don Josef Domingo 
Díaz . . . sobre lo obrado hasta la conclusión de los tratados de armisticio y 
regularización de guerra, Caracas, 24 December 1820, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 668. Many of the documents printed in this m anifiesto and 
jn  Rodriguez Villa arc also in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017, contains Simón Bolivar’s negotiations 
with Gabriel de Torres, July-August 1820. For a printed account o f the 
negotiations, see José Manuel G root, Historia eclesiástica y civil de Nueva 
Granada, vol. 4. Editorial M. Rivas (Bogotá, 1893), pp. 110-126.
B olívar also entered into negotiations with Miguel de la Torre over 
the proposed armistice. Sec the letters exchanged between Miguel de la 
Torre and Simón Bolívar. July 1820- April 1821, AHNM. Estado, legajo 8723, 
docs. 4-24; and in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
25Scc Pablo Morillo to Minister o f  Overseas, Barquisimcto, 31 October 1820, 
AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
26Pahlo M orillo to Minister of Overseas, Barquisimcto, 31 October 1820, AGI, 
Indiferente G eneral, legajo 1568. Bolivar had never intended to keep the 
appointment. In September 1820 he wrote to Santander that “the aim I had 
in view was to draw his attention away to San Fernando while our troops 
operated to the west". Sec Salvador dc Madariaga. Holivar, Hollis and Carter 
(London, 1952), p. 380.
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Trujillo in late Novem ber.27 There was some difficulty in agreeing 
to the length of the proposed armistice, but the real sticking point 
of the negotiations proved to be the dem arcation of boundaries 
between the two forces. Discussions occupied several days of 
intense negotiation. Finally, on 25 November 1820, an accord was 
re a c h e d .28
The accord granted many of the republican demands.
Bolivar was referred to as the president of Colombia, not as the 
president of the Congress in Angostura, which had been the 
preferred (and inaccurate) Spanish form ula.29 The length of the 
armistice was to be six months, not the year proposed by the 
Spanish. The terms for the exchange of prisoners classified spies 
as prisoners of war, contrary to M orillo’s wishes.30 However, a 
compromise was reached on the demarcation of limits. On the 
eastern border a slight variation of the royalist proposal was used, 
while on the western border the republican option was followed. 
Royalist territory thus included Caracas and the surrounding 
region bordered by the Unare, Guanape, Orinoco, Apure and Santo 
Domingo Rivers. At the same time, both sides agreed to a 
régularisation of the war, which stipulated that prisoners were to 
be exchanged, rather than killed, and that the war would be
27 Many documents related to  the negotiations may be found in Rodriguez 
Villa, rabio Morillo, vol. 4, # 870. pp. 292-301, # 872, pp. 302-309. See also 
Francisco González dc Linares to Pablo Morillo, Trujillo, 23 November 1820, 
Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, p. 310.
28Sce Bases para el arm isticio, Trujillo, 25 November 1820, Rodriguez Villa, 
Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 314-319.
2 9 In his private correspondence M orillo had been referring to the 
‘Gobierno dc C olom bia’ for over five months. See, for example, Pablo 
Morillo to  Vicente Sánchez Lima, Valencia, 22 June 1820, BRAH. Colección 
Morillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 5-6.
30Scc Pablo Morillo to M inister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 16 December 
1820, AGI, Indiferente G eneral, legajo 1569.
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conducted “como la hacen los pueblos civilizados”.31 Bolívar 
privately described the arm istice as highly advantageous to the 
republic, and added, somewhat m endaciously, that the treaty 
“ honours us greatly, for we proposed it” .32
Despite the concessions made by Spain, Morillo was 
m oderately pleased with the result, and even expressed the wish 
to meet Bolivar in person. This was arranged, and on 27 
Novem ber 1820 Morillo and Bolivar met in the town of Santa Ana. 
The meeting was an emotional one, and both participants left 
written records. Morillo recorded that
No es posible dar una idea de las diferentes emociones, de la 
sensibilidad, de la franqueza, sinceridad y nobleza con que 
SS.EE. manifestaban de mil maneras la satisfacción de que 
gozaban en aquel momento, en que . . .  se veían por la 
primera vez los que estaban antes destinados a un mutuo 
exterminio, no sólo como hombres, sino como amigos.33
3 1 See the copy o f  the arm istice with the treaty regularising the war, 
printed in the Gaceta de Caracas, no. 19. 6 December 1820, AGI, Indiferente 
General, legajo 1568. Other copies may be found in AHNM, Estado, legajo 
8717, docs 5, 7.
32Simón Bolivar to  Francisco de Paula Santander, Trujillo, 29 November 
1820, Selected Writings of Bolívar, vol. 1, edited by Vicente Lecuna, The 
Colonial Press (New York, 1951), pp. 244-247. See also Francisco Zea to 
•Viscount Castlcrcagh, London, 20 February 1821, Britain and the 
Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830, C.K. W ebster (editor), vol. 1, 
Octagon Books (New York, 1970), pp. 375-376, for the views o f a republican 
agent in Europe. In his com munications with royalist leaders Bolivar 
m aintained that the settlem ent had afforded the republicans no advantage;
sec Simón Bolívar to Miguel de la Torre, Bogotá, 25 January 1821, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8723, doc. 16.
33M orillo 's description of his meeting with Bolivar. Rodrigue/. Villa, Pablo
M orillo, vol. 4, pp. 320-323. Rodriguez Villa’ does not attribute this 
description to M orillo himself, but it is undoubtedly drawn for the 
autobiographical m em oir begun by Morillo and preserved in the B iblioteca
dc la Real Academia de Historia in Madrid. Rodriguez Villa based his study 
of M orillo on docum ents in this library, and the style of this account 
accords entirely with the style of the other autobiographical fragments I
have encountered in the library.
Sec also M orillo 's account of the meeting given in Groot, Historia 
eclesiástica, vol. 4, p. 134.
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Bolívar too was enthusiastic about the meeting. In a letter to 
Santander he described both Morillo and La Torre as likeable and 
honest men, adding that the royalist negotiator Ramón Correa was 
“ without question the best man who treads this earth” . Bolivar 
further recorded that:
. . .  A report is being drawn up of what passed at our 
interview, which is certain to amaze and astonish even our 
friends. From Morillo down, the Spaniards vied with each 
other in the courtesies that they showed up and in their 
protestations of friendship. Their praise for our 
determination and for the valor that has distinguished the 
Colombians, their repeated toasts to the Army of Liberation, 
in short, all the m anifestations of their desire for Colombian 
and Spanish friendship and of deep regret for past tragedies 
resulting from the strong feelings on either side, cost me a 
few tears and inspired in me a warmth of feeling toward 
more than one of them.
There were many courteous and clever toasts, but I 
was most pleased with those of Colonel |Juan | Tello and 
General La Torre. The former drank “to the victories of 
Boyacá, that brought freedom for Colom bia”; and the latter 
“to the Colombians and the Spaniards, who side by side will 
march through Hell itself, if necessary, against despots and 
tyrants” . Morillo, am ong many other exuberant and liberal 
sentiments, toasted “the heroes who died fighting for their 
country and their coun try ’s freedom .” Indeed, it would take 
a volume to record the toasts that were offered, for, as I 
have indicated, each Spaniard contended for the honour of 
eulogising us. We responded to their courtesies in kind.
I
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with full m easure and due m odesty, to their complete 
satisfaction. . . . Since this interview, it no longer seems 
proper to write against these gentlem en in our public prints. 
I have so proposed, and we must com ply.34 
Shortly after this happy event, Morillo returned to Spain, handing 
on the post of comm ander-in-chief of the royalist army to Miguel 
de La Torre. In Spain, Morillo developed an amicable friendship 
with his erstw hile opponents, even describing the republican 
Generals Soublette and O ’Leary as “buenos amigos y camaradas” .35
News of the armistice was greeted with joy in much of 
Venezuela. The royalist governor of M aracaibo, for example, 
reported in early December 1820 that everyone was delighted 
with the settlem ent.36 Disagreements, however, continued to 
arise. A particular source of difficulty concerned the question of 
whether particular cities could change sides. M aracaibo, for 
example, was included in royalist territory under the armistice, 
but in February 1821 a republican uprising occurred in the city. 
The royalists demanded that the city rem ain in Spanish hands, 
and hinted that the republican leadership had fomented the 
unrest. Bolivar, for his part, insisted that the uprising had been 
spontaneous, and m aintained that there was no reason to return
t
the city to the Spanish if its inhabitants had chosen to join 
C o lo m b ia .37 Many residents of the town of Trujillo, which fell on
,4 Simón Bolivar to Francisco dc Paula Santander, Trujillo, 29 November 
1820, in Selected Writings of Bolívar, vol. 1, pp. 244-247.
35Pablo Morillo to Francisco Martinez dc la Rosa, La Coruña, 24 March 1834, 
AGI, Estado, legajo 69, Doc. 60. Morillo further assisted General O 'Leary in 
writing his great biography of Bolivar. See O 'L eary , Bolivar, pp. xvi, 187. 
36Francisco Delgado to Pablo Morillo, Maracaibo, 6 December 1820, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 14.
17Scc Simón Bolivar to Miguel dc la Torre, Cúcuta, 19 February 1821, AHNM. 
Estado, legajo 8723, doc. 18; and also Justo Briceño to Manuel Landa, Santa 
Marta, 22 December 1820, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8723, doc. 38, for similar
/
3 6 3
the republican side of the border, were allegedly heartbroken to 
be consigned to the Republic of Colombia. Antonio Van Halen, a 
royalist officer who was escorted through Trujillo in early 1821, 
reported that during his visit there:
Varios vecinos entre ellos algunos alcaldes, me m anifestaron 
en los pocos momentos en que me dejaba solo el ayudante 
del General Urdaneta que m e acompañaba, el grado de 
vejación en que estaban aquellos pueblos, el efecto del 
despotismo militar que sufrían y los deseos de que nosotros 
volviéramos a ocupar aquel país, libertándoles de aquellos 
picaros (estas eran sus expresiones) y más de una vez con 
exclamaciones y lágrimas me han dicho ¿Será la España tan 
cruel que nos abandonara?38
Bolívar, meanwhile, arranged to send his own com m issioners
(José Revenga and José Echeverría) to Spain, and in early 1821
began discussing his conditions for extending the armistice
beyond the initial six months. Miguel de la Torre, now leading the
royalist forces, rejected Bolivar’s demand that the Spanish
surrender much of the territory granted to them  under the 1820
arm istice, and in April 1821 discussions were suspended.39
Armed confrontations resumed, and, on 14 May 1821, Caracas fell 
0
to the republicans. Then, on 24 June 1821, Bolivar defeated the 
rem aining royalist forces in Venezuela at the second battle of
problem s in New Granada. See also Pablo Morillo to Minister o f War, 
Caracas, 30 September 1820, Rodrigue/. Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp, 234- 
235, for remarks about republican sym pathisers in M aracaibo.
38A ntonio Van-Halcn to Miguel dc la Torre, Caracas, March 1821, enclosed 
in Miguel de la Torre to Minister o f Overseas, Caracas, 22 March 1821, AGI, 
Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55, doc. 19.
39Sec the negotiations between Miguel de la Torre and Simón Bolivar in 
AHNM, Estado, legajo 8723, docs. 23, 24ff; and Actos dc la Junta dc 
Conciliación dc Venezuela, 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24. See also 
Simón Bolívar to Fernando Pcftalvcr, Barinas, 21 April 1821, Selected  
Writings of Bolívar, vol. 1, pp. 262-263.
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Carabobo, virtually elim inating the royalists from the military 
scene in Venezuela. Survivors fled to Puerto Cabello, which held 
out for a further four and a half months.
M eanwhile, Spain attem pted various last-m inute 
bureaucratic reshuffles of colonial officials. To begin with, a new 
viceroy had been named for New Granada. On 9 Septem ber 1820, 
following Sám ano’s resignation, Alejandro Hore, the commander 
general of Panama, had been named viceroy; he never held office, 
however, as he had in fact died two months earlier.40 Juan de la 
Cruz Mourgeon was then appointed to replace him.41 Cruz 
Mourgeon arrived in the m idst of disaster. The entire royalist 
army in Venezuela was by this time reduced to 3,000 men, 
trapped in Puerto Cabello with Miguel de la Torre as a result of 
Bolivar’s victory at Carabobo. Like the peace comm issioners Barry 
and Sartorio, who were also stuck in Puerto Cabello, the new 
viceroy insisted that his presence in the besieged city was entirely 
pointless, and took the first opportunity to retreat to Jamaica, 
from where he tried unsuccessfully to assemble an arm y.42 Then, 
in August 1822, General La Torre surrendered comm and of the 
remaining royalist troops to Francisco Tomás Morales. La Torre 
moved to Puerto Rico to take up the post of captain general of the 
island. Soon after arriving, he wrote a passionate denunciation of 
Morales, whom he condemned as a bloodthirsty tyrant. All chance 
of reconquering Venezuela was destroyed, he asserted, with the
40Ministcr of War to Minister of Overseas, Palace, 9 September 1820, AGI, 
Indiferente General, legajo 1568; and Manuel dc Urriola to Juan Sámano, 
Panama, 9 July 1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 742.
41 Order by Ferdinand, San Lorenzo, 31 October 1820, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, 
legajo 714A.
42Scc Juan dc la Cruz Mourgeon to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 5 
July 1821, AGI. Audiencia dc Caracas, legajo 55; and Juan dc la Cruz 
Mourgeon to Captain General o f Cuba, Kingston, 7 August 1821, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 668.
appointment o f Morales as comm ander in chief.43 Of course, 
there was by this stage little hope of reconquering Venezuela, 
with or w ithout Morales.
§ 3 .  The Surrender  of Cartagena
¿No es cosa bien resalada, 
y que a todos desatina 
ver virgen nuestra M a rin a  
y la plaza bloqueada?
Ella p iensa no hacer nada 
según dem uestra y yo infiero 
pues por poner un guerrero 
para m anegar la armada 
hicieron la gran C agada 
de ponernos un Cordero.
| Manuel Cordero led C artagena’s navy]
La m arina no es culpada 
según lo dice milor 
ni ninguno es com prehendido 
sino es el G obernador
Su señoría no admitió 
haciendo una gran C agada 
para que se este diciendo 
que es cosa bien resalada.44
As the pasquinade suggests, Cartagena was under blockade 
while the arm istice negotiations were going on. Riohacha had 
already surrendered to Luis Brion in March 1820, and throughout 
May, June and July fighting had occurred in the villages 
surrounding Cartagena and in the bay.4!S By 7 July 1820, the last
4 'M iguel dc la Torre to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Rico, 16 September 
1822, AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, legajo 55.
44Sacta, Cartagena, 1820, AGI, Pasquines y Loas, legajo 9 (undcrlinings as in 
the original). Sec also Complaints about Manuel Cordero, Cartagena, 9 June 
1821, AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 7I9B.
4 , For the fall o f  Rfoliaclia, see Mariano M ontilla to Francisco dc Paula 
Santander, Riohacha. 22 March 1820; and other related documents, all in
3 6 6
Spanish outposts in the towns of Santa Rosa, Ternera and Turbaco 
returned to the city, defeated by the insurgents. Then, on 9-10 
July 1820, naval forces, led by Luis Brion, and republican infantry 
under Mariano M ontilla surrounded Cartagena and began a slow 
but effective strangulation of the city.46
Even before the official start of the siege, lack of food had 
obliged Governor Torres to order all ‘bocas inutiles’ to leave the 
c ity .47 The Audiencia chose to leave as well, and its remaining 
members established them selves in Jam aica.48 The city’s 
government was in a continual state of crisis throughout the siege, 
and constant efforts at increasing the city’s supply of food were 
n ecessary .49 Lack of food, poor weather, and exhaustion soon 
reduced the royalist garrison to a mere 630 men fit for active 
service, plus an additional 550-man “ volunteer” militia. The 
remaining 500 members of the garrison were incapacitated by ill 
health. Governor Torres was unable to determine precisely how 
many men the republicans had, as his spies inevitably deserted or 
were captured, but he estim ated that the troops on land
AGI, Papeles Uc Cuba, legajo 745; and also Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, 
Valencia, 29 March 1820, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 165-172. 
Riohacha was temporarily recaptured by the royalists; see Vicente Sánchez 
•L im a to Pablo Morillo, Riohacha, II June 1820, BRAH, Colección Morillo, sig. 
9/7664 (legajo 21), fol. 14.
46Sce First declaration of Gabriel de Torres, Proceso contra Gabriel dc 
Torres, Havana, 2 November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A;
Gabriel dc Torres to Pedro Ruiz de Porras, Cartagena, 8 July 1820, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709; and Francisco W arleta to Juan Sámano,
Barranca, 9 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 713B.
47Scc Bando dc Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 4 July 1820; Bando de Gabriel 
dc Torres, Cartagena, 5 July 1820; and repeated order of 17 April 1821, all in 
AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 717; and various Bandos of Torres from July 
1820 to April 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136C.
48Francisco de Mosquera to M inister o f State, Kingston, 15 August 1820, AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 665.
49Sec, for example, the docum ents about C artagena’s food supply in AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 715; Gabriel dc Torres to  Alejandro Ramirez,
Cartagena, 19 August 1820; and Proclama dc Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 13 
September 1820; both in AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 714.
/ 3 6 7
num bered perhaps 1,700. These numbers increased steadily as 
republican victories elsewhere freed men to join the blockade. 
Torres calculated that, by September 1821, republican forces had 
grown to over 4,000. By this time the total royalist force 
consisted in only 732 troops, many of whom were ill and unfit for 
s e rv ic e .50
Meanwhile, Santa M arta fell to the republicans. It was 
captured by Luis Brion after a simultaneous naval and terrestrial 
attack on 11 November 1820.51 Governor Pedro Ruiz de Porras 
fled, and the surviving royalists regathered in Riohacha, virtually 
the only remaining royalist holdout on the coast, with the 
exception of Cartagena.52
The signing of the armistice in Venezuela, news of which 
reached Cartagena in late 1820, did not much alter the situation. 
Governor Torres had already been engaged in unsatisfying 
negotiations with the besieging insurgents since August 1820.53 
(Torres was extremely unenthusiastic about the discussions, 
informing Morillo that he had entered into negotiations “por pura 
o b e d ie n c ia ” .54) Special republican and royalist comm issioners
• 50F irst declaration of Gabriel dc Torres, Proceso contra Gabriel de Torres, 
Havana. 2 November 1X24, AGI. Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 2136A.
5 'M iguel dc la Torre to M inister of Overseas, Caracas, 21 December 1820,
AGI. Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
52Scc Vicente Sánchez Lima to Miguel José Gómez, Arroyo Cardón, 23 
Novem ber 1820; Vicente Sánchez Lima to Military com m anders in 
Riohacha, Moreno, 26 November 1820; Miguel José Gómez to Vicente 
Sánchez Lima, Arroyo Cardón, 29 November 1820; and Vicente Sánchez Lima 
to Pablo Morillo, Maracaibo, 8 December 1820; all in AGI, Indiferente 
General, legajo 1568. Also sec AHNM, Estado, legajo 8722, docs. 183-191.
5 , Scc negotiations between Gabriel dc Torres and M ariano Montilla, July 
1820, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe. legajo 1017.
54Gabricl dc Torres to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 18 August 1820, and 13 
September 1820; both in AGI, Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 714; Gabriel dc Torres 
to M inister o f Overseas, Cartagena. 22 September 1820, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Santa Fe, legajo 1017; and Gabriel dc Torres to Interim commander of 
Panama, Cartagena. I October 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
were nonetheless sent to Cartagena to explain the details of the 
Bolívar-M orillo armistice. As had been the case in Venezuela, in 
New Granada the major difficulty lay in establishing demarcation 
lines between the two camps. From December 1820, considerable 
effort was devoted to negotiating this point. The Spanish in 
Cartagena were unhappy about surrendering to the republicans 
any of the small amount of territory remaining in their hands, but 
they were not in a strong negotiating position.55 There was little 
royalist negotiator Manuel de Landa could do, aside from  express 
disgust over “ las proposiciones absurdas, ambiciosas y ofensivas a 
la dignidad de la m onarquía” made by the republican negotiator 
Justo Briceño about the dem arcation.56 By February 1821, Landa 
had given up, and Governor Torres resumed the post of royalist 
negotiator, much to his own regret.57 Despite the ongoing 
hostilities, efforts were made by both sides to conduct the war 
within the bounds described by the treaty regularising the war. 
That is, both sides com plained energetically when they felt the
55See discussions about line of demarcation, December 1820, AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8719, docs. 9, 12; AHNM, Estado, legajo 8723, doc. 38; (for January- 
February 1821) AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709; and Gabriel de Torres to 
Miguel de la Torre, Cartagena, 8 February 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
714.
• 56Manuel Landa to Miguel dc la Torre, Sasaria, 20 February 1821, AHNM, 
Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 21. See also the subsequent documents in the same 
legajo, and also Manuel Landa to Miguel dc la Torre, Caracas, 23 March 1821, 
AGI, Audiencia dc Caracas, legajo 55, doc. 20.
Aside from agreeing to the demarcation, both sides had to inform 
their own forces of the suspension of hostilities. In the months following 
the suspension, numerous com plaints were made over the failure of one or 
the other side to  control their forces. (See Miguel Josef Gómez to Pablo 
Morillo, Rfohacha, 29 December 1820, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8722; Gabriel dc 
Torres to Manuel Landa, Cartagena, 4 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 
8725, doc. 14; Miguel dc la Torre to Miguel José Gómez, Caracas, 24, 29 
January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8722, doc. 183; Justo Briceño to Manuel 
Landa. Cartagena, 4 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 38;
Manuel Landa to Justo Briceño, Cartagena, 5 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, 
legajo 8719, doc. 40)
57Gabricl dc Torres to Miguel dc la Torre, Cartagena, 8 February 1821, AGI, 
Papeles dc Cuba, legajo 714.
other was violating the spirit of the accords. Thus, in May 1821, 
General Montilla protested vigorously that in a recent 
proclamation Governor Torres had referred to the republicans as 
“una horda de hombres sin patria, ley, gobierno, ni religion” . Such 
language was entirely opposed to the spirit of the treaty 
regularising the war, M ontilla observed.58 Torres’ response to this 
com plaint merely enraged the republican further, and 
comm unication between the two camps was tem porarily 
su sp en d ed .
Meanwhile, republican military advances continued. By 
May 1821 republican troops controlled all of the bay of 
C a rtag en a .59 In early July 1821 the Castle of Bocachica fell to the 
rep u b lica n s .60 M orale among the royalist troops declined 
alarmingly, and by the end of August 1821 the prospects for 
royalist victory were rem ote.61 Governor Torres proposed a 
month-long suspension of hostilities, supposedly to facilitate 
negotiations. This suggestion was rejected out of hand by the 
republican leadership, who correctly sensed imm inent v ictory .62 
Then, in early Septem ber 1821, Governor Torres began 
negotiating the capitulation of the only important city in New 
. Granada remaining in royalist hands.63 By the end of September,
58Mariano Montilla to Gabriel de Torres, Turhaco, 29 May 1821, and 8 June 
1821; Gabriel de Torres to Mariano Montilla, Cartagena, 23 June 1821; all in 
AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709.
59Gabricl de Torres to Minister of Overseas, Cartagena, 23 May 1821, AG1, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668 (also AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 
1568).
60Surrendcr of the Castillo de Boca Chica, Turbaco, 7 July 1821, AGI, Papeles 
de Cuba, legajo 709.
6 'F irs t declaration o f Gabriel de Torres, Proceso contra Gabriel de Torres, 
Havana, 2 November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A.
62Gabriel de Torres to Luis de Ricux, Cartagena, 29 August 1821; and Luis de 
Ricux to Gabriel de Torres, Turbaco, 31 August 1821, both in AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 717.
63Scc the Proposals for the capitulation in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
the negotiations had been completed, and a generous surrender 
was arranged.64 The town was not to be sacked, an amnesty was 
offered to everyone who wanted to remain in the city, and those 
who did not wish to remain were permitted to leave. Cartagena 
was evacuated by the royalists on 10 October 1821. Over 1,300 
people chose to sail to Havana with the royalist troops.
$ 4 .  Royalist  (Guerrillas in Pasto
Following the surrender to Cartagena, the only region of New 
Granada remaining in royalist hands was the Province of Pasto. 
Pasto thus became the prime target of republican attack after the 
fall of Cartagena. The armistice had not been warmly received in 
the region. In 1821 the Bishop of Popayán had attempted in vain 
to win support for it, and the republican comm issioners charged 
with explaining the armistice had no success in selling its virtues. 
Indeed, the comm isioners had been forced to flee Pasto under 
armed escort following a hostile reception. “En fin, por poco me 
lleva el diablo. Dios quiera sacarme bien de esta com isión,” one 
allegedly exclaim ed as he departed.65 The region thus remained 
entirely anti-republican, and in consequence Bolivar turned his 
attention to it.
0
He first attem pted to win the supposedly influential Bishop 
of Popayán (then in residence in Pasto) to the republican cause, 
but, this at first failing, he prepared to lead a campaign against 
Pasto in person.66 Reports of the imminent arrival of the dreaded
64Thc details of the surrender negotiations are contained in AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, legajo 709.
65Scrgio Elias Ortiz, Ayustín Ayualongo y su tiempo. Editorial ABC (Bogotá, 
1938), p. 389.
66Gcrhard Masur, Simón Bolívar, University of New Mexico Press 
(Albuquerque, 1948), p. 455.
Bolívar sent the city into a flurry of frantic preparations. The 
army began holding exercises and the city organised a reasonable 
military force, under the command of Basilio García. García was 
widely regarded as both cruel and politically inept, but the morale 
of his troops was reportedly excellent.67 In April 1822, at 
Bombona, these southern royalists were attacked by the 
republicans, who enjoyed a phyrric victory. José María Obando 
commented that "ambos combatientes perdieron la batalla: [los 
republicanos] la fuerza, los españoles el campo".68 The popular 
classes of Pasto allegedly regarded the battle as a royalist 
v ic to ry .69 Nonetheless, the royalists were obliged to sue for 
surrender from Bolivar.
While negotiations were underway, the fate of Pasto’s 
royalists was being decided 200 kilometres to the south. On 22 
May 1822, José Antonio de Sucre scored a decisive victory over 
Melchor Aymerich at the Battle of Pichincha, above Quito- The 
royalists, however, controlled the roads, and hence the mail, from 
Quito, and so prevented reports of Sucre's tremendous victory 
from reaching Bolivar.70 Pasto’s commander Garcia was thus able 
to negotiate a surrender considerably more favourable than could 
have been obtained had Bolivar known of the royalists' defeat at 
P ic h in c h a .71 The surrender was, however, viewed with hostility
67Sec, for example, José María Obando, Apuntamientos para la historia. 
Editorial ABC (Bogotá. 1945), vol. 1, p. 25; and Brian Hamnett, "Popular 
Insurrection and Royalist Reaction: Colombian Regions. 1810-1823”, Reform  
and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru, John Fisher, Allan 
Kucthe, and Anthony McFarlanc (editors), Louisiana State Press (Baton 
Rouge, 1990) p. 322.
68Obando, Apuntamientos, vol. 1, p. 53.
69José Rafael Sañudo, Estudios sobre la vida de Bolívar, Bolsilibro Bcdout 
(M edellin, 1980), pp. 225-236.
70Scc Simón Bolívar to  José de San Martín, 22 June 1822, Selected Writings 
of Bolívar, vol. 1, p. 52.
71 Sec Ortiz, Agustín Ayualongo, pp. 438-440.
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by many Pastusos, who were adverse to negotiations, and some of 
whom regarded the purported cause of the surrender, the Battle 
of Bomboná, as a royalist victory. The surrender appears to have 
caused a split in the Pastuso population.72 Indeed, from this point 
on, royalism became a primarily lower-class cause in Pasto. A 
series of royalist guerrillas attempted to rally support for the 
king, but these were invariably suppressed by the g en te  decente  
of Pasto itself.
The most important such uprising began in July 1822, when 
Benito Boves, a would-be imitator of the erstwhile terror of 
Venezuela, attempted to lead a royalist revolt in Pasto. Benito 
Boves (who was in fact a relative of José Tomás) was joined by 
Agustín Agualongo, a low-ranking Indian royalist officer, and 
together they led a lengthy but doomed resistance to 
republicanism. Boves and Agualongo, backed by a few wealthy 
Pastusos, for a time enjoyed considerable success. For several 
months Boves and Agualongo, commanding some 1,000 men 
(mostly royalist soldiers, Indians and labourers), controlled much 
of the province of Los Pastos, collecting weapons in small raids 
and interfering with the republicans' communications.73 In 
December 1822, however. Field Marshall Sucre marched toward 
Pasto, and after suffering an initial defeat in the hands of the 
Pastusos, recaptured the city after a terrible battle. Some 400 
non-combatants (roughly 5% of the city's population) are reported
72See Francisco Zuluaga, José María Obando: de soldado realista a caudillo 
republicano. Biblioteca Banco Popular (Bogotá, 1985), p. 57.
73Sec J.G. Pérez to Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, 17 June 1822, José M. De- 
Micr (editor). Historia de Colombia según sus protagonistas, vol. 1, Colegio 
Máximo de la Américas de Colombia, Libreros Colombianos (Bogotá. 1987), p 
353.; O ’Leary, Bolívar, p. 227; and Sañudo, Estudios sobre Bolívar, p. 247.
to have been killed in the attack, which lasted several days.74 
Following the battle Sucre exiled 1,300 royalists, many of whom 
died while en route to Quito.75
Following the fall of Pasto to the republicans, Boves fled, 
Agualongo went into hiding, and support for the royalists tailed 
off dramatically.76 Agualongo, however, rallied, and led another 
uprising in June 1823.77 Accompanied by some 600 Indian troops 
armed with sticks and machetes, he captured Pasto, prompting 
Bolivar to issue a proclamation announcing; “ ¡Quiteños! La infame 
Pasto ha vuelto a levantar su odiosa cabeza de sedición, pero esta 
cabeza quedará cortada para siempre. . . Esta vez será la última en 
la vida de Pasto; desaparecerá del catálogo de los pueblos si sus 
viles moradores no rinden sus armas a Colombia antes de disparar 
un tiro” .78 Santander, by then president of the Republic of 
Colombia, offered to send a delegation to Pasto to negotiate a 
peaceful return to republicanism. He observed, “ A fin debemos 
triunfar nosotros, porque somos más y tenemos infinitos recursos. 
¿Y qué ganarán ustedes de morir peleando, o . . . huyendo por las 
montañas? . . . ¿Le dará recompensa el Rey de España?”.79 
Santander met with no success in his attempt at negotiation, but 
the royalist rebels were nonetheless expelled from Pasto.
74Sañudo, Estudios sobre bolívar, p. 248; Obando, Apuntamientos, vol. I, pp. 
58-59; and José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, vol. 
4. Editorial Bcdoul (Mcdcllín. 1969), p. 422.
75Sec Masur, Simón Bolívar, p. 500; and H.M. Wood to Georgc Canning, 
Popayán, 30 June 1825, PRO, F.O. 18/21, fols. 86-91. Sec also Obando, 
Apuntamientos, vol. 1, p. 59.
76For details ahout Agualongo. see Ortiz, Agustín Agualongo .
77Scc O ’Lcary, Bolívar, p. 223; and Simón Bolívar to José Antonio Sucre, 21 
June 1823, in Selected Writings of Bolívar, vol. 1, p. 382.
78Ezcquicl Márquez, “ ¡Pasto!", Boletín de Estudios Históricos, vol. 5 (1934), p. 
299.
79Alhcrto Miramón. "Agualongo, el guerrillero indom iblc,” BHA,  vol. 27 
(1940). p. 974.
Agualongo enjoyed a few more victories, and even succeeded in 
reoccupying Pasto for a third time, but in m id-1824 he was 
captured, taken to Popayan, and shot, reportedly crying "¡viva el 
rey!" as he died.80
After Sucre's victory over the royalists at Ayacucho on 8 
December 1824, Spain’s war in South America effectively ended. 
In New Granada, the royalist war effort was reduced entirely to 
bands of Indians and castas  who roamed southern New Granada, 
ambushing groups of republican soldiers and committing acts of 
b a n d it ry .81 In Pasto, in particular, a number of royalist fa c c io s o s  
continued the attempt to drive the republicans out of the 
province. In 1824 there were reportedly over 2,000 such 
guerrilla fighters .82 Many guerrilla bands consisted of little more 
than a handful of men armed with a few rifles, but some of their 
members did have considerable military experience. In 1825, for 
example, a royalist guerrilla from the Patia named Pedro Galindez 
was captured by the republicans.83 Galindez, who was 22, was 
found to have served under five different royalist guerrilla 
leaders, including the famous Agualongo. Few of these
80Scc Ohando, Apuntamientos, vol. 1, pp. 63-73; J.P. Hamilton, Travels  
through the Interior Provinces of Colombia, John Murray (London, 1827), 
vol. 2, p. 58, and Report on Agualongo's execution, AHNC, Secretaría de 
Guerra y M arina, tomo 43, fols. 679-672.
81 Sec Eduardo Pérez, Guerra irregular en la independencia de la Nueva 
Granada y Venezuela, 1810-1830, Publicaciones de la Universidad 
Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia (Tunja, 1982), p. 337; Edgar Bastidas 
Urrcsty, Las guerras de Pasto, Ediciones Testimonio (Pasto, 1979), pp. 102- 
104; and Reports on Bandits. ACC, Independencia J I -15cr, sig. 6099.
82Scc Obando. Apuntamientos, vol. 1, p. 77-81; H.M. Wood to George Canning, 
Popayán, 30 June 1825; 12 August 1825; and 14 September 1825; all in PRO, 
F.O. 18/21, fols. 86-91, 98-100, 101-102, respectively; Report on unrest in 
Pasto. Quito. 21 September 1824; and List of executed royalist cabecillas ; 
both in AHNC, Secretaría dc Guerra y Marina, tomo 47, fols. 153, 155.
83Scc Interrogation of Pedro Galindcz, Septem ber 1825, ACC, Independencia 
Ml-3j, sig. 4202.
d e sa fe c ta d o s , however, achieved anything approaching 
Agualongo’s degree of success. Royalism was acknowledged to be 
a lost cause by all but a minority of Indians and castas. The 
British Consul H.M. Wood commented on this fact, remarking 
that,"[They] who so late as 1822 were zealous supporters of the 
government of Spain, are now seen voluntarily bearing arms in 
support of Colombia, and gratuitously devoting their time to her 
s e rv ic e ”.84 Spain’s view of the war had been stood on its head. It 
was not independence which was supported only by the quixotic, 
the disloyal and the marginalised. It was royalism.
84H.M. Wood to George Canning. Popayán, 12 August 1825, PRO, F.O. 18/21, 
fo ls. 98-100,
C h a p t e r  13: S p a i n  a n d  t h e  L o s s  o f  N e w  G r a n a d a
Spain’s surrender of Cartagena in October 1821 was followed 
by a pro-republican uprising in Panama in November 1821, which 
forced the royalists to withdraw from the Isthmus. Then, in May 
1822, Sucre’s victory at the Battle of Pichincha ended Spanish 
control of southern New Granada. Bolivar and Páez’s defeat of 
royalist forces at Carabobo in June 1821 had already cleared 
Venezuela of a meaningful Spanish presence. Thus the war with 
Spain was effectively over by the end of 1821. The war at home, 
however, continued. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
republicans faced a series of revolts and continued guerrilla 
warfare in various parts of the former viceroyalty, most 
particularly in the south. Annoying guerrilla war was not the only 
problem faced by the new republic. Creating a functional 
alternative to Spanish rule was perhaps the most pressing 
challenge to Colombia’s republican leaders, although this was far 
from being the most important task faced by m ost Colombians.
For the majority, the principal occupations remained what they 
had always been: agricultural pursuits, local commerce and other 
activities of subsistence.
Much thought had already gone into question of constructing 
an independent state. Some members of the viceroyalty’s creole 
elite had perhaps been considering the most appropriate form of 
government for a hypothetically independent New Granada even 
before the outbreak o f  war in 1810, and the experiences of the 
First Republic had provided clear illustrations of the dangers to be
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av o id e d .1 Thus the outlines of Colom bia’s new government 
sketched at the Congress of Angostura in 1819 cannot be called a 
preliminary draft.2 The proposals were, however, extremely 
cursory. The Congress of Angostura proclaimed the unity of 
Venezuela, Colombia, and Quito, and proposed a presidential 
system, with separate vice-presidents governing Colombia and 
Venezuela. Much was left unspecified. In 1821, another 
constitutional congress was held in Cucuta, and it was there that 
the details were filled in. The Constitution of Cucuta confirmed 
the basic form given to the new government at Angostura. A 
centralised government was accepted, although in practice the 
division between the three units of the former colony were not 
eliminated. A number of other alterations were also introduced. 
Most importantly, the Constitution enshrined a law of free birth, 
liberating all slaves born in the future once they had reached a set 
age. Indian resguardos  were also abolished, and various changes 
were made to the fiscal system as well. As the Spanish liberals 
had done in 1812, the delegates in 1821 abolished the Indian 
tribute, although they, like the Spanish, would chose to reinstate it 
when confronted with the fiscal consequences of abolition. No 
attempt was made to eliminate the tobacco monopoly, but the 
a lcaba la  was ended, and the role o f  the church was somewhat 
limited. The man elected to oversee these policies in Colombia
1 See Anthony McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Cam bridge 
University Press (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 283-284, for inform ation on 
colonial advocates of independence.
2Thc remarks which follow on the Congress of Cucuta and Santander's 
government arc drawn from David Bushncll, The Making of Modern 
Colombia: A Nation in Spite of itself. U niversity o f California Press 
(Berkeley, 1993). Further information m ay be found in David Bushncll, The  
Santander Regime in Gran Colombia, Greenwood Press (W estport, 1970).
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was Francisco de Paula Santander, the country’s first vice- 
p res iden t.
Santander was presented with a number of challenges 
during his years in office. Among the more substantial were the 
difficulties that arose in maintaining the unity of Gran Colombia. 
This was in the end to prove impossible. In Venezuela, hostility 
towards Colombia in general, and Santander in particular, led to 
increasing demands for separation from Bogotá, which culminated 
in revolt. When Venezuelan General José Antonio Páez was 
summoned to Bogotá to stand trial for abuse of power, he instead 
rose in rebellion.3 This initial move at separation was quelled, but 
only temporarily. In 1829, Páez again rebelled; by 1830,
Venezuela was a separate country. Meanwhile, in Pasto, local 
caudillo José María Obando began patiently to build up support for 
an insurrection against the dictatorship of Bolivar, which began in 
October 1828.4 This rebellion ended in Obando’s surrender in 
December 1828, but proved to be but the first in a series of 
revolts in the south.
Further complicating matters was the attempt by Juan José 
Flores to separate the old presidency of Quito from Colombia. His 
proposed new state of Ecuador was to include the Provinces of 
Pasto and Popayán as well. The ensuing war was ended in 1831, 
but the question of Colombia’s southern border was far from 
resolved. There were almost immediate complaints that Ecuador
3For material on Páez, sec John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800- 
1850, Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1992), pp. 275-315.
4For information about Ohando, López, and their activities, sec Francisco 
Zuluaga, José María Ohando: de soldado realista a caudillo republicano. 
Biblioteca Banco Popular. (Bogotá. 1985), José Marta Obando, Apuntaminetos 
para la historia. Editorial ABC (Bogotá, 1945); and José Hilario López, 
Memorias, vol. 1, Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, Editorial ABC 
(Bogotá, 1942).
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was not respecting the agreed boundary, and border conflicts with 
Ecuador arose both in the 1840s during the Guerra de los 
Conventos/Supremos, and in 1860, during an uprising engineered 
by Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera.
Colombia, then, faced serious challenges from the moment of 
its birth. Moreover, in many ways life in the Republic of Colombia 
was little different from life in the old viceroyalty. Several 
historians have observed that the net effect of the war of 
independence was extremely limited in Colombia.5 The war did 
not bring any great reordering of society, and it was some decades 
before the economic possibilities of independence were acted 
upon. Yet, while many aspects of Colombian society remained 
unaltered, one fundamental change had occurred: Colombia was no 
longer a Spanish colony. Perhaps, as David Bushnell claims,
Colombia was not yet a nation, but it was undoubtedly not a 
colony of Spain. This change, however, was not at all visible from 
Madrid. Indeed, while Colombia was launching itself into the 
difficult arena of nationhood, a very different process was 
discernible from Spain’s vantage point. Far from acknowledging 
the separation of its former colony, Spain’s governments refused 
even to recognise that Colombia was independent, much less that 
it had a moderately successful government and was not in a state 
of utter anarchy. We began this thesis with an examination of the 
events in Spain which triggered New Granada's War of 
Independence. We will now end by exploring the legacy of the 
war in Spain itself.
5Scc Anthony M cFarlane. "The Transition from Colonialism in Colombia, 
1819-1X75," Latin America: Economic Imperialism and the State,
Christopher Abel and Colin Lewis (editors). Institute o f Latin American 
Studies Monograph f3, Athlonc Press, (London, 1985); and Bushncll, The 
Makinn of Modern Colombia, pp. 48-55.
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No great outcry from the Spanish public greeted the fall of 
royalist New Granada. On the contrary, the wars of independence 
in the Americas had never aroused a great level of interest among 
Spaniards, nor did interest in the former colonies revive 
substantially after their loss. When the final defeat came at the 
battle of Ayacucho in December 1824, the reaction in Spain was 
muted. Contemporary newspapers scarcely mentioned the event.6 
Indeed, the historian Melchor Fernández Almagro has asserted 
that most of his contemporaries would claim Spain lost its colonies 
in 1898 after the war with the United States, not in the 1820s.7 
Overall, he stated, the loss of the Americas made but a faint 
impression on Spanish consciousness. However, while the loss of 
their colonies did not propel Spaniards into deep, collective soul 
searching, there were repercussions in Spain. Newspapers 
continued to insist on the importance of the American question, 
even if they did not recognise the extent to which it had already 
been settled, and a number of participants in the war published 
memoirs of their experiences.8 Moreover, during the 1820s
§ 1 .  S p a i n  a n d  t h e  L o s s  o f  A m e r i c a
6Scc Jaime Delgado, La independencia de América en la prensa española, 
Seminario de Problemas H ispanoam ericanos (Madrid, 1949), pp. 7-12, 315.
7 M elchor Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América y su reflejo en 
la conciencia española. Instituto de Estudios Políticos (Madrid, 1954), pp. 7- 
14. 155-157; and Michael Costcloe, Response to Revolution: Imperial Spain 
and the Spanish American Revolutions, 1810-1840, Cambridge University 
Press (Cambridge, 19X6) pp. 1-3. A small poll conducted by the author 
confirm s Fernández A lm agro 's assertions.
8For information on Spanish periodicals o f the epoch, sec Jaime Delgado, La 
independencia de América en la prensa española. Seminario de Problemas 
Hispanoamericanos (Madrid, 1949). A lberto Gil Novales lists many 
pam phlets and memoires of the period which discuss the American 
question. See Alberto Gil Novalcs, La independencia de América cn la 
conciencia española, 1X20-1X23," Revista de Indias, vol. 39 (1979), pp. 235- 
265.
Spain’s governments were forced to confront the failure they had 
sown in America.
The most immediate reactions to the royalist defeats 
occurred, as might have been expected, within the military itself.
We have seen that there were many officers who believed the 
war in New Granada was unwinnable, but not all were prepared to 
accept the end when it came. The surrender of Cartagena to the 
republican Montilla in 1821, which signalled the effective loss of 
New Granada, became the focus of discontent. The circumstances 
surrounding the surrender had attracted immediate attention, and 
criticism was soon directed at Governor Torres for his handling of 
it. Principally, critics objected that Torres had begun negotiations 
with the republicans prematurely, and that the city had 
surrendered earlier than was necessary. In particular, attention 
was drawn to the fact that, at the time of the surrender, the city’s 
food supplies had been sufficient for two more months. The real 
motive for this criticism, however, lay elsewhere. The surrender 
of Cartagena had been a blow to royalist hopes for New Granada, 
and there were those who could not accept that Spain had lost the 
war. In blaming Governor Torres for the surrender of Cartagena, 
critics were denying that the loss was inevitable. If the surrender 
had been premature or unnecessary, then perhaps royalism was 
not a dead letter in New Granada.
In order to refute these charges of poor leadership, Torres 
himself demanded that the case be tried by court-martial. This 
was agreed, and the trial began in September 1824, some three 
years after C artagena’s surrender.9 The investigations lasted over
9Thc investigation against Torres filled four volumes o f correspondence.
See the Proceso conlra Gabriel dc Torres, AGI, Papcles dc Cuba, legajos 
2136A. 2136B, 2136C, 2I36D.
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two years. On 13 November 1826 a final verdict was at last given. 
The nine members of the tribunal concluded that Torres was 
innocent of wrongdoing. Three judges censured some of Torres’ 
actions, but all save one agreed that the surrender had been 
necessary and correct. As Brigadier Rafael Arze noted, the 
“ninguna esperanza” of surviving the blockade entirely justified 
the evacuation.10 The court-martial had thus been a trial not 
merely of Torres’ behaviour, but also of the viability of royalist 
resistance. The verdict of not guilty was a concession of defeat. 
The trial, however, did not lay to rest the ghosts of a betrayed 
royalist victory. While Torres’ trial was underway, the Spanish 
Council of State considered court-marshalling the officers involved 
in the defeat at Ayacucho.11
Although the Council of State suspected royalist officers, 
especially liberal officers, of selling out to the republicans, many 
officers were themselves unwilling to accept the finality of the 
loss of America. Miguel de la Torre, for example, who had been 
appointed Captain General of Puerto Rico after his resignation as 
commander of the Expeditionary Army in 1822, remained ready 
to launch a reconquest of the mainland throughout most of the 
fifteen years he spent in Puerto Rico. He allegedly believed that 
he and the royalists émigrés who surrounded him would return in 
triumph to V enezuela .12
l0 Scc votes in Proceso contra Gabriel dc Torres, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 
2136B.
11 The planned court-m artial was m otivated by the suspicion that Spanish 
officer had agreed to capitulate before the battle was begun. See Salvador 
dc Madariaga, Rolivar , Hollis and Carter (London, 1952), pp. 487-490;
Costeloe, Response to Revolution, p. 115, and Fernández Almagro, La 
emancipación de América, pp. 132-133, 163-164.
l2 Scc Sebastián G onzález García, “El aniquilamiento del ejército 
expedicionario de Costa Firme (1815-1823)”, Revista de Indias, vol. 22 (1962), 
pp. 137-138.
Miguel de la Torre was far from alone in his belief that the 
Spain would eventually reconquer the Americas. The Spanish 
government itself took many years to admit that the colonies 
were irretrievably lost. While a few deputies to the Cortes 
insisted that Spain face reality, throughout the 1820s the 
government continued to act as though a royalist victory were 
p o ss ib le .13 Indeed, Spain was unwilling to recognise that it had 
already been forced to compromise. Although the armistice 
signed by Morillo and Bolivar in 1820 had referred to the latter as 
the President of Colombia, in 1821 Spain’s government was still 
instructing its commissioners to refer to the republicans only as 
‘dissidents’, and not as de facto heads of state.14 Even the decisive 
republican victory at Ayacucho was referred to in the Gaceta de 
M adrid  as a “revés momentáneo”.15 Part of the difficulty was 
Ferdinand’s profound belief that the majority of Americans really 
wanted to remain Spanish. The king is indeed reported to have 
wept publicly during a reading of an ode affirming the undying 
Spanish heritage of the Americas.16 Ferdinand maintained to his 
dying day that the Americans would themselves demand a 
reunion with Spain, once the republican experiment revealed 
itself to be a failure. This attitude exasperated Spain’s European 
allies. British diplomats in particular complained about Spain’s 
obstinate belief that there was “still great attachment on the part
13For an admission that the colonies were lost, see José Moreno de García, 
Manifiesto a la Nación Española. Cádiz, 16 February 1822, Iris Zavala. 
Masones, Comuneros y Carbonarios, Siglo XXI (Madrid, 1971), pp. 258-259; 
and Luis Miguel Enciso Recio, La opinión pública española y la 
independencia hispanoamericana, 1819-1820, Universidad de Valladolid 
(Valladolid. 1967), pp. 147-149.
l4 Dictamcn de la comisión de Cortes sobre la pacificación de América, 1821, 
AGI, Indiferente G eneral, legajo 1569.
15Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América, pp. 131-132.
16Fcrnándcz Alm agro, La emancipación de América, pp. 148-149.
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of the inhabitants [of Mexico in particular] to the Mother 
C o u n try ” . 17 This mistaken view led the Spanish to contemplate 
every type of scheme to recapture the Americas. Throughout the 
1820s Spain’s governments discussed the launching of military 
expeditions to Venezuela and elsewhere.18 Various other 
unlikely plans were also considered. The idea of installing 
Spanish princes as independent American monarchs was one of 
the more plausible. An official in Buenos Aires suggested that a 
reconquest of that region could be effected by a private 
mercantile company composed of merchants from across Europe, 
while attempts were made to interest the Rothschilds in funding 
an expedition.19 These plots found their last expression in the 
1829 expedition which attempted unsuccessfully to invade 
Mexico, under the command of Isidro Barradas. Although 
Ferdinand continued to believe that the failure of this expedition 
was due to mismanagement, not flawed aims, no further attacks 
on Spain’s former colonies took place. It was not, however, until 
the reign of Ferdinand’s daughter Isabel II that Spain formally 
recognised American independence. The first former colony to be 
recognised was Mexico, whose independence was acknowledged in 
1836. Ecuador was recognised in 1840, and Venezuela in 1845,
17Lional Hcrvcy to Marquis o f Londonderry, Madrid, 27 May 1822, Britain  
and the Independence of Latin America, I8I2-I8J0, C.K. W ebster (editor), 
vol. 1, Octagon Books (New York, 1970), p. 386. Sec also Lional Hervey to 
Marquis of Londonderry, Madrid, 16 December 1821, W ebster, Britain and 
the Independence of Latin America, vol. 1, p. 384; Costcloe, Response to 
Revolution, pp. 100, 220-221; and Timothy Anna, Spain and the Loss of 
America, University o f Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1983), pp. 272-274.
18Scc Report by the Council of State, 6 June 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, 
legajo 55; Report by ambassador to United States, 1821, AGI, Audiencia de 
Caracas, legajo 55; Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 93-99; and 
Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América, pp. 129-157.
19Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 187-818, 97-98; and Anna, Spain and 
the Loss of America, pp. 277-178, 293-294.
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while Colombia had to wait until 1881. The independence of 
Honduras was not acknowledged until 1895.20
It is one thing to lose a colony; it is another thing to grieve 
over its loss. Indeed, during the 1820s it became increasingly 
popular in Spain to claim that the American colonies had in fact 
been a burden to Spain. The debate over the value of the colonies 
had already been in full swing in the eighteenth century, and the 
loss of America proved an additional stimulus.21 The colonies, it 
was alleged, had stifled industry and enterprise in the peninsula. 
They had sapped Spain of its population. Moreover, they had 
diverted the crow n’s attention away from the needs of the 
peninsula itself. “When all was said and done,” one writer 
commented in 1821, “what we received from America was 
venereal disease, yellow fever and the vomit” .22 Even some 
merchants asserted that Spain had little to gain from its 
co lon ies .23 The attractions of this thesis to Spaniards who had just 
lost the majority of their overseas possessions should be obvious.
Not everyone was sanguine about the prospect of losing the 
colonies. Gabriel de Torres commented in 1820 that while the
2,,For inform ation about Spain’s recognition of its form er colonics, see 
Mark Van Akcn, Pan-Hispanism: its Origin and Development to 1866, 
University o f C alifornia Press (Berkeley. 1959); W illiam Spence Robertson, 
"The Recognition of the Spanish Colonies by the M otherland,” HAHR.  vol. I 
(1918), pp. 70-91; and John Tate Lanning. “Great Britain and Spanish 
Recognition of the Hispanic American States,” HAHR,  voi. 10 (1930), pp. 
429-456.
For interesting comments on Spanish attitudes tow ards the former 
colonics during a later period, see Frederick Pike, Hispanismo, 1898-1936, 
University o f Notre Dame Press (Notre Dame, 1971).
21 Sec Costeloc. Response to Revolution, pp. 165-170; and David Brading. The 
First America, the Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State 
1492-1867, Cambridge University Press (1991), p. 506.
22Costcloc, Response to Revolution, p. 167. The quotation is Costcloe’s 
paraphrase. Sec also Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América, pp. 
95-97.
23Scc Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 2-4.
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original discovery of the colonies had perhaps hindered Spain, “en 
el día sería su pérdida un golpe mortal para el comercio, 
agricultura, artes, e industria” .24 Many of Torres’ contemporaries 
seconded this view. The Spanish ambassador to the United States 
put it bluntly: “la pérdida de la América será la destrucción de la 
E spaña” .25 While the ambassador perhaps exaggerated, it is now 
clear that the loss of the Americas was a dreadful blow to Spain’s 
overseas com m erce .26 Spain’s trade with both the former colonies 
and the rest of the world shrank drastically after the war. Josep 
Fontana has shown that, in 1827, Spain’s total foreign trade had 
fallen by some 75% from its level in 1792.27 Certain American 
products, such as dye wood, vanished altogether from Spain’s 
markets, and the American raw materials, such as cotton, needed 
for Spain’s re-export trade ceased to be freely available. The 
effect was especially marked on Spain’s great ports, particularly 
Cádiz. The Spanish ambassador to the United States had in 1821 
predicted that, with the loss of America, Cádiz would be reduced 
to nothingness, and so it nearly was. By 1824, only 20 of the 
city’s 300 ship-owners remained in business, a third o f  the 
merchant companies had gone bankrupt, and the population had 
been reduced by nearly a half. The other towns of Andalusia 
experienced proportional declines, while the fishing industry in
24Gabricl dc Torres to Minister o f  Overseas, Cartagena, 22 September 1820, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
25 Report by Spanish Ambassador to  United States, 1821, AGI, Audiencia dc 
Caracas, legajo 55. See also Costcloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 167-168; 
and Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América, pp. 149-151.
26Thesc rem arks on Spain 's econom y are drawn primarily from  Costeloe, 
Response to Revolution, pp. 150-170.
2 7 1792 was, admittedly, a year o f  unusually high commercial profit, and so 
is perhaps a misleading point for comparison. See John Fisher, Trade, War 
and Revolution: Exports from Spain to Spanish America, 1977-1820, Institute 
of Latin American Studies M onograph 16, (Liverpool, 1992).
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Galicia “ languished for lack of trans-atlantic demand”.28 Despite 
its lesser dependence on American trade, Catalonia, too, suffered 
economically after the war, although losses were perhaps partially 
compensated for by the reinvestment in Spain of capital 
withdrawn from the Americas. Overall, it seems that the 
pessimists, rather than the optimists, were most accurate in their 
predictions for the future of an America-less Spain.
§ 2 .  Displaced Officials
One further consequence of the loss of America was that 
virtually the entire Spanish colonial bureaucracy became 
redundant. During the 1820s large numbers of “cesantes  ”, or 
unemployed officials, returned to Spain from New Granada,
Mexico, Central America, Peru, and elsewhere.29 Displaced 
colonial officials had, in fact, been a problem for Spain since the 
outbreak of the war, and considerable effort had already gone into 
defining the precise rights of individuals who had been forced by 
the war to leave their posts. In New Granada, after the outbreak 
of revolt in 1810, and again after the battle of Boyacá in 1819, a 
large number of royalist officials had been left without any real 
prospect of employment in the near future. These individuals 
poured into Cuba, in particular, where they were, at least in 
theory, entitled to draw part of their salary (the usual amount 
seems to have been 2/3).30 The crown thus saw itself expected to
28For Galicia, see Van Akcn, Pan-Hispanism, pp. 22-23.
29Scc Mark Burkholder and D.S. Chandler, From Impotence to Authority:
The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687-1 SOR, University of 
Missouri Press (Columbia. 1977), p. 144; Costcloe, Response to Revolution, p. 
165; and Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 277, 292-3.
^ ’Council of the Indies to Francisco Montalvo, Madrid, 14 November 1818, 
AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe. legajo 549. Sec also Juan M archcna Fernández.. 
Oficiales y soldados en el Ejército de America, Escuela dc Estudios Hispano- 
Americanos (Seville, 1983), pp. 15-16.
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pay partial salaries to a large number of officials who were not 
engaged in any useful work. The matter was complicated by the 
fact that often the claimant had been imprisoned by the 
republicans, or at least had spent some time in republican- 
controlled territory before arriving in Havana. Most officials 
wanted to be paid back salary for this time, as well as for the time 
spent in Cuba awaiting new employment elsewhere. The Council 
of the Indies eventually decided that people who had actually 
been imprisoned could claim the standard 2/3 salary from the 
time of their imprisonment, but that those who hadn’t been 
incarcerated could claim only from the moment they presented 
themselves to the colonial authorities in “países libres de 
in su r re c c ió n ” .31 Many requests for pensions and back salary were 
nonetheless still dealt with on a case-by-case basis.32
The fact that the crown was supposed to provide for the 
upkeep of displaced employees did not mean that it willingly 
doled out money to all penniless officials. Many unemployed 
minor officials complained of having been left completely 
poverty-stricken and without any means of earning a living. They 
petitioned the government in great numbers, asking to be given 
employment in some more tranquil part of the remaining Spanish 
d o m in io n s .33 A further drain on financial resources arose from 
the claims put foreward by widows of government officials, who
31 Sec Report by Council o f the Indies on a letter of Francisco Montalvo 
front 24 May 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; and 
Representation by Juan Bastus y Faya, 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 
261.
32Scc Report by Council o f the Indies, 16 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de 
Santa Fe, legajo 549.
33Sce, for exam ple, Representation by Pablo dc Alhaida, Vallcdupar, 9 July 
1815, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajo 551; and the many requests in AGI, 
Audiencia dc Santa Fe. legajo 631.
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asked to be granted their husbands’ pensions.34 As the war 
continued, the number of claimants rose steadily, putting ever- 
greater strains on the already limited capacity of the state pension 
fu n d s .35 As compensation for the small size (or non-existence) of 
pensions, Ferdinand ruled on 23 February 1818 that widows of 
royalists killed by the insurgents be awarded a special 
m eda ll ion .36
Even those officials whose jobs or lives were not directly 
threatened by the insurgents responded to the war by trying to 
leave the Americas as quickly as possible. In the early years of 
the war, many asked to be allowed to resign, often citing poor 
health as an excuse.37 Similar outbreaks of mass resignations 
occurred in Cartagena in 1820.38 Others simply never took up 
their posts at all. Juan Collado, for example, had been appointed 
regent of the Audiencia of Santa Fe on 19 July 1810, but he never 
travelled from Spain to New Granada to assume office. In 1820, 
Viceroy Samano wrote to Ferdinand VII to point out that Collado 
still hadn’t arrived. By this time rumours were circulating that he 
was in fact dead, and Samano advised to king to appoint a 
different oidor.39 Similarly, the bishop-elect o f  Popayan, Pedro
34See, for example. Report by Council of the Indies, 26 April 1818, AGI, 
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551; and Juan Ramirez, to  Minister of Grace 
and Justice, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 261.
3 5 By April 1810, before the start of the war. the Monte Pío of Santa Fe 
declared that it was near bankruptcy, and requested an urgent transfer o f 
$2,300 from the crown. See Cabildo of Santa Fe(?) to Minister of Hacienda, 
Santa Fe, 19 April 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
3 6 Decrce of Ferdinand, Madrid, 23 February 1818, AGI, Audiencia dc Santa 
Fe, legajo 580.
3 7 Sec various requests for retirement in AGI, Audiencia dc Santa Fe, legajos 
551, 631.
3 8 See various resignations from 1820 in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 
1017. Also see Margaret Woodward, "The Spanish Army and the Loss of 
America, 1810-1824", HAHR.  Voi 48 (1968), p. 591.
3 9 List of Appointees to Audiencia dc Santa Fc, 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa 
Fe, legajo 747; and Juan Sámano to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 30 May 1820, AGI,
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Alvarez, evidently preferred to continue drawing part of his 
salary in the relative safety of Panama, rather than travel south to 
assume his seat. According to Viceroy Pérez, the bishop-elect, 
después de haberse mantenido largo tiempo en Cartagena 
hace más de un año, se ha establecido pacificamente en 
[Panama], y pasando una vida verdaderamente ociosa, sin 
haberse visto siquiera decir una m isa en la iglesia, ni 
dedicarse a otras funciones de su ministerio, solo se ocupa 
en sostener en su casa una diaria tertulia sin tratar de 
dirigirse a Popayán, ni aún de aproximarse a aquel destino, 
cuando, por las noticias progresivas que han ido llegando, 
debe considerar que aquella su diócesis si ya no está 
pacificada, debe serlo bien prontamente.40 
In response to this sort of behaviour, Ferdinand in 1818 ordered 
that officials who refused to take up their posts would not be 
entitled to draw any salary at all, unless their reasons were 
deemed convincing.41 The king specifically noted that he would 
not accept a refusal to work based on the petitioner’s belief that 
he deserved a better job. Clearly, few officials were attracted by 
the prospect of appointment to a war zone. Although Mark 
Burkholder and D.S. Chandler have suggested that the increased 
number of creoles appointed to serve in the Americas after 1814 
reflects a deliberate policy by Ferdinand, in fact, it merely
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748. For other examples, sec Francisco 
Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice. S an ta  Marta, 22 February 1814, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Bando de Francisco Montalvo to 
the Venezuelans, Santa Marta, 26 August 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, 
legajo 109.
4(1 Benito Pérez to Minister o f Grace and Justice, Panama, 22 March 1813, 
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Report on Bishop Alvarez, Cádiz, 
22 October 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
41 Royal Order of 14 November 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
illustrates the unpopularity of colonial service during the years of 
the war.42 Peninsulars preferred to stay at home.
Thus, by the 1820s, S pa in ’s governments had considerable 
experience with the difficulties posed by displaced officials. Like 
their predecessors, the cesantes of the 1820s expected to be 
provided with employment or pensions, and various efforts were 
made to accommodate them. A decision of 8 June 1822 
established pensions of $1,500 for those who had earned over 
$1,000, and of 2/3 the former salary for those who had earned 
less than this amount.43 Then, in 1824, Ferdinand ruled that 
returning émigrés should be appointed to administrative posts in 
preference to other applicants. A similar decree had already been 
issued in 1817; its repetition suggests that the earlier order had 
not been implemented.44 C esantes  , like all other government 
appointees after the fall of the liberal government in 1823, were 
required to undergo purification before being appointed to vacant 
pos ts .45
An important sub-set of the cesantes consisted of army 
officers with experience in the American wars. They became an 
important political force in Spain, where they were known as 
“ Ayacuchos” . Particularly associated with the ‘liberal’ Baldomero 
Espartero, the Ayacuchos were influential in the various Carlist 
wars and enjoyed the distinction of having a novel written about 
them: Los Ayacuchos, by Pérez Galdós.46 The influence of
4 2 SccBurkholder and Chandler, From Impotence to Authority, pp. 142-143.
4 3 Costcloe, Response to Revolution, p. 251.
4 4 For the 1817 decree, sec Royal O rder of 19 June 1817, AOI, Papcles dc Cuba, 
legajo 742.
4 5 Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 292.
4 6 Raymond Carr, Spain: IS0H-I97S, Clarendon Press (Oxford. 1982), pp. 2 l7n, 
220, 221, 226.
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veterans of the American war on Spanish political life, and the 
impact of émigré royalists returning to Spain has, however, been 
little investigated.
E p i l o g u e
I met a traveler from an antique land,
Who said “Two vast and trunkless legs of stone 
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read.
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things.
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed:
And on the pedestal these word appear:
“ My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings:
Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!”
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay 
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare 
The lone and level sands stretch far away. 
iPercy Bysshe Shelley, O zym andias  )
Spain’s legacy in the Americas was not so faint as that left 
by Ozymandias in the sands of that ancient land. Nonetheless, the 
Spanish experience from 1X08-1824 provides much material for 
philosophising on the fall of kings and empires. Misguided from 
the start, Spain’s policy towards its revolted colonies suffered 
from the same contradictions as the United States’ policy towards 
Central America in the 1970s. A desire to improve relations was
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accompanied by a stubborn unwillingness to countenance change. 
Pushed in (at least) two opposing directions, Spain’s governments 
oscillated between reconquest and reconciliation, never 
committing itself sufficiently to either. Worse, limited by financial 
restraints in Spain itself, and by the unpopularity of the colonial 
war, the metropolis failed to supply its armies with sufficient 
resources, with the inevitable result that the Expeditionary Army 
of Morillo became a burden on and an oppressor of the Americans 
they were sent to ‘pacify’. Alienated even from potential 
supporters, and continually undermined by disease, desertion and 
defeat, the Expeditionary Arm y dwindled away. While the 
fortunes of the royalist army trace out a steady decline from the 
heights of 1816, the history of the royalist administration during 
the war reveals few peaks at any time. Spanish administrators in 
New Granada appear never to have succeeded in restoring the 
colonial economy to its pre-war state. Finally, events in Spain 
itself outpaced the colonial administration. The liberal revolution 
of 1820 threw Spaniards into disarray, and highlighted the 
divisions within the royalist camp. Divided from the beginning, 
Spain’s colony in New Granada collapsed in on itself, a colossal 
w re c k .
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Royal  Off ic ials ,  1810-18221
T he V ic e ro y s
1803 -1810 :
1810 -1812 :
1812 -1816 :
1 8 1 6 -  1817:
1 8 1 7 -  1820:
1 820-c. 1 822:
Antonio Amar y Borbön 
Benito Pérez de Valdemar 
Francisco de Montalvo y Ambulodi 
(captain general)
Francisco de Montalvo y Ambulodi (viceroy) 
Juan Sâmano y Uribarri 
Juan de la Cruz Mourgeön
C o m a n d a n te s
c . 1810-1812: 
c . 1813- c .1815 
c. 18 1 7-c. 1819 
c. 1819-c. 1820
O en e ra  les de P a n a m a 
Juan Antonio de la Mata 
Carlos Meyner (jefe político) 
Alejandro Hore 
José Santa Cruz
Ihe___Apdi énçi a
R egentes: 
c . 1812-1816: 
Oidores: 
1796-1821 : 
1809 -1816 :
1808-c. 1812:
1790-c. 18 16:
1 8 10-c .1813: 
1812:
1 8 14-c. I 822: 
1816:
de S an ta  F e
Joaquín Carrión y Moreno
Anselmo Bierna y Mazo
Juan Jurado de Laynez
Joaquín Carrión y Moreno
Juan Hernández de Alba y Alonso
Manuel García
Tomás de Aréchaga
Francisco Mosquera y Cabrera
Miguel Agustín Novas
'T h is list is compiled from information in the AGI, and from José María 
Restrcpo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, vol. 1, Imprenta 
Nacional (Bogotá, 1932); José María Restrcpo Saenz, Gobernadores y 
próceres de Neiva, Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 63 (Bogotá, 1941); 
José María Restrcpo Sacnz, Biografías de los mandatarios y ministros de la 
real Audiencia (1671-1819), Biblioteca de H istoria Nacional, vol. 84, Editorial 
Cromos, (Bogotá. 1952); Horacio Rodríguez Plata, La antigua provincia del 
Socorro y la independencia. Biblioteca de H istoria Nacional, vol. 98 (Bogotá, 
1963); and Mark Burkholder and D.S. Chandler, From Impotence to 
Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687-1808, 
University of Missouri Press (Columbia, 1977).
The list includes only those officials who actually took office. Thus, 
for example, Alejandro Hore is not listed as a viceroy, for, although he was 
appointed to the post, he died before taking office.
c. is used when the precise dates of office arc not available. It 
indicates that the individual was active during the period given, but may 
have been in office for considerably longer.
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1816-C.1820:  
1 8 1 6-c .  1 820: 
1 819 -c .  1 820: 
c. 1820: 
Fiscales:
1803 -c .  1812: 
c .1813: 
c. 1 820:
1818-c. 1 820:
Gabriel Antonio García de Vallecillos 
Pablo Hilario Chicha y Astudillo 
José Barrio y Valle 
José Miguel del Castillo Fallado
Manuel Martínez Mansilla 
José Váldez Posada 
Agustín de Lopetedi 
Eugenio Miota y Maturana
The__Audiencia.
P re s id e n ts:  
c.181 1 :
181 1 -1817 : 
1 8 1 7 -1 8 1 9 :
1 8 19 -c .  1 820: 
R egentes:
181 1 :
1 8 1 5 -c . l  818:
1819-c .  1 820: 
O idores:
1799-c. 1 810:
1 8 02 -c .  1819:
1 8 1 0 - c . l  813:
181 1 - c .1814:
1 8 1 1 -  1819: 
1810-C.1820:
1 8 14 -c .  1 8 1 8:
1 8 I4 -c .  I 815:
1 8 1 4-c .  1 822: 
c.181 4-c. 1819:
1 8 1 6 - c . 1 820:
1 8 1 8-c. 1 822:
1 8 I8 -c .  I 822: 
Fiscales:
181 1 -c.181 13:
181 2 -  C .I816: 
1814:
c.181 4-c. 1815:
1815-c.l 819:
1 8 I8 -c .  I 822:
1 8 I9 -c .  I 822:
( i o v e r n o r s
A n tio q u ia :  
1 8 0 4 -1 8 1 1 :
de Q u i to
Joachín Molino 
Toribio Montes 
Juan Ramírez de Orosco 
Melchor Aymerich (intérim)
Francisco Cortázar y Labayen 
Francisco Xavier de Esterripa 
Francisco Xavier de Manzanos y Castillo
Baltasar de Miñano y Lascasas 
José Merchante de Contreras 
Tomás de Arechaga 
José Ramón de Ostolaza y Ríos 
Francisco Xavier de Manzanos y Castillo 
Juan Nepomuceno Múñez y Plaza 
Pedro López de Segovia 
Santiago Corbalan
Antonio María Izquierdo de la Torre 
León Pereda de Sarabía 
Juan Bastus y Faya 
Juan López Tormaleo 
Ascencio Manuel Montenegro
José Joaquín Maroto 
José Vásquez de Novoa 
Victor Félix San Miguel 
Francisco Xavier Salvador 
Vicente Rodríguez Romano 
Diego Martín de Villodres 
Eugenio Bastanero Carillo
Francisco de Ayala Gudino
1816:
1816-1818 :
1818:
1818:
1818:
1 8 1 8 -  1819: 
1819:
Cartagena:
1816-1821 :
Chocó:
c. 1810-1819: 
Cuenca: 
c. 1815:
Neiva:
1807 -1810 :
1 8 1 6 -1 8 1 9
1816 -1818 :
1816:
1 8 1 6 -  1817:
1 8 1 7 -  1823: 
Llanos:
c. 1820:
P a n a m a : 
1813 -1814 :  
P o p a yá n : 
c. 1 810-c. 1812: 
c. I 812-c. 1815: 
c. 1816: 
1817 -1818 :  
1817-1819 :  
c. 1820: 
Ríohacha: 
C.I805-C.18 1 1: 
1817 -1820 :  
Santa Fe:
1816:
1816 -1817 :  
Santa Marta: 
c. 1810-c. 1811: 
1812 -1819 :
1 8 1 9 -  1821: 
Socorro: 
1809 -1810 :  
1816:
1816:
1816 -1819 :
Francisco de Paula Warleta 
Vicente Sánchez Lima 
Pantaleón Arango (political)
José Guerrero y Cabero (military)
Miguel Valbuena 
Carlos Tolrá 
Faustino Martínez
Gabriel de Torres y Velasco
Juan Aguirre
Melchor Aymerich
Anastasio Ladrón de Guevara (corregidor) 
Anastasio Ladrón de Guevara (corregidor) 
Carlos Tolrá (military)
Diego Aragonés 
Ruperto Delgado
José Manuel Alvarez (corregidor)
Juan de Salazar
Francisco de Ayala (interim)
Miguel Tacón
Aparicio de Vidaurrázaga
José Solís (political)
Ruperto Delgado (military)
Pedro Domínguez
Francisco Eugenio Tameriz (interim)
José de Medina y Galindo 
José Solís
Antonio María Cansano 
Juan Sámano y Uribarrí
Tomás de Acosta 
Pedro Ruíz de Porras 
Latino Fitz-Gerald
José Valdés Posada (corregidor)
Sebastián de la Calzada 
José Silverio Pérez 
Antonio Fominaya
1819: Lucas González
Veragua:
c. 1810-c. 1818: Juan Domingo de Iturralde
B ishops__ a n d __ A r c h h is h o n s
Archbishop o f  Santa Fe:
c .  1 8 1 0 - 1 8 1 7 : Juan Bautista Sacristán
1 8 1 9 : Isidro Dominguez
Bishop o f Cartagena:
c .  1 8 1  8 - c .  1 8 2 0 : Gregorio José Rodríguez Carrillo
Bishop o f Cuenca
C . 1 8 1 1 - C . 1 8 1 3 : A ndrés
c . 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 1 8 : Josef Igancio Cortázar
Bishop o f Panama:
c . 1 8 1 0 - c .  1 8  1 3  : M anuel
c . 1 8 1 7 : Josef Hygenio
Bishop o f Popayùin:
1 8 1 0 : Pedro Alvarez
c . 1 8 1  1 - c . 1 8 1 3 : Manuel Mariano de Urrutia
c . 1 8 1  6 - c .  1 8 2 2 : Salvador Ximénez Padilla y Enciso
Bishop o f Quito:
c . 1 8 1 8 : José Ysidoro Camacho
c .  1 8 2 0 : Leonardo
Bishop o f Santa Marta:
c.1814-c. 1815: José Eulalio Ziosi
1 8 1 7 : Antonio Gómez Polanco
B i b l i o g r a p h y
A r c h i v e s
Archivo Central del Cauca (Popayán, Colombia)
Independencia: signaturas JI-15cr, MI-3j
Archivo General de Indias (Seville, Spain)
Audiencia de Caracas: legajos 55, 109, 386 
Audiencia de Lima: legajo 1618 
Audiencia de Panama: legajo 262, 265, 272
Audiencia de Quito: legajos 235, 236, 257, 258, 260, 261, 275, 276 
Audiencia de Santa Fe: legajos 549, 551, 579, 580, 629, 631, 632, 
665, 668, 745, 746, 747, 748, 1011, 1017, 1203 
Correos: legajo 72A 
Diversos: legajos 3, 4, 5, 42 
Estado: legajos 53, 57, 64, 69, 72, 88 
Indiferente General: legajos 1568, 1569, 1571 
Mapas y Planos
Papeles de Cuba: legajos 707, 708, 709, 710A, 711, 712, 714, 715, 
716, 717, 718, 719B, 720A, 738, 739, 741A, 741B, 742, 743, 
745, 747, 749, 750, 759A, 759B, 888, 889B, 890A, 890B,
891 A, 897, 1901, 1945, 2136A, 2136B, 2136C, 2136D 
Pasquines y Loas: legajo 9 
Ultramar: legajo 811
Archivo General de Simancas (Simancas, Spain)
Estado: legajos 8223, 8287
Archivo Histórico Nacional de Colombia (Bogotá, Colombia)
Juicios Criminales: tomo 45
Secretaria de Guerra y Marina : tomo 47
Secretaria de Guerra y Marina (Archivo Anexo): tomo 152
Visitas del Cauca: tomo 4
Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid (Madrid, Spain)
Estado (Archivo Torrepando): legajos 8717, 8718, 8719, 8721, 
8722, 8723, 8724, 8725, 8728, 8733, 8739, 8740, 8745
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Biblioteca de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid, Spain)
Colección Morillo: signaturas 9/7648 (legajo 52), 9/7651 (legajo 
8), 9/7658 (legajo 15), 9/7662 (legajo 19), 9/7664 (legajo 
21), 9/7665 (legajo 22), 9/7667 (legajo 24)
British Library (London, England)
Egerton: 1809
Public Record Office (Kew, England)
Foreign Office: 18/21
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